Daniels v. State

DAVIS, J. Appellant, Sonya Marie Daniels, was charged in the Circuit Court for Frederick County with two counts of first-degree murder, attempted kidnapping and carrying a handgun. Appellant, facing the death penalty, requested a change of venue and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On October 21, 2003, jury selection began and, after trial, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on ⁷⁹ November 19, 2003, declared a mistrial after the jurors were unable to reach a verdict. On October 18, 2004, appellant’s second trial began.

The State, however, decided not to seek the death penalty and, on November 8, 2004, appellant elected to proceed by way of a not guilty agreed statement of facts on two counts of first-degree murder. Based on the statement of facts, the trial court entered a finding of guilty as to both counts. On February 3, 2005, appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each count of first-degree murder, the sentences to run concurrent. Appellant filed this timely appeal, presenting the following questions for our review: I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of appellant’s van?

II

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress statements made by appellant to deputies from the Frederick County Sheriffs Department prior to her presentment before the magistrate? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On October 19, 2002, a dark green mini-van drove onto Discovery Boulevard and pulled in front of the house of Deanne Prichard. Nine-year-old Lee Prichard, Jr. was out front when the van pulled up.

Lee, his mother, Patricia Collins, his sister, sixteen-year-old Deanne Prichard, and his five week old niece, Makayla, had just returned home from visiting Tracy Frost, his sister’s boyfriend, at the Washington County Detention Center. The driver of the van, an African American female with marks on her face, rolled down her window and told Lee that she was “Tracy Frost [sic] sister from New York” and that she wanted to see the baby. Lee then went inside to get his sister. ⁸⁰ As Collins walked outside with her daughter, granddaughter and son, the assailant, in a black ski mask and hood, jumped out of the van holding a black handgun. The assailant demanded that Prichard get into the van, but she refused as she was holding her baby.

The assailant pointed the gun at Prichard and fired. After she and the baby fell to the pavement, the assailant pointed the gun at the baby and fired a second shot. The assailant jumped back in the van and drove off. The Frederick County Sheriffs Office responded and arrived on the scene immediately after the shooting, finding Prichard and baby Makayla lying on the street.

Both were pronounced dead at the scene. The police spoke with several individuals at the scene and all gave varying descriptions of the assailant and the van. In an effort to find possible suspects, the police went to the Washington County Detention Center to speak with, Makayla’s father, Tracy Frost. During their conversation with Frost, police learned that there had been an altercation at the prison two weeks earlier between appellant, who was Frost’s ex-girlfriend and Prichard.

Frost informed the police that, on October 5, 2002, appellant was visiting him during the same time that Prichard, Makayla and Collins were visiting. Following a confrontation between Prichard and appellant, appellant was asked to leave. Based on information gathered from the scene and at the detention center, the Frederick County police turned their attention to appellant as a suspect. Detectives Dewees and Jenkins drove to the Martinsburg, West Virginia Police Department and requested assistance.

Detective Dewees informed Martinsburg police that appellant was a suspect in a double homicide investigation and that they were trying to locate a green mini-van that was registered to appellant’s father. Detective Dewees then provided the officers with appellant’s address and license plate number of the van and instructed the Martinsburg police to conduct a stop of the vehicle. ⁸¹ On October 19, 2002, at approximately 9:25 p.m., Martins-burg police officers stopped appellant while driving the green mini-van four blocks from her home. After stopping the vehicle, the officers ordered appellant out of the mini-van. She was told that she was free to leave, but that the van was being detained.

When appellant was further told that officers from the Frederick County Sheriffs Department were en route to Martinsburg, she agreed to stay until they arrived. While waiting for the officers from Frederick County, Martinsburg police set up a perimeter around the van and blocked off the area with police tape. Using flashlights to facilitate an inspection of the vehicle, the officers noticed several dark stains on one of the rear hubcaps. In an effort to preserve possible evidence on the vehicle from rain which had begun to fall, a tent was placed over the van.

When the Frederic County police officers arrived two hours later, they were met by a Martinsburg’s police officer who had remained at the scene with the van. Appellant spoke with police officers briefly, then left the scene with her sister. Her father, the owner of the van, remained with the vehicle. A warrant to search the van was obtained by Martinsburg police at 1:00 a.m., approximately two hours later.

While the search of the van was being conducted, Martinsburg police, accompanied by a Frederick County officer, went to appellant’s home and executed the fugitive warrant they had obtained for her arrest. She was then taken to the Martinsburg Police Department where she was processed and placed in a room where she was interviewed by Detectives Dewees and Jenkins, beginning at 1:48 a.m. At approximately 4:00 a.m., appellant complained of chest pains and was taken to the hospital, where she was treated and released the next morning. At approximately 10:05 a.m. the next day, appellant was taken before a magistrate.

