Derricott v. State

¹⁹⁴ MOYLAN, Judge. The appellant, Darone Antonio Derricott, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Judge J. James McKenna, sitting without a jury, of the unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. There are no appellate issues arising out of the trial itself. The case proceeded on an agreed statement of facts.

The undisputed facts established that when the appellant was stopped for speeding at 6:53 P.M. on June 3, 1988, the 1985 Nissan 300ZX which he was operating contained a cellophane bag, situated between the driver’s seat and the center console, containing 43 “hits” of crack cocaine in individual glassine bags. The appellant was the only occupant of the automobile. Other paraphernalia typically employed by narcotics pushers, including a beeper, were also found on the center console and the right front seat. The appellant does not contest the legitimacy of the guilty verdict.

The appellant does contest, most strenuously, the denial of his Motion to Suppress the glassine bags of crack cocaine on the ground that the search of his automobile that produced the cocaine was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 1 FACTUAL SUMMARY Although certain facts will be developed and discussed more fully as they bear upon specific sub-issues in the case, ¹⁹⁵ a brief summary may help to provide background. The appellant was stopped for speeding. The traffic officer approached the appellant’s vehicle as the appellant remained seated behind the wheel. The appellant turned over his driver’s license and registration card uneventfully.

The officer, during that brief initial encounter, did make certain observations about the appellant and about the automobile that took on subsequent significance. In the course of the initial stop, however, the officer did not notice anything that suggested the presence of either contraband or a weapon of any sort. The officer returned to his police cruiser for the purpose of writing a traffic citation. He made a routine radio check with respect to the appellant’s operator’s license and registration card.

The check revealed nothing out of the ordinary. The officer wrote out the citation for speeding but did not proceed immediately to reapproach the appellant’s vehicle to issue the citation. The curbside detention was to some extent protracted beyond the time ordinarily required to issue a speeding ticket, as a second purpose emerged in the officer’s mind. Because certain characteristics of the appellant and his vehicle matched the local drug courier profile for the Washington metropolitan area, the officer called for a drug-sniffing canine.

He called, in addition, for police “backup.” He awaited the arrival of that reinforcement before reapproaching the appellant because he now suspected that the appellant might be armed. He estimated that approximately seven minutes transpired between spotting the appellant’s car on the radar screen and reapproaching the appellant for the second time with the traffic citation in hand. Although the traffic ticket had been written, it was not then handed to the appellant. The appellant was instead requested to step out of his automobile.

He was then frisked. No weapons were found on his person. As part of an extended frisk, the officer approached the automobile, the door of which was open. The officer leaned the upper part of his body into the automobile for the express purpose ¹⁹⁶ of looking for weapons.

As he did so, he was looking down at a center console between the two bucket seats. Between the driver’s seat and the console, he observed approximately 20 per cent of a cellophane bag he suspected to contain narcotics. He seized the bag and found therein the contraband that formed the basis for the appellant’s prosecution. THE IMMATERIALITY OF PROBABLE CAUSE As we undertake our consideration of Fourth Amendment issues, we can narrow the focus significantly at the outset.

Fully half of the appellant’s brief was dedicated to discussing and analyzing the alléged absence of probable cause to support any of the police actions in this case. The appellant in that regard may well be right. Even if that be so, however, it is utterly immaterial. The State’s theory of the case, and the one obviously suggested by the evidence, is that 1) a routine stop for a speeding violation led to 2) the accumulation of articulable suspicion for a Terry * stop for a narcotics violation which was, in turn, attended by 3) a Terry frisk for weapons.

The necessary predicate for both a Terry stop and a Terry frisk is articulable suspicion, not probable cause. On the continuum of escalating likelihood of guilt, the articulable suspicion level is well down the scale from the probable cause level. The settled law that it is a significantly lesser measure of likely guilt was recently rearticulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 , -, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989): “The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ... The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop____ That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance ¹⁹⁷ of the evidence.

We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found/ ... and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." (Citations omitted). (Emphasis supplied). And see Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433-434 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990). THE TRAFFIC STOP As we “bracket the target” of issue or issues to be resolved, we can move in a step or two closer.

