Das v. Das

THIEME, Judge. The genesis of this appeal arises from the strategic decision of Vincent Das (“Husband”) not to attack the suit brought against him by Anuradha Das (“Wife”) frontally but on the flank. His strategy is unsuccessful. The issues that Husband presents to this Court arise from the denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment of absolute divorce entered against him and in favor of his Wife in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

Husband, who now sojourns in India after spiriting away one of the couple’s minor children, filed a subsequent motion to strike this order and requested a hearing. The court addressed his motion by advising counsel that a hearing would be scheduled “on condition that Mr. Das and the minor child, Radha, are present.” Husband appeals and asks: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s motion to vacate the order of default? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or deny Husband due process by not granting a continuance of the divorce hearing? 8.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in granting Wife an absolute divorce? We answer “No” to these questions and explain. Facts The parties were married on August 13,1978, in New Dehli, India. Two children were bom of the marriage: Radha, on October 7,1983, and Jaya, on October 3,1985. ⁷ The parties separated in January 1998, following entry of a domestic violence protective order granted to Wife by the District Court of Montgomery County.

The order granted Wife custody of the children, who are minors. Because the order was set to expire on January 10, 1999, the parties entered into an “Interim Agreement,” reached during voluntary mediation and designed to preserve the status quo for custody and living arrangements, on December 14,1998. The agreement provided that Husband would not “resume residence in the family home” for three months from December 10, 1998, and would “deliver the children’s passports to David S. Goldberg, mediator, for safekeeping.” On January 19, 1999, Wife filed an Emergency Complaint for Custody, which alleged that Husband had undermined her custody of and relationship with Radha in violation of the Interim Agreement and that he had “abused the process to gain possession of his daughter.” 1 The court denied this complaint on January 20, after it conferred with counsel. At this time, the parties agreed through counsel that Wife would retain custody of the children.

Notwithstanding the Interim Agreement and subsequent oral custody agreement, Husband fled the country, taking Radha with him, on or about April 16, and went to Japan, following personal service of the Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce on March 8. 2 Wife neither knew of nor consented to Husband’s plans to remove the child from Maryland. In response, Wife filed a second Emergency Complaint ⁸ for Custody. The Emergency Complaint stated that “Defendant [fled] to Japan with the minor child on or about April 16, 1999, where he arid the child remain at this time.” Husband did not oppose this complaint, because, he alleges, neither he nor his attorney were served. The court granted Wife legal and physical custody of the children by an order issued April 30.

Cheryl P. Vural entered an appearance as counsel on Husband’s behalf on March 25 and moved to strike Wife’s divorce complaint. Neither Husband nor his lawyer, however, appeared for the scheduling conference on April 28, despite the court’s notice to husband mailed on March 19. The court denied Husband’s Motion to Strike on June 1. Before the period for filing an Answer began, Vural moved to strike her own appearance on May 12, and the court granted her motion without a hearing on June 3.

The court immediately mailed Husband Notice to Employ New Counsel. Husband’s residential address before he left the country— and the address used by the court for the divorce proceedings—was 5104 White Flint Drive, Kensington, Maryland 20985. Wife alleges in her opposition to the motion on appeal that Husband continued to pay rent for this apartment home at the time of the post-judgment motions. He used this address on the mediation agreement executed on December 4, 1998, and his own attorney certified in her Motion to Strike Appearance that this address was Husband’s “last known mailing address,” but she also explained that her “various efforts” to contact her client had been unsuccessful and she had not heard from him since April 13.

Husband was thus without representation at the June 30 hearing on pendente lite child support, and Wife testified there that Husband was “to the best of [her] knowledge” in India. 3 The master filed a partial transcript as a report and recommendation, which was sent to Husband at the Kensing ⁹ ton address. Moreover, because Husband did not file an Answer to Wife’s Amended Complaint, Wife requested an Order of Default on June 21, which was entered on June 30. 4 The Clerk mailed Husband a Notice of Default Order at the Kensington address. Concurrent to the custody and divorce actions, a child in need of assistance (CINA) action for Radha was wending its way through the District Court. On May 25, Nancy Karkowsky, Radha’s court-appointed attorney, filed a Praecipe notifying that court and the circuit court that, after first being taken to Japan, Radha was now “staying with the father and the family of the father’s cousin ... in Chandigarh, India.” On June 2, Karkowsky notified the courts in a Second Praecipe of what she believed to be Radha’s exact address in New Delhi, India. 5 Information in both notices as to the whereabouts of Husband and Radha came from Husband’s father.

