DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hospital

FISCHER, Judge. Karen E. DeBusk, appellant, filed a claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”). ⁹⁹ Appellee, Johns Hopkins Hospital contested the claim, alleging that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission held a hearing and found that the statute of limitations barred the filing of the claim. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Gordy, J.) affirmed, on a motion for summary judgment.

DeBusk appeals from that order and asks us to address the following questions: I. Did the Court err in granting summary judgment without allowing appellant the opportunity to discover facts relating to estoppel and absence of the employer’s notice?

II

Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on the basis that limitations for accidental injuries accrue from the date of the accident, as opposed to the date of discovery of a compensable injury?

III

Did the Court err in declining to hold that limitations for accidental personal injuries based on the date of the accident, denied Appellant equal protection under the law? FACTS DeBusk was employed as a registered nurse in the Neuroscience Critical Care Unit of Johns Hopkins Hospital. On October 2, 1990, DeBusk was lowering the head of an electric bed of a paralyzed patient. The bed began to tilt to the side and the patient began to fall toward the tilted side.

DeBusk grabbed the bed to prevent it from collapsing. When she realized that only a wheel had come off, she released the bed. At the time of the incident, DeBusk felt a strain in her neck and right shoulder region but continued to work through the end of her shift. DeBusk orally reported the incident to her supervisor.

DeBusk continued to work all her scheduled shifts. During the two months following the incident, DeBusk experienced periodic neck and shoulder discomfort. The discomfort was more prominent when she worked longer shifts and usually abated with rest. DeBusk believed she had suffered a minor strain, but decided to be examined by a doctor at the Johns Hopkins Hospital Workers’ Compensation Clinic (the “Clinic”). ¹⁰⁰ On December 6, 1990, DeBusk was examined at the Clinic.

She was told to return to work and return to the Clinic four days later for an x-ray examination. The x-rays were read as unremarkable. Other than her appointments at the Clinic, DeBusk continued her work and regular duties. DeBusk continued to suffer from neck and shoulder pain and began treatment from a chiropractor on February 19, 1991.

She continued to receive treatments through the summer of 1992. During this time, DeBusk missed occasional days from her regular duties. The bills for the chiropractic treatments were paid by appellee. In July of 1992, DeBusk experienced severe symptoms in her right arm and went back to the Clinic where nerve conduction studies were performed.

The tests were normal. On July 24, 1992, DeBusk was referred by her primary care physician for an MRI of the cervical spine. The MRI revealed some disc herniation and evidence of a spur centrally and slightly toward the right side of the C6-C7 cervical spine. On November 10, 1992, DeBusk filed a claim with the Commission.

On August 5, 1993, the Commission held a hearing on the issue raised by appellee: whether DeBusk’s claim was barred by limitations. The Commission found that the claim was barred and, on August 23, 1993, denied DeBusk’s claim. DeBusk appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On March 10,1994, DeBusk filed answers to appellee’s request for production of documents and interrogatories and filed a set of interrogatories to appellee.

These interrogatories dealt with equitable estoppel and whether the employer should have filed an employer’s notice with the Commission. On March 24, 1994, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. DeBusk moved to extend time to file an answer until 30 days after appellee responded to her interrogatories. On April 14, 1994, the circuit court denied the motion, citing noncompliance with Maryland Rules l-204(b) and 1-351.

Appellee agreed to stipulate to an extension of time but the circuit court denied the motion, stating that the motion for ¹⁰¹ summary judgment was scheduled to be argued on May 25, 1994. On summary judgment, appellee argued that DeBusk’s claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations set forth in Md.Code (1991), § 9-709(b)(3) of the Labor and Employment Article. 1 Appellee relied on this Court’s opinion in Dintaman v. Board of County Commissioners, 17 Md.App. 345 , 303 A.2d 442 (1973). Appellant argued that the two year limitation period did not begin to run from the date of her accident because this accident did not produce an immediately apparent disability. Appellant argued that the current codification of the limitations requirement uses different language than did the statute considered in Dintaman .

Appellant also argued that appellee had a notice obligation and that the statute of limitations was tolled until the employer filed the requisite notice pursuant to § 9-707. In addition, appellant argued that appellee’s limitations defense was waived by equitable estoppel because she notified her employer of her injury and that it was unclear that she was required to file a claim. At the hearing, the court denied DeBusk’s claim, rejecting her equitable estoppel and constitutional arguments. In addition, the trial court found that the language of the statute is clear and that the words “accidental personal injury” mean from the date of the accident.

The trial judge relied on Md.Code (1991), § 9-709(b)(3) of the Labor and Employment Article and Dintaman v. Board of County Commissioners, 17 Md.App. 345 , 303 A.2d 442 (1973). STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Rule 2-501(a), a motion for summary judgment may be filed “on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Subparagraph (e) of the rule ¹⁰² directs the court to “enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court determines issues of law and does not resolve disputed issues of fact. Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990). Thus, the standard of review for appellate courts is whether the trial court was legally correct.

Beatty, 330 Md. at 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 ; Heat & Power, 320 Md. at 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 . See also Bond v. NIBCO, 96 Md.App. 127, 134-136 , 623 A.2d 731 (1993); Seaboard Surety v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 241-245 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992). The rules pertaining to summary judgment apply to workers’ compensation commission appeals. Dawson’s Charter Service v. Chin, 68 Md.App. 433, 440 , 511 A.2d 1138 (1986).

DISCUSSION The central issue in this case is whether DeBusk filed her workers’ compensation claim within the statutory time period. The procedure for filing a claim under the current workers’ compensation law is as follows: When an employee is injured due to an accidental personal injury 2 , the employee must give oral or written notice to the employer within 10 days after the accidental personal injury. § 9-704(b)(1). Failure to give notice, unless excused by the Com ¹⁰³ mission under § 9-706, may be fatal to the employee’s case. Molony v. Shalom Et Benedictus, 46 Md.App. 96 , 415 A.2d 648 (1980).

If the accidental personal injury causes disability for more than three days, the employer must report the accidental personal injury and the disability to the Commission within 10 days after receiving oral or written notice of the disability from the employee. § 9-707(a). Section 9-709(a) provides that the employee must file a claim with the Commission within 60 days after the date of the accidental personal injury. Giving notice to the employer of an injury is not the same as an application for benefits and an employer is not required to file a claim. This 60 day period does not begin to run until the injury becomes apparent.

Griffin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co., 187 Md. 524 , 51 A.2d 280 (1947). “Unless excused by the Commission ..., failure to file a claim in accordance with subsection (a) of this section bars a claim under this title.” § 9-709(b)(l). “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, if an employee fails to file a claim within 2 years after the date of the accidental personal injury, the claim is completely barred.” § 9-709(b)(3). In addition, this statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employer files a report with the Commission pursuant to § 9-707, (which requires an employer to report the accidental personal injury and disability to the Commission if the accidental personal injury causes disability for more than three days) if the employer has been notified in accordance with § 9-704. I. DeBusk first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without giving her the opportunity to discover facts relating to estoppel and absence of the employer’s notice. She contends that she was precluded from discovering particular information that substantiated her claim that limitations had not run.

DeBusk argues that the court’s denial of the extension of time was an abuse of discretion because she needed the information in order to answer properly appellee’s motion for ¹⁰⁴ summary judgment. In her response to the motion for summary judgment, she argued that the employer had a notice obligation pursuant to § 9-707. DeBusk admitted before the Commission that she had missed no days of work. In addition, her claim form indicates that she did not miss any work.

Because there was no period of missed work, appellee was under no obligation to file a report pursuant to § 9-707 and, accordingly, the exception in § 9-708(b) does not apply. This information was found in the record before the Commission and, therefore, further discovery was unnecessary.