With respect to the traffic stop that set this episode in motion, there is no hint of subterfuge. This is not one of those cases where a narcotics officer, for instance, seizes the occasion, opportunistically, to observe a traffic violation on the part of a narcotics suspect. Corporal Michael W. Thomas of the Maryland State Police was routinely performing stationary radar observations from the median strip of Interstate 270 at a point just northwest of the Capital Beltway. At 6:53 P.M. on June 3, 1988, he observed the appellant’s vehicle travelling northbound at a speed of 89 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone.

He pursued the vehicle and directed it to the side of the road. The appellant produced his driver’s license and his registration card and was ultimately issued a traffic citation for speeding. The appellant does not contest the legitimacy of the traffic stop. PENNSYLVANIA v. MIMMS We can also eliminate another distinct component of the police conduct as noncontroversial.

After the appellant had been initially approached by Corporal Thomas but just before the officer reapproached him for the second time, Corporal Thomas ordered the appellant out of his car. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 , 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), established unequivocally that when the ¹⁹⁸ police have legitimately stopped an automobile, for a traffic offense or for any other reason, they are automatically entitled to order the driver and/or any of the passengers to alight from the vehicle. No particularized justification is required. The rationale behind this blanket police prerogative is general concern for police safety under such potentially dangerous circumstances.

The need having been established as a general rule, nothing by way of further justification is required on an individual occasion of its being invoked. In the Mimms case itself, there was no individualized justification: “The State freely concedes the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior. It was apparently his practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation.” 434 U.S. at 109-110 , 98 S.Ct. at 332 . The constitutional imprimatur on this police tactic is unequivocal, the Supreme Court saying, 434 U.S. at 111 , 98 S.Ct. at 333 : “We think this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis.

The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a ‘serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,’ but it hardly rises to the level of a ‘ “petty indignity.” ’ ... What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.” (Citation and footnote omitted).

Indeed, the appellant raises no issue with respect to his having been ordered to alight from his vehicle during the course of the encounter. ¹⁹⁹ THE FOCUS BECOMES BLURRED At this point, it would appear that we have settled upon three key issues for ultimate resolution: 1) the legitimacy of the superseding Terry stop based upon articulable suspicion that the appellant was a drug courier, 2) the legitimacy of the attendant Terry -frisk based upon articulable suspicion that the appellant might be armed, and 3) the permitted geographic scope of that frisk. The appellant has come perilously close to conceding himself out of court, as he arguably concedes the propriety of both 1) the Terry stop and 2) the attendant frisk or pat-down of his person: “Both the State and Appellant agree that the initial detention of the Appellant following the traffic violation was lawful. Appellant does not dispute the propriety of the initial patdown search, for that search produced no evidence of any criminal wrongdoing. The dispute surrounds the use of the local drug courier profile as the sole predicate for the belief that the Appellant was dangerous and able to gain immediate control of a weapon from the vehicle, thereby justifying a warrantless search of the passenger compartment and/or Appellant.” (Emphasis supplied).

If articulable suspicion for a Terry stop for narcotics trafficking were, indeed, conceded, that would go 95 per cent of the way (or more) toward establishing articulable suspicion for a Terry-frisk, with the right to frisk following virtually automatically from the very nature of the crime suspected. If the legitimacy of the frisk or pat-down of his person, moreover, were also conceded, the extension of the frisk into the passenger compartment of the automobile would then involve nothing more than a question of the geographic scope of the frisk and would bypass totally any challenge to its initial justification. We cannot believe that the appellant intended to concede so much. It seems that the appellant’s failure to challenge specifically the detention of his person arises from his mistaken belief that the detention for the speeding violation was the only detention involved in this case.

It is rather the fact ²⁰⁰ that the initial stop for speeding gave way to a superseding stop based upon subsequently accruing articulable suspicion that the appellant was a drug courier. Indeed, if that were not the case, the State might be facing a serious problem of a scope violation with respect to the length of the appellant’s detention for the traffic offense. Once Corporal Thomas concluded that the appellant might be a drug courier, he requested both backup officers and a drug-sniffing dog. The backup, human and canine, arrived about five minutes later.

A brief wait for the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog is a reasonable incident of a narcotics-related detention. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-707 , 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-2645 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 120-121 (1983). It is hardly necessary, on the other hand, to wait for a drug-sniffing dog to consummate the issuance of a speeding ticket. We will consider a challenge to the superseding, drug-related Terry stop properly to have been lodged.

