Davis v. Quille

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action for malicious prosecution instituted in the Superior Court of Baltimore City by the plaintiff-appellant Marvin B. Davis against the defendant-appellee Allen Quille. The case was tried before Judge Jones and a jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant Quille. From the judgment entered upon the verdict the plaintiff appealed.

The details of the facts leading to the bringing of this suit were disputed, but the essentials are as follows. At the time of the incident that precipitated this suit, Davis was employed by Quille as a gas station attendant. On October 6, 1963, the date of the incident, it was the duty of Davis to come to the station at 809 Fremont Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, where he was employed, and relieve June Willis who was working the evening shift. He arrived at approximately 12:30 a.m. and was given the receipts for the preceding shift, approximately $128, in a brown paper envelope.

Davis said that he took the envelope and dropped it through a slot in the door of a storage room in the station. Willis said that he did not see what was done with the money. At any rate, when Quille opened the door to the storage room on the morning in question, there was no money and no envelope to be found. The door was locked and only Quille had a key.

There were no other doors to the room. When the money was discovered ¡missing Quille told Davis that if he hadn’t returned the money by morning that he would swear out a warrant for his arrest. The money not being forthcom ⁶³³ ing, a warrant was sworn out and Davis was arrested and charged with larceny after trust. A preliminary hearing was held at the Western Police Station at which Quille testified against Davis, who was subsequently held for action of the grand jury.

The grand jury failed to indict him and he was released. The appellant then proceeded to institute the current action. At the close of the evidence, Judge Jones gave instructions to the jury and the appellant claims that a portion of these instructions constituted reversible error in that the jury did not know and was not instructed that a preliminary hearing is not an adversary proceeding but is only for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case against the defendant. This instruction of the trial judge, that the jury could consider the fact that the accused was held for the grand jury as a result of the preliminary hearing before the municipal court judge, constitutes the appellant’s sole claim that error exists in this case.

After an examination of that portion of the charge that was objected to and after a careful study of the authorities, we find that the trial judge was correct in charging the jury as she did, that they could consider, among other things, the fact that the defendant was held for action of the grand jury. The portion of the charge objected to was as follows: “In determining whether or not Mr. Quille had probable cause for starting this prosecution, take into consideration all the evidence that you have heard and you may include in your consideration the fact that as a result of the preliminary hearing before the