Copies of these notices were sent to counsel of record for both Husband, i.e., Vural, and Wife. When the divorce trial began on August 11, Gary Segal, Husband’s attorney for employment matters, attended the hearing. He explained that he was “here for Dr. Das,” but because he received little notice he was ill-prepared to enter an appearance and undertake full representation. Segal ad ¹⁰ vised the court that, if he were to enter an appearance, he would petition the court for a continuance; however, at the present time, he “[did] not feel that [he] would be capable of properly defending Dr. Das in this matter.” The court excused Segal, noting that any request for continuance would be denied, which “is pretty typical in our process today.

Under the best of circumstances, cases are not continued____” At trial, Wife testified that she had been subject to repeated acts of physical and mental cruelty during the marriage. Her brother corroborated this testimony. Husband’s father, Badri Das, who had been given power of attorney for Husband’s affairs in the United States, sought to give testimony and present documents to the court. The court allowed him to testify as to Husband’s and Radha’s current locale, which was different from the address Karkowsky provided. 6 The elder Das could not, however, recall their exact address.

The court did not allow the father to speak otherwise on behalf of his son, 7 and the testimony of Wife and her brother went untested by cross-examination. On August 19, the court granted Wife an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruelty and excessively vicious conduct, legal and residential custody of the parties’ minor children, child support, use and possession of the family home and family-use personalty, a monetary award, and attorney’s fees. ¹¹ Husband quickly retained new counsel; however, on October 19, the court denied his Motion to Vacate Order of Default, Stay Entry of Judgment, Permit Filing of Responsive Pleadings, Grant a New Trial and/or Reconsider Award of Custody, and Certain Other Relief. Husband then, on October 26, filed a pleading styled Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Strike Order Dated October 19, 1999, and Set Hearing in Open Court, to which Wife filed opposition. By letter dated November 16,1999, the court addressed this motion by advising counsel: “I do not believe that there is any requirement that I schedule a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order---- However, I will agree to schedule a hearing on the condition that Mr. Das and the minor child, Radha, aré present.” Husband noted a timely appeal on November 24.

Discussion I Standard of Review The question of whether this appeal is ripe for our review has troubled us, and we flirted with dismissing it entirely. Husband appeals a judgment that appears not to be final, yet the trial court’s response to his most recent motion and ministerial failure to deny this motion leave the parties in a deadlock. Husband’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default was filed eleven days after the Judgment of Absolute Divorce was docketed. Husband’s motion was thus a request to revise a final judgment, filed pursuant to the limitations of Maryland Rule 2-535, 8 rather than a motion to alter or amend a non-final judgment filed under the more generous standard of ¹² Maryland Rule 2-534. 9 The instant appeal, at least as framed by the parties, is from the trial court’s denial of that motion.

The problem lies with Husband’s Unopposed [sic ] Motion to Strike Order Dated October 19, 1999, and Set Hearing in Open Court, filed but a single day after the docketing of the court’s order denying Husband’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default. Under Rule 2-534, Husband’s diligence in filing this motion within 10 days of judgment stayed the entry of the court’s order and this appeal. Unnamed Atty. v. Attorney Grievance Comm’n, 303 Md. 473, 486 , 494 A.2d 940 (1985) (“[W]hen a motion to alter or amend an otherwise final judgment is filed within ten days after the judgment’s entry, the judgment loses its finality for purposes of appeal.”); see also Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins.

Co., 333 Md. 136 , 634 A.2d 28 (1993). If the trial court had denied this motion when it replied, Husband could have refiled his notice of appeal, and we would now unhesitatingly address the merits. Unnamed Atty., 303 Md. at 486 , 494 A.2d 940 (if judgment loses finality under revisory motion, “an order of appeal ... becomes ineffective, and a new order of appeal must be filed after the circuit court disposes of the motion”). The court, however, neither granted nor denied Husband’s motion.

