DEINLEIN v. Johnson

BERGER, J. This consolidated case arises from a tax sale of a four-acre parcel of real property (the “subject property”) located in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The subject property, which lacks a metes and bounds description, was part of a larger 7.8023-acre parcel (the “Original Tract”) before the Maryland Department of Assessment and Taxation (the “SDAT”) began treating the Original Tract as two separate parcels in order to create two separate tax bills. Frederick Deinlein, the appellant, purchased the subject property from Prince George’s County (the “County”), an appellee, and subsequently acted to foreclose the right of redemption. After making several unsuccessful attempts to perfect title to the property, Deinlein initiated a quiet title action against Andrew Johnson, an appellee, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s ³⁷⁶ County.

At trial, Deinlein sought reimbursement for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred under exceptional circumstances. After voiding the tax sale and vacating the order foreclosing the right of redemption, the court ordered the County to refund certain expenses paid by Deinlein but denied his request for extraordinary legal fees. Deinlein filed a timely appeal and presents a single issue for our review, 1 which we have rephrased into two questions: I. Did the circuit court err in denying Deinlein’s request for reimbursement of extraordinary legal fees and costs under § 14-843 of the Tax-Property Article of the Maryland Code?

II

If not, is Deinlein entitled to reimbursement of extraordinary legal fees and costs under § 14-848 of the Tax-Property Article in light of the circuit court’s decision to void the original tax sale? We answer both questions in the negative and, therefore, shall affirm the circuit court’s judgment for the reasons set forth below. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties do not dispute the material facts of this case. On November 10, 1983, Andrew and Mattie Burno conveyed the 7.8-acre Original Tract, by deed, 2 to Andrea Burno, mother of and former Trustee for Andrew Johnson, who was a minor at that time.

Andrea lived in a one-story residence situated on the Original Tract and held a life estate interest in the house and surrounding curtilage. The deed made conveyance of the Original Tract subject to the life estate. In 1996, Andrea requested a homeowner’s tax credit from the State for the tax assessment on the residence. The SDAT administratively divided the Original Tract into two separate ³⁷⁷ parcels based on two separate tax account numbers.

Tax Account No. 1138338 referred to a 3.8-acre parcel on which the residence was located. This number was originally assigned to Andrea and, after the division, allowed her to receive the homeowner’s tax credit. The SDAT created a second number, Tax Account No. 2924397, which referred to the four-acre subject property. The SDAT’s administrative division of the Original Tract did not, however, include any legal descriptions of the properties’ boundaries.

The only legal property description on record referred to the Original Tract in its entirety. Neither the SDAT nor the Prince George’s County Office of Finance (the “Office of Finance”) ever prepared a survey of the two properties. Nevertheless, both agencies treated the two parcels separately thereafter based on the establishment of the two accounts. In 1997, the Office of Finance reported that taxes on both accounts were in arrears.

In accordance with Maryland law, the Director of the Office of Finance advertised the two properties separately and sold them at a tax sale on May 12, 1997. Deinlein participated in the sale and purchased the certificate of tax sale for the subject property for $1,192.66. Neither the advertisement nor the certificate of tax sale contained a metes and bounds description of the property. 3 On May 4, 1999, approximately two years after the tax sale, Deinlein filed a Complaint to foreclose the right of redemption in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. 4 While the ³⁷⁸ action to foreclose the right of redemption was pending, the Original Tract was conveyed by Trustee’s Deed to Johnson on September 22, 2000. 5 On August 13, 2002, the court entered an order foreclosing the right of redemption regarding the subject property. Deinlein received a deed to the subject property on August 12, 2004, which was recorded September 9, 2004, in Liber 20289 at Folio 437, et seq.

The following year, Johnson redeemed the 3.8-acre property assessed under Tax. Account No. 1138338. 6 Deinlein claims that prior to the court’s August 13, 2002 foreclosure order, he discovered, through his own efforts, the nonexistence of any metes and bounds description for the subject property. Deinlein later testified that he spoke with Dan Puma, 7 a tax appraiser for the State of Maryland, who informed Deinlein that the SDAT purposefully created two separate tax accounts in order to give Andrea a homeowner’s tax credit for her residence. When Deinlein complained of the inadequate description of the subject property, Puma agreed to speak with the attorney general’s office.

