D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley

Peabce, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the appellants in the Circuit .Court, of Baltimore City - to restrain •Charles IT. Stanley, comptroller of the State, from collecting a charge of one cent per bushel upon all oysters unloaded from vessels at the place where oysters are to be no further shipped in vessels, which charge is imposed by section 69'of Article 72 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland as re-enacted by Chapter 413 of 1910. This charge is levied “to help defray the expenses” of the system of inspection provided by that article, of all oysters taken from the waters of the State for sale, and sold by commission merchants or others, and “the other expenses of the State Fishery Force,” upon which the duty of making such inspection is laid by that article.

During the period for which the charges were ³³⁷ made, the collection of which is here sought to be restrained, the appellants have received at their several places of business 494,260 bushels of Maryland oysters, and 243,935 bushels of Virginia and New Jersey oysters. In the case of Foot & Co. v. Wm. B. Clagett, Comptroller of the State, in which the opinion was filed June 23, 1911, and reported in 116 Md. 228 , a similar bill was filed to restrain the collection of a charge of two cents per bushel upon all oysters unloaded from vessels as above stated, and sold by commission merchants or others, which charge was imposed by section 69 of Chapter 735 of 1910. Under that act, one-half of that charge was to help defray the expenses of the same inspection provided for by section 69 of Oh. 413, Acts of 1910, and the other half was to be expended in reshelling, cultivating and improving the natural oyster beds and bars in the waters of the State.

Section 69 of Ch. 413, Acts of 1910, is identical in language with section 69 of Ch. 735, Acts of 1910, except that in the latter the charge was two cents per bushel — only one-half of which was for expense of inspection, and the other half was required to be expended in developing and cultivating the natural oyster 'bars and beds of the'State; while under section 69 of Ch. 413, Acts of 1910, the charge was only 'one cent per bushel, the whole of which was to help defray the ex] tense of inspection, and the other expenses of the State .Fishery Force, through whose agency the inspection is required to be made. Sec. 69 of Ch. 735, Acts of 1910, was set out in full in, the opinion in the former case, and it will be unnecessary, therefore, to set out here section 69 of Ch. 413, Acts of 1910. In the former case, section 69 of Ch. 735,, Acts of 1910, was held void solely upon the ground that in addition to the charge for inspection, it also imposed a further charge for reshelling and improving the oyster bars and beds of the State, thus making the law a revenue measure, and bringing that case within the authority of State v. C. & P. R. R. Co., 40 Md. 22 , in which the act imposing a tonnage tax upon all coal mined in this State and transported to any ³³⁸ place in this State or elsewhere, was held, void as a restriction upon interstate commerce. None of the other grounds upon which the validity of section 69 of Chapter 735 was assailed, were considered in that case, and it is virtually conceded by both parties to this case that as the result of the decision in the former case, Ch. 413, Acts of 1910, was left in force until also declared unconstitutional and void.

Three of the other grounds alleged in the former case against Chapter 735 are renewed here as against Chapter 413, and they are these: , (c) Because it is repugnant to Article 1, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, which vests the Congress of the United States with exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. (6) Because it is repugnant to Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution of the United States which forbids any State to lay any duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; “in that said charge is used for purposes other than the execution of the inspection law of Maryland, and that the .charge therein prescribed is far in excess of what is needed for the execution of the inspection laws of said State.” (c) “Because it is repugnant to Article 15 of the Bill of Eights of the Constitution of the State of Maryland' which provides That every person in the State, or persons holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of pub-lio taxes for the support of the Grovemment according to his actual worth in real or personal property; yet fines, duties or taxes, may properly, or justly be imposed or laid, with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community,’ in that said act imposes a • direct tax upon property, and not upon the owner thereof, and that, quite irrespective of the value of said property, the said tax is not laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community.” ³³⁹ Tbo Circuit Court held the law to be constitutional and valid, and dismissed the bill, and this appeal is from that decree. We shall consider these three objections of the appellants to the constitutionality of this law in the following order, somewhat different from that in which they are stated in the bill: 1. That based upon Art. 1, sec. 10, Constitution of the United States.

