Dept. of Health v. Sheffield

Maryland Department of Health v. Jamal Lateef Sheffield, No. 1046, Sept. Term 2019. Opinion filed on July 29, 2020, by Berger, J. NOTICE OF APPEAL - TIMING When a trial court issues an oral ruling that is subsequently memorialized in a written order, a notice of appeal is timely if it has been filed within thirty days of the date upon which the written order was entered on the docket by the clerk. CRIMINAL LAW - POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING - COMPETENCE - TRANSFER TO PERKINS HOSPITAL Section 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article governing incompetency in criminal cases refers to the competence of a “defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation proceeding.” A post conviction proceeding is not a criminal case and a post conviction petitioner is not a defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation proceeding. Section 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article does not provide the statutory authority for a circuit court’s grant of a post conviction petitioner’s motion to transfer from a correctional facility to a psychiatric hospital operated by the Maryland Department of Health for the purposes of achieving competency.

Assuming arguendo that a petitioner in a post conviction proceeding has the right to be found competent, it does not necessarily follow that the trial court has the authority to order the petitioner’s transfer to a psychiatric hospital. The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services provides health care, including mental health services, to inmates, and, if necessary, prisons may utilize the involuntary admissions provisions set forth in Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 10-614 of the Health-General Article. Absent statutory authority, the circuit court may not order the transfer of a post conviction petitioner from a correctional institution to a psychiatric hospital operated by MDH for the purpose of achieving competency.

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT-96-1449X REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1046 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. JAMAL LATEEF SHEFFIELD ______________________________________ Berger, Wells, Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Berger, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 29, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2021-01-11 17:30-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In 1997, Jamal Lateef Sheffield, appellant, was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two counts of use of a handgun in connection with a felony or crime of violence, for which he received a life sentence.1 In 2018, Sheffield, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and a Motion to Transfer Sheffield to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”), an inpatient psychiatric facility operated by the Maryland Department of Health (“MDH”). The purpose of the transfer was the restoration of Sheffield’s competence in order to assist counsel in his post conviction proceeding.

The trial court granted Sheffield’s motion to transfer. MDH moved to vacate the trial court’s order transferring Sheffield, which the trial court denied. On appeal, MDH presents the following single issue for our consideration: Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by granting the motion to transfer Sheffield from a correctional facility to MDH’s psychiatric facility. For the reasons explained herein, we shall vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. 1 Sheffield was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, thirty years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder, and thirty years’ imprisonment for each of the two counts of use of a handgun in connection with a felony or crime of violence.

The thirty-year sentence for second-degree murder was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence for attempted first-degree murder. One of the two sentences for the handgun offense was to be served consecutively and the other concurrently. The total sentence was life plus fifty years. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Following a jury trial, Sheffield was convicted of second-degree murder and associated offenses on October 10, 1997.

A notice of appeal was filed after Sheffield’s conviction but was subsequently withdrawn. In 1998, Carol E. Chance, then-Chief of the Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”), wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County indicating that she had been asked to assist Sheffield in connection with “possible post conviction relief” and asked that the clerk send her the docket entries for Sheffield’s case. The OPD did not file for post conviction relief. On April 13, 2016, Sheffield filed a pro se Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

The circuit court subsequently referred Sheffield’s petition to the Office of the Public Defender on May 18, 2016. In late 2017 or early 2018, Sheffield sent a letter to the circuit court.2 On May 8, 2018, the trial court sent a letter to the OPD requesting “that you folks investigate this case.” On December 27, 2018, Sheffield filed, through counsel, a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and a motion seeking his transfer from Western Correctional Institute to Perkins.3 Attached to the motion was a report from psychiatrist Dr. Solomon Meltzer. 2 The circuit court judge observed that the letter was received by the clerk on December 15, 2017 but was not docketed until April 30, 2018. The circuit court observed that the letter “candidly does not make sense and may indicate Mr. Sheffield has some sort of mental health issues.” 3 The OPD assigned the case to panel attorney Lisa J. Sansone, Esq. 2 Dr. Meltzer diagnosed Sheffield with schizophrenia, noted that Sheffield was not taking any medications at the time of his interview with Melzer, and commented that Sheffield had been “non-compliant with psychiatric medications at various points in his incarceration.” Dr. Meltzer expressed that, in his professional opinion, Sheffield was “incompetent to stand trial.” Dr. Meltzer recommended that Sheffield be treated at Perkins because it was his “understanding that Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center provides treatment for incompetent inmates who require adjudication of post conviction matters.” MDH, which was not a party to the post conviction action, was not served with a copy of Sheffield’s petition or motion to transfer. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to transfer on June 20, 2019.4 MDH was not notified of the hearing.

The court heard testimony from Dr. Meltzer, who testified that Sheffield was not competent to stand trial and “lack[ed] the ability to participate in post conviction proceedings.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that it was “appropriate that we send [Sheffield] to Perkins.” The trial judge issued an oral ruling granting the motion to transfer. The trial court’s grant of the motion to transfer was docketed the same day. The court asked Sheffield’s counsel to provide a written order for him to sign. Counsel subsequently provided the court with a written order memorializing the previous oral ruling, and the court signed the written order on June 24, 2019.

The June 24, 2019 order required that Sheffield “be transferred from 4 At the hearing, the trial court referred to an “off the record conversation” between the judge, the prosecutor, and counsel for Sheffield that had occurred the previous week. 3 Western Correctional Institution to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital forthwith for treatment.” On June 28, 2019, the trial court issued a subsequent order with an additional phrase. Specifically, the June 28th order required that Sheffield be transferred to “Perkins Hospital forthwith for treatment to restore competency for post conviction proceedings.” Both the June 24, 2019 order and the June 28, 2019 order were entered by the clerk on July 3, 2019. On July 2, 2019, the prosecutor contacted the trial court via email and advised the court that he had been contacted by Ms. Jo Anne Dudeck, Manager of Centralized Admissions for MDH, who had advised him that Sheffield was “not being transported” because the circuit court’s order “does not have language that the transfer is for a Criminal Procedure Section 315 evaluation.”5 The parties agreed to two additional orders for the circuit court to sign, and the trial court signed both orders on July 5, 2019. The first provided: The Court finds that: 1) That Mr. Sheffield is incompetent for his post conviction proceedings and, 2) Because of a mental disorder, is a danger to self or the person or property of another, It is HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Maryland Criminal Procedures Code, Section 3-106 and case law: 5 Ms. Dudeck is a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, not an attorney.

Ms. Dudeck acknowledged in her emails that “it is up to [the attorneys] what order you submit to the court” and “[defense counsel] and the ASA and Judge can decide which order.” 4 1) that Mr. Sheffield is committed to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital until the court finds that: a) the defendant no longer is incompetent for his post conviction proceedings; or b) There is no reasonable possibility of a restoration to competency. THEREFORE, the Motion to Transfer is GRANTED, and Mr. Sheffield is to be transferred from Western Correctional Institution to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital forthwith for treatment to restore competency for post conviction proceedings. It is so ORDERED. The other order entered by the trial court on July 5th was a form suggested by Ms. Dudeck and was titled “Commitment to the Maryland Department of Health after a Finding of Defendant’s Incompetency to Stand Trial and a Finding that by Reason of a Mental Disorder or Mental Retardation the Defendant is a Danger to Self or the Person or Property of Another (Criminal Procedure § 3-106).” This order appears to be the standard form order used by most trial courts when committing an individual to MDH pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl.

Vol.), § 3-106 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”). Neither of the orders signed by the circuit court judge on July 5, 2019 were ever docketed. On July 11, 2019, MDH filed a motion titled Motion to Vacate Orders of June 28, 2019 and July 5, 2019. MDH argued that there was no statutory authority to support the order of a competency determination, evaluation, or commitment in a post conviction proceeding.

Sheffield opposed the motion. Before the motion to vacate had been ruled upon by the circuit court, on July 26, 2019, MDH noted an appeal of the four orders 5 granting the motion to transfer. On August 8, 2019, Sheffield filed a motion to dismiss MDH’s appeal.6 MDH filed a response on August 16, 2019, and we denied the motion to dismiss on September 3, 2019. Sheffield subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss premised upon MDH’s delay in filing its brief.

We granted MDH’s request for an extension of time to file its brief and denied Sheffield’s motion. DISCUSSION In this appeal, MDH asserts that the trial court erred by committing Sheffield to MDH because there is no statutory authority to support a commitment under the circumstances presented in this case. As we shall explain, we agree. First, we address Sheffield’s assertion that MDH’s July 26, 2019 appeal is untimely.

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-202(a), a “notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” Sheffield asserts that the trial court orally granted his motion to transfer on June 20, 2019 and that the ruling was reflected in the electronic docket entry on the same day.7 Sheffield 6 Sheffield raised several arguments in his motion to dismiss, including that this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because there was no final judgment below, that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely, and that MDH had no standing to appeal because it was not a party to the proceeding below. 7 The electronic docket entry provides: 625 LA Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Mr. Sheff[iel]d from WCI to Perkins Judge Green; CS-D2019 Witness/Exhibit list, filed Motion – Granted Defendant to be transferred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Order to be submitted by Counsel for Defendant Case is to be reset for (Continued) 6 contends that the notice of appeal was due on or before July 20, 2019. We disagree. The Court of Appeals explained in Byrum v. Horning, 360 Md. 23, 33 (2000), that “[i]t is the entry of [a] separate document on the docket which constitutes the entry of the judgment . . . and it is the date of that entry which commences the running of the time for noting an appeal.” The trial court’s written orders dated June 24, 2019 and June 28, 2019 were entered on the docket by the clerk on July 3, 2019. Furthermore, the electronic docket entry cited by Sheffield in support of his assertion that the notice of appeal was untimely specifically provides that an “Order [was] to be submitted by Counsel for Defendant.” Because MDH’s notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of July 3, 2019, we reject Sheffield’s assertion that the notice of appeal was untimely filed.

We, therefore, turn to the merits of MDH’s appeal and consider the issue of whether the circuit court had the authority to issue an order transferring Sheffield from Western Correctional Institute to Perkins. Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article governs incompetency and criminal responsibility in criminal cases. The trial court’s duties regarding competence determinations are outlined in CP § 3-104, which provides: (a) If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case or a violation of probation proceeding appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Post Conviction Hearing before a judge Date to be set by the office of Calendar Management 7 (b) If, after receiving evidence, the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial shall begin as soon as practicable or, if already begun, shall continue.

(c) At any time before final judgment, the court may reconsider the question of whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. The statute specifically refers to a “defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation proceeding” and requires that a court determine “whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” CP § 3-104(a). The statute permits a court to “consider the question” of a defendant’s competence “[a]t any time before final judgment.” CP § 3-104(c).8 The case before us in this appeal is not a criminal case and does not involve a criminal defendant. Rather, this appeal stems from Sheffield’s petition for post conviction relief and accompanying motion to transfer.

When Sheffield sought a transfer to Perkins in order to obtain psychiatric treatment with the goal of attaining competency, Sheffield was not a defendant in a criminal case. Sheffield, instead, was a petitioner in a post conviction proceeding. A post conviction proceeding is not a criminal case. See State v. Bundy, 52 Md. App. 456 , 459 n.2 (1982) (“[A] post conviction proceeding is deemed to be civil in nature[.]”); Maryland Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90 (1974) (explaining that a post conviction proceeding “does not constitute part of the original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity 8 Indeed, the legislature could set forth a similar mechanism for the trial court’s consideration of a petitioner’s competency in a post conviction proceeding if it were inclined to do so. 8 of the conviction and sentence.”).

This is not a situation in which, “before final judgment,” questions arose about the competence of a “defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation proceeding.” CP § 3-104(a), (c). Sheffield points to no statutory authority that would support the trial court’s transfer under the circumstances of this case.9 Rather, Sheffield points to a variety of other sources that he asserts form the basis for the trial court’s authority to order his transfer. Both parties discuss the United States Supreme Court case of Ryan v. Gonzalez, 568 U.S. 57 (2013), at some length in support of their opposing positions. The issue before the Supreme Court in Ryan was “whether the incompetence of a state prisoner require[d] suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Id. at 60-61 .

The Supreme Court held that the petitioners did not have a statutory right to the suspension of federal habeas proceedings under such circumstances. Id. at 61 . The Ryan petitioners argued that two statutes formed the basis for the right to competency in habeas proceedings, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (guaranteeing the right to federally funded counsel in federal habeas proceedings) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (governing the determination of mental competency to stand trial or to undergo post- release proceedings). The Court found that neither statute established a right to competence in federal habeas proceedings.

With respect to § 3599, the Court observed that there was no constitutional right to counsel in