At approximately 3:15 p.m., she was again interviewed by Deputies Dewees and Jenkins. Appellant was then returned to ⁸² Maryland, where she faced charges of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses in Frederick County. After the State filed its notice to seek the death penalty, appellant filed for a change of venue, prior to trial. On September 29, 2003, a hearing on pre-trial motions was conducted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

Appellant’s initial trial commenced on October 29, 2003. On November 19, 2003, a mistrial was declared after the jury informed the court that it was unable to reach a verdict. Prior to the second trial, the State withdrew its notice to seek the death penalty, seeking instead a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On June 30, 2004 and September 2, 2004, additional hearings on pre-trial motions were held.

After jury selection, appellant’s retrial commenced on October 25,2004. On November 3, 2004, six days into the trial, the State disclosed that it intended to call Joe Daniels, Jr., appellant’s brother, as a witness on behalf of the State. He had been an alibi witness for the defense in the first trial and it was anticipated that he would again provide an alibi in the second trial. According to the State’s proffer, Daniels was prepared to implicate appellant in the murders.

Appellant’s defense counsel moved for a mistrial, specifically conditioned on preclusion of the State from seeking the death penalty at a subsequent trial. In the alternative, defense counsel moved to continue the trial for two weeks. The trial court took the matter under advisement and continued the case for several days. On November 8, 2004, trial resumed; defense counsel renewed her motion for a mistrial with the same condition regarding seeking exposure to the death penalty at a subsequent trial.

The trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel, faced with what she considered a Hobson’s choice, proffered that the defense and the State were negotiating aborting the trial and entering an agreed statement of facts with respect to the two counts of murder, coupled with the State’s agreement to nolle pros each of the remaining counts in the indictment. ⁸³ Appellant, responding to the examination by the court as to whether she concurred with the proposed agreement between her counsel and the State, indicated that she wanted to abort the trial and proceed by way of a not guilty agreed statement of facts. Appellant then entered a plea of not guilty to the counts charging the first-degree murders of Deanne Prichard and Makayla Frost and the State presented the following agreed statements of facts to the trial court. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 19th of 2002, members of the Frederick County Sheriffs Office, responded to Discovery Boulevard in Walkersville, Frederick County, Maryland.

The bodies of 16-year-old Deanne Prichard and 5-week-old Makayla Frost were lying on Discovery Boulevard. Both were pronounced dead from single gunshot wounds. Witnesses at the scene, including Maria Beyer, Leda Harris, Robert Crouse and Scott Shaffer would testify that they observed a dark green mini van, pulling away from the scene of the shooting. Robert Crouse would further testify that he saw an African American female with freckles on her face, driving the van.

Leda Harris would further testify that the green mini van had Maryland tags. Patricia Collins, the mother of Deanne and the grandmother of Makayla would testify that they had returned from Washington County Detention Center from visiting Tracy Frost, the father of Makayla Frost. Lee Prichard, Jr., age 9, was outside his house on Discovery Boulevard when a dark green mini van pulled up. He would testify that an African American female with marks on her face, like chicken pox scars, stated, “I am Tracy Frost’s sister from New York.

I want to see the baby.” He goes in his house, walks out to the green mini van with Pat Collins, Deanne and Makayla. They then walk around to the driver’s side of the van, at which time, the driver exits the van, with a black handgun with brown grips and a long barrel in hand. The person was wearing a ski mask and black leather gloves. The person told Deanne to get in the van.

Deanne, while holding the baby refused, at ⁸⁴ which time, the driver of the green mini van pointed the gun at Deanne and fired. The baby and Deanne fell to the street. The driver of the green mini van then pointed the gun at the baby, Makayla, and a second shot was fired at the baby by the driver. Pat Collins would also testify that she walked out with Lee, Deanne and Makayla and approached the dark green mini van at the driver’s side.

The green mini van had Maryland tags and tinted windows. At the time she approached the driver’s side door, a person exited who she would describe as an African American with a hoodie and a black ski mask. She would further describe the person as having the body shape and voice of a female, with a height about the same as Deanne, who was five foot four inches tall. No taller.

The person had a black handgun, with brown grips, and was standing on the driver’s side at [the] rear of the van. At this time, the person tells Deanne to get in the van, who refuses. The gun was then pointed by the driver of the green mini van, at the neck of Deanne and fired. Deanne falls to the ground while the baby was lying in the street.