Instead, it sent by letter the following: I have reviewed Defendant’s Motion to Strike Order of Court____ I do not believe that there is any requirement that I schedule a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Order of Default, Stay Entry of Judgment---- However, I will agree to schedule a hearing on the condition that Mr. Das and the minor child, Radha, are present. ¹³ In reply, counsel wrote the chancellor, declining to present Husband and his daughter in court because “[t]he issues raised in the motion can be considered in large part on the record =.. and involve primarily legal grounds on which Vincent and his daughter are not necessarily witnesses,” travel from India “is an expensive proposition,” and “Radha is in school, so a trip here could be very disruptive to her education.” He also stated: Your order dated October 19, 1999, and filed October 26, 1999, denied our motion without a hearing. Unless that order is rescinded, and a hearing on the original motion set, our client must appeal the judgment in this case immediately- Husband’s counsel asked the court below to docket this correspondence and proceeded with this appeal, informing us at oral argument that he considered the Motion to Strike to have been denied. The docket, however, shows Husband’s motion as open. Although Wife does not challenge our jurisdiction, we nevertheless address this point.

Popham, 333 Md. at 142 , 634 A.2d 28 (“Unless an appeal is from a final judgment, the appellate court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction to review it”). We believe, however, that the motion remains open due to ministerial error rather than efforts by the trial court to retain jurisdiction. Correspondence from Husband’s counsel indicated his intent to move forward with this appeal. The court’s denial of the Motion to Vacate Order of Default had previously settled the rights of the parties and concluded the cause of action.

Davis v. Davis, 97 Md.App. 1, 10 , 627 A.2d 17 (1993) (holding that final judgment must (1) be intended as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) adjudicate or complete adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) be recorded by the clerk pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-601) (citing Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989), aff'd, 335 Md. 699 , 646 A.2d 365 (1994)). The court itself acknowledged in correspondence that it owed Husband nothing more on the Motion to Vacate Order of Default. Patently, its offer was an effort to secure the return ¹⁴ of the minor child to Maryland, rather than one to delay finality or appellate review. Considerations of judicial efficiency also constrain us to entertain this appeal.

Between counsel’s attempt to cow the trial court into restoring to Husband that which he forfeited and the court’s reply, this matter is frozen in time. Husband is unlikely to return to Maryland, for he reasonably believes that he would incur significant liability. Cf. Popham, 333 Md. at 142 , 634 A.2d 28 (“A judgment is final if it is ‘so far final as ... to deny to the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.’ ”) (quoting In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427 , 125 A. 177 (1924)).

If we were to remand so that Husband could withdraw his Motion to Strike, he would also take action that is arguably contrary to his interests. Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65 , 427 A2d 1002 (1981) (“The law of this State is clear that the ‘right to an appeal may be lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below from which the appeal is taken or by otherwise taking a position which is inconsistent with the right of appeal.’”) (quoting Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630 , 217 A.2d 531, 541 (1966)). He is thus unlikely to do so. If we remanded suggesting that the court below deny his motion, we would be shortly faced with the significant family law issues addressed infra and, meanwhile, the parties, including Wife, would continue'to bear the significant cost of litigation.

Our rules and policy, however, disfavor piecemeal appeals. See, e.g., Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”); State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 25 , 273 A2d 156 (1971) (“The interest of justice is best served if there are not piecemeal appeals.”). By addressing the merits issues now, we encourage their rapid resolution. ¹⁵ That the court below failed in its ministerial duties under Maryland Rule 2-601 (requiring entry, recording, and indexing of judgment) is troubling, but need not be fatal in the circumstances of this case. Cf.

Davis, 97 Md.App. at 10-11 , 627 A.2d 17 (no final judgment existed where clerk entered judgment pursuant to Rule 2-601, but court had not directed such entry of a judgment as defined by Maryland Rule 1-202(n)). Maryland Rule 8-414(a) allows us to correct errors and omissions in the record, and we hereby order pursuant to Rule 8-414(c) that Husband’s Motion to Strike be deemed denied as of November 23, 1999, the date that Husband’s counsel replied to the court’s offer of a hearing. See Davis, 97 Md.App. at 12 , 627 A.2d 17 (ordering correction of docket entries). Husband’s appeal is from the denial of his Motion to Vacate Order of Default, filed under Maryland Rule 2-535, not from the underlying Judgment of Divorce itself.

