Davis v. State

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland Constitution provides that a jury in a criminal case "shall be Judges of Law, as well as the fact.” The Court of Appeals in Stevenson v. State, Md. , 423 A.2d 558 (1980), has ⁴⁷⁵ very recently (December 17, 1980), considerably altered the application of this provision of our Constitution holding: "Implicit in the decisions of this Court limiting the jury’s judicial role to the 'law of the crime’ is a recognition that all other legal issues are for the judge alone to decide. Because of this division of the law-judging function between judge and jury, it is incumbent upon a trial judge to carefully delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive 'law of the crime,’ as well as the 'legal effect of the evidence,’ and that any comments by the judge concerning these matters are advisory only; and (ii) that, by virtue of this same constitutional provision, all other aspects of law (e.g., the burden of proof, the requirement of unanimity, the validity of a statute) are beyond the jury’s pale, and that the judge’s comments on these matters are binding upon that body. In other words, the jury should not be informed that all of the court’s instructions are merely advisory; rather only that portion of the charge addressed to the former areas of 'law’ may be regarded as non-binding by it, and it is only these aspects of the 'law’ which counsel may dispute in their respective arguments to the jury.” Id. 423 A.2d at 565 .

Relying upon this holding, the appellants here, Ralph Dupont Davis and Steven George Thomas, contend that the Criminal Court of Baltimore committed reversible error when it refused a request that the jury be instructed that, even though they were judges of the law, they were bound by the trial court’s instruction that the burden was upon the State to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 1 ⁴⁷⁶ The State first contends that the appellants’ objection was not sufficient to preserve the issue, because it constituted "a frontal one against the jury’s role under the Maryland Constitution and not a peripheral one asking for instructions of one or more of the limitations upon that role.” Jones v. State, 29 Md. App. 182, 204 , 348 A.2d 55 (1975), rev’d on other grounds, 279 Md. 1 , 367 A.2d 1 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977).. We are unable to follow the State’s argument. The basis for the objection was quite clear; it was the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that they were bound by the judge’s instruction concerning the burden of proof.

Even if the basis for the objection is not explicitly stated, the objection was still sufficient, under the principles set forth in Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 283 Md. 284 , 388 A.2d 543 (1978). There the Court, construing Rule 554 d and e, the civil counterpart to the Criminal Rule 757 f, 2 said at 288-89: ⁴⁷⁷ "The reason for Rule 554 d and e, as this Court stated in Fisher v. Balto. Transit Co., 184 Md. 399, 402 , 41 A.2d 297 (1945), 'is obviously to enable the trial court to correct any inadvertent error or omission in the oral charge, as well as to limit the review on appeal to those errors which are brought to the trial court’s attention.’ In this manner, the trial judge is afforded 'an opportunity to amend or supplement his charge if he deems an amendment necessary.’ State v. Wolleyhan Transport Co., 192 Md. 686, 689-90 , 65 A.2d 321 (1949). Succinctly put, then, the rule is designed to afford the