A second shot was fired by the driver of the green mini van at the face of the baby. Pat Collins only saw one person in the van. The general physical descriptors given by the witnesses are consistent with the appearance of the defendant, [appellant]. Dr. Mary Ripple, who is the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, would opine that Deanne’s death was caused by a single gunshot wound to the neck, which round went through her cervical spine and exited the other side of her neck.

She would state that death was very quick and that the gun was fired within six inches of her neck. Her opinion as to Makayla was that she was prone on the street when shot through the mouth, and the back of the head, causing death. The shot was fired within two feet of Makayla. Tracy Frost would state, would testify that he and the [appellant] were in a romantic relationship for a period of about two years and that relationship ended in the Fall of 2001.

Further, he would testify that he and Deanne Prich ⁸⁵ ard began a romantic relationship in the Fall of 2001. As a result of that relationship, Deanne became pregnant and gave birth to Makayla Frost on September 13th, 2002[sic]. He would further testify that he was incarcerated at the Washington County Detention Center on August 28th of 2002. The [appellant] visited him on four occasions.

On October 5th of 2002, the [appellant] visited him at the same time that Deanne Prichard was visiting with Makayla Frost and Pat Collins. A confrontation occurred between Deanne and the [appellant], which precipitated Tracy Frost’s request to have the [appellant’s] visit terminated. Deputy Bradley would testify that he, in fact, requested the [appellant] terminate the visit and leave and she did leave as a result of his request. Pat Collins would state during the confrontation, the [appellant] states that the baby was not Tracy Frost’s.

At which time, Deanne states that the baby is Tracy’s and that she would get a blood test. Karlos Smallwood was a co-worker of the [appellant] when she was working at MAMSI. He would testify that [appellant] called him at some time prior to the murders and asked him where she could get a gun for protection. Joe Daniels, Jr. is the brother of the [appellant].

He would testify that approximately two weeks prior to the murders, [appellant] asked him if he could get a gun for her. He did get a gun for the [appellant]. The gun was a black Smith & Wesson, 44 caliber magnum revolver with brown wooden grips. He would further testify that on 10/19 of 2002, at approximately 3:50 p.m. he was at home when the [appellant] arrived at his house.

She stated to him that, “I think I just shot two people.” At that time, she handed him a black jacket with clothes and a 44 caliber magnum revolver and asked him to get rid of the items. The black jacket had on it what appeared to him to be blood. The following day, Joe Daniels, Jr. took the items to Arthur Lancaster’s house in Frederick, Maryland. At Mr. Lancaster’s house, Joe Daniels, Jr. proceeded to burn the items of clothing in a fire pit.

He also buried the weapon. ⁸⁶ Arthur Lancaster would corroborate that items of clothing were burned and a 44 caliber magnum revolver was buried by Joe Daniels, Jr. on his property. Several months later, Joe Daniels, Jr. returned to Mr. Lancaster’s property and unburied the weapon. He took it to a work site in Martinsburg, West Virginia and buried it in gravel. Subsequently, concrete was poured over the weapon.

On or about November 3rd of 2004, members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office responded to the location provided by Mr. Daniels and recovered the weapon from under the concrete walk. On October 19th of 2002, the [appellant] was stopped in Martinsburg, West Virginia, while driving her father’s green mini van, which van was borrowed by her prior to the shooting. The van had Maryland plates. Members of the Martinsburg Police Department made the felony stop and secured the vehicle.

Lt. Timothy Catlett would testify that on the driver’s side rear hub cap, there appeared to be blood drops. Members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office responded to the location and secured the hub cap as evidence. The [appellant] was subsequently arrested and interviewed by members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office on two occasions.

On both occasions, the [appellant] indicated that she was in sole possession of the green mini van at the time of the murders. The hub cap was transported to the Maryland State Police Crime Lab. Teresa Roberts, a certified serologist examined the hub cap. She would testify the areas had an appearance consistent with dried blood.

She would opine that her testing showed four areas tested positive for the indication of blood. She forwarded her results and the hub cap to the DNA section of the Maryland State Police Crime Lab. Amy Kelly, a certified forensic chemist, would testify that she performed a DNA analysis of swabbing from the areas of the hub cap where blood was indicated. From swabbing Q-l, she would opine that the DNA profile from the known ⁸⁷ standard of Deanne Prichard matched the DNA profile obtained from swab Q-l from the hub cap of the [appellant’s] vehicle.

