Department of Economic & Employment Development v. Jones

POLLITT, Judge. The issue in this case is whether the Board of Appeals of the Department of Economic and Employment Development erred as a matter of law when it concluded that an employee’s persistent absenteeism and drug use, for which he ultimately was discharged, constituted “gross misconduct” which disqualified him for certain benefits under the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. We shall hold that the Board did not err, and shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Facts The relevant facts are brief and undisputed.

Donald Jones (appellee) was employed as a Senior Stockkeeper at the Martin Marietta Corporation from May 2, 1977 to May 13, 1987. On April 10, 1987, as a result of repeated absences, extensive visits to the employer’s medical facilities, and performance-related complaints by company supervisors, Jones was given a written warning by the company requiring that he complete a one-year drug treatment program and submit to random urinalysis three times per week. The agreement, signed by Jones, stated that his failure to comply could result in discharge. Jones failed to remain drug-free.

Subsequent urinalysis tests given on April 13, April 16, April 30, May 1, and May ⁵³³ 13, 1987, all showed positive results for illegal substances including marijuana and, on at least one occasion, cocaine. Appellant simply failed to appear on other scheduled testing dates. Appellant was hospitalized for 14 days in January, 1987 for depression, stress, and suicidal behavior, and for 10 days in May of that year for related reasons. On May 15, 1987, based on his “failure to abide to the conditions set forth in [his] conditional return to work letter dated April 7, 1987 and [his] failure to remain drug free” the company indefinitely suspended Jones.

Subsequently, on May 26, 1987, Jones was hospitalized at the Sheppard Pratt Hospital for 30 days for stress and suicidal behavior. Finally, on June 8, 1987, Jones was terminated “based on a full review of [his] record.” On September 2, 1987, a hearing examiner for the Department concluded that: The claimant’s conduct by having a positive result for drug screening results on at least 5 occasions for controlled, dangerous substances in April and May 1987, amounts to a wanton disregard to the employer’s interest" and constitutes gross misconduct in connection with the work, within the meaning of Section 6(b) of the [Maryland Unemployment Insurance] Law. The Board of Appeals agreed with the hearing examiner. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed the decision of the Board.

Based on this court’s subsequent decision in Department of Employment v. Owens, 75 Md. App. 472 , 541 A.2d 1324 (1988), however, the Department filed a motion requesting the circuit court to alter or amend its original judgment. The court agreed to review briefs from both parties, but ultimately denied the motion, finding that “Mr. Jones’ behavior did not constitute gross misconduct as a matter of law.” This appeal followed. The Department asserts that the trial court has improperly substituted its judgment for that of the agency in determining what behavior constitutes “gross misconduct”. We agree. ⁵³⁴ I Standard of Review The standard for judicial review of unemployment insurance determinations is set out in Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 95A, § 7(h), which provides: In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Board of Appeals as to the facts, if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record, and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of [the reviewing] court shall be confined to questions of law. [emphasis added] Ordinarily, therefore, the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency determines only the legality of the decision and whether there was “substantial evidence” from the record as a whole to support the decision.

Board of Educ., Mont. Co. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35 , 491 A.2d 1186 (1985). The Court of Appeals has summed up the “substantial evidence” standard this way: [the court’s] appraisal or evaluation must be of the agency’s fact-finding results and not an independent original estimate of or decision on the evidence. The required process is difficult to precisely articulate but it is plain that it requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere with