Delph v. Ammons

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We are presented with two appeals in two law actions which were consolidated for trial below. Plaintiffs, Charles Ammons and his wife Virgie, and Kenneth Stockdale instituted suits for recovery for personal injuries and property damages against the defendants, William Delph, his mother Alice, and Daniel Chew and his wife Dorothy, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. A directed verdict was granted by the trial court as to Alice Delph but the correctness of this action by the court is not before us since there was no cross-appeal as to her.

The cases were subsequently sent to the jury as to William Delph, Daniel and Dorothy Chew, and verdicts were re ⁶⁶⁵ turned in favor of Kenneth Stockdale in the amount of $15,000 and in favor of each of the Ammons in the respective amounts of $5,000. Thereafter, the trial court granted a judgment n.o.v. in favor of both of the Chews, and entered judgment absolute upon the verdicts in favor of Stockdale and the Ammons. A joint appeal was taken by William Delph and Kenneth Stock-dale, appellants, against Charles and Virgie Ammons, and Daniel and Dorothy Chew, appellees. At approximately 4:10 p.m. on March 12, 1962, Virgie Ammons was driving a vehicle south on Route 124 in Montgomery County.

William Delph at that time was operating a vehicle traveling north, and while attempting to pass an automobile driven by Dorothy Chew, owned by her husband, Daniel Chew, Delph collided head on with the Ammons car. At the time of the accident Daniel Chew was sitting in the rear seat of his car and was returning to his home after being picked up by his wife. There was no contact by the Chew vehicle with the other two cars. Charles Ammons was a passenger in the automobile operated by his wife, and Kenneth Stockdale was a passenger seated next to Delph in his automobile.

The record discloses that Route 124 is a macadam road with one northbound and one southbound lane. Officer Burdette of the Montgomery County Police Department testified that when he arrived at the scene, he found that the Delph car had been involved in a head on collision with the Ammons car completely within the southbound lane in which Mrs. Ammons had been driving. The Chew vehicle was parked 600 feet north of the point of impact. Mrs. Chew told the officer that when the Delph car attempted to pass her, she saw the Ammons vehicle coming south, so she increased her speed to let the Delph car “fall in behind her.” The officer’s investigation revealed that the point of impact was 63 feet north of where the “no passing zone” began.

Stockdale told the investigating officer that Delph had tried to pass the Chew vehicle on several occasions, and each time Mrs. Chew increased her speed. Charles Ammons testified that he noticed the Delph vehicle trying to pass the Chew car, and as it did the Chew vehicle sped up. Mrs. Ammons testified that it looked as though the Chew car did not want the Delph vehicle to pass it. Delph ⁶⁶⁶ stated that on two prior occasions when he tried to pass the Chew car, it accelerated and he could not complete the passing.

He testified that he could have passed safely if she had not increased her speed. The record shows that he and Mrs. Chew were friends and at the time of the trial he had married her daughter. Mrs. Chew admitted that she knew Delph was behind her and that on both prior occasions she did increase her speed when he was attempting to pass her. Other witnesses testified to substantially the same happenings as described above.

On this appeal, the appellants- contend that there was legally sufficient evidence of such probative value to raise a jury question as to the negligence of Daniel and Dorothy Chew and thus the trial court erred in granting a judgment n.o.v. in their favor. Delph, in addition, contends that the court below erred in instructing the jury as to impairment of the Ammons’ earning capacity. ' ... In this case although there was sufficient testimony to" sustain the finding of the jury that Delph’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, there was also evidence justifying the jury’s finding of negligence on the part of the Chews and that their negligence contributed to and was a concurring proximate cause of the accident. Negligence which constitutes a proximate cause of an injury need not necessarily be the sole cause.

We have held that it is enough to show that the defendant’s negligence is an efficient and contributing cause of the injury, without which the injury "would not have resulted, despite the additional negligence of another motorist. See also Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 257-258 ,