Further, that the probabilities of selecting an unrelated individual at random would be one in 1.1 billion. From swabbing Q-2, she would opine that the DNA profile from the known standard of Deanne Prichard matched the DNA profile obtained from swab Q-2 from the hub cap of the [appellant’s] vehicle. Further, that the probabilities of selecting an unrelated individual at random would be one in 42 million. At the conclusion of the State’s proffer, the trial court found appellant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

Additional facts will be supplied during discussion. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we look only to the record of the suppression hearing and do not consider any evidence adduced at trial. Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999). We extend great deference to the findings of the hearing court with respect to first-level findings of fact and the credibility of witnesses unless it is shown that the court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

Reynolds v. State, 130 Md.App. 304, 313 , 746 A.2d 422 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 383 , 749 A.2d 173 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 874 , 121 S.Ct. 178 , 148 L.Ed.2d 122 (2000). Moreover, we view those findings of fact, and indeed the record as a whole, in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, however, making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officers’ encounter with appellant was lawful.

Id. LEGAL ANALYSIS I A. Appellant contends that “the van was ‘seized’ at the moment the appellant was stopped and ordered out of the car by the ⁸⁸ Martinsburg police and that the officers who conducted that seizure did so without probable cause.” She argues that such a seizure requires probable cause, but, “If the seizure was somehow justified, the evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant should have been suppressed because the Maryland officers who executed the warrant had no authority to do so.” Appellant further contends that there was unnecessary delay in appellant’s presentment before a magistrate. She summarizes her first assignment of error in her brief: Initially, it must be noted that the trial court applied [the] wrong standard when determining whether the seizure of the appellant’s van was justified. After making several “findings,” not all of which are supported by the record, the trial court stated that the Martinsburg officers “had a substantial amount of information which would cause them to believe that they that [sic] van might yield some information if they could get a closer look at it.” (Emphasis supplied).

There is no such test under the Fourth Amendment. The mere fact that a law enforcement officer may have a substantial amount of information which would cause him to believe that a search of property might yield some information does not justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. While that standard may be close in nature to a reasonable suspicion standard it is certainly a far cry from probable cause, and probable cause is what is required to justify the seizure in this case. The officer’s [sic] in this case unquestionably “seized” the appellant’s van for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

They made it absolutely clear to the appellant the minute they got her out of the car that the van was not leaving. Such a seizure requires probable cause. The State counters that “the record clearly demonstrates that the police had adequate probable cause to lawfully conduct a warrantless stop and search of the vehicle at issue, regardless of the fact that a warrant was ultimately obtained in this case.” The State further avers, “The officers’ subjective intent in stopping the vehicle to detain it for the purposes ⁸⁹ of obtaining a warrant is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis.” The trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress, according to the State, because the investigating officers had probable cause that appellant and her vehicle were involved in the double shooting earlier that day, based on information from the officers’ investigations. Finally, the State asserts that the fact that Frederick County law enforcement officers acted in concert with the Martins-burg Police Department during the execution of the search warrant for the vehicle was lawful.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures____” Rosenberg v. State, 129 Md.App. 221, 239 , 741 A.2d 533 (1999). The Supreme Court has frequently remarked that probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false. A “practical, non-technieal” probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 194-95 , 571 A.2d 1239 (1990). The law is well established that a vehicle stop by the police and “detaining its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.” Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 9 , 668 A.2d 22 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1203 , 116 S.Ct. 1704 , 134 L.Ed.2d 803 (1996) (citations omitted). It is the reasonableness, vel non, by which we measure a state-initiated search and seizure to determine whether it passes constitutional muster. See Florida v. Jime ⁹⁰ no, 500 U.S. 248 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 , 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

Regarding whether the standard which serves to lawfully justify the stop of a vehicle, in the first instance, should be objective or subjective, the Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1777 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), rejected Petitioner’s claim that an extraordinary factor was “that the ‘multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations’ is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a stop.” The Court concluded that, since the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code, the stop was thereby rendered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the evidence discovered as a consequence thereof was admissible. Id. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, upholding the convictions, was therefore deemed correct. Id.

Turning to the issue of the search, recognizing that certain exigencies were inherent in the mobility of a vehicle, the Supreme Court, in Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155-56 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , held that the search of a vehicle, if there was probable cause to believe that it contained contraband, was an exception to the warrant requirement. Accord Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648, 665-66 , 805 A.2d 1086 (2002). In reviewing the particular factors to be considered in a determination of whether a warrantless search of a vehicle comports with the “reasonableness” requirements of the Fourth Amendment, we said in State v. Cabral, 159 Md.App. 354, 372-73 , 859 A.2d 285 (2004): A warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. In general, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is premised upon the exigencies associated with ⁹¹ the mobility of a vehicle, and the diminished expectation of privacy with regard to a vehicle.

