Davidson v. Seneca Crossing Section II Homeowner's Ass'n

WOODWARD, Judge. Appellant, David S. Davidson, initiated this litigation by filing suit against appellees, Seneca Crossing Section II Housing Association, Inc. (“the Association”), Azadeh Kaider (“Azadeh”), Brian Kaider (“Brian”), Lourdes Sandoval (“Lourdes”), and Santiago Sandoval (“Santiago”). 1 The individual appellees are past and present members of the Association’s Board of ⁶¹⁰ Directors. The complaint, as amended, sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief regarding the administration of the Association, as well as damages for defamation. Appellees filed a counterclaim for injunctive relief and damages for private nuisance and libel.

Relief was denied on all of the parties’ claims, by court rulings or jury verdict, except for appellees’ counterclaim for injunctive relief. The circuit court, sitting as a court of equity, found in favor of appellees on their counterclaim and entered a permanent injunction against appellant, which proscribed certain conduct and communications by appellant regarding appellees, as is more fully set forth below. This timely appeal followed. Appellant presents for our review a multitude of questions, which we have distilled and rephrased into three questions: 2 ⁶¹¹ I. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in granting a permanent injunction in favor of appellees and against appellant?

II

Did the trial court’s granting of a permanent injunction violate appellant’s constitutional right to freedom of speech?

III

Did the trial court commit reversible error in making certain substantive and procedural rulings in the course of the litigation? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND Seneca Crossing Section II is a residential subdivision in Germantown, Montgomery County, consisting of approximately 55 homes. The Association is a corporate entity comprised of the 55 homes, each home having a voting right within the Association.

The community is small, with the majority of the homes located along Summer Sweet Terrace, which is an approximately two-block-long street with a cul de sac at each end. Appellant purchased his home in the Seneca Crossing Section II community at 20700 Summer Sweet Terrace in March of 1999. Shortly thereafter, appellant became active in the Association. As set forth more fully below, appellant’s relationship with the Association deteriorated and grew hostile and antagonistic.

In 2003, the Association hired a new management company, and appellant was unhappy with the services provided by that company. Appellant “complained about dues going up and services going down.” Appellant also believed “that certain people on the board of directors [of the ⁶¹² Association] were getting preferred service.” Appellant took some of his issues to the Montgomery County Commission on Common Ownership Communities and a settlement was ultimately reached. On November 27, 2006, appellant filed a complaint against appellees and others for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and mandamus, regarding certain actions of the Association. On December 18, 2006, appellees filed an answer and counterclaim for injunctive relief, private nuisance, and libel of Azadeh.

At about the same time, Lourdes, Santiago, Azadeh, and Lydia Marzouk, individually, sought peace orders against appellant from the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. After the parties, including appellant, participated in alternative dispute resolution, a settlement was reached. On December 12, 2006, consent final peace orders were entered in favor of Lourdes, Santiago, Azadeh, and Marzouk. Thereafter, in the instant litigation, appellant amended his complaint on several occasions.

Ultimately, on September 17, 2007, appellant filed a Fifth Amended Complaint, which contained a total of six counts: (I) “breach of contract, shareholder derivative action request for declaratory relief, request for injunctive relief, request for attorney’s fees,” (II) defamation against Azadeh, (III) defamation against Lee Newbegin, (IV) defamation against Santiago, (V) defamation against Marzouk, and (VI) defamation against the Association. In an order dated October 22, 2007, the circuit court dismissed counts I and V of appellant’s Fifth Amended Complaint. In an order entered on March 10, 2008, the circuit court dismissed count III. Appellant’s defamation claims against Azadeh, Santiago, and the Association, appellees’ counterclaim for private nuisance, and libel of Azadeh were tried to a jury on March 31, 2008 to April 3, 2008.

In the same proceeding, evidence was received on appellees’ counterclaim for injunctive relief. At the close of appellant’s case, appellees moved for judgment, which was granted in regard to counts II and IV, ie., the defamation counts against Azadeh and Santiago. At the conclusion of the ⁶¹³ trial, appellant moved for judgment on appellees’ counterclaim for private nuisance, which was granted. The jury denied relief on all of the remaining claims, to wit, appellant’s defamation against the Association and Azadeh’s libel against appellant.

