Dett v. State

DEBORAH S. EYLER, J. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Evelyn Y. Dett sued the State of Maryland, the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“Department”), the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services (“DPDS”), the Baltimore City Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), the Central Booking and Intake Center (“Central Booking”), and the Division of Parole and Probation (“DP & P”), the appellees, for false imprisonment and violation of her state constitutional right to due process. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. Dett challenges that ruling in two questions presented that can be distilled into one: Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment for the appellees? 1 II.For the following reasons, we answer “yes” and therefore shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The facts and reasonable inferences presented to the court in the summary judgment record, and viewed most favorably to Dett, show the following. ⁴³⁴ On March 7, 2003, at 5:00 p.m., Dett was driving near the 100 block of North Schroeder Street, in Baltimore City, when she was stopped by Officer Darren Moore, of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) Police Department, for a traffic violation.

Dett identified herself by her name. Officer Moore contacted his dispatch officer to run a routine background check. The background check revealed an open violation of probation bench warrant issued on July 31, 2002, by a judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for “Vanessa Hawkins a/k/a Evelyn Dett,” having “SID No. 381961,” in Case Number 802134014 (“the bench warrant”). An SID (State Identification) number is a unique identification number that Central Booking issues to each person processed there.

The number is assigned based on the person’s fingerprint. See Glover v. State, 143 Md.App. 313, 318 , 794 A.2d 735 (2002). Believing Dett to be the subject of the bench warrant, Officer Moore arrested her and took her to Central Booking. Dett arrived at Central Booking at 5:50 p.m., and was taken to a booking station.

According to Central Booking’s “Offender Activity Log,” Dett was booked at 6:15. At 6:26, she was moved from the booking station to a photograph station. Her photograph was taken at 6:27. At 6:32 p.m., an entry in the “Offender Activity Log,” under “Offender Delays,” states: “DO NOT RLSE SUBJECT BOOKED ON CIRCUIT # 802134014.” A similar entry appears at 6:35, by the same person, on an “Offender Detainer Information Report.” These entries were prompted by a “commitment order” issued by the Baltimore City Sheriff that evening to DPDS, which administers the Detention Center, directing the Detention Center to detain “Vanessa Hawkins” a “B/F” having “SID No. 381961” and a date of birth of July 11, 1963, to “await further action [by the] Circuit Court for Baltimore City.” The commitment order states it was issued on March 7, 2003, pursuant to “Bench Warrant No. 802134014.” ⁴³⁵ At 6:41 p.m., Dett was moved to a fingerprint station.

Her fingerprints were taken at 6:43. One minute later, they were “[ujploaded to CRC.” It is apparent that the “uploading” of Dett’s fingerprints into the computer database generated SID number 2413966, not SID number 381961, because an “offender check” was made on SID number 2413966 at 7:05, and, according to Central Booking’s “Offender Criminal History Information Report,” three computer searches (an “IDENT/INDEX” search, a “RAP SHEET CONDENSED” search, and a “RAP SHEET NARRATIVE” search) were made at 7:22, using that SID number. The “Offender Activity Log” and all other computer documents for Dett generated by Central Booking, and later by the Detention Center, bear SID No. 2413966. As an apparent result of the discrepancy between the SID number on the bench warrant and Dett’s SID number, at 7:22 p.m., a “Flag” was “Inserted” into Dett’s computer identification record.

At a time that evening not referenced in the “Offender Activity Log,” Central Booking generated an “Offender Identification Information Report” showing that Dett’s SID number was 2413966, not 381961. Also sometime that evening, not timed, Debara Driver of Central Booking filled in the top section of a “Problem Paperwork Notice” for “Vanessa Hawkins,” with SID numbers “2413966” and “381961,” stating: “[D]efendant has 2 sid # ’s[.] Please clarify with fingerprint the correct [number] to be used.” That same evening (again not documented by time), Driver prepared an “SID PROBLEM FORM” for “Vanessa Hawkins,” having SID numbers “2413966 and 381961,” on which she wrote: [Defendant has 2 sid #’s — commitment has been entered into the system under 2413966. I contacted fingerprint who insisted that this is the correct # . I spoke to Ada who said that they could not do anything until Monday 3/10/03.

At 7:33 p.m., Dett was moved to a group cell, where she remained until 1:31 a.m. (Saturday, March 8), when she was “released” to the Detention Center, i.e., moved there from ⁴³⁶ Central Booking. Several reports were generated at that time, all under SID number 2413966, among them: an “Offender Personal Property Information Report,” an “Offender Detainer Information Report,” an “Offender Arrest Information Report,” and an “Offender Booking Information Report.” The latter report gives Dett’s birthday as February 6, 1962, not July 11, 1963, as stated in the bench warrant. It also gives a social security number, weight, height, and address for Dett.