In Re: Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055/CAD, 344 Md. 458, 475 , 687 A.2d 681 , cert. denied sub nom., Clemy P. v. Montgomery Dept. of Soc. Serv., 520 U.S. 1267 , 117 S.Ct. 2439 , 138 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). Our standard of review here is thus abuse of discretion. See Wormwood v. Batching Systems, Inc., 124 Md.App. 695, 700 , 723 A.2d 568 (citing New Freedom Corp. v. Brown, 260 Md. 383, 386 , 272 A.2d 401 (1971)), cert. denied, 354 Md. 113 , 729 A.2d 405 (1999).

The abuse of discretion standard makes generous allowances for the trial court’s reasoning. Abuse of discretion occurs “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result,” when the ruling is ‘Violative of fact and logic,” or when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.” ¹⁶ North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13-14, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994) (citations omitted). We will not reverse a ruling we review under the abuse of discretion standard simply because we would have made a different ruling had we been sitting as trial judges. Instead, “[t]he real question is whether justice has not been done,” and the judgment will be reversed only if “there is a grave reason for doing so.” Wormwood, 124 Md.App. at 700 , 723 A.2d 568 .

II Motion to Vacate Order of Default We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s motion. Marching behind the banner of Maryland Rule 2-535(b) (“On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.”), Husband attacks the trial court’s exercise of discretion on three fronts. First, he argues that the judgment should be vacated because Wife’s counsel engaged in extrinsic fraud when she requested an Order of Default Judgment using Husband’s Kensington address. Second, he claims that the court acted with irregularity when it granted Vural’s Motion to Strike Appearance without allowing adequate time for response, as required by Maryland Rule 2-311(b). 10 Third, Husband asserts that he acted with due diligence and good faith in moving to set aside the court’s judgment. “A court ... will only exercise its revisory powers if, in addition to a finding of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, the party moving to set aside the enrolled judgment has acted with ordinary ¹⁷ diligence, in good faith, and has a meritorious defense or cause of action.” Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 314 , 648 A.2d 439 (1994).

We shall parry each prong of Husband’s thrust in turn. A Extrinsic Fraud Husband argues that the default judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud because Wife’s attorney filed both her first and second Requests for Order of Default supplying the court with Husband’s Kensington address as his “last known address.” In doing so, he argues, she perpetrated fraud on the court, because she had actual knowledge of Husband’s address in India, and she thus perpetrated a fraud on the court and prevented Husband from presenting his own favorable evidence. 11 Fraud, however, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and, under the instant facts, Husband has not done so. Furthermore, Husband’s own actions to evade the reach of the court and eloign his minor child in another land—including his failure to apprise the court of his change of address once this action began—were, in our view, the predominant causes of his inability to put on his case. The trial court can disturb an enrolled judgment after the thirty-day revisory period only upon a showing of fraud, mistake, irregularity, or the failure of the court to perform a duty required by statute or rule.

Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 6-408 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article; see also Md. Rule 2-535(b). This rule exists to ensure the finality of judgments, see Tandra S., 336 Md. at 314 , 648 A.2d ¹⁸ 439 (citing Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 (1989)), and it applies to all final judgments, including those entered by default. See Maggin v. Stevens, 266 Md. 14, 16 , 291 A.2d 440 (1972) (citing Berwyn Fuel & Feed Co. v. Kolb, 249 Md. 475, 477 , 240 A.2d 239 (1968)).

The term “fraud” as used in Rule 2-535(b) is “narrowly defined and strictly applied.” Tandra S., 336 Md. at 315 , 648 A.2d. 439 . To prevail on a motion to set aside an enrolled judgment, the moving party must show fraud, mistake, or irregularity by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 314 , 648 A.2d 439 . Maryland courts may vacate an enrolled judgment for extrinsic, but not for intrinsic, fraud.

In Hresko v. Hresko, 83 Md.App. 228 , 574 A.2d 24 (1990), we differentiated between these two forms of fraud: Intrinsic fraud is defined as “[t]hat “which pertains to issues involved in the original action or where acts constituting fraud were, or could have been, litigated therein.” Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is “[f]raud which is collateral to the issues tried in the case where the judgment is rendered.” Fraud is extrinsic when it actually prevents an adversarial trial. In determining whether or not extrinsic fraud exists, the question is not whether the fraud operated to cause the trier of fact to reach an unjust conclusion, but whether the fraud prevented the actual dispute from being submitted to the fact finder at all. Id. at 232 , 574 A.2d 24 (citations omitted) (quoting in part Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.1979)). Intrinsic fraud occurs within the ease itself when, for example, a witness perjures himself or a party offers a forged instrument into evidence.