One of the core protections of the Fourth Amendment is the warrant requirement. There is, however, a lesser expectation of privacy associated with automobiles and, because they are inherently mobile, a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted under certain circumstances. “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.” This exception was derived from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and has since been referred to as the “Carroll doctrine.” 132 Md.App. at 261, 752 A.2d 620 (internal citations and footnote omitted). Writing for this Court in Berry v. State, 155 Md.App. 144, 176 , 843 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 381 Md. 674 , 851 A.2d 594 (2004), Judge Barbera explained: The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases harkening back almost 80 years, has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, to search the vehicle for that contraband or evidence of a crime and seize it, without a warrant. It is clear from these cases that “the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: ‘If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.’ ” (Citations omitted).

The concept of probable cause has been described as “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 , 69 S.Ct. at 1310 , quoted with approval in Carroll, supra. ⁹² In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. Id. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Id. The Court in Brinegar further observed, And this “means less than evidence which would justify condemnation” or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 , 3 L.Ed. 364 (1813). Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within their (the officers”) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-11 .

In a more recent decision, we said in State v. James, 87 Md.App. 39, 46 , 589 A.2d 81 (1991): While the standard for probable cause varies with each occurrence, the experience of a police officer is taken into account in determining whether the officer could reasonably believe that the automobile will contain contraband. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 895 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 , 99 S.Ct. 458 , 58 L.Ed.2d 427 (1978). Thus, the Court in United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 376 , rehearing denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 , 104 S.Ct. 1419 , 79 L.Ed.2d 744 (1984), stated that probable cause includes the “sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained offi cers.,” (Citations omitted). In the case at hand, the evidence in support of the State’s argument that the investigating officers possessed probable ⁹³ cause centered around the testimony of Detective David Dewees of the Frederick County Sheriffs office.

Upon responding to the scene of the crime, he, of course, immediately determined, from his own observations, that sixteen-year-old Deanne Prichard and a five-week-old infant, Makayla Frost, had been murdered. As a result of interviewing Patricia Collins, who was Prichard’s mother and Makayla’s grandmother, Detective Dewees learned that, upon the return from the Washington County Detention Center, Collins, the two victims, and Deanne Prichard’s nine-year-old brother, Lee, the latter had walked the dog, later advising Deanne, when he returned from walking the dog, that a woman claiming to be Tracy Frost’s cousin was outside and wanted to see the baby. When Deanne and Makayla went outside, a female wearing a black ski mask shot the two victims. Detective Dewees received information from Deputy Rick Cook that Cook had additionally learned from Collins that the assailant was seen in a green minivan and had told Lee that she was Tracy Frost’s sister from New York.

When Collins and Deanne, who was holding the baby, approached the driver’s side of the van, the masked assailant exited the van and, at gunpoint, told Deanne to get in the van and then, when she refused, to hand over the baby. After shooting Deanne in the left side of her neck, the woman then shot baby Makayla. Deputy Gary Marriotti advised Detective Dewees that he had learned from the Washington County Detention Center that the name of appellant had appeared on the visitor log at the Center as a visitor to Tracy Frost, that there had been an altercation between appellant and Deanne Prichard at the detention center a week earlier and that Daniels had been escorted from the facility. Accompanied by Sergeant Troy Barrick, en route to the detention center to interview Tracy Frost, Detective Dewees had the police dispatcher run the name of appellant through the Motor Vehicle Administration computer to ascertain her address and whether a van was registered to her.

Registered in the name of appellant’s father, Joe Daniels, was a Chevrolet van. ⁹⁴ Upon being notified by Detective Dewees of the murders of Deanne and Makayla, Frost informed the officer that Deanne and appellant had visited him on October 5th and that he had told appellant that Deanne and the baby were in his life now, and that he did not want appellant to visit him anymore. According to Frost, appellant told him, “You’ll never see that baby again.” Frost provided Detective Dewees with a description of appellant, i.e., a dark skinned African-American female with acne scars or pock marks on her face. In response to an inquiry regarding whether appellant had access to weapons and a van, Frost told Detective Dewees that her father, an employee of the Department of Corrections, had weapons and that he also owned a green minivan. After concluding their interview with Frost, Detective Dewees and Deputy Barrick, having previously obtained an address for appellant at 110 Georgetown Square in Martinsburg, West Virginia, drove to Martinsburg, where they met with officers of the Martinsburg Police Department at 5:45 p.m. on the same day of the murders.