Similarly, we will treat the apparent concession as to “the initial pat-down search” of his person as no more than an acknowledgment that the pat-down itself yielded no inculpatory fruits, rather than as a concession that it was constitutionally justified. The three issues, therefore, remain before us for consideration. ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING In the course of stopping the appellant for the speeding violation, Corporal Thomas made the following observations. He noted that the appellant was a young, black male (he was 20 years of age at the time), driving an expensive sports car, a Nissan 300ZX (a two-seater sports car of a very expensive type).

The appellant was wearing a blue sweatsuit, gold chains, and a thick, monogrammed gold ²⁰¹ ring. 2 As Corporal Thomas stood outside the driver’s window and looked inside, he saw a beeper lying on the center console. 3 He also noted on the passenger seat next to the appellant various papers containing phone numbers. His subsequent radio check on the vehicle’s registration revealed that it was registered jointly to the appellant and another. Through both in-service training and bulletins furnished by the Narcotics Section, Corporal Thomas was familiar with the “local drug courier profile” compiled by the Narcotics Section of the Maryland State Police. The profile listed the following characteristics of local drug couriers, which characteristics matched the appellant in this case: 1.

Young, black males wearing expensive jewelry, 2. Driving expensive cars, usually sports cars, 3. Carrying beepers, and 4. In possession of telephone numbers.

On the basis of those observations, enhanced by his knowledge of their significance, Corporal Thomas reasonably suspected that the appellant might be a drug courier and concluded that he should be detained briefly for questioning and for the arrival of the drug-sniffing canine. ²⁰² A PROFILE OF THE PROFILE The notion of a “drug courier profile” first surfaced in the plurality opinion of Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560-566 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1880-1883 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 513-517 (1980). Although the investigative phenomenon reappeared on five subsequent occasions, Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 , 100 S.Ct. 2752 , 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 308 , 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984); and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the Supreme Court has made it clear that the undergirding legal and constitutional issue involved is simply the presence of articulable suspicion for a stop and/or frisk. The so-called profile is something that may have investigative and factual significance but no legal significance per se. It is but one of the ways in which an officer accumulates articulable suspicion.

Since a stop and frisk based upon a profile is but an instance of the broader phenomenon of stop and frisk generally, it would never suffice for an officer to make the blanket and conclusory statement that the suspect “fit the profile.” It would be required, as it always is when an officer must articulate his articulable suspicion, that the officer recite the observed characteristics. Reference to the profile might then explain why he, on the basis of his own or the collective experience of the police team, could attach significance to the observed characteristics that an ordinary layman could not. Indeed, the use of a profile is simply a means by which the law enforcement team communicates its collective expertise and empirical experience to the officer in the field and by which the officer, in turn, explains the special significance of his observations to the court. The value of that expertise was commented upon in the concurring opinion in Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563 , 100 S.Ct. at 1882 : ²⁰³ “In reviewing the factors that led the agents to stop and question the respondent, it is important to recall that a trained law enforcement agent may be ‘able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.’ ...

Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the agent’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.” (Citation omitted). That the source of the expertise could be collective experience rather than requiring each officer in the field “to reinvent the wheel” for himself is the special investigative virtue of the profile: “Federal agents have developed ‘drug courier profiles,’ that describe the characteristics generally associated with narcotics traffickers.” Id. at 562 , 100 S.Ct. at 1881. In this regard, we ourselves observed in Grant v. State, 55 Md.App. 1, 7 , 461 A.2d 524 (1983): “The only legal significance to this umbrella term called ‘the profile’ is that the expertise of the police will be legitimately taken into consideration when we assess the significance of observations that might to the untrained layman seem completely ambiguous. The establishment of the profile by the Drug Enforcement Agency simply gives us the benefit of the collective expertise of many investigators working nationwide in this sensitive area of law enforcement.

The special significance that a given observation might have to a trained and experienced policeman could always be established on a case-by-case basis, even if the ‘profile’ did not exist.” A profile, any profile, is simply an investigative tool. It is an investigative tool, moreover, that the officer who uses it may describe to the court as he explains the special significance that otherwise innocuous observations may have for him. Although in recent years special attention has been lavished upon the drug courier profile in the special setting of airports, it is by no means the only profile ²⁰⁴ utilized. There are pickpocket profiles, especially valuable for use at race tracks and other crowded areas.