Tandra S., 336 Md. at 316 , 648 A,2d 439 (citing Schwartz v. Merchants Mort. Co., 272 Md. 305, 308 , 322 A.2d 544 (1974)). Even if a perpetrator of intrinsic fraud occasionally succeeds in distorting the truth, our adversarial system is the best hope for ferreting out such deception. On the other hand, extrinsic fraud prevents the ¹⁹ adversarial system from working at all.

It involves infirmities such as “a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing.” Id., 336 Md. at 316-17 , 648 A.2d 439 (quoting Schwartz, 272 Md. at 309 , 322 A.2d 544 ) (quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 , 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878)). Here, Husband fails to establish extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence; instead, the evidence shows that Husband’s own failure to keep the court enlightened of his address and his actions to evade the custody orders of the court below caused his misfortunes. To be sure, Wife’s attorney had at least some notice, from the Second Praecipe filed by Karkowsky on June 2, of Husband’s most recent address before he filed the second Request for Order of Default on June 21. Whether by continuing to use Husband’s old address Wife’s counsel “set forth that type of intentionally deceptive artifice” calculated to keep him away fi*om court, made a mere record-keeping error, or acted with the understanding that Husband had access to mail sent to his Kensington address is rather nebulous from the facts presented.

See Schwartz, 272 Md. at 308 , 322 A.2d 544 . What is patent, however, is that Husband withdrew from the country—in an apparent attempt to remove a minor child from the jurisdiction of Maryland courts—during ongoing litigation. Our rules on a litigant’s duties in the midst of litigation are clear. First, a litigant has a duty to keep himself informed as to the progress of a pending case.

See Penn ²⁰ Cent. Co. v. Buffalo Spring & Equip. Co., 260 Md. 576, 581 , 273 A.2d 97 (1971); Tasea Inv. Corp. v. Dale, 222 Md. 474, 478 , 160 A.2d 920 (1960).

Second, a litigant has “a continuing obligation to furnish the court with [his] most recent address.” Grass v. Grass, 123 Md.App. 311, 320 , 718 A.2d 622 (1998). It was thus no abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that Husband’s wounds were self-inflicted, rather than caused by Wife’s alleged artifice. His assertions to the contrary, Husband was well aware that the case was at issue. 12 He was served in Arlington, Virginia, with the Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce on March 8. 13 He also was notified on March 19 of the Scheduling Conference that he and his attorney later missed. In response to the Amended Complaint, Husband filed a preliminary Motion to Strike under Maryland Rule 2-322(e), because Wife had failed to attach a financial statement to her pleadings.

He filed this motion on March 25, within the 60-day period for timely filing his answer or other responsive pleading. See Md. Rule 2-321(b)(l) (“A defendant who is served with an original pleading outside of the State but within the United States shall file an answer within 60 days after being served.”); see also Md. Rule 2-322(e). Husband left the country on or about April 15. Because “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with a court,” Md. Rule 2-101(a), Husband clearly removed himself from the jurisdiction of the court during an ongoing action of which he was duty-bound to stay apprised.

Furthermore, he breached his duty to inform the court of his new address, even though he was warned by the court at least once to do so. 14 Unlike the defendant in Grass , which Husband cites with approval, no pleading or paper filed by Husband gives any address other ²¹ than the one in Kensington. 123 Md.App. at 320 , 718 A2d 622 . It was reasonable, moreover, for Wife and her attorney to rely on the fact that Husband’s Kensington address was the correct one. At the time of service, his address of record was that address. Husband’s preliminary Motion to Strike used that address.

The letter from Vural to Husband, advising him of her intention to withdraw, and her subsequent Motion to Strike Appearance used that address. Despite Karkowsky’s Second Praecipe, docketed on June 2, which inferred that Husband had settled in a family-owned house in New Delhi, the court itself mailed Husband’s Notice to Employ New Counsel to that address. Husband might argue with scant credibility that the Clerk’s Office should have changed the address of record based on Karkowsky’s praecipe, but we think that receiving such third-hand notice did not obligate the court to change a local address of record, where the litigant seemed to be receiving mail, to a rumored address in a remote land. The facts, moreover, in no way support Husband’s assertion that, by continuing to use the Kensington address, Wife and her attorney deliberately deceived the court and denied Husband the opportunity to present his case.