After sharing all of the information that he had gathered about the shootings with Detective Sergeant George Swortwood of the Martinsburg Police Department, Detective Dewees proceeded to type the narrative for an arrest warrant for appellant, using one of the computers at the Martinsburg police station. Informed that appellant might have a look-alike cousin from New York visiting her, Detective Dewees and Detective Eric Byer returned to the Washington County Detention Center to ask Frost about a cousin who had a similar appearance to appellant; Frost was not aware of any such cousin. En route to Martinsburg, Detective Dewees and Detective Byer were notified by Deputy Barrick that the green minivan was parked in front of appellant’s house, but it was in the process of leaving. Realizing “that the vehicle was a part of the — was a part of the crime, was a part of the crime scene, and we wanted to secure the vehicle for the purposes of a search and seizure warrant,” Detective Dewees instructed Detective Swortwood to stop the vehicle.

Due to possible “evidence from the crime scene, such as what the suspect was wearing, possibly a gun, ⁹⁵ any blood evidence,” Detective Dewees believed that the van was relevant to the crime scene. Additionally, the van had evidentiary importance because it could be identified by eyewitnesses to the murders. At approximately 9:25 p.m. on October 19, 2002, on instructions from Detective Dewees, the green minivan was stopped. When he arrived at the scene at approximately 9:35 p.m., Detective Dewees was directed by the Martinsburg police to look at what appeared to be spots of blood on the hubcap of the vehicle.

Although Corporal Dewees advised appellant that she was free to leave at least three times, she was told that the vehicle was being detained until a search warrant for the vehicle could be obtained. After Dewees and Corporal Kevin Miller returned to the Martinsburg police station and completed a search and seizure warrant for the green mini-van and another warrant for appellant’s residence, accompanied by Detective Swortwood, they presented the warrants to the magistrate in Martinsburg, who issued the search and seizure warrants for the vehicle and the residence. The testimony of Detective Jenkins of the Frederick County Sheriffs office essentially confirmed the testimony of Detective Dewees. Lee Prichard recounted the same version of events to Jenkins as had been communicated to Detective Dewees, ie., that a black female with chicken pox marks on her face identified herself as the sister of Tracy Frost from New York and asked him to summon Deanne and the baby because she wanted to see the baby.

Lee recounted to Detective Jenkins, as Collins had to Detective Dewees, that as the four approached the van, the masked female shot the two victims. In collaboration with Detective Dewees, Detective Jenkins determined that a 1997 dark green Chevrolet minivan was owned by appellant’s father, Joe Nathan Daniels. Joe Daniels, at a meeting with Detective Jenkins at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, confirmed his ownership of the minivan and that appellant had obtained the vehicle from his home in Martinsburg at approximately 2:15 that afternoon. He further confirmed that he had not ⁹⁶ seen the vehicle since then and that he owned a 9 millimeter semiautomatic handgun, which he kept at his house.

Detective Jenkins, accompanied by Joe Daniels, went to the home of Daniels’ other daughter, Natasha, who told Detective Jenkins that appellant had come to her home at 4:00 p.m. that day. Detective Jenkins, while following Joe Daniels and Natasha in a separate car en route to Martinsburg, learned, via a radio transmission, that the minivan had been stopped. The testimony of Detective Derek Creetinstine of the Frederick County Sheriff’s office provided further confirmation of the version of events recounted by Detectives Dewees and Jenkins. He was told by Deborah Frey that she had heard shots and saw a green minivan flee from the scene.

William Smouse described the getaway vehicle as a green minivan, whereas Tammy Bothe described it as a Caravan; Smouse, however, thought the short individual wearing headgear was a male. Larry Glass saw what “was possibly” a Dodge Caravan being driven by an African-American; Maria Precioso, who called 911, saw a dark green van leave the scene; Leda Harris saw a green minivan with a license plate number which began with the letter “M;” and Ron Krause recalled seeing a dark hunter green van that he believed to be a Dodge Caravan driven by an African-American female with marks or freckles on her medium complexion face and wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt. Krause gave chase, but broke off his pursuit of the fleeing vehicle when the driver turned and pointed a gun in his direction. Cassie Krause saw an individual wearing a hood shoot Deanne and bend down and shoot the baby, then flee in a dark green van.