The trial court held appellees’ counterclaim for injunctive relief under advisement. Thereafter, in an order entered on May 7, 2008, the circuit court ruled in favor of appellees on their counterclaim for injunctive relief and entered a permanent injunction against appellant. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be included as necessary for our discussion of the issues presented in this appeal.

DISCUSSION I. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in granting a permanent injunction in favor of appellees and against appellant? Standard of Review The relevant standard of review was articulated by the Court of Appeals in El Bey v. Moorish Science Temple of America, 362 Md. 339, 353 , 765 A.2d 132 (2001). The Court stated: When reviewing a judgment arising from a bench trial, we must “review the case on both the law and the evidence” but we must not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, for we must give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Additionally, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, deciding not whether the trial judge’s conclusions were correct, but whether they were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Where, as here, the appeal concerns the issuance of a permanent injunction, we proceed with certain principles of injunctive relief guiding our review: ⁶¹⁴ An injunction is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience. Thus, injunctive relief is a preventative and protective remedy, aimed at future acts, and is not intended to redress past wrongs.

Id. at 353-54 , 765 A.2d 132 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Was there sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a permanent injunction? Appellant makes several allegations of error concerning the factual and legal basis for the trial court’s issuance of a permanent injunction. We will address each argument in turn, after first setting forth the precise findings and order of the circuit court and a summary of the evidence supporting those findings.

The Circuit Court’s Opinion and Order In rendering its opinion and order for injunctive relief, the trial court found: 1. [Appellant] sent unsolicited correspondence to [individual appellees] and other members of the Association that contained demeaning, harassing and gratuitously vulgar language; 2. [Appellant] made vulgar and harassing gestures to [individual appellees] and other members of the Association without cause, justification or provocation; 3. [Appellant] used obscenities, loud, antagonistic and overly boisterous tones at meetings and gatherings of the members of the Association that disrupted such meetings and interfered with the Association’s ability to conduct its business affairs; 4. [Appellant’s] conduct resulted in harassment of the Association’s Board members and its agents including [individual appellees]; ⁶¹⁵ 5. [Appellant’s] unreasonable and outrageous conduct, verbal attacks, written words (through e-mails and letters), manner, demeanor and method of speaking has placed [individual appellees] in fear of bodily harm and that such actions constitute harassment of them; 6. [Appellant’s] unreasonable and outrageous conduct (including but not limited to those actions described in Paragraphs 1-5 above), has resulted in the disruption of [individual appellees’] peaceful use and enjoyment of their respective properties and Association common areas; 7. [Appellant’s] unreasonable and outrageous conduct, verbal attacks, written words (through e-mails and letters), manner, demeanor and method of speaking with [individual appellees] and other members and agents of the Association at meeting and other functions and gatherings of the Association, constituted an unreasonable disruption to the Association and resulted in interference with the Association’s ability to manage its affairs, conduct peaceful and businesslike meetings, transact business and tend to the affairs of the Association; 8. The acts of [appellant], set forth herein above resulted in irreparable injury under [Coster v. Department of Personnel, 36 Md.App. 523 , 373 A.2d 1287 (1977)] and [Harford County Education Association v. Board of Education, 281 Md. 574 , 380 A.2d 1041 (1977)], [El Bey v. Moorish Science Temple of America, 362 Md. 339, 355-56 , 765 A.2d 132 (2001)]. Based on these findings, the circuit court, in its injunction, ordered that appellant: 1. Shall not commit or threaten to commit any act or conduct himself in any manner that harasses, causes bodily harm, threatens to cause bodily harm or places Azadeh [ ], Brian [ ], Lourdes [ ], and/or Santiago [ ] in fear of bodily harm; 2.

Shall not use spoken or written words towards Azadeh [ ], Brian [ ], Lourdes [ ], Santiago [ ], and/or any member of the Association, including its Board members ⁶¹⁶ (past or present) or agents, that harass[ ], tend to incite a breach of the peace or invoke a physical or violent response; 3. Shall not use spoken or written words, conduct or actions of a lewd, obscene, profane, defamatory and/or insulting manner towards Azadeh [ ], Brian [ ], Lourdes [ ], Santiago [ ], and/or any member of the Association, including its Board members (past or present) or agents, which by their very utterance harass, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace; 4. Shall not verbally harass, attack or send any written communication (including but not limited to e-mails, facsimiles and/or letters) of a demeaning and harassing nature to Azadeh [], Brian [], Lourdes [], Santiago [], and/or any member of the Association, including its Board members (past or present) or agents; 5. Shall not enter the residence and/or real property of Azadeh [ ], Brian [ ], Lourdes [ ], and/or Santiago [ ]; 6.