It is quite clear, in our opinion, that this section of the Constitution can have no application to this case. There is no allegation in the bill, nor in the agreed statement of facts filed in the case, that these appellants, or any of them, are dealers in oysters brought from any foreign country, or that any of the oysters for the inspection of which the charge is imposed in this case, were brought from any foreign country. On the contrary the only allegation of the bill as to the places from which the oysters in which they deal are brought, is that they are brought “from the oyster beds located within the States of Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey,” respectively, and the agreed statement of facts shows that all the' oysters in respect to which this charge is laid, came from the three States above named, and in the proportions stated in the agreed statement of facts. In Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 , Mr. Justice Mie-ler, critically considered the language of the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the meaning of the correlative terms “impost,” “imports” and “exports,” as used therein, and the history of its formation and adoption, and it was there determined, without dissent from any member of the Court, that no intention existed to prohibit by this clause, the right of one Stale to tax articles brought into it from another, and that therefore the constitutional provision against taxing imports by the States, does not extend to articles brought from another State.

This conclusion was reached, as declared by the Court, without questioning the authority, or departing from the principles, laid down in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 , which case Mr. Justice ³⁴⁰ Millee says was well decided upon another ground there ’taken; namely, that the tax in that case “was.a regulation of commerce, a tax imposed upon the transportation of goods from one State to another over the high seas, in conflict with that freedom of transit of goods and persons between one State and another which is within the rule laid down in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 , and with the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the States.” That case has been approved and followed in later cases, notably in Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Louisana, 156 U. S. 590 , Patapsco Guano Co. v. Boards of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345 , and is now the settled doctine of the Supreme Court. New Mexico v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38 . If the law now before us is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, such repugnancy niust be found in some other clause of the Constitution. It may be observed before passing from the consideration of this clause of the Constitution, that even as to imports from foreign countries, the right of the States to lay such imposts or duties as are absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws, is expressly declared in that clause, thus recognizing by clear implication the right of the States to pass inspection laws as distinguished from revenue measures. 2.

We will now turn to section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States which vests Congress with exclusive power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” and which is the only other clause of that Constitution to which this law is alleged to he repugnant. In Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489 , it was-said that the power to regulate commerce between the States was exclusive “and that any regulation of the subject by the States, except in matters of local concern only, as hereinafter mentioned, is repugnant to such freedom * * * and that the only way in which commerce between the States can be legitimately affected by State laws, is ³⁴¹ when by virtue of its police power and its jurisdiction ever persons and property within its limits, a State provides for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property, or when it does those things which may otherwise incidently affect commerce; such as * * * the passage of inspection laws to secure the due quality and measure of products and ■commodities, etc./’ and that case has been since consistently and unhesitatingly followed in the Supreme Court. Mr. Jcstice Mjxuejk, in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 , declared the police power to be incapable of exact definition or limitation, and “that all persons and property within the State, in the exercise of that power” are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State. Of the perfect right of the Legislature to do this, no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made so far as natural persons are concerned.” The only question therefore upon this branch of the case is whether this law is really an inspection law, or a revenue law in disguise.

In Pittsburg & Southern, Coal Co. v. La., 156 U. S. 590 , an act of that State providing for two guagers of coal and coke boats, and requiring the measurement by them of all coal or coke brought in the State on boats or barges, and fixing a charge of $10 for each boat, and' $5 for each barge, to be paid by the seller, was held not to be a regulation of commerce, “but was properly to be regarded as a part of those innumerable police regulations which every State may enact for the convenience and comfort of its inhabitants in the conduct of their business.” In Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345 , an act of that State imposed a charge of twenty-five cents per ton for inspection of fertilizers, to be paid before delivery to agents, dealers or consumers. ³⁴² Tbe appellant sought to enjoin the collection of this charge on the ground, that the law was in violation of section 8, and also of section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. The appellants contended, as the appellants in the present case contend, that the