There are airplane highjacker profiles and terrorist profiles. Customs officers regularly select individuals for personal attention by using smuggler profiles. In the special world of drug smuggling, there is even a “balloon swallower” profile. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).

There are also, as this case illustrates, drug courier profiles for highways and streets as well as for airports. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985), was a case where the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of articulable suspicion to stop a motorist essentially on the basis that a congeries of apparently innocuous driving characteristics were tell-tale indicia of couriers carrying drugs north and south along the Atlantic coastal highway. It is important to remember that a profile is, in essence, a fact and not a legal principle. As a fact, it is as susceptible to change as the seasons.

Tell-tale characteristics in one region or milieu may be very different from those in others. As counter-measures are constantly devised to meet the tactics of the opposition, the tell-tale characteristics of last year may not be the tell-tale characteristics of next year. Because of this inherent fluidity, it is particularly unfit for being frozen into a legal principle. Because of the variable nature of the very concept of a profile, the indispensable rule for handling the concept is, “Think plural.” It was with this in mind that we observed in Grant v. State, supra, at 55 Md.App. 6 , 461 A.2d 524 : “An additional preliminary word is also in order about the so-called ‘drug courier profile.’ It is a convenient descriptive term without a great deal of legal significance.

Some lament the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet told us whether meeting the so-called ‘drug courier profile’ is an adequate predicate to establish either articulable suspicion for a stop or probable cause for an arrest or search. Of course, the Supreme Court has not told us that and they never will. Indeed, they cannot, for ²⁰⁵ there is no such thing as a single drug courier profile; there are infinite drug courier profiles. The very notion is protean, not monolithic.” In the last analysis, it is never a profile per se that is the object of appellate review.

The data to be scrutinized by the suppression hearing judge and appellate judge alike are the factual observations of the policeman. They may, to be sure, be interpreted through the collective police experience reflected in a profile. The ultimate issue, however, is whether the factual observations in combination, refracted through the trained eye of the policeman, yield articulable suspicion. Except as a guide to interpretation, the existence of a profile neither adds to nor subtracts from that computation.

As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1587 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 12 : “We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the agents’ belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA’s ‘drug courier profiles.’ A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a ‘profile’ does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.” (Footnote omitted). A POLICEMAN IS NOT A JUDGE The appellant complains vigorously that Corporal Thomas, even granting that his initial suspicion was reasonable, made no effort to verify or dispel that suspicion by asking the appellant to explain the luxurious car, the beeper, the phone numbers, etc. The appellant compiles a significant checklist of steps he thinks a “reasonable” officer should have taken: “During the course of the encounter, Corporal Thomas did not make reasonable inquiries of the Appellant which could have disaffirmed Appellant’s match [of] the local drug courier profile. Corporal Thomas did not ask Appel ²⁰⁶ lant how he came into possession of his jewelry, beeper, or phone numbers. No inquiry was made as to how or why the Appellant was driving an expensive vehicle.

Although aware that the vehicle was registered in the name of Appellant and a relative, Corporal Thomas did not ask Appellant whether the vehicle belonged to his mother, or whether it was bought for him.” There is no merit to the complaint. Its basic thrust is that the policeman acted liked a reasonable policeman and not like a judge. 4 In the after-the-fact tranquility of the courtroom, the judge is enjoined to hear all possible explanations for suspicious behavior before making dispassionate judgment as to what was the historic reality. The role of the policeman, by contrast, is, generally speaking, to assemble his best case. In the context of stop and frisk situations particularly, the circumstances are such that “in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U.S. 10 , at 88 S.Ct. 1874 .

What is required is not the thorough probing and counter-probing of the courtroom but “necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat.” Id. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. In one sense, the appellant’s suggestion is disingenuous. He argues that the officer should ask the suspect to explain suspicious circumstances but gives no reason why the officer, trained to be skeptical, should believe the explanations. The officer could hardly be required to go further afield by way of verifying the explanations for himself.