If Husband could not keep his own father, who held power of attorney, informed of his exact address, how can he reasonably expect his estranged wife to have knowledge of the same? Neither did the court err when it entered the Order of Default. On June 1, the court denied Husband’s Motion to Strike. Under Maryland Rule 2-321(c), 15 Husband’s Answer to the Amended Complaint was thus due on June 16, although the court allowed him until June 19.

When no Answer was forthcoming, Wife filed a Request for Order of Default on June 21, giving as Husband’s “last known address” the Kensington location. See Md. Rule 2-613(b). The time for plead ²² ing having expired, and upon written request of the plaintiff, the court entered its Order of Default as Rule 2-613(b) requires. 16 See Carter v. Harris, 312 Md. 371 , 539 A.2d 1127 (1988) (for Rule 2-613, “the word ‘shall’ is presumed to have a mandatory meaning inconsistent with the exercise of discretion” unless the context indicates otherwise). When Husband failed to move timely for vacation of that order, see Md. Rule 2-613(d), 17 the court held a hearing as required by Maryland Rule 9-204 18 and entered its Judgment of Absolute Divorce on August 19.

The court below, moreover, properly denied Husband’s motion to stay that judgment, 19 even though his motion was filed on August 30, within thirty days after its entry. See Md. Rule 2-535(a) (“On motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment and, if the action was tried before the court, may take any action that it could have taken under Rule 2-534.”). Rule 2-613(g) expressly provides that default judgments are not subject to the broad revisory powers of Rules 2-534 and 2-535(a) except as to the relief granted. The judge’s powers are thus constrained, even during the first thirty days, and the court below did not'abuse its discretion by refusing to stay the judgment or revise the relief granted.

See also Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 619-21 , 541 A.2d 969 (1988). Instead, Rule 2-535(b), which ²³ covers motions to vacate for fraud, mistake, and irregularity made after thirty days have passed, provides Husband’s only legitimate basis for argument. He has failed to establish at the threshold that Wife and her attorney had defrauded the court below. Rather, it appears that Husband, contrary to his mediation agreement with Wife and in violation of the court’s later custody order, scurried from the court’s jurisdiction with his minor daughter and played three-card monte with respect to his whereabouts.

When it refused to reward such chicanery, the eourt below exercised sound discretion. We uphold its judgment. B Motion to Strike Appearance Husband’s second claim is that the court acted with irregularity when it granted the Motion to Strike Appearance filed by Vural. Husband argues that the court failed to allow adequate time for response, as required by Maryland Rule 2-311(b). 20 Because the court file contained information indicating that he was out of the country, Husband contends, and no Answer had been filed, the court should have held a hearing prior to granting Vural’s Motion to Strike Appearance, presumably so that he would not have been left without counsel as the deadline for filing the Answer approached.

Just as Husband cannot prove extrinsic fraud, he cannot prove irregularity. Irregularity, like fraud, provides very narrow grounds for revising a final judgment under Rule 2-535(b). Tandra S., 336 Md. at 318 , 648 A.2d 439 . ²⁴ Irregularity, as used in Rule 2—535(b), has been defined as “the doing or not doing of that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conformable to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done.” ... “[I]rregularity, in the contemplation of the Rule, usually means irregularity of process or procedure ... and not an error, which in legal parlance, generally connotes a departure from truth or accuracy of which a defendant had notice and could have challenged.” Id. (quoting Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 631 , 331 A.2d 291 (1975) (citations omitted)); see also Hughes v. Beltway Homes, 276 Md. 382, 388-89 , 347 A.2d 837 (1975); Berwyn Fuel & Feed Co., 249 Md. at 479 , 240 A.2d 239 .

