Davis v. State

Per Curiam. The Appellants, Nimrod Davis, Jr. and Ronald Peterson, along with a third co-defendant, Willie C. Robinson, who is not involved in this appeal, were convicted of robbery by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and each was sentenced by Judge J. Gilbert Prendergast to serve not more than five years in the Maryland Correctional Institution. Adelaide Dickens, a 54 year old domestic worker, testified that shortly after midnight on June 20, 1965, as she was leaving a restaurant, two youths attacked her, dragged her into an alley, slammed her against a wall and finally knocked her down. They then took her pocket book containing eighty-five dollars in cash.

She was unable to identify her assailants. Davis was arrested on June 22, 1965, as a result of information given to the police by two juveniles apprehended in a stolen car. He signed a statement admitting his participation in the robbery several hours after his interrogation by the police officers began. Peterson was arrested on June 23, 1965, after Davis had involved him in the robbery.

He signed an inculpatory statement on June 25, 1965. In this appeal, Davis contends that the lower court erred in refusing to grant his motion to sequester his co-defendants, Peterson and Robinson. Maryland Rule 775 provides that “the accused shall be present * * * at every stage of the trial * * * except as provided in this Rule.” Since none of the exceptions provided for in the Rule were applicable, the Court properly refused to sequester Davis’ co-defendants. Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights compels the same result. ⁵⁸⁴ Peterson contends that the lower court erred in refusing his motion for a severance.

The granting of a severance is within the sound discretion of the lower court and its action will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing that the discretion was abused. Day v. State, 196 Md. 384 ; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306 ; Maryland Rule 735. In Day, supra, the Court found that the defenses of the co-defendants, there involved, were hostile and damaging to each other and, accordingly held that a severance should have been granted. These elements are not present in this case since neither Appellant took the stand nor presented any evidence at the conclusion of the State’s case.

We have carefully considered Peterson’s arguments and we have reviewed the record. We find no evidence of an abuse of discretion by the lower court in denying a severance. Both Appellants contend that the lower court erred in admitting their respective inculpatory statements into evidence. Davis took the stand solely for the purpose of contesting the voluntariness of a written statement which the police testified was signed by him on June 22, 1965, without the use of threats, promises or inducements.

Davis admitted signing a statement but asserted that he never read it and he thought it was signed on June 24, 1965; that prior to signing it he had been threatened by the interrogating officers with a sentence of forty to fifty years and that he only signed the statement after one of the officers promised him two year’s probation. Davis’ co-defendants took the stand on his behalf and testified that they heard the police promise Davis probation if he would cooperate. The foregoing testimony was specifically denied by the police