Davis v. Helbig

Crabs', J., delivered the opinion of this Court. Two questions present themselves for the consideration of the Court on this appeal. First: Whether the Act of the legislature, passed at December session, 1845, chap. 253, entitled, “ An Act for the relief of John L. Hook and others, devisees of James Hook, late of Allegany county, deceased,” was aproper exercise of legislative power ; and, secondly, if so, whether the power conferred by the Act on the County Court of Allegany gave that Court jurisdiction, and authorized the decree, by virtue of which the property in controversy was purchased. The three sections of the Act very clearly designate the reason and object of its enactment; the authority granted by the Act was two-fold : to effect a valid division of the real estate among the devisees of James Hook, on their application for that purpose, at that time depending in the Court, ⁴⁶² and also to transmute the share of the real estate to be allotted to Mrs. Davis and her children into personal property of money, provided the Court was satisfied it would he beneficial to all who were interested.

The Acts of the legislature are presumed to he constitutional, and it is only when they manifestly infringe some of the provisions of the Constitution, or violate the vested rights of the people, that their effect and operation can he impeded hy judicial power ; for the Act of a legislature is not pronounced unconstitutional or invalid in a doubtful case. The power to decree the sale of real estate of minors in special cases, was frequently exercised hy the legislature of this State, and the power thus exercised was never successfully doubted or questioned hy the profession or the Courts. See 11 Gill & Johnson, 81. The increasing necessity of these special Acts caused, the legislature to enact the statutes of 1816, chapter 139;, and 1818, chapter 133.

These Acts conferred general powers on the Courts to decree sales of the real estates of infants, provided they were satisfied it would he for the interest and benefit of the minors. The constitutional right of the legislature to pass these special and general laws was conceded, as the State was considered the general guardian and protector of minors who were disabled to act for themselves, and the legislature, exercising this tutelary power over the persons and property of infants, claimed and exercised the right to provide hy public or private Acts for converting real estate in which they had vested or contingent interests, into personal property and securities, when necessary for their benefit. It was contended hy one of the counsel for the appellants, that in virtue of the 21st section of the Bill of Rights, the legislature was prohibited from passing this Act, as hy that section “ no freeman ought to he deprived of his property, without the judgment of his peers, of hy the law of the land.” Surely this Act cannot he consid ⁴⁶³ ered repugnant to that clause in the Bill of Rights; it did not propose to deprive the minors of their property, but was passed on the application of their father, representing that a sale of the property would be beneficial to the children and promotive of their interest, and it was therefore, we think, a just and proper subject for the exercise of the authority of the legislature as parens patriae. The commuting of realty into personalty has never been held as depriving the children of their property ; by the exercise of such a power, minor children are enabled to derive subsistence, comfort and education from their property, which otherwise might be wholly useless and unproductive, and this power is asserted by Justice Grier, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in the case of Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wallace, 210, where he says, “ Statutes are found in almost every State in the Union, giving authority to guardians to sell the estates of their wards, subject to the supervision and approbation of a Court, and the power to grant such special authority to guardians has been generally admitted.” This is not like the case of Crane vs. Meginnis, 1 Gill & Johns., 463.

In that case the legislature undertook to appropriate the money of Meginnis to Crane, and it was therefore an exercise by the legislature of judicial power, and repugnant to the Constitution. It was an attempt on the part of the legislative department of the government to encroach on a co-ordinate department, and for that reason the third section of the Act in that case was declared hy the Court a nullity. Now, can it be said that this Act of Assembly has deprived any man of his property, or applied it to any other use than that of the children ? The sale of the property was in virtue of the exercise of the power vested in the legislative department, and which was not prescribed by the Federal or State Constitution.

The views which we have expressed in this opinion of the constitutional power of the legislature to pass this Act, ⁴⁶⁴ are fully sustained by adjudged cases of our sister States. In 16 Massa., 326, it was decided that “the legislature have power to license the sale of the real estate of minors, notwithstanding they have delegated the same power to the judicial Courts.” In 19 New York, 463, Allen Justice, said, “The Courts have established this power by judicial decisions; and I think the legislature also had the power to direct as it did by the Act in question, a sale of the premises, so as to bind the interest of any posthumous children of the daughters, who on their birth w.ould become interested in the remainder created in the will.” And in 2 Barr, 277, Chief Justice Gibson, commenting on the same question, says, “ The Act is constitutional, and the Court will enforce a contract of purchase from the