Danaher v. Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation

HOLLANDER, J. This appeal is rooted in the discharge of John Richard Danaher, appellant, who was terminated from employment in 1998 by the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR,” the “Department,” or the “Employer”), appellee, after approximately twenty-five years of State service. Following complaints by three DLLR employees, appellant was fired because of “unjustifiably offensive conduct toward fellow employees.” The Employer discharged appellant, with prejudice, about one hour after advising him of the allegations of misconduct. Based on procedures applicable to an at-will, “management service” employee in the Executive Branch of State government, appellant was not afforded a hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). Thereafter, Eugene Conti, Jr., the Secretary of DLLR, denied Danaher’s appeal, on the ground that Danaher failed to identify an illegal or unconstitutional ground with respect to the termination, as required by 17.04.05.01 of the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”).

Appellant subsequently sought review of DLLR’s action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. By order dated November 13, 2000, the circuit court affirmed. From that order, appellant noted this appeal, and presents the following questions for our review: I. Did the Department fail to reclassify appellant as either a skilled or professional service employee after restructuring his job position, thus denying him appropriate administrative review of his termination?

II

Did DLLR violate appellant’s rights by ignoring the legal strictures of Title Eleven of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, requiring the appointing author ¹⁴⁶ ity to investigate, consider mitigation, and meet with the employee within thirty days prior to termination?

III

Did DLLR arbitrarily and capriciously classify this termination as one “with prejudice”, which is reserved for only those proven actions that are so egregious as to not merit employment in any capacity with the State? For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL SUMMARY 1 As noted, Danaher was an employee of the State for twenty-five years. At one time, he served as the Director of Finance of DLLR, a position within the management service of the State Personnel Management System.

According to appellant, his duties changed considerably on January 6, 1998, when he was reassigned to the Accounting Unit as a Fiscal Administrator V. 2 As a result of that reassignment, Danaher claims he no longer had direct responsibility for the oversight and management of personnel or financial resources. Nevertheless, it is clear that, at the time of his discharge, appellant was a management service employee. The Record Extract shows that Danaher and others attended “Sexual Harassment Training” on March 19, 1996, for a total of three hours. Moreover, DLLR has a written, one-page “Sexual Harassment Policy,” which became effective on July 1, 1997.

It states that the Department is “committed to ¹⁴⁷ creating a workplace void of all unlawful discrimination and ... free from harassment or intimidation based upon sex.” The policy lists examples of unacceptable conduct, including suggestive remarks, gestures, or jokes of a sexual nature, and intentional physical behavior. Further, the policy provides that “[sjwift and appropriate disciplinary actions up to and including termination will be taken against any DLLR employee found to have sexually harassed any other DLLR employee.” By memorandum of May 15, 1998, Denise Carroll, an employee in DLLR’s Employee Relations Unit, wrote to Donald Crumble, DLLR’s Director of the Office of Personnel and Training, regarding a “Lewd Statement by Rick Danaher.” According to Ms. Carroll’s memorandum, Sheena Thomas and Andrea, whose last name was not known to Ms. Carroll, were “within the hearing distance ...” 3 when appellant made his offensive remarks on May 15, 1998. Ms. Carroll stated, in part: On the afternoon of Friday, May 15, 1998, .... I went to the fourth floor snack room to make a purchase....

Richard Danaher, started a conversation with me and made a colorful statement. The conversation started out discussing voting preferences and continued like this: As I was paying for my purchase at the coffee mug next to Andrea’s cubicle, Mr. Danaher asked, “Who are you?” I said to him, “Rick, I was in your office for a meeting not too long ago, you don’t remember who I am? If you don’t remember my name, you should remember my face.” Rick said to me, “I am not good with faces; I’m better with butts.” I put up my hand up as if to say stop and said, “Hold it right there. Don’t even go there.” I then told Rick my name and that I worked in Personnel.

Rick asked me, “Where do you work in Personnel?” I said to him, “I work with Sharon Ball.” ¹⁴⁸ Rick put his hand to his head and said, “Oh no! I stay in trouble. Another one of those social service people.” (Italics and underline in original). Ms. Carroll added that the conversation occurred within “hearing distance” of Sheena Thomas and an individual named Andrea, whose last name she did not know.

But, Ms. Carroll was not “sure” if they heard what had been said. In addition, Meriel Newsome, another DLLR employee, sent an undated memo to Sharon Ball, the “Deputy Director/Employer Relations Manager,” regarding “Inappropriate Statements Made by Rick Danaher” on May 15, 1998. She indicated that an employee named Sheena was also present. Ms. Newsome stated, in part: On Friday, May 15, 1998, ...

Sheena [Thomas] ... introduced me to Mr. Rick Danaher.... ... I mentioned [in my conversation with Danaher] that in Canada the sales tax is really high ... however the health care system is totally free. He made the statement “You must be a democrat, you have to be because you are black[.]”... I then stated that I always had very good health care because my parents have good jobs and that I felt that everyone is entitled to good healthcare [sic].

Then Rick made a joke about my having Polish ancestry which I didn’t understand. He explained to me that there was a stereotype about Polish people being hypochondriacs. Rick asked me if I had ever seen a certain television show and I told him “No.” He said to me “You need to stop watching so much B.E.T. (Black Entertainment Television).” I told him that I don’t watch very much television at all....

Sheena then mentioned, to Rick, that I was elected “Miss Coppin” and showed Rick the Ebony Magazine so that he could see my picture. He stated that “I can’t tell which one you are because you all look alike.” Rick then asked me if I had any naked pictures of myself and I told him no. He then made a joke, saying “Do you want to buy some?” Rick also, in my presence, told Sheena that she needs to get married because she is ruining her life since she had two ¹⁴⁹ children and wasn’t married. She told Rick that she her [sic] life was not ruined.

Rick said “Not necessarily because you are not young but the Bible says that people should marry if they are going to have children.” Rick then said most of those girls having babies are very young. I felt that this comment was racially motivated. I got the feeling that Rick wanted me to respond in some way because he made all of these inappropriate statements twice to make sure that I heard him clearly. I didn’t take any of these statements personally because I don’t know Rick very well.

However, I don’t feel the comments he made were in good taste. I felt that his racially stereotypical comments could make someone very angry. I also felt that the question he asked me about ... owning naked pictures was belittling and sexist. In an undated memorandum, Melissa Ellen, Personnel Clerk, reported to Crumble that she witnessed appellant engage in inappropriate touching of Trudy Meads, Danaher’s Administrative Assistant. 4 At the time, Ms. Meads was pregnant.

Ms. Ellen wrote, in part: They [i.e., Trudy Meads and appellant] were about to leave [my cubicle] when Mr. Danaher got behind Trudy (who is about 6 months pregnant) and put his hand underneath her blouse, and I really did not pay any attention to this action until I heard this popping noise which I realized was the elastic of her pants. This was in the middle of the aisle in my office because I have an open cubicle and there was also another person in the office at the time. This was a very open scene. On May 18, 1998, Crumble sent a memorandum to Thomas Crowley, Chief Financial Officer. 5 Crumble said: ¹⁵⁰ In less than one month, Mr. Danaher has managed to offend another female member of my staff.

Ms. Denise Carroll of my Employee Relations Unit was wantonly offended when Mr. Danaher made a verbal statement to her indicating that he “was not good at remembering faces, but good at remembering BUTTS!” Mr. Danaher also makes reference that my Deputy Director is a “Social Worker” and that shows a lack of respect. I feel that we can no longer tolerate this kind of attitude from a senior staff member who evidently has no regard for the feelings of female employees in this Department. I recommend that Mr. Danaher be terminated immediately under the circumstances of the attached memorandum from Ms. Denise Carroll dated May 15, 1998 and the written testimony from Ms. Lisa Allen [sic] dated April 28, 1998. At about 3:00 p.m. on May 19, 1998, Danaher was orally advised about the allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior that had been lodged against him.

By 4:00 p.m. on that date, in a letter from the Secretary of DLLR, appellant was terminated, with prejudice, effective June 3, 1998. Citing § 11 — 104(7)(ii) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (“S.P.P.”) of the Maryland Code (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.), the Secretary stated that the discharge was “due to [appellant’s] unjustifiably offensive conduct toward fellow employees.” Appellant was also advised of his right to appeal under S.P.P. § 11-113. In addition, appellant was provided with an “Unsatisfactory Report of Service,” notifying him that his termination was “with prejudice.” 6 On May 20, 1998, Danaher appealed the termination to the Secretary of DLLR. He also completed a “State Personnel Management System Appeal and Grievance Form” in regard to his appeal, in which he asserted that his termination was ¹⁵¹ “arbitrary, capricious, and has no factual basis.” Appellant added: “Additional issues of fact and law may and will be developed during the course of discovery and hearing on employee’s appeal.” By letter of June 10, 1998, the Secretary upheld the termination.

The Secretary stated, in pertinent part: I have received and reviewed the appeal of your recent termination. Please be advised that your appeal was considered pursuant to State Personnel and Pensions Article, Sections 11-113 and 11-305, which states, in part: “An appeal ... may only be based on the grounds that the disciplinary action is illegal or unconstitutional.” The appeal submitted on your behalf did not specify a legal nor constitutional basis on which it could have been considered, as required by COMAR 17.04.05.01[F]. Based upon my review of this matter, I have decided to uphold the disciplinary termination. Pursuant to Title 11 — 113(b)(3), this decision is the final administrative decision.

The Record Elxtract contains a transcript of a recorded statement provided by Trudy Meads on June 10, 1998, which is the same date on which the Secretary upheld appellant’s termination. Ms. Meads, who was appellant’s assistant, stated that she had known appellant since March 1989. She characterized their relationship as “professional” and “enjoyable.” Moreover, Ms. Meads insisted that appellant had never made any offensive racial or sexual remarks to her, nor had anyone ever complained to her about such conduct. Significantly, she characterized as “false” the allegations in which Danaher was accused of putting his hand under her clothes.

When asked whether there was any truth to the allegations, Ms. Meads responded: “None whatsoever.” Nor was she aware of any such conduct involving Danaher and someone else. Rather, Ms. Meads attributed the incident to “playful banter” that is accepted in the workplace, and which continued after Danaher had been fired. ¹⁵² Ms. Meads also recounted that she had filed a grievance to dispute the allegations that Danaher touched her. Although she had approached Crumble about the matter, she recalled that Crumble declined to discuss it, saying it was “confidential.” Ms. Meads added that Danaher is “one in a million,” and completely “fair, no matter who you are.... ” Moreover, she maintained that she had never known him to discriminate based on race or gender. On July 9, 1998, appellant sought review of the agency’s decision in the circuit court.

In September 1998, appellant filed a “MOTION TO ORDER THE [DLLR] TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND TO STAY THE TIME FOR FILING A RULE 7-207 MEMORANDUM OF LAW.” That motion was denied on January 21,1999. While the matter was pending in circuit court, Crumble submitted an affidavit of April 5, 2000, amplifying, for the first time, some of the facts and circumstances that culminated in the termination of appellant. He averred, in part: 2. Richard Danaher remained in the same position, at the same rate of pay, and classification of Fiscal Administrator .V from January 1997 until his termination in June of 1998.

Mr. Danaher was assigned to the management service within the State Personnel' Management System pursuant to personnel reform legislation. 3. I conducted the Department’s investigation of the incidents giving rise to Mr. Danaher’s termination. Ms. Melissa Ellen reported first to my deputy, and then to me, informed [sic] that she witnessed Mr. Danaher placing his hands under the shirt of Mr. Danaher’s assistant, Ms. Meads, to pull the elastic of her pants. Ms. Ellen was upset when she reported these events.

I asked Ms. Ellen to place her statement in writing. I did not feel it was necessary to speak with Ms. Meads, the employee who v>as involved in the touching incident, because I was aware of the close working relationship between Ms. Meads and Mr. Danaher, and was concerned about Ms. Mead’s [sic] veracity. ¹⁵³ 4. Only two weeks later, another DLLR employee, Ms. Denise Carroll reported first to my deputy, and then to me, that she had a conversation with Mr. Danaher in which Mr. Danaher commented that he did not recognize Ms. Carroll's face but was “better with butts.” Ms. Carroll was upset when she reported these events to my deputy. I asked Ms. Carroll to put her statement in writing. 5.

I found both Ms. Carroll’s and Ms. Ellen’s statements to be credible. I took into consideration the fact that these employees were willing to put their statements in writing. 6. After considering the Ellen and Carroll incidents, I wrote to Mr. Danaher’s supervisor Thomas Crowley, Director of Budget and Fiscal, suggesting that disciplinary action be taken against Mr. Danaher based upon his workplace conduct. While the Department was evaluating the situation, the third statement by Ms. Meriel Newsome was brought to the Department’s attention.

On the very same day that Mr. Danaher made inappropriate comments to Ms. Carroll, he also made both sexually and racially inappropriate comments to Ms. Newsome, a DLLR intern, concerning her race and naked pictures. I felt that there was a pattern of conduct which made the statements even more credible. 7. Pursuant to a delegation from the Secretary of the Department, Mr. Thomas Crowley, Mr. Danaher’s supervisor, and I met with Mr. Danaher. We informed him of the allegations, and provided him with the opportunity to respond. 8.

After meeting with Mr. Danaher, we reported to the Secretary the events from the meeting. Taking into consideration the credibility of the employees making the allegations against Mr. Danaher, the pattern of conduct reflected in the three statements, Mr. Danaher’s response, the existence of any mitigating circumstances, and the law on discrimination and harassment, the Secretary made the final decision to terminate Mr. Danaher. (Emphasis added). On October 19, 2000, the circuit court held a hearing on the matter.

In her oral ruling, the judge said: ¹⁵⁴ This case comes before the Court today as an appeal from a decision of the Secretary of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to terminate the State service of the petitioner, John R. Danaher. There are a number of issues which Mr. Danaher raises in the appeal. [He] has the burden of proof here, and he must prove that the Secretary’s determination and decision was either illegal or based on an, an [sic] unconstitutional ground. It is apparent to me that when Mr. Danaher had his job duties moved from one place to another that he continued to be an at-will employee of the State of Maryland. He did not seek reclassification during the time he was employed with the State and it’s too late to complain about it now. ...

Section 11-106 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article provides that prior to taking disciplinary action for employee misconduct — the Agency will investigate the alleged misconduct, which it did, meet with the employee, which is, it apparently did, based upon an affidavit, I think it’s from Sharon Ball, consider mitigating circumstances, determine the appropriate disciplinary action and give written notice of the action below of Frederick A. Blow. I am persuaded that the Agency did all that it had to do under 11-106. This was not an automatic termination. It, the conduct that was set out against Mr. Danaher did not fall specifically within one of the automatic termination criteria; it was done in conformity with the law.

The other matter is the termination with prejudice. And I can certainly understand why Mr. Danaher is extremely upset and angry that he would be determined, to be let go with prejudice after 25 years of credible service to the State of Maryland, but the Secretary has discretion to terminate an employee with prejudice and it is not up to the Court to, to substitute its judgment for that, the Secretary in making that determination. The appeal petition is denied and I will sign an order. By Order dated November 13, 2000, the circuit court dismissed appellant’s petition for judicial review, finding that the “Department’s decision to deny [appellant’s] appeal of his ¹⁵⁵ termination for lack of illegal or unconstitutional grounds is supported by the record.” We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

DISCUSSION I. Our analysis begins with a review of the statutory scheme involved in this case. Following a study undertaken by a Task Force appointed by the Governor, the so called State Merit System was revised by the State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996 (the “Act”). See Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr.

Servs. v. Beard, 142 Md.App. 283, 298 , 790 A.2d 57 , cert. denied, 369 Md. 180 , 798 A.2d 552 (2002); Western Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 130 Md.App. 562, 567-68 , 747 A.2d 697 (2000), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 371 Md. 125 , 807 A.2d 32 (2002); see also State Election Bd. v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46 , 548 A.2d 819 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 , 109 S.Ct. 1644 , 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989). The General Assembly created the State Personnel Management System (“SPMS”) to govern the employment of persons in the Executive branch of State government. See S.P.P. § 6-202 et seq.

SPMS falls “under the authority of the Secretary of Budget and Management.” S.P.P. § 6-101. Pursuant to S.P.P. § 6-102, the “basic purpose” of the SPMS “is to provide a system of employment for employees under the authority of the Secretary.” To that end, the SPMS “establishes categories of service for employees based on the general nature of the employee’s duties or method of appointment.” S.P.P. § 6 — 102(l)(i). In particular, it “groups employees into classes based on specific duties ...,” S.P.P. § 6-102(2)(i), and “provides for a system of merit employment in the skilled service and professional service,” based on a “standard” of “business efficiency.” S.P.P. § 6-102(3). Further, SPMS “provides procedures for the appointment, discipline, and termination of employees in each service.” S.P.P. § 6-102(l)(ii).

Additionally, it provides “a process for the ... prompt removal of employees.” S.P.P. § 6 — 102(4)(ii). ¹⁵⁶ Specifically, within SPMS, there are six employment categories: skilled service; professional service; management service; executive service; special appointees; and temporary employees. See S.P.P. §§ 6-401 to 6-406. Under S.P.P. § 6-401(a), “all positions in the Executive Branch of State government that are included in the State Personnel Management System are in the skilled service,” unless otherwise provided. 7 Collectively, the various provisions of the Act combine to refute the perception that a person employed by the State is virtually guaranteed continued employment, without regard to the quality of performance. Instead, the legislative scheme provides for a system in which a skilled employee’s continued employment depends upon satisfactory job performance.

That view is reflected in S.P.P. § 2-301(a), which states: “In keeping with State efforts to reinvent government, restructuring of the State’s personnel system should enhance the delivery of services to citizens in an effective and timely manner.” As we noted, appellant was in the management service, not the skilled service. S.P.P. § 6-403(a) states: Except as otherwise provided by law, a position ... is in the management service if the position: (1) primarily involves direct responsibility for the oversight and management of personnel and financial resources; (2) requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; and (3) is not in the executive service. S.P.P. § 6-402(a) provides: Except as otherwise provided by law, a position in the Executive Branch of State government is in the professional service if the position: ¹⁵⁷ (1) requires knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a course of specialized intellectual instruction and study; and (2) normally requires a professional license, advanced degree, or both. Subtitle 5 of Title 7 of S.P.P. concerns employee performance appraisals.

Pursuant to S.P.P. §§ 7-501 to 7-504, the Act provides that skilled, professional, and management service employees are evaluated in accordance with the subtitle. See S.P.P. § 7-502(a). These employees are assessed, in writing, in six month intervals, based on the employee’s entry-on-duty date. The employee receives both a mid-year and end-of-year appraisal, with an overall performance rating of either “outstanding,” “exceeds standards,” “meets standards,” “needs improvement,” or “unsatisfactory.” S.P.P. § 7-502(a)(b).

Although S.P.P. § 7-503 sets forth a careful process of appraisal, it does not outline the consequences, if any, of a poor evaluation. Title 11 is called “Disciplinary Actions, Layoffs, and Employment Terminations in State Personnel Management System.” Subtitle 1 concerns “Disciplinary Actions,” and is expressly applicable to all employees in the State Personnel Management System of the Executive Branch, with the exception of temporary workers. S.P.P. § 11-102. Under S.P.P. § 11-103(a), the appointing authority “has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence in any proceeding under this subtitle,” including appeals.

As we noted, S.P.P. § 11-104(7)(ii) allows for the termination of an employee, “with prejudice,” if the employee’s actions are found “egregious.” Pursuant to S.P.P. § 11-111, the Secretary, “by regulation,” must establish policies and procedures with regard to “disciplinary actions related to employee performance,” including: (1) counseling of an employee with performance deficiencies; (2) an opportunity for the employee to improve the deficiencies; (3) imposition of disciplinary actions, if warranted; and (4) notice to the employee of disciplinary action and appeal rights. Apart from layoffs, employees in the skilled and ¹⁵⁸ professional services, previously known as classified employees, may be removed from State service only for “cause.” See S.P.P. § 11-109; COMAR 17.04.05.04. Under S.P.P. §§ 11-109 and 11-110, skilled and professional service employees are entitled to an administrative hearing with respect to disciplinary actions. In contrast, employees in the management service, who are sometimes referred to as “at will” employees, see S.P.P. § 11-305, do not have a statutory right to a full administrative hearing regarding disciplinary action.

See S.P.P. § 11-113; COMAR 17.04.05.05C. Rather, an appeal of an at-will employee’s termination “may only be based on the grounds that the disciplinary action is illegal or unconstitutional.” S.P.P. § 11 — 113(b)(2)(ii) (1997); COMAR 17.04.05.05C. A management service employee’s appeal is heard by the head of the principal unit. S.P.P. § 11-105 specifies the conduct that constitutes cause for “automatic termination of employment.” Section § 11-106, which we discuss, infra, concerns the procedure that must be followed before any disciplinary action is taken.

Because appellant was in the management service, he was an at-will employee. Therefore, subject to certain statutory protections regarding disciplinary actions, applicable to almost all employees in the SPMS, appellant could be terminated, without cause, so long as the action was not illegal or unconstitutional. Subtitle 3 of Title 11 is called “Employment Separations and Terminations.” None of the six sections in Subtitle 3 provides that Subtitle 1 is inapplicable to an employee' in the management service. Moreover, S.P.P. § 11-301 states that Subtitle 3 applies to all nontemporary employees in SPMS.

S.P.P. § 11-305 is relevant. It provides: 11-305. Termination of other employees. (a) Applicability of section. — This section only applies to an employee who is in a position: (1) under a special appointment; or (2) in the management service; or ¹⁵⁹ (3) in the executive service.

(b) Employee at will. — Each employee subject to this section: (1) serves at the pleasure of the employee’s appointing authority; and (2) may be terminated from employment for any reason, solely in the discretion of the appointing authority. As appellant was in the management service, his appeal was governed by S.P.P. § 11-113. It provides, in pertinent part: 11-113. Appeal to head of principal unit.

(a) Applicability of section. — This section only applies to an employee: (1) in the management service; (2) in the executive service; (b) Procedure. — (1) An employee or an employee’s representative may file a written appeal of a disciplinary action with the head of the principal unit. (2) An appeal: (i) must be filed within 15 days after the employee receives notice of the disciplinary action; and (ii) may only be based on the grounds that the disciplinary action is illegal or unconstitutional. (3) The employee has the burden of proof in an appeal under this section. (c) Conference. — The head of the principal unit may confer with the employee before making a decision.

(d) Disposition. — (1) The head of the principal unit may: (i) uphold the disciplinary action; or (ii) rescind or modify the disciplinary action and restore to the employee any lost time, compensation, status, benefits. ¹⁶⁰ (2) Within 15 days after receiving an appeal, the head of the principal unit shall issue the employee a written decision. (3) The decision of the head of the principal unit is the final administrative decision.

II

As a threshold matter, we shall address the Employer’s claim that this “appeal must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Specifically, the Department asserts that appellant did not present at the administrative level any of the arguments he advanced to the circuit court or to this Court. DLLR cites Maryland State Retirement & Pension Sys. v. Martin, 75 Md.App. 240, 248 , 540 A.2d 1188 (1988), and Chertkof v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 43 Md.App. 10, 16 , 402 A.2d 1315 (1979), to support its position that Danaher cannot present an “entirely new theory” that “was not exposed” at the agency level. DLLR’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. First, both cases involved administrative hearings, in which the parties would have had an opportunity to present or challenge the evidence and articulate legal theories.

No hearing ever occurred here. Second, in both cases the appellants raised new theories before this Court. In contrast, appellant’s contentions were fully raised with the circuit court. Moreover, it appears to us that the Department has confused principles of waiver with those of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

It is a • longstanding principle of administrative law that one must ordinarily exhaust statutorily prescribed administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. See Moose v. Fraternal Order of Police, 369 Md. 476, 486 , 800 A.2d 790 (2002); Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 452 , 758 A.2d 995 (2000); Young v. Anne Arundel County, 146 Md.App. 526, 566 , 807 A.2d 651 (2002); Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey, 110 Md.App. 493, 526 , 678 A.2d 55 (1996). Therefore, a litigant must first pursue the applicable administrative pro ¹⁶¹ cess; other remedies cannot be pursued prematurely. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68 , 81 A.2d 226 (1951); Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 81 Md.App. 54, 62 , 566 A.2d 792 (1989).

In this case, appellant clearly pursued his administrative remedies, limited though they were. He also exercised his right to seek judicial review of the Secretary’s adverse decision. See Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(a)(1) of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). In McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), the Supreme Court noted that one purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent the possibility “that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.” We explained in Boyd v. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore City, 57 Md.App. 603 , 471 A.2d 749 (1984): The purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are threefold.

It is designed to encourage the determination of particular issues by agencies with special expertise as to those issues; to avoid the judicial resolution of matters the legislature thought could be best performed by an agency; and to keep from the courts matters they might never be called upon to decide if the prescribed administrative remedy was followed. Id. at 606 , 471 A.2d 749 (quotations omitted). See also McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 489-91 , 91 S.Ct. 1565 , 29 L.Ed.2d 47 (1971) (in criminal prosecution for draft evasion, exhaustion doctrine applied to prevent defendant from raising the defense that he was a conscientious objector, because he had not pursued that contention before the Selective Service Board); Gingell v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 249 Md. 374, 376-77 , 239 A.2d 903 (1968) (specifying the reasons for the exhaustion doctrine). Judicial review of an administrative order is generally available only when that order is “final,” meaning that there must be nothing further for the agency to do.

See Holiday ¹⁶² Spas v. Montgomery County Human Relations Comm’n, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197 (1989); Celanese Corp. of America v. Bartlett, 200 Md. 397, 409 , 90 A.2d 208 (1952); Crofton Partners v. Anne Arundel County, 99 Md.App. 233, 243 , 636 A.2d 487 , cert. denied, 335 Md. 81 , 642 A.2d 192 (1994). The “exhaustion” and “finality” requirements both share the common goal of preventing potentially unnecessary and premature disruption of the courts. Appellant was an employee in the management service. He pursued all .administrative avenues before turning to the courts for relief.

First, through the Maryland Classified Employees Association, appellant sent a letter to the Secretary. The letter stated, in pertinent part: The Maryland Classified Employees Association is requesting a Second Step Hearing on behalf of John R. Danaher, ... employed by DLLR. We would appreciate your cooperation in scheduling a time, date and place for this hearing and notifying my office of same. Then, as we noted earlier, appellant submitted the State Personnel Management System Appeal and Grievance Form, seeking a hearing on appeal.

Thus, there is no merit to appellee’s claim that appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies. To the extent that appellee contends that appellant’s complaints are not preserved because they were waived, due to the inadequacy of his assertions below, we reject that position as well. Appellant’s challenge was, of necessity, very general. DLLR did not reveal what information had been furnished so as to enable appellant to particularize his allegations.

Indeed, there is no indication that appellant knew who had complained, when he learned for the first