Shall not initiate contact with Azadeh [], Brian [], Lourdes [ ], and/or Santiago [ ], in any manner, including but not limited to e-mails, letters, facsimiles, telephone or in person at their respective places of business, their residences or their real property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to the limitations set forth in Paragraph 7 below, in the event that one of [individual appellees] is, at the time of the intended communication, serving as a member of the Association Board of Directors or in the event the communication is one related to Association business, [appellant] may send written correspondence to that person but only by postal mail delivery, sent to care of the Association’s management company; 7. Shall not communicate (verbally and/or in writing) with any member of the Association, including its Board members (past or present) or agents, using profane, intimidating, threatening, harassing, vulgar or offensive language that would tend to, by their very utterance, inflict injury and/or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace; and ⁶¹⁷ 8. Shall not use obscenities, loud, antagonistic and overly boisterous tones at meetings and gatherings of the members of the Association so as to disrupt such meetings or interfere with the Association’s ability to conduct its business in a business like and efficient manner; and it is FURTHER ORDERED, that any breach of this Order will subject [appellant] to sanctions, damages and/or any other remedy that may be determined by this Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction.

The Evidence The trial below spanned three days, with the jury rendering its verdict on a fourth day, and included the testimony of twelve individuals and substantial documentary evidence spanning the years 2008 to 2006. Taken in a light most favorable to appellees, as prevailing parties, the evidence tended to show a pattern of obscene, vulgar, belittling, and harassing communications sent from appellant to appellees; a pattern of threatening and disruptive behavior against appellees; and, actual acts, which along with the forgoing threats and behaviors, caused harm to appellees. Appellant’s Communications The communications entered into evidence spanned several years and included statements from appellant to various Association Board members and agents. The evidence included: • Appellant’s September 2003 email to Association Board member Marzouk stating: “You are an uneducated, ignoramus!.] Do not ever contact me via email, you ballbusting trash....

Do not ever contact me personally, bitch.” • Appellant’s October 2003 email to the Association’s email address, in which appellant addressed Marzouk: Your bitchy bait-and-switching attempts to obfuscate the real dispute/issue, by saying ‘threatening this or threatening that’ is vacuous, Bitch. ⁶¹⁸ You have absolutely no self-respect. Even after you’ve been exposed as an empty life person.... Fuck you, bitch. See your ugly ass in court! • Appellant’s October 2003 email, copied to the Association, in which appellant stated to the then-President of the Association to “be sure to keep your leased penis extender (aka Corvette) nice and clean ...

All Heil [sic] the shortshitt [sic] Napoleon.” • • Appellant’s September 2005 email to an attorney representing the Association calling him a “mercenary cunt[ ]” and stating: “You have a better chance of seeing jesús fucking christ, than you do of seeing me ‘settle’ with you cocksuckers ever again .... And I don’t ‘get mad.’ I get litigious.” • Appellant’s September 2004 email to Linda Wildman, an employee of the Association’s management company, stating: I would remind the whole stinking lot of you azzholes [sic] that you can be replaced if it is the PROACTIVE wishes of we homeowners, disregarding the perennial bitch named Lydia Marzouk; and her sycophant, the impotent little man named Jack Zavin. And by the way, their move to illictly [sic] ‘grandfather’ in the IIDIOT [sic] they did for ‘president’—will not stand scrutiny. ... • Appellant’s February 2005 email to Wildman stating: “You think this is poker bluffing, don’t you? Behold what unfolds in the courts, Ms. Wildass.

Have a nice day stirring your cauldron, beeee Yatch!” • Appellant’s September 2005, email to Wildman and a principal of the Association’s management company, Rick Szajna, stating: Rickyboy— Read this well, buttsquirt. ⁶¹⁹ Today sometime your attorney will inform you that the undersigned’s attorney ... will be present at the [Association] meeting. Your days are numbered as [the Association’s] “manager,” you ignorant sonofabitch. So bring your best sissy la-la ‘fight,’ motherfucker. [Appellant] • Appellant’s April 2006 email to Szajna stating: “HEY RICK. YOU MFER, what do you think of me now, you henpecked, 2-inch pecker’d MFer?” According to the testimony adduced at trial, these communications were representative of those sent by appellant to the Association’s Board members and agents.

Wildman testified that the Association “had received a million e-mails from [appellant] over the [year prior to September 2005].” According to her testimony, Wildman had “a file probably [a foot thick] of emails from [appellant].” The emails were “[a]lways harassing.... [T]hey never made much sense, just harassing.” In the course of her testimony, Wildman reviewed the September 2004 and February 2005 emails to her from appellant, which were admitted into evidence. She then testified that the “couple of emails ... just reviewed” were “similar to the stack of emails that [she had] indicated [she had] received.” Wildman further testified that the emails were copied to the Association’s Board members. Marzouk testified to receiving the October 2003 email calling her a “bitch,” and testified that she had “reeeive[d] similar emails ... from [appellant] while [she] was on the board.” Marzouk added that the Board of Directors “reeeive[d] copies of letters [appellant] had sent to the management company where he had referenced [Marzouk] or other board members in a similar fashion.” Marzouk also testified that the emails she received from appellant “in the four-year period while [she][was] on the board,” which spanned June 2000 to June 2004, were similar to the October 2003 email from appellant, in which appellant called Marzouk a “bitch.” ⁶²⁰ Robert Gittens, the Association’s attorney in 2005 and 2006, testified to regularly receiving emails from appellant. According to Gittens, the emails were very graphic.

There was always very salty language involved. They were personally attacking. They only very loosely had anything to do with the litigation itself. It seemed to be a form of entertainment for [appellant].

Jack Zavin, a resident and Association Board member, testified that appellant “ha[d] personally communicated with anybody that was on the board in probably the most offensive manner I’ve ever seen and heard ... in e-mails that I wouldn’t want my wife or kids to see.” According to Zavin, appellant had sent both emails and letters through the mail. He further testified that the contents of the emails were “rude,” “include[d] four letter words,” and “includ[ed] anti-Semitic remarks.” Threats and Disruptive Behavior There was also substantial evidence about appellant’s threats and disruptive behavior in relation to the Association, its Board members, and agents. Zavin testified to appellant’s disruptive actions at Association meetings: “Since the beginning of when we were established as [the Association,] [appellant] would routinely come to the meetings and then would raise his voice. Would scream at other people and do other stuff to disrupt the meeting.” Zavin testified that he could not “recall one meeting that ... the ...

Association [had] where [appellant] wasn’t destructive in some form or fashion.” According to Zavin, the situation with appellant was “unmanageable.” Zavin testified that at Association meetings appellant “would stand up and yell at the board members or anybody, stating that we were not doing our duty.... It was just a string of allegations.” Zavin added, “[s]ome of us have felt threatened to the point of which we will not walk on the sidewalk in front of [appellant’s] house.” Zavin also testified that, in the past, appellant “ha[d] ⁶²¹ come past in his truck while [Zavin] was walking the dog and raised his middle finger at me and screamed a whole string of obscenities and then sped up the block,” and that “there ha[d] been other instances like that.” Lourdes, Santiago’s wife, testified that, after becoming involved with the Association and having occasion to meet appellant, her impression of appellant was that he was “argumentative, expressing his issues quite aggressively with foul language and intimidation].” According to Lourdes, appellant consistently behaved in this manner at meetings. Lourdes also testified to one occasion where appellant left a message on her home answering machine “talking about court documents or something to that effect.” The message concluded with appellant “us[ing] slurs in Spanish,” which “in English would be coward homosexual.” Lourdes stated that she found this message “threatening,” and she “felt violated.” She “called the police a few days later” after receiving the message. Several days after that, Lourdes received another similar message, again using the slur “cowardly homosexual or coward homosexual.” After receiving the second message, Lourdes was “very scared” and again called the police.

Thereafter, Lourdes sought a peace order “to protect [her]self from being contacted again” and “to protect my family.” According to Lourdes, appellant had a reputation in the community as being “[s]omebody that is feisty, scary[,] ... [and] that insults people, [and] has an aggressive nature.” As a result of appellant’s behavior, Lourdes was “always nervous and live[d] in constant anxiety.” Marzouk testified that, after moving into the community in 1999, she had a very friendly relationship with appellant, his wife, and other neighbors. However, after Marzouk was elected to the Association’s Board, her relationship with appellant began to change. Appellant “started to express more dissatisfaction with the board and started making more personal complaints and verbal assaults.” According to Marzouk, appellant “started using a lot of profanity. His communications were very hostile.

He called [the Board] by ... bad names, derogatory [names].” Marzouk noted that appellant ⁶²² “started communicating more through the management company but there were times when he got so dissatisfied and the e-mails were so nasty that [she] asked him to stop communicating with [her] personally and to please keep everything official through the management company.” Appellant referred to Marzouk as “Lydia the bitch Marzouk[,] Perennial bitch, ‘ho president, vacuous bitch[,] ... lard ass[,] and a two-ton Tanya.’ ” According to Marzouk, appellant “indicated that he knew things about [her] husband’s whereabouts that [she] never told [appellant,] ... [and] made reference to [her] children in one of the letters that he sent around the neighborhood.” This behavior from appellant caused Marzouk to be “very disgusted that [appellant] was watching [her].” Marzouk also described appellant’s behavior at Association meetings: [Appellant] usually dominated the meeting. He was very loud, always interrupting. [The Association] tried to have, follow procedures and have some control over the meeting as far as following those procedures and having order. But [appellant] was very loud, always interrupting, always making accusations. Sometimes he’d stand up or hit the table kind of loud.

I was just basically scared to say much at the meetings for fear of becoming somebody that he was going to yell at or focus on. I felt very threatened ... like he had a lot of anger towards me. And that scared me a lot. Marzouk further testified that this pattern of communication lasted for years and was evident in other communications received from appellant by the management company and other Board members.

Azadeh, Brian’s wife, testified that she lived in the community from 1999 to 2007. Azadeh became actively involved with the Association in 2003. Azadeh testified to one event on September 22, 2003, in which appellant threatened another member of the Board of Directors: ⁶²³ [Appellant] approached me in a very agitated and angry manner and he made a threat to put a round between another board member’s eyes. What I remember is that [appellant] came to me and he said “You tell that Williams [ (the then-president of the Association) ] that if he ever insults me again, I will place a round between his eyes.

And he knows exactly what I’m talking about.” [Appellant] was angry. He was red in the face. And he was stumbling over and ... I believe he was drunk.

At the time, Azadeh was with “[her] kids, [her] friend’s children, and the caretaker of the kids.” The event “horrified” and “terrified” Azadeh. The police were called as a result of this incident. Acts and Impact Appellant’s acts periodically went beyond threats and intimidation, which had a palpable effect on the Association and its members. Wildman testified that she and Szajna attended a meeting of the Association on September 21, 2005.

According to Wild-man, the following transpired at that meeting: When the President of the board at that time, Mr. Lee Newbegin went to open the meeting, [appellant] became very volatile at Mr. Newbegin and then I realized who [appellant] was. I had never met [appellant] before that time. And ... [Szajna] went to introduce himself ... because we had received a million e-mails from him over the past year at that point.... At that point [appellant] became, he was, his language was horrible and Mr. Newbegin told him to be quiet. [Szajna] went over and there became some very violent posturing and [Szajna] asked [appellant] if he would just [go] outside and they got up and they went outside.

And ⁶²⁴ then they got into a physical confrontation and I followed them with my cell phone and other people in attendance at the meeting were asking me to call the police, which I did do. ❖ * * They were right up in each other’s face, you know, just with their hands and then [Szajna] turned and like went to walk away and [appellant] at that time struck him. ... [H]e struck him in the back.... Well, [Szajna] turned around ... and he didn’t strike him back. The police came and you have to understand that this is in a community center and all kinds of children were at that time at practice.... So their parents, the children and everybody else were walking by____ So the police came and they basically broke it up and took [appellant] away. [3] According to Wildman, this event was “frightening to everybody that was in the room” and “was almost a knock down, drag out fight.” Wildman stated that, “from [appellant’s] past actions and his volatile e-mails and everything else it would not have surprised [her] if [appellant] ... had a gun in” the box that he brought with him to the September 21, 2005 meeting.

Ultimately, appellant’s behavior towards Wildman and the Association contributed to her leaving her position as property manager. According to Zavin, appellant’s behavior at the Association’s meetings made the Board of Directors feel “threatened,” and the Association “actually had to hire [an] off duty Montgomery County Police Officer” to be present at those meetings. ⁶²⁵ Lourdes summed up the impact of appellant’s acts on her home life this way: I’m always nervous and I live in constant anxiety. I don’t walk around the neighborhood at all. I used to do that once in a while.

I don’t do that at all. I’m terrified of going to get my mail because that means I have to get close to [appellant’s] house. Every time I have to go back home I feel trapped because that means I have to get into the cul de sac I have to go through his house. It’s the only entrance....

I feel scared to the point that I have avoided the local grocery stores, the local vendors, the dry cleaners, the local businesses to make sure that there’s no potential encounter with him at all. * * * . .. [W]e use[d] to have barbecues with the neighbors. We used to have parties for the children for Halloween and we no longer do that because you know, that creates problems, creates issues and we are always questioned about everything. We can’t talk freely with neighbors.... I don’t even dare to wave to anybody because when we did that once to [appellant] he was driving his truck around the cul de sac and instead of waving back he pulled down his window and gave us the finger.

And he drives his motorcycles around the cul de sac and you know, squeaks the wheels and things like that. And it’s intimidating and its’s very uncomfortable. Lourdes went on to note that she “was afraid this pattern [of threatening behavior by appellant] was going to continue and” she remained scared “to this day.” Marzouk testified similarly: I might see [appellant] on the street, but I always avoided him. ... I knew about some previous incident that had happened in the neighborhood and I didn’t [want] to have any interaction with him. ⁶²⁶ ...

Basically I tried not to walk on [appellant’s] side of the street. If I see him outside I directly do anything I can to avoid him, because I believe that he watches people coming and going in the neighborhood.... I always make sure to pick up my son from the bus stop or have somebody else pick up my son---- [T]he. front of [appellant’s] house has [a] view to the back of my house. And I always shut the windows, shut the drapes, shut the blinds so that [appellant] can’t see into my personal life and space.

Marzouk also sought a peace order against appellant. Marzouk testified that she was “sick and tired of being contacted by [appellant] and being harassed by [appellant].” She “didn’t want to be a part of anything more to do with [appellant,] [and] ... had informed him at least twice in print, ‘Don’t contact me anymore.’ ” Finally, Marzouk testified that, “based on [her] interactions with [appellant] over this period of time,” she had “decided to leave the community even though [she] love[d] [her] home dearly.” Azadeh explained that she brought a claim of libel against appellant “based on the harassment that [she] [had] received ever since [she] got on the board and ever since [she had] been off of it until today.” According to Azadeh, the Kaiders moved out of the community because of the statements and acts by appellant. Azadeh testified as to why she was seeking injunctive relief: My family has been through a lot. My children have been through a lot.

I’ve been through a lot. My husband has been affected by this. Not only do we want to be left alone for good, we feel that we need to be compensated for what we’ve been through. ... I actually sought medical attention in 2003 after I got off the board.

And I’m on anxiety and antidepressant medication. ⁶²⁷ Azadeh testified that appellant’s harassment of her did not stop when she got off the Board and, as of the time of trial, was “still going on.” Appellant’s Contentions Appellant argues that “[ajppellees failed to meet their burden of proof: they did not present a factually and legally sufficient basis for the award of the permanent injunction.” In particular, appellant first contends that the majority of the documentary evidence was “three to five years old by the time the matter came to trial” and that the “only substantive testimony ... was that [ajppellant was allegedly loud, boisterous, tended to yell, used profanities and obscenities, and had once given some people ‘the finger.’ ” We disagree. Appellees filed their counterclaim in December of 2006, and the matter came to trial, after protracted discovery and motions by each side, in March of 2008. Although the documentary evidence spanned 2003 through 2006, such evidence was not inherently stale or irrelevant to appellees’ claim. To the contrary, the documentary evidence demonstrated a long, sustained, pattern of harassing communications by appellant to appellees.