The information gathered as a result of the above interviews by Detective Creetinstine was conveyed to Detectives Dewees and Jenkins. On the afternoon of October 19, 2002, advised by Detective Dewees of the murders and that the suspect was appellant who would probably be returning to 110 Georgetown Square Apartments in Martinsburg driving a green Chevy van, Detective Swortwood testified that he located the van at approximately 9:00 p.m., after being unsuccessful in locating it when he initially drove past the residence. As the vehicle began to ⁹⁷ drive away from the residence, the officers stopped the van at approximately 9:25 p.m. and patted down appellant, advising her that she could leave, but that the van would be detained. According to Detective Swortwood, he and Detective Kevin Miller proceeded to the Martinsburg police station to prepare search warrants for the van and appellant’s residence.

Detective Miller testified that he assisted in the preparation of the search and seizure warrants and their presentation to the magistrate for his signature at sometime after midnight on October 20, 2002. The motions court made the following findings of fact regarding the issue of probable cause to support the stop and seizure of appellant’s father’s van: The first issue I guess is, is the very stop of the van which occurred in Martinsburg on the 19th of October at 9:25 p.m. Initial Investigation The evidence is that at approximately 1500 or 3 p.m. on the 19th of October of 2002 there was a shooting of two individuals, Deanne Pritchard and Makayla Frost, and that officers began to arrive on the scene shortly thereafter. Detective Jenkins testified that he arrived on the scene at 3:12.

Detective Dewees received a call at 3:15. Sergeant Creitenstein (phonetic) was on the scene at 3:40 and so forth. Within those first few minutes and I’ll say up to 60 because I don’t know that I have the precise times, a fair amount of information was collected by the many officers on the scene and, and from I guess to some extent personal observations, but from many people who were in the vicinity, not all of whom were witnesses. But what the deputies did know was that there were two people who were dead, that it appeared that they were dead by gunshot wounds.

That was pretty obvious. They learned that the person who, that someone had been on the scene in a green van, that the someone was an African American. They had some ... information it was a male, but they also had information that it was a person with head gear. They had some information, however, that ... it was a woman and that information came from ⁹⁸ Lee Pritchard [sic] and Patricia Collins as testified by Detective Jenkins, and someone who was about the same height as Deanne, about five feet, five inches.

Description of Vehicle Involved There was some fair amount of information about the van. It wasn’t all consistent. As I recall, the only information as to its make or model, first of all it was, it was generally described as green. It think that was pretty consistent.

But as far as a make and model, many people thought it was a Dodge Caravan. And in fact Lee said, the young man said that it was, either was or looked like a van he often saw in the nearby shopping center, and there was at least one description apparently, although it was not known to Detective Dewees he testified, that the van had gold wheels. It was known that the van ... had Maryland tags starting with M. Identification of Assailant There was information that the person who did the shooting said I’m Tracy’s sister. Whether it was Tracy Frost’s sister ... or — but some connection to Tracy.

It was told to Corporal Dewees by Ms. Collins that the family had returned from Washington County Detention Center. Ms. Collins told Detective Jenkins that there had been problems with Mr. Frost’s former girlfriend ... and ... I don’t recall whether the name was, the full name of [appellant] was given, but I do know that ... Detective Dewees left fairly soon.

He arrived on the scene at 3:34 by his testimony and after he spent some time there he went on to the Washington County Detention Center to notify Tracy Frost of the deaths of his child and the mother of the child, and on the way he must have had notice, some knowledge of the name of [appellant] because he called or he was in communication with Motor Vehicle Administration or the dispatcher who was in communication with, who learned that [appellant] drove a BMW which she jointly owned with her father Joseph Daniels, and upon running further the name of ⁹⁹ Joseph Daniels there was information that came back that he in fact owned a Chevrolet van and ... he testified that he learned in that whole process where he got the information specifically that [appellant] lived in Georgetown Square, at Georgetown Square in Martinsburg. So that, he has that information. Motive for the Murders He drives to the Washington County Detention Center where he speaks to Tracy Frost. Tracy Frost tells him that two weeks earlier on the fifth of October he had told [appellant] not to come visit him again when she had been there at the Detention Center and she said you’ll never see that baby again and he gave a description of [appellant] as being dark skinned with acne pockmarks and told, and said that she was capable of violence____But he also said that [appellant’s] father was a correctional officer and owned a green minivan.

Information Possessed by West Virginia Authorities Now this is the information known to Detective Dewees who then drives on to West Virginia where he meets with Sergeant Swortwood and Corporal Miller, two detectives over there. And he speaks to them and gives them information .... Detective Swortwood only knows at that point a name, a description of the van, an address and a tag number, and, and it appears to me that and my recollection is that that may have been what he testified to. But he also ... had talked to Detective Dewees at that time about what had gone on and Detective Miller in his testimony was well aware of these matters____ Preparation of Affidavit [Detective Miller] writes in his affidavit ... that in fact Detective Dewees arrived at 1745 hours, 5:45, and described, well, he advised of a double homicide and some other matters.

