Davis v. Wicomico County Bureau of Support Enforcement

WOODWARD, J. On December 23, 2009, shortly after the birth of twin boys, Jessica Cook and appellant, Justin Davis, signed an affidavit of parentage for each child, attesting that Cook was the mother and appellant was the father of the children. On July 25, 2011, appellee, the Wicomico County Bureau of Support Enforcement (“the Bureau”), filed a complaint seeking an order requiring appellant to pay support for the twins. At a hearing on September 16, 2011, appellant, appearing pro se, denied that he was the father of the children and requested a blood test to determine paternity. The circuit court denied the request, determining that by law appellant was the father of the children based on the signed affidavits of parentage.

The court then ordered appellant to pay child support. Appellant did not appeal that order. Two years later, on September 10, 2013, appellant filed a complaint asking the circuit court again to order a blood test pursuant to Sections 5-1029 and 5-1038 of the Family Law ²³³ Article (“FL”), to strike the finding of paternity by affidavit of parentage, and to set aside the 2011 child support order. The Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint.

Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment to the Bureau after a hearing on December 13, 2013. On appeal, appellant raises one question for our review, which we have rephrased and recast as two questions: 1 1. Did the circuit court err by granting the Bureau’s motion for summary judgment? 2. Did the circuit court err in finding that FL §§ 5-1029 and 5-1038 do not grant appellant an automatic right to a paternity test?

For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND On December 21 and 22, 2009, twin boys were born to Jessica Cook. On December 23, 2009, Cook and appellant signed an affidavit of parentage for each child in which they attested that appellant was the “natural father” of the children. The children were both given appellant’s last name.

On July 25, 2011, the Bureau filed a Complaint for Child Support against appellant, seeking child support based on the signed affidavits of parentage. In response, appellant sent a letter, dated August 4, 2011, to the Bureau, which was later filed with the circuit court and designated as an answer. In the letter, appellant denied that he was the father of the children and that he owed any support to Cook for the ²³⁴ children. Appellant alleged that the affidavits of parentage could not establish paternity because [appellant’s] signature was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation.

After Jessica Cook and [appellant] had broken up as a couple, she called [appellant] and said she was pregnant and from what she told [appellant, he] was led to believe that Nicholas Marley Davis and Benjamin Davis were [appellant’s] children. No one explained to [appellant] what significance there was to [appellant] signing an Affidavit of Parentage. Appellant concluded the letter by asking the court to administer a paternity test. The circuit court held a hearing on September 16, 2011.

Appellant appeared pro se at the hearing and declined the court’s offer to continue the hearing until he could obtain a lawyer. The court determined that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to an attorney. The court admitted into evidence the two signed affidavits of parentage and heard testimony from Cook and appellant. Cook testified that she and appellant dated and then broke up before she was pregnant, and that, when they got back together in May 2009, she told appellant that she was two months pregnant.

Cook acknowledged in her testimony that in May 2009, she communicated with appellant that “there is a possibility that those children were not his.” According to Cook, she “was under the understanding that, you know, regardless of whether or not these were biologically his children that we were going to raise them together.” Cook testified that she and appellant remained in a steady relationship throughout the remainder of her pregnancy, and that appellant proposed marriage to her more than once. According to Cook, while at the hospital after she gave birth, she and appellant signed the affidavits of parentage for both children. Appellant testified that, when he signed the affidavits of parentage, he believed that he was the biological father of the children. Appellant testified, however, that he began to doubt that he was the biological father of the children “afterwards ²³⁵ when the children came out visibly, visibly Caucasian.” Appellant also testified that there was only a three-week period where he and Cook did not have a sexual relationship prior to getting back together ip May of 2009.

Appellant asked multiple times during the hearing for a paternity test. Counsel for the Bureau argued to the trial court that, pursuant to FL § 5-1028, an individual who signs an affidavit of parentage has sixty days to rescind the affidavit; otherwise the only challenge to such affidavit must be based on fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. The Bureau argued that (1) appellant knew that there was at least a possibility that he was not the father of the children, but he signed the affidavits nonetheless; and (2) the form makes clear to the signatory of the legal responsibilities that one assumes in signing the affidavit. In response, appellant argued: I was lead [sic] to believe the children were mine.

That’s the only reason why I signed that. So in this case, I’m just asking for a paternity test. That’s it. I’m asking for a paternity test to actually prove paternity.

I don’t feel that me signing a piece of paper in the hospital that I wasn’t explained — I swear, Your Honor, I was never told that by me signing this Affidavit of Parentage that it would hold me binding even though I’m not the father. The circuit court found Cook’s testimony that she had informed appellant before the birth of the possibility that he was not the biological father “irrelevant because [appellant] armed with whatever knowledge he had chose to voluntarily execute an affidavit establishing him as the father of these children.” The court noted that there was no evidence before the court “that would even broach the subject of fraud, duress, or ... material mistake of fact.” The court told appellant: You were clearly — you meaning, both mother and father, were clearly advised, don’t sign if you have a doubt. You can get assistance if you want because you don’t understand what you’re about to sign. But the moment you affix your pen to that paper and sign your name, you have obligated ²³⁶ yourself to these children.