The record reflects that the attorney general believed the description was adequate to locate the property. Unsatisfied with this answer, Deinlein appealed to the County and spoke with Stanley Willis, a county tax collector. Following a series of discussions with Willis, Deinlein took title to the subject property with the understanding that Willis would speak with the county attorney and his superiors about objecting to the action to foreclose the right of redemption for which the court’s final order was pending. The County did not object, however, and Deinlein received a signed deed to the subject property in the ³⁷⁹ mail.

Willis later informed Deinlein that the County decided not to pursue the matter. On October 10, 2007, after the State and the County denied him relief, Deinlein filed a Complaint to quiet title in the subject property, case number CAE-07-28513, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In his suit, Deinlein asked the court to appoint a surveyor to determine and describe the location of the subject property, assess the costs thereof, and quiet title to the parcel in his name. 8 On October 23, 2008, Johnson filed a motion to vacate the judgment foreclosing Johnson’s right of redemption in case number CAE-99-10119, asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to foreclose the right of redemption under T.P. § 14-845(a) because the subject property lacked a legal description by metes and bounds. Thereafter, on October 27, 2008, Johnson filed his own counterclaim to quiet title and request for declaratory judgment in case number CAE-07-28513.

Following a hearing on Johnson’s motion to vacate, the circuit court issued a written Memorandum Opinion and Order on June 17, 2009, vacating the order foreclosing the right of redemption. 9 On September 30, 2009, the court vacated the June 2009 order and reinstated the August 13, 2002 foreclosure order. The record reflects that the court, citing Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374 , 893 A.2d 1067 (2006), 10 gave Johnson the opportunity to secure funds to pay ³⁸⁰ the delinquent taxes, subsequent taxes, interest and costs necessary to redeem the subject property from the tax sale. The court granted Deinlein leave to file a motion for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred under exceptional circumstances pursuant to § 14-843(a)(4)(ii) of the Tax-Property Article (“T.P.”), Ann.Code of Maryland.

Deinlein filed a Motion for Payment of Extraordinary Legal Fees and Costs or, in the Alternative, for Other Relief on December 14, 2009. On May 4, 2010, Deinlein advanced his request for extraordinary fees at a hearing on the consolidated action and offered the following into evidence: (1) details of the expenses he incurred while trying to resolve the “predicament”; and (2) an affidavit of counsel attesting to the reasonableness and amount of legal fees paid by Deinlein as a result of pursuing the quiet title action and defending against Johnson’s related counterclaim. On May 6, 2010, the court voided the tax sale and vacated the order foreclosing the right of redemption. The court also ordered the County to refund to Deinlein certain taxes and costs he paid concerning the sale.

Lastly, the court denied Deinlein’s Motion for Payment of Extraordinary Legal Fees and Costs or, in the Alternative, for Other Relief. Deinlein timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on June 21, 2010. DISCUSSION I. The question before us, as pursued by Deinlein on appeal, raises a legal issue which we address initially. Deinlein contends that he is entitled to recoup the attorney’s fees he paid in relation to this case, including the extraordinary fees incurred in pursuing this action to quiet title.

The ³⁸¹ County responds that T.P. § 14—843(a)(4)(ii), the sole provision under the Tax-Property Article that provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees in “exceptional circumstances,” does not apply to the subject property tax sale. As such, the County contends that the circuit court did not err in denying Deinlein’s motion. We agree. Tax sales are governed under the principal statutes of T.P. §§ 14-808 through 14-854, 11 and serve as a mechanism for local governments to collect unpaid property taxes.

Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363, 369 , 614 A.2d 582 (1992). A tax sale proceeds according to a general outline, which may be summarized as follows: [T]he tax collector for a county sells property on which real estate taxes are in arrears. § 14-808. The purchaser receives a certificate of sale. § 14-820. The purchaser must file a complaint to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption during a period beginning six months after the sale and ending two years after the sale. § 14-833.

