Department of Motor Vehicles v. Greyhound Corporation

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The proceedings in this case were initiated when the appellees, The Greyhound Corporation, Monumental Motor Tours, Inc., and McMahon Transportation Company, Inc., three interstate carriers of passengers, filed claims with the appellant, Department of Motor Vehicles, under Code (1957), Article 81, Section 215, for the refund, with interest, of excise taxes paid to the appellant by the appellees for the issuance of title certificates to various public passenger motor vehicles owned by the appellees. The appellant denied the refunds and appellees filed appeals to the Maryland Tax Court, as provided in Code (1957), Article 81, Section 217. The only evidence presented before the Tax Court consisted of a stipulation and supplemental stipulation.

The denial of the refund by the Department was affirmed by the Tax Court in a three to two decision in which a strong dissent was registered, and again the appellees here appealed under the provisions of Article 81, Section 217, and Rule B1-B12 of the Maryland Rules, this time to the Baltimore City Court. The hearing before the Baltimore City Court was on the record of the prior proceedings in the Tax Court, although the appellant proffered evidence which consisted of certain legislative materials in the form of reports of commissions and letters from various officials and private parties, which the appellant claims would have shown the legislative intent in enacting Chapter 267, Section 2, of the Daws of Maryland, 1961, (codified as Article 56, Section 184 of the Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.)), to support its theory of the case. This proffer was ruled inadmissible by Chief Judge Foster, who reversed the decision of the Tax Court, adopting the opinion of the dissenting minority, ⁶⁶⁶ •and awarding the appellees the relief for which they prayed.

The appeal to this Court followed. The resolution of this case hinges on the effect of statutes ■dating back to 1933. These statutes have been re-enacted as amended on numerous occasions since their inceptions, and it is upon the effect of these amendments and re-enactments that the contentions of the parties here involved are based. In 1933, by Chapter 593, a “seat-mile” tax was imposed up-en owners of public passenger carriers on the public highways •of the State.

In 1935 Chapter 539 was enacted requiring the ■owners of commercial vehicles, with certain exceptions not here involved, to pay an excise tax to the Department of Motor Vehicles for the issuance of the original certificates of title for the vehicles owned by them. Then in 1961, Chapter 267, Section 2, of the laws of that year was enacted substituting an axle tax for the earlier seat-mile tax, (codified as Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.), Article 56, Section 184 (a)) and this Act also stated that: “No other additional fees, licenses or tax shall be •charged by the State or any county or municipal subdivision ■of the State except the property tax and gasoline tax in respect to such vehicles or their operation.” In 1964 this exception was expanded to include “* * * the excise tax for the issuance of every original certificate of title,” by Chapter 16, Section 2, of the Laws of 1964 (codified as ■Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.) Article 56, Section 184 (a)).

During the period from May 1, 1961, the effective date of Chapter 267 of the Acts of 1961, and April 15, 1963, the appellant collected and the appellees paid, without protest, the titling tax in question. The appellees here claim that the exception in the 1961 Act does not include the titling tax, that a later act repeals an earlier one so far as the two conflict, and that by virtue of this implied repeal they are entitled to refunds for taxes paid during this period. The appellant disagrees with this contention, saying that the statutory provisions involved create an ambiguity and that the intent of the Legislature should be looked to and ascertained to resolve such ambiguity. While two or more statutes in pari materia are to be given full effect whenever possible, Balto.

Credit Union v. Thorne, 214 Md. 200, 209 , 134 A. 2d 84 , where the provisions of such ⁶⁶⁷ statutes are unreconcilable, the later statute governs to the extent of the conflict. Hensley v. Bethesda Metal Co., 230 Md. 556 , 188 A. 2d 290 ; Elgin v. Capital Greyhound Lines, 192 Md. 303 , 64 A. 2d 284 (citing cases); Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Section 2012 (3d ed.). The Department now attempts to reverse the argument through which it prevailed in Elgin, supra. In that case there were two statutes involved, both approved by the Governor on the same day.

Chapter 326 of the Acts of 1947, (codified as Article 81, Section 218, 1947 Cum. Supp.) provided that “* * * and no other additional fees, licenses or tax, shall be charged by the State or any County or municipal sub-division of the State except the property tax and gasoline tax on gasoline purchased in Maryland in respect to such vehicles or their operation.” This was identical to the language used in the statute as first enacted in Chapter 593, Section 1 of the Acts of 1933, and the only effect of the 1947 re-enactment was to reduce the amount of the tax charged. Chapter 560, Section 7 of the Acts of 1947, (codified as Article 66j^, Section 25A, 1947 Cum. Supp.) imposed an excise tax on the issuance of original certificates of title.

In that case this Court held that since there was a conflict between Chapter 326 and Chapter 560 that the latter must prevail since it was