Daniels v. Daniels

J. FREDERICK SHARER (Retired, Specially Assigned), J. It is established that, in order to effectively convey title to real property, the title documents—ordinarily a deed—must be delivered by the grantor to the grantee. An exception to the requirement of actual delivery is found in the doctrine of constructive delivery. ⁴⁰⁸ In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the court ruled that the conduct of James H. Daniels, which we shall detail, infra, did not satisfy the requirements of either actual or constructive delivery of a deed by Daniels to his wife, appellant, Lana Daniels. Hence, the court, after a bench trial, entered judgment for appellee, Brenda Daniels, Personal Representative of the Estate of James H. Daniels. In her timely appeal, appellant presents the following question: Does constructive delivery of a deed occur where the husband executes a tenants by the entireties deed, informs his wife, and places the unrecorded deed with the couple’s important papers?

For the reasons set forth below, we answer this question “no” and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY James H. Daniels (“Daniels”) died intestate. Appellee, Brenda Daniels, his daughter from a former marriage, qualified as personal representative of his estate. In her capacity, Brenda filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to quiet title, which sought to have real property at 1602 Frederick Road, Catonsville, included as an asset of the estate.

The suit to quiet title asserted that paper title to the property was based on a deed, recorded in 1987, to Daniels and his mother, Emily Daniels, as joint tenants. Upon Emily Daniels’s death in 2005, Daniels became the surviving owner. At the time of his death, Daniels was residing with appellant, Lana Daniels. Appellant asserts ownership of 1602 Frederick Road by virtue of a deed that was executed by her husband and witnessed and notarized on March 3, 2006, naming himself and appellant as tenants by the entireties.

The deed was not recorded until May 12, 2011, after Daniels’s death. Daniels’s execution of the deed on March 3, 2006, occurred during a meeting with his stepdaughter, Leslie Robin Cadey, an escrow closer and underwriter, and Ingrid Chichester, a ⁴⁰⁹ notary and title officer. Chichester witnessed Daniels sign the deed and notarized his signature. Cadey testified that Daniels retained possession of the deed, despite her advice that he have it recorded.

Daniels, for some reason, did not follow that advice and, as we shall discuss, placed the deed among his and appellant’s personal papers in their home. At the time the deed was executed, and thereafter for some time, appellant was in Texas receiving medical treatments. She related to the court that when she returned home, Daniels informed her that “he had added her name on the deed.” Appellant testified that on the day of her husband’s death, her daughter, Cadey, was helping her locate a life insurance policy in a bedroom file cabinet that held “all of our important papers.” The cabinet contained, inter alia, personal documents, insurance policies, and the deed to their marital residence at 2407 Hammonds Ferry Road. During the search, Lana and Cadey came upon a file folder containing the executed deed to 1602 Frederick Road.

Appellant had not placed the deed in the cabinet, so she concluded that her husband had done so. Upon finding the deed, Cadey asked appellant why it had not been recorded. Their assumption was that, because the property was lien free, recordation had not been necessary. Testified Lana: “[W]e assumed, because there was no lien, we didn’t have to file it.” Cadey testified that she had drawn the deed at Daniels’s request.

She testified about her meeting with Daniels and Chichester, and the execution of the deed, and recalled her advice to Daniels to “go and record the deed in Baltimore County.” Chichester confirmed that she witnessed Daniels sign the deed, and notarized his signature. She concluded that “[njothing was unusual.” Cadey testified that on the morning of Daniels’s death, while helping her mother get papers together in order to complete funeral arrangements, she discovered the executed, but unrecorded, deed in a bedroom file cabinet amongst personal papers of both Daniels and appellant. A few weeks ⁴¹⁰ later Cadey consulted with counsel, who advised her to “guard it with [her] life and to get it on record[,]” which Cadey did. After recordation of the deed, Brenda Daniels, as personal representative of the Daniels estate, filed suit to quiet title, alleging that the unrecorded deed was of no effect and that the property was an asset of the estate.

Appellee maintained that there had been no effective delivery of the deed, which rendered it void and inoperable. The quiet title action was tried by the court on March 30, 2012. After hearing the evidence that we have recounted and arguments of counsel, the court ruled that “there has not been a delivery of the deed dated March, 2006 and recorded May 12, 2011.” The court orally explained its ruling: [Appellant] says this was in their possessions, which means that ... she did not have exclusive dominion over these items where the deed was found. He clearly had access to them throughout his lifetime, which means that he ... clearly could have revoked it at any point.

It would have been a much different case had this deed been found, for instance, in her safe deposit box to which she had a key---Recordation is not the essential element in this case. It is delivery. And had the deed been delivered either to [appellant] or to someone else as a third-party where Mr. Daniels, the decedent did not have access to it, ... this deed would survive. But I applaud her for her honesty, her candor.

She says that it was in our things, in our file cabinet, with our important documents. Not hers. Theirs. Which means that he had access to it too.

He could have— if he wanted, reached in there and tore it up if he wanted or just taken it back. That being the case, delivery, being an essential element to the legality of the deed, does fail. And I must find in favor of the [appellee]. I, I am sorry because I do acknowledge that this was a forty year marriage.

And it is clear in, in the Court’s mind what the decedent’s intention was. There’s been no question in the Court’s mind that he intended to transfer the interest to his, his ⁴¹¹ spouse of forty years. But I am without power to change that under the law. So I must find in favor of [appellee], the Estate.

I’ll ask [counsel for appellee] to prepare an order to that effect. (Emphasis added). The court’s Order, filed on April 13, 2012, provides, in relevant part: ORDERED, that Judgment be and is hereby awarded in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant; and it is further ORDERED, that The Estate of James H. Daniels, Register of Wills for Baltimore County Estate No.: 163375, be and is hereby adjudged and decreed to be the sole, true and lawful owner of all that real property situated in Baltimore County, State of Maryland, known as 1602 Frederick Road, Catonsville, Maryland 21228; and it is further ORDERED, that the Deed, dated March 3, 2006, by and between James H. Daniels, Grantor, and James H. Daniel and Lana L. Daniels, Grantees, and recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore County ..., having been determined by this Court to be an insufficiently delivered Deed, is hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid and of no force and effect[.] (Emphasis added). This timely appeal followed. 1 DISCUSSION Appellant concedes that there was not actual delivery of the deed, but posits that Daniels’s actions were effective to transfer title under the doctrine of constructive delivery.

Appellant argues that “constructive delivery of a deed occurs when the husband deeds his property to himself and his wife, as tenants by the entireties, informs his wife, and places the ⁴¹² unrecorded deed with the couple’s important papers.” Thus, she concludes, the trial court erred as a matter of law. “Delivery is the last but an indispensable step by a grantor to give validity and operative effect to a deed for conveyance of real estate. Execution and acknowledgment are equally indispensable but, without delivery, accomplish nothing.” Fike v. Harshbarger, 20 Md.App. 661, 661-62 , 317 A.2d 859 (1974), aff'd, 273 Md. 586 , 332 A.2d 27 (1975). 2 In order for the conveyance to be held legally effective, all necessary elements of a gift must occur, including the intent to transfer the property, relinquishment of control, delivery, and acceptance by the donee. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 302 Md. 312, 318 , 487 A.2d 1181 (1985). In Fike , which involved a conveyance of real estate from father to daughter, and a deed that was not recorded until after the father died, the sole issue was “whether or not there was a proper and legal delivery of the deed from [father] to [daughter].” 273 Md. at 589 , 332 A.2d 27 .

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of both this Court and the Circuit Court for Garrett County that, because the grantor’s daughter lacked “any evidence whatsoever to indicate that Mr. Thomas surrendered control over same during his lifetime, it was not a valid delivery of the deed under the laws of the State of Maryland.” Fike, 273 Md. at 589 , 332 A.2d 27 . The Court wrote: One hundred years ago our predecessors, through Judge Robinson, stated in Duer v. James, 42 Md. 492 (1875), citing the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Younge v. Guilbeau, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 636 ,