Daniels v. State

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents unusual procedural questions concerning the entry of a “final” judgment on a directed verdict pursuant to Maryland Rule 567 e despite the pendency of a motion for a new trial filed in pursuance of Rule 567 a and the filing of a “motion to correct record” more than thirty days after the inadvertently entered judgment had become enrolled under the provisions of Rule 625 concerning the revisory power of a court over a judgment. ²⁴⁶ As a result of the collision between an automobile owned and operated, respectively, by Norman Eugene Pessin and Claudia Pessin (the Pessins) and a truck owned by the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (W.S.S.C.) and operated by Willie Lee Daniels-(Daniels), Helen Deoudes (a passenger in the automobile) was killed and actions for wrongful death were brought on behalf of Emmanuel G. Deoudes, Stephanie Eleni Deoudes and Renee Maria Deoudes (the Deoudes), surviving husband and children, respectively, of the decedent. The Deoudes, as equitable plaintiffs, brought two actions. One (Law No. 11290/16675 herein referred to as the W.S.S.C. case) was against the W.S.S.C. and the Pessins.

The other (Law No. 11637/17269 herein referred to as the Daniels case) was against Daniels, and he interpleaded the Pessins as third party defendants. The declarations in both cases charged the respective defendants named therein with having operated the respective motor vehicles in a negligent manner and in violation of traffic laws. Subsequently, the Pessins, having settled with the Deoudes, were released but remained in the cases for the purpose of determining responsibility among the possible joint tortfeasors. At the close of all the testimony at the first and second trials, the motions of Norman Eugene Pessin for a directed verdict were granted.

Although the Daniels case was subsequently consolidated with the W.S.S.C. case, the transcript indicates that the clerk continued to make docket entries in both cases according to the titling and/or case number or numbers without reference to the content or text of the particular motion or other pleading presented for filing. But with regard to the docket notations concerning the hearings of motions and the entry of orders, verdicts and judgments, it appears that while some were made in both cases or the particular case to which the notation applied, some (though applicable to both cases) were made in only one of the cases. The first trial of the consolidated cases (on October 21, 1963), before a jury at which Judge Shure presided, resulted in verdicts totaling $18,000 in favor of the Deoudes against both W.S.S.C. and Daniels (as well as Claudia Pessin, the remaining nominal defendant) which (other than a dubious cross ²⁴⁷ reference thereto) were entered in the W.S.S.C. case only. On the timely motion by the Deoudes for a new trial and the motions by the W.S.S.C. and Daniels for an arrest of judgment and for a judgment n.o.v. (all of which motions were filed in both cases), the trial judge, having concluded that the jury had disregarded the instructions of the court, granted the motion for a new trial apparently on the ground that the verdict was inadequate.

At the second trial of the consolidated cases (on April 28, 1964), before a jury at which Judge Moorman presided, the court granted the motion of W.S.S.C. and Daniels for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the Deoudes. The Deoudes promptly made a motion for a new trial as to both Daniels and W.S.S.C., but because it carried the titling and number of the W.S.S.C. case only, the motion was filed (on May 1, 1964) only in the latter case. As a consequence (on May 4, 1964) a judgment for costs on the directed verdict was entered by the clerk in favor of Daniels against the Deoudes before the motion for a new trial was heard. The motion of the Deoudes for a new (third) trial was based primarily on the ground that the court erred in ruling that the negligence of Daniels and W.S.S.C. “did not constitute either a proximate or contributing cause of the accident.” A copy thereof, together with a memorandum in support of the motion, was duly served on counsel for Daniels and W.S.S.C. A hearing on the motion was held on May 14, 1964, but the order granting the new trial was not filed until September 8, 1964.

Apparently the trial judge was