Until a final order of foreclosure, the owner retains the right to redeem. § 14-827. The amount to be paid to the collector on redemption is provided by § 14-828, while the amount to be reimbursed to the purchaser is governed by § 14-843. Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481, 485 , 597 A.2d 952 (1991). Once the right of redemption has been foreclosed, the purchaser holding the certificate of sale receives a deed from the local government conveying fee simple title to the property.

T.P. § 14-844; Howard County v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 178 Md.App. 491, 497 , 943 A.2d 22 (2008); see also Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 139 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997). T.P. § 14-843, which governs the repayment of attorney’s fees and other expenses paid by the holder upon redemption of the property sold at tax sale, is central to this case, and it provides in pertinent part: ³⁸² § 14-843. Plaintiff or holder of certifícate of sale reimbursed for expenses incurred. (a) In general.— (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, on redemption, the plaintiff or the holder of a certificate of sale may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in any action or in preparation for any action to foreclose the right of redemption as provided in this section.

(2) The plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale is not entitled to be reimbursed for any other expenses or attorney’s fees that are not included in this section. (4) If an action to foreclose the right of redemption has been filed, the plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale may be reimbursed for: * * * (ii) in exceptional circumstances, other reasonable attorney’s fees incurred and specifically requested by the plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale and approved by the court, on a case by case basis.... (Emphasis added). The Maryland General Assembly amended the Tax-Property Article in 2008 and adopted the above-quoted language, as stated in Chapters 333 and 334 of the 2008 Laws of Maryland (“2008 Amendments”).

Prior to the amendments, the reimbursement provision read as follows: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, on redemption, the plaintiff or the holder of a certificate of sale is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in any action or in preparation for any action to foreclose the right of redemption. In addition, the plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale, on redemption, is entitled to be reimbursed for fees paid for recording the certificate of sale, for reasonable attorney’s fees, provided that the fees may not exceed $400 unless an action to foreclose the right of redemption has been filed, for expenses incurred in the ³⁸³ publication and service of process by publication, for reasonable fees for a necessary title search, and for taxes, together with interest and penalties on the taxes, arising after the date of sale that have been paid by the plaintiff.... The plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale is not entitled to be reimbursed for any other expenses. T.P. § 14-843(a) (2007) (amended 2008) (emphasis added).

The County argues that the legislature, by amending T.P. § 14-843 in 2008, intended for this provision, which allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees in exceptional circumstances, to apply only prospectively. Deciphering legislative intent is the very object of our judicial function of statutory interpretation. See Parker v. State, 193 Md.App. 469, 498 , 997 A.2d 912 (2010); Zimmer-Rubert v. Bd. of Educ., 179 Md.App. 589, 606-07 , 947 A.2d 135 (2008), aff'd, 409 Md. 200 , 973 A.2d 233 (2009). The canons of statutory interpretation are well established.

To ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, we first consider the plain language of the statute, giving words in the statute their ordinary and popular meaning within the English language. McHale v. DCW Dutchship Island,, LLC, 415 Md. 145, 171, 999 A.2d 969 (2010) (citation omitted); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484 (2004). Courts may not add or delete language so as to reflect a legislative intent not evidenced by the statute’s very words. Alavez v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 402 Md. 727, 734-35 , 939 A.2d 139 (2008); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 , 835 A.2d 1221 (2003).

By the same token, courts may not limit or extend the statute’s application with forced or subtle interpretations. County Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416-17 , 780 A.2d 1137 (2001) (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 579 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996)). We read statutory text such that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 577 , 870 A.2d 186 (2005) (citations omitted).

Moreover, we do not interpret statutory language in isolation. Id. Rather, we are obligated to examine the statutory scheme as a whole and, to the extent possible, ³⁸⁴ reconcile and “harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.” Id.; see also Headen v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 559, 570 , 16 A.3d 196 (2011). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry into legislative intent ends, and we give effect to the statute as it is written.

Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006); see Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688-89 , 861 A.2d 727 (2004); Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502 , 860 A.2d 886 (2004). If, on the other hand, ambiguity exists within the statutory language despite further consideration of the literal or usual meanings of the words, we may consider “evidence of intent from legislative history or other sources.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim,