Davis v. State

Mason, J., delivered the opinion of this court, and his own, in part, dissenting opinion. We did not understand the counsel for the appellant as contending, that the legislature had no power to amend, modify or even repeal the act of 1821, ch. 77, creating the office of inspector of bark. We understand, that while they clearly admit the power, they insist that the legislature in passing the act of 1854, ch. 200, entitled: “An act regulating inspections in the city of Baltimore,” have exercised that power in a mode not warranted by the constitution, and that therefore the law is of no avail. Under our former constitution, there could have been no doubt, that as the act of 1854 was inconsistent with that of 1821, the last act would operate as a repeal of the former, in so far as they were repugnant to each other.

It is supposed that under art. 3, sec. 17, of our new constitution, which provides, that ccno law or section of law shall be revived, amended or repealed, by reference to its title or section only,” there can be no repeal of a preexisting law, by the implication resulting from a subsequent inconsistent or contradictory legislative enactment. We do not so understand the new constitution. ¹⁵⁹ The particular clause to which we refer, was evidently inserted in the constitution, for the purpose of preventing incautious and fraudulent legislation, and to enable members to act knowingly upon all subjects, and to guard them from the contingency of voting for the repeal or revival of laws, through mistake or accident, under the deceptive language often employed in the title of acts. Under our former system of legislation, a good or abad provision might slumber in the body of a law, of which the title gave no intimation, and hence members of the legislature might suppose from the title of the law, that they were voting for one thing, when in fact they were unwittingly voting for another directly the opposite; at least the title afforded often little or no information, as to what was contained in the body of the law, which was its office to have done. Not so however with an independent act of the legislature, establishing a new, or reversing some previous policy of the State.

The very fact of establishing a particular rule of conduct for the public, presupposes án intention on the part of the legislature, that a contrary rule should not prevail, and therefore the enactment of one law, is as-much a repeal of all inconsistent laws, as if those inconsistent laws had been repealed by express words. It could never surely have been the intention of the framers of the constitution, that a positive enactment by the legislature upon a subject within their legitimate powers, was to be defeated, because a previous law, not in terms repealed, was inconsistent with it. If this strict test were required, many wholesome laws would be rendered wholly inoperative, because of the inability or neglect of members to search thoroughly the statute books for laws which might be inconsistent or- repugnant ; a work in many cases of so great difficulty, as to amount almost to impossibility. The next objection urged to the validity of the act of 1854, is, that if its purpose was to create a new system of inspections, and to repeal the act of 1821, then the subject of the law is not sufficiently described by its title, as required by the 3rd article and 17th section of the constitution.

The lan ¹⁶⁰ guage of the constitution is:' “Every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described by the title.” We think the act of 1854, ch. 200, has sufficiently been made to conform to these requirements. The law relates to inspections, and to such' other matters only as are inseparably connected with it, and to none other, and therefore can be said to embrace but a single subject. It could hardly be successfully urged against a law, that it does not embrace and dispose of the whole subject to which it relates. If it could be, few laws, if any, could stand such a test.

The object of this constitutional provision’ is obvious and highly commendable. A practice had crept into our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters, and rather than endanger the main- subject, or for the purpose of securing, new strength for it, members were often induced to sanction and actually vote for such provisions, which- if they were offered as independent subjects, would never have received their support. In this way the people of our State, have been frequently inflicted with evil and injurious legislation. Besides, foreign matter has often been stealthily incorporated into- a law, during the haste and confusion always incident upon-the close of the sessions of all legislative bodies, and it has not unfrequently happened,, that in this way the statute books have shown the existence of enactments, that few of the members of the legislature knew any thing of before.

To remedy such and similar evils, was this provision inserted into the constitution, and we think wisely inserted. We are not prepared to say, that a whole law, otherwise Constitutional, would be rendered void by the introduction of a single foreign or irrelevant subject into it, and where such subject was not indicated-in-the title. In such a ease the irrelevant matter would be rejected as void, while the principal subject of the law would be supported, if properly described in the title. But if an act of Assembly, be composed of a ¹⁶¹ number of discordant and dissimilar subjects, so that no one could be clearly recognised as the controlling or principal one, the whole law would be void.

The appellant, in the next place, contends, that the law of 1854 is unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as it seeks to take from the governor the appointment of the inspector; and art. 2 and sec. 11 of the constitution is relied on to support this position. That section provides, that the governor shall appoint all officers “whose appointment or election is not otherwise herein provided for, unless a different mode of appointment be prescribed by the law creating the office.” In few words, we think this provision means, simply, that the governor shall have the power to fill all offices in the