In the first place, this would be the very antithesis of the “necessarily swift action” contemplated by Terry v. Ohio and its proge ²⁰⁷ ny. In the second place, it would involve the paradox of detaining the suspect even while deciding whether there was good cause to detain him. If there were enough reason to hold the suspect while the verification was in progress, the verification would be redundant. If there were not, the suspect would have to be released before the verification could even take place.

The phenomenon of verifying or dispelling the initial suspicion is not a precondition for a Terry stop but rather the very object of an already consummated Terry stop. If the initial suspicion is dispelled, the Terry stop comes to an end and the suspect is free to leave. If, on the other hand, the initial suspicion is sufficiently verified, the stop ripens into an arrest. In this case, moreover, Corporal Thomas did take an appropriate step to verify or dispel his initial suspicion.

He summoned a trained drug-sniffing dog to the scene. The dog, with neither motive nor capacity to fabricate, would not suffer the same credibility gap as would the appellant’s explanations. Had no other event intervened, the dog, within five minutes, would, quickly and fairly, have verified or dispelled the initial suspicion. The defendant in United States v. Sokolow, supra, made the same argument as does the appellant here that a reasonable inquiry should be a necessary preliminary to a Terry detention.

It was Sokolow’s position that, “the agents should have simply approached and spoken with him, rather than forcibly detaining him.” 490 U.S. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 1587 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 12 . Although that might have been less intrusive, the Supreme Court was clear that the reasonableness of a Terry stop does not turn upon the availability of less intrusive means: “The reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. Such a rule would unduly hamper the police’s ability to make swift on-the-spot decisions —here, respondent was about to get into a taxicab — and ²⁰⁸ it would require courts to ‘indulge in “unrealistic second-guessing.” ’ ” Id. ARTICULABLE SUSPICION FOR THE SUPERSEDING TERRY STOP We hold that there was sufficient articulable suspicion that the appellant was a drug courier to justify the Terry stop that superseded the traffic stop.

In measuring articulable suspicion, of course, we are actually making and then comparing two measures. Judging Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a balancing process and balancing, by definition, is an exercise in relativity. A minimal justification can outweigh a minimal intrusion just as surely as a weightier justification can outweigh a weightier intrusion. Our concern is not with absolute weight but with relative weight.

On one side of the scale is both the public interest in curbing crime and police expertise in evaluating evidence. The concurring opinion of Justice Powell in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565-566 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1883 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 517 (1980), spoke of the significance of both of these factors: “The jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment demands consideration of the public’s interest in effective law enforcement as well as each person’s constitutionally secured right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In applying a test of ‘reasonableness,’ courts need not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement officials have gained from their special training and experience.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 , 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3308 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381, 388 (1985), also spoke of the competing interests that vie for dominance: “What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself____ The permissibility of a ²⁰⁹ particular law enforcement practice is judged by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” (Citation omitted). That same opinion went on to point out that trafficking in narcotics particularly is no ordinary crime problem but one that has assumed the dimensions of a national crisis: “This concern is, if anything, heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.” 473 U.S. at 538 , 105 S.Ct. at 3309.

In dealing with airport stops, the Supreme Court in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 , 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 119 (1983), also alluded to the strong governmental interest in stemming the flow of narcotics: “Because of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity ..., allowing police to make brief investigative stops of persons ... on reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels.” (Footnote omitted). And see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-499 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 237 (1983). Counsel for the appellant observed at oral argument that the Supreme Court seems to be creating a diluted Fourth Amendment for drug prosecutions while preserving a more substantial Fourth Amendment for other types of crime. Although the comment as offered was wry, it may actually have been not far off the mark.

It is, of course, not the case that the Supreme Court is creating one Fourth Amendment for drug prosecutions and another for other types of crime. It is rather the case that when the currently prevailing general reasonableness approach to the Fourth Amendment applies, as it does here, that reasonableness is determined by balancing the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against the “promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” ²¹⁰ By the very nature of the balancing process, it follows that the individuars Fourth Amendment interest does not enjoy a fixed position, as if in a vacuum chamber, but rises or falls in relationship to the countervailing interest being weighed against it. When a scourge such as narcotics assumes plague-like proportions, therefore, the governmental interest in combatting it is correspondingly weighty. The very phenomenon of balancing necessarily implies that the gravity of the governmental interest on one side of the scale will inevitably influence what happens on the other side of the scale.