Now certainly Detective Sergeant Swortwood knew there had been a double homicide. He testified ¹⁰⁰ to that____ New paragraph. We know a name. [Appellant]. New paragraph.

Green van. New paragraph. Maryland license M-something, whatever it was. Paragraph. 110 Georgetown Square.

There clearly was some discussion of farther details, and at that point the only, as far as I, as far as we know, the only effort that was made right then by the Martinsburg Police was to drive to 110 Georgetown Square and they did not observe the van at that point. In the meantime Detective Dewees left Martinsburg and came back to Maryland where he went to Washington County to verify a piece of information with Tracy Frost and ... he now learns on his way back, he’s at the Maryland West Virginia border stopped. He gets word that the van has been stopped and he testified that, well, we know the van was stopped at 7, at 9:25____ Corporal Dewees arrived about ten minutes from that stop. He had been notified by I believe then Corporal, now Sergeant Barrick who was in Martinsburg and he had been from 5:45, stayed there on.

Court’s Recap of Evidence of Probable Cause Now I’m gonna back up to earlier starting with the time Corporal Dewees first went to Martinsburg. He testified that he had spoken to the [S]tate’s [Attorney and I, my recollection is that was about 7:00 and that the [S]tate’s [Attorney had ... told him there was probable cause. Let me try to put together consistent with what the law tells me I should do to analyze whether there’s probable cause____ An African American person, a man or woman has been seen whose made a, whose verbalized a connection with Tracy, ... Patricia Collins has seen it, shot these two individuals, has left the scene, has arrived and left the scene in a green van, has a connection with the father of the one victim and the boyfriend of the other, has made threatening statements about the child whose been shot, whose known to have ac — or who’s likely to have access because her father owns a van which somewhat fits the description albeit not a caravan because it’s a Chevrolet, and who was known to be in possession of that van that day because the father ¹⁰¹ said so, Joe Daniels....

Who lives in Martinsburg. And so therefore had the motive, had the possibility certainly of being there, driving in a vehicle that would be available, these events occurred very recently. Again, I don’t know that the police at this point had evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence to prove anything. But they had a substantial amount of information which would cause them to believe that that van might yield some information if they could get a closer look at it.

Search it in the legal term. And I believe that they had that information, let me put it this way, that Corporal Dewees had that information from all that he collected by the time he arrived in Martinsburg at 5:45. The Stop But by that point I believe as I said certainly Corporal Dewees had the information and communicated it to the Martinsburg Police, who did keep a look-out on 110 Georgetown Square and had determined by 9:00 that they would stop the van if it moved and it did. Sergeant Swortwood and Corporal Miller observed the van leaving the parking area of 110 Georgetown Square just about 9:25 and it drove two or three blocks.

They had to turn around apparently. They followed it and followed it about two or three blocks where they stopped it with lights flashing believing that there was, had been a felony committed. They conducted what they call a felony stop. That is they approached from both sides of the van with weapons drawn.

It doesn’t apparently appear to be any problems with [appellant] getting out of the van. She did. They apparently holstered their weapons. Detective Miller conducted some Terry type frisk, determined that she had no weapons and she was outside of the van and yes, right away they announced to her that the van was going to stay where it was and they may have said that before they told her she was free to go, but they also promptly told her that she didn’t have to stay.

There were law enforcement officers coming from Frederick County, Maryland. ¹⁰² The Seizure of the Van So they were very clear, unequivocal. The van was gonna stay where it was until they got a warrant and [appellant] was told that she could leave____The van remained where it was until the search warrant was brought and that came I believe after 1:00. Now as far as the observation of the blood spatter, I think my,, what I’ve ruled so far pretty well covers that,----But between that and the fact that the, this blood splatter was visible, albeit required a flashlight to see it, it was visible. It was outside the van.

It was on the exterior and it was seen. I don’t think detracts from the legitimacy of the search of the van that was, was conducted later. As noted, the gravamen of appellant’s assignment of error regarding the court’s finding that the Martinsburg police had probable cause to stop appellant’s minivan is twofold: (1) that the court, in its factual findings, stated that the officers “had a substantial amount of information which would cause them to believe that [the] van might yield some information if they could get a closer look at it,” a standard which appellant describes as “close in nature to a reasonable suspicion standard [which] is certainly a far cry from reasonable cause”; and (2) that there was no testimony that, at the time of the stop, the