The testimonial evidence similarly demonstrated that appellant harbored unrelenting animosity towards the Association, its Board members, and its agents, and as a result, appellant harassed, threatened, intimidated, and insulted those involved with the Association and acted in a manner that disrupted the Association’s meetings and its efforts to carry out its business. The evidence clearly evinced more than the mere loud and boisterous conduct that appellant claims. In sum, the evidence of appellant’s years of harassing, threatening, intimidating, and insulting conduct directed toward the Association, its Board members, and its agents, was persuasive and substantial. Irreparable Harm.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to “identify the nature of the substantial and irreparable harm ⁶²⁸ that” appellant’s conduct would cause. 4 In Coster v. Department of Personnel, 36 Md.App. 523 , 373 A.2d 1287 (1977), we relied on American Jurisprudence’s treatment of the necessity of irreparable injury for an injunction: “A court of equity reserves its injunctive process for the protection of property or other rights against actual or threatened injuries of a substantial character which cannot be adequately remedied in a court of law. That is to say, the jurisdiction or power to grant injunctive relief should be exercised only when intervention is essential to effectually protect property or other rights, of which equity will take cognizance, against irreparable injuries. The very function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against irreparable mischief or injury, and the remedy will not be awarded where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the injury complained of is not of such character. Suitors may not resort to a court of equity to restrain acts, actual or threatened, merely because they are illegal or transcend constitutional powers, unless it is apparent that ⁶²⁹ irremediable injury will result.

The mere assertion that apprehended acts will inflict irreparable injury is not enough. The complaining party must allege and prove facts from which the court can reasonably infer that such would be the result.” Id. at 525-26 , 373 A.2d 1287 (quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 49). We also said that “an injury is irreparable, within the law of injunctions, where it is of such a character that a fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law, so that to refuse the injunction would be a denial of justice—in other words, where, from the nature of the act, or from the circumstances surrounding the person injured, or from the financial condition of the person committing it, it cannot be readily, adequately, and completely compensated for with money.” Id. at 526, 373 A.2d 1287 (quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 49). The trial court specifically found that appellant’s actions had “resulted in irreparable injury.” The unambiguous implication of this finding, and the court’s other findings, was that, if left unaddressed, these injuries would continue on into the future.

The trial court found a sustained pattern, over three to four years, of “demeaning, harassing and gratuitously vulgar language,” “vulgar and harassing gestures,” “inter-fer[ence] with the Association’s ability to conduct its business and affairs,” “harassment,” “unreasonable and outrageous conduct,” and “verbal attacks” by appellant directed against the Association, its Board members, and its agents. Moreover, appellant’s conduct, according to the trial court, “placed [the individual appellees] in fear of bodily harm” and “resulted in the disruption of [the individual appellees’] peaceful use and enjoyment of their respective properties and Association common areas.” These injuries to appellees’ interest in being free from harassment and threat of violence, to their interest in being able to peacefully use and enjoy their property, and to their interest in being able to contribute to the administration ⁶³⁰ of the Association, are the types of harm that cannot be compensated by a monetary award and that justify the court’s issuance of injunctive relief. In sum, the trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence in the record that appellant’s conduct “caused, or was likely to cause, [appellees] irreparable harm.” El Bey, 862 Md. at 355, 765 A.2d 132 . Other Points of Error Appellant contends that “[ajwarding a permanent injunction to [a]ppellees Brian [ ], Santiago [ ], and [the Association] was not supported by any evidence and therefore clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis in original).

Specifically, appellant asserts that neither Brian nor Santiago testified as to wrongful acts committed by appellant against them or against the Association, and therefore, the trial court’s “decision to award the permanent injunction [to the Association, Brian, and Santiago] was completely un supported.(Emphasis in original). We disagree. Our review of the record indicates that Brian, Santiago, and the Association did not fail to provide evidence of wrongs committed against them by appellant. Santiago testified that he was active with the Association and had served on its Board of Directors; he thus was subjected to the threats and harassment appellant directed toward the Board as a whole.

This harassment was evident in Lourdes’s testimony regarding the offensive answering machine message that appellant left on the Sandoval’s home answering machine. According to Lourdes, she felt the need “to protect her family” from such threats. Lourdes’s testimony as to appellant’s behavior towards her family, in conjunction with the evidence of appellant’s broader pattern of attacks, provided sufficient evidence of appellant’s acts against Santiago, both as a member of his family, and as a member of