The investigation of narcotics cases is not the only instance where the Supreme Court has recognized the gravity of a social problem as a factor in the weighing process. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-559 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 919-920 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 755-756 (1983) (drunken driving); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755-756 , 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2100-2101 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 746-747 (1984) (concurring opinion by Blackmun, J.) (drunken driving); Michigan Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2481 , 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (drunken driving); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111-112 , 106 S.Ct. 960, 964-965 , 89 L.Ed.2d 81, 88-89 (1986) (automobile larceny); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-661 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1399-1400 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 671-672 (1979) (highway safety). The balancing of the governmental interest in solving a social problem against the constitutional intrusion has also taken place with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 448 , 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1547 , 29 L.Ed.2d 9, 29 (1971) (concurring opinion by Harlan, J.) (hit-and-run drivers).

On the other side of the balance scale, the constraint on liberty imposed by a Terry stop is relatively minimal. It is limited in space in the sense that it does not involve removing the suspect from the place where he is initially stopped to some more remote location. It is limited in time in that its duration must be brief. Nothing more severe by way of constraint will happen to the suspect unless, during the ²¹¹ course of the brief restraint, some supervening justification should develop.

Because the impact on personal liberty of the Terry detention itself (as opposed to its possible consequences) is minimal, the required justification is significantly less than probable cause. As was discussed in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 , 105 S.Ct. 308, 310 , 83 L.Ed.2d 165, 170 (1984): “Certain constraints on personal liberty that constitute ‘seizures’ for purposes of the Fourth Amendment may nonetheless be justified even though there is no showing of ‘probable cause’ if ‘there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ ... Such a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an airport search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, ... and is permissible because of the ‘public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.’ ” (Citations omitted) (Emphasis supplied). The most recent (June 11, 1990) decision of the Supreme Court dealing with stop and frisk law illustrates tellingly how little is required by way of justification for a stop or a frisk.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), dealt with a stop precipitated by an anonymous telephone tip and corroborated only by police observation of several relatively innocuous details. In upholding the Fourth Amendment legitimacy of the stop, the Supreme Court observed: “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” In our case, both the appellant’s age 5 and his sex were compatible with the statistically-based profile of a drug ²¹² courier in the Washington metropolitan area. These factors, standing alone, would be so de minimis as to be meaningless. Even in combination with other pieces of circumstantial evidence, they are of minimal weight.

They are nonetheless of some slight weight and are, therefore, entitled to enter into the larger totality of circumstances. 6 Both the dress of the appellant and the gold chains and gold rings worn by the appellant are data in the same category. They are virtually meaningless standing alone because thousands of innocent persons are so dressed and so adorned. They are also compatible, however, with the characteristic dress and adornment of the drug dealer, as reflected in the profile. Any single item in this category is not purported to be self-sufficient proof of guilt or even self-sufficient evidence of either probable cause or articulable suspicion.

It is simply a clue. Clues, however, are the life blood of good detective work. Clues alert the police as to where to look and when to look more closely. When clues begin to ²¹³ accumulate and to point in the same direction, moreover, that accumulation becomes the stuff of which articulable suspicion (and even, further along the continuum, probable cause and proof of guilt) may be made.

A mosaic begins to emerge from the individually insignificant little pieces of stone. The combination of gold chains and gold rings on a young man, for instance, may have a different investigative value than the combination of the same gold jewelry on an older woman, or even a younger woman. A more significant clue was the expensive sports car. For a young man of an age suggesting that he would be still in school or newly entered into the work force to be provided with a sports car the cost of which is measured in units of tens of thousands of dollars is a clue that the police would have been derelict to overlook. 7 There, of course, could be innocent explanations, such as the young man’s using of the family car.

The document check showing the sports car to have been registered to the appellant himself and another of a different surname, however, at least tilted against such innocent explanation. In contemplating the range of explanations for a phenomenon worthy of their interest, the police could not ignore the more sinister possibility that the source of the appellant’s precocious affluence was the narcotics traffic. It is in the weighing of that possibility that the appellant’s characteristics compatible with those of a narcotics trafficker took on a significance they might not otherwise have possessed. The clincher, especially when considered in combination with all of the other