And it is the finding of this Court that there is no fraud, duress, or mistake of material [ ] fact that would justify the rescission of the Affidavits of Parentage properly executed. These are your children by law, and that’s the end of the story. (Emphasis added). The trial court then heard evidence regarding child support from a child support specialist with the Wicomico County Child Support office.

The court ruled from the bench, ordering that “the father of these children shall be required to pay support from commencing on July 25, 2011 in the amount of $197.00 per month. That Order will last until December 25, 2011. Thereafter, effective January 25, 2012, the father shall pay support for both children in the total amount of $325.00 per month.” The court immediately corrected itself and ordered the latter amount amended to $352.50 each month. The court signed an order memorializing the ruling on September 23, 2011.

Appellant did not appeal the September 23, 2011 order. Almost two years later, on September 6, 2013, Cook filed a petition to change the twins’ last names from Davis (appellant’s last name) to Cook. On September 10, 2013, appellant filed a complaint again asking the court to (1) order a blood test pursuant to FL §§ 5-1029 and 5-1038, (2) strike the finding of paternity by affidavit of parentage pursuant to FL §§ 5-1028(d) and 5-1038(a)(2)(i), and (3) set aside the September 23, 2011 child support order. The Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint.

On December 13, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, which the parties agreed would be heard as a motion for summary judgment. The court took judicial notice of the court file, including the 2011 proceeding. At the hearing, the Bureau argued that the trial court should grant summary judgment because res judicata barred relitigation of appellant’s claims. Appellant, through counsel, argued that a putative father can challenge paternity at any time after a judicial determination of paternity, pursuant to ²³⁷ FL § 5-1038, and that the same opportunity should be afforded to an individual who signs an affidavit of parentage.

The Bureau argued in response that FL § 5-1038 did not control because appellant signed an affidavit of parentage, and, pursuant to FL § 5-1028, an individual who voluntarily signs an affidavit of parentage cannot later “undo” his parentage by establishing that he is not the biological father of the children. The circuit court issued an opinion and order on December 20, 2013, granting the Bureau’s motion for summary judgment. The circuit court determined that, under the unambiguous language of the statute, the right to a blood test applied only to set aside a judicial declaration of paternity under FL § 5-1038, and not to paternity established by affidavit of parentage under FL § 5-1028. Furthermore, the circuit court held that, “even if [appellant] had a present right for blood testing, despite paternity having been established by means of affidavits of paternity, he asserted that right repeatedly at the 2011 hearing.” The court concluded that appellant had waived his right to a blood test by failing to appeal the 2011 decision.

Appellant filed a timely appeal of the court’s December 20, 2013 order. DISCUSSION Summary Judgment We review the decision of a circuit court granting summary judgment de novo. Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md.App. 340, 345 , 6 A.3d 360 (2010), aff'd, 421 Md. 266 , 26 A.3d 878 (2011). A trial court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the [moving] party ... is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 2 — 501(f).

Maryland’s summary judgment rule makes clear that a trial court determines issues of law; it makes rulings as a matter of law, resolving no disputed issues of fact. In this regard, the standard for appellate review of a trial court’s grant of a ²³⁸ motion for summary judgment is simply whether the trial court was legally correct.... Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501, 522 , 96 A.3d 714 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘As such ... we review independently the record to determine whether the parties generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Tyler v. City of Coll.

Park, 415 Md. 475, 498-99 , 3 A.3d 421 (2010)). We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bednar v. Provident Bank of Md., Inc., 402 Md. 532, 542 , 937 A.2d 210 (2007). Appellant argues now, as he did at the lower court hearing in 2011 and again at the hearing in 2013, that he should be granted a blood test to prove that he is not the biological father of the children.

The Bureau responds that the circuit court properly determined that appellant could not relitigate the issues adjudicated in 2011. According to the Bureau, the doctrine of res judicata precludes appellant from again seeking to obtain relief from the court, because his argument is the same as it was in 2011: the court should have ordered a blood test or genetic testing, because Cook lied to him about paternity. We agree with the Bureau. Under the doctrine of res judicata, appellant is barred from relitigating the claims adjudicated in an earlier proceeding.

See Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005). The Court of Appeals has explained: Res judicata literally means “a thing adjudicated,” and generally indicátes “[a]n affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been — but was not — raised in the first suit.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336-37 (8th ed. 2004). See Alvey v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 390 , 171 A.2d 92, 94 (1961) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata is that a judgment between the ²³⁹ same parties and their privies is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and is conclusive, not only as to all matters that have been decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit”); see also Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 228 , 443 A.2d 98, 102 (1982) (stating that “if a proceeding between parties involves the same cause of action as a previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of res judicata applies and all matters actually litigated or that could have been litigated are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding”).

Lizzi v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 384 Md. 199, 206-07 , 862 A.2d 1017 (2004) (alterations in original) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1116 , 125 S.Ct. 2919 , 162 L.Ed.2d 297 (2005). Thus the doctrine of res judicata, bars the relitigation of a claim where: (1) [ ] the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier dispute; (2) [ ] the claim presented in the current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and, (3) [ ] there has been a final judgment on the merits.

Norville, 390 Md. at 107 , 887 A.2d 1029 (citing, e.g., Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Comm. Ass’n, 361 Md. 371, 392 , 761 A.2d 899 (2000); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 (1982)). In the instant case, the trial court wrote: The undisputed facts before this court, and also before the trial judge in 2011, are that [appellant] executed