Here, we find no error in the process and procedure of the instant case when the court decided to accept counsel’s Motion to Strike Appearance. Maryland Rule 2-132(b) requires that motions for withdrawal that are not made in open court be accompanied by the client’s written consent to the withdrawal or the moving attorney’s certificate that notice has been mailed to the client at least five days prior to the filing of the motion, informing the client of the attorney’s intention to move for withdrawal and advising the client to have another attorney enter an appearance or to notify the clerk in writing of the client’s intention to proceed in proper person. Unless the motion is granted in open court, the court may not order the appearance stricken before the expiration of the time prescribed by Rule 2-311 for responding. The court may deny the motion if withdrawal of the appearance would cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice.

Under Maryland Rule 2-311(b), the litigant who is served with such a motion “shall file a response within 15 days after being served ... or within the time allowed for a party’s original pleading pursuant to Rule 2-321(a), whichever is later.” As required by Rule 2-132(b), Vural sent notice to Husband of her impending withdrawal by letter on April 28, advising him to “immediately obtain alternative counsel and have them enter their appearance on your behalf.” After waiting consid ²⁵ erably more than five days thereafter, and hearing nothing from Husband, Vural moved the court on May 12, attaching a copy of this letter to her papers to support her statement certifying she had notified him of her withdrawal. The court granted her motion on June 3, more than 18 days after its filing and service. Husband cites with approval Ritter v. Danbury, 15 Md.App. 309 , 290 A.2d 173 (1972), in which, he claims, we vacated the judgment of the trial court for refusing to consider a party’s request not to permit her counsel to withdraw. Ritter is inapposite, however, because Husband misrepresents what transpired in that case.

In Ritter , Danbury’s counsel moved to strike appearance by petition, and his motion had been granted “immediately following the filing of their petition and consent thereto,” i.e., the client gave his permission to withdraw. Id. at 313 , 290 A.2d 173 (emphasis added). Ritter appealed and complained that he had not been served with notice of the withdrawal of Danbury’s counsel. We agreed.

In Ritter , as here, client consent was a non-issue, because the withdrawing attorney followed the rule for client notification or consent. Moreover, Ritter’s analysis clarifies the rationale behind the service requirement of Rule 2-132(b) for motions not made in open court: It protects parties to the case other than the withdrawing counselor’s client. “[E]xcept where a motion to withdraw or strike an appearance is made in open court in the presence of the other party or his attorney ... such motion shall be served upon the other party or his attorney—” Id. at 313-14 , 290 A.2d 173 . Thus, once the client has granted consent or the five-day notification period passes, the protective force of Rule 2-132(b) shifts to shield from disadvantage the other parties in the case. By not responding to Vural’s letter within five days or, as a practical matter, before Vural could file her motion, Husband slept on his rights and lost the opportunity to protest her withdrawal.

For the same reason, Husband was not entitled to a hearing on counsel’s attempts to locate him before the court allowed her to withdraw. Rule 2-132 imposes no hearing requirement for motions made by petition. ²⁶ Moreover, Husband’s present contention that he lacked the notice he needed to retain new counsel strains credibility. In the very motion on appeal, Husband claimed to have dismissed Vural: During this same time period, Defendant became dissatisfied with the services of Ms. Vural, and sought new counsel. Defendant paid a retainer to Edouard Bouquet, Esquire, and signed pleadings, including ¿n answer to the amended complaint, but was faxing these pleadings from overseas, and did not know why they were never filed.

If his allegations are true, Vural’s withdrawal and the court’s subsequent Notice to Employ New Counsel were no surprise. In his own words, he “did expect to be represented by new counsel in this case.” Whether or not Vural’s withdrawal was expected, however, the duty to stay informed and file pleadings in timely fashion ultimately lay with Husband, and not with his attorney, incumbent or newly retained. In Banegura, 312 Md. at 609 , 541 A.2d 969 , the court refused to find an irregularity when appellant’s personal attorney failed to file responsive pleadings because he had not been retained for that particular action, concluding that [t]he irregularity suggested by Banegura was the discrepancy that existed between his version of why Burke did not file an answer or timely motion, and the version given by Burke. This is clearly not the type of irregularity contemplated by Rule 2-535(b)---- Id. at 621 , 541 A.2d 969 .

Likewise, in the case sub judice, any misunderstandings between Husband and Vural or Husband and Bouquet about the filing of the Answer are his responsibility and need not have been considered by the court. See also Wooddy v. Wooddy, 256 Md. 440, 454 , 261 A.2d 486 (1970) (negligence or