A “Bed Entry Completed” notation was made at 4:12 a.m. A little more than two hours later, at 6:19, someone at the Detention Center made an “Identification/Index System Central Repository Inquiry,” into “Maryland CJIS,” for SID number 2413966. The search showed “No exact matched record on file.” Two minutes later, the person made an inquiry for SID number 381961 — the number for the person who was the subject of the bench warrant. That search did not match any of the information generated until then on Dett and SID number 2413966.

It showed the subject’s name was Vanessa Ann Hawkins but that she used the alias Evelyn Y. Dett. It gave her date of birth as July 11, 1963 — not February 6, 1962 — but cautioned that she used an alias date of birth of February 6, 1962. It further showed that Hawkins was using two social security numbers (neither of which matched Dett’s social security number), that she had an assigned FBI number (which Dett did not), that she had prior contacts with Central Booking in 1983, 1997 (twice), 1998 (three times), 1999 (twice), and 2002 (when Dett had no prior contacts), and that her address and height were not the same as Dett’s. At 6:23 a.m., Dett’s “release” from Central Booking to the Detention Center was entered into the “Offender Activity Log” as “completed,” and she was documented as having been moved.

There are no further entries for Saturday, March 8 and none at all for Sunday, March 9. On Monday, March 10, two entries were added to the March 7 “Problem Paperwork Notice.” One states: “these are two different people. Cor ⁴³⁷ rect sid # 2413966 for Vanessa Hawkins DOB 2-6-1962, sid # 381961 belongs to Evelyn Dett who used Vanessa Hawkins as AKA DOB 7-11-63.” 2 The other, also untimed, states, in apparent response, and referring to Dett’s “release” from Central Booking to the Detention Center: [Y]ou still did not tell us which sid is correct for Vanessa Hawkins born 2-10-62 #2413966 is that the correct sid # also the DOB on the release is for the inmate w[ith] DOB of 7-11-63 but uses the DOB of 2-6-62. We need to have this lady fingerprinted again since the release had the DOB different from what is on the offender booking sheet.

There is no further activity documented on Monday, March 10. On Tuesday, March 11, at 10:27 a.m., a staff employee of DPDS sent a facsimile to “Bonnie,” in the circuit court, requesting a “court seal & true test” for “Vanessa Hawkins,” SID number 2413966, case number 802134014. Sometime that same day, the Sheriff issued a document to the Detention Center directing the release from custody of “Vanessa Hawkins” with SID number 2413966, in case 802134014, stating “Wrong Defendant.” Although the parties in their briefs have made reference to a court order issued that day, releasing Dett, there is no such order in the record, and they appear to be referencing the “release” issued by the Sheriff. 3 A DPDS “Release Form” signed by four employees, at times ranging from 10:57 that morning to 1:00 that afternoon, states that, upon examining “the commitment papers and computer record” for “Vanessa Hawkins,” SID number 2413966, they had “determined that [she] should be released from the Division of Pretrial Deten ⁴³⁸ tion and Services.... ” The DPDS “Release Form” shows that Dett in fact was released from custody at 3:00 p.m. From the time she was arrested forward, Dett was protesting, saying she was not the person who was the subject of the bench warrant.

At Central Booking, she was told that, if her fingerprints did not match the fingerprints of the warrant suspect, she would be released. When the fingerprints did not match, however, she was not released, and instead was moved to the Detention Center. On December 12, 2003, Dett filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State; the Department; DPDS; the Detention Center; Central Booking; and DP & P, for false imprisonment and violation of her due process rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. She alleged that she was held in custody at Central Booking and the Detention Center without her consent, without legal justification, and without being charged with a crime and taken before a commissioner, and that she suffered injuries as a result, for which she sought damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expungement of her criminal record. 4 She demanded a jury trial. 5 On March 1, 2004, without filing an answer and before any discovery was undertaken, the appellees jointly filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law.

The motion was supported by documents generated by Central Booking and the Detention Center; the bench warrant, “commitment order,” and the Sheriffs “release”; and an affidavit by Susan Murphy, Assistant Warden assigned to Central Booking. ⁴³⁹ The appellees asserted that the material facts were not in genuine dispute and, on those facts, they had legal justification to hold Dett in custody. Specifically, they argued that she had been committed to their custody by the “lawful authority” of Officer Moore and then of the Sheriff, pursuant to the bench warrant. Relying on Glover, supra, 143 Md.App. 313 , 794 A.2d 735 , they further argued that, upon Dett’s being committed to their custody by lawful authority, they could not take action to release her except upon court order, and they had no duty to investigate whether she in fact was not the subject of the bench warrant. They argued that, for the same reason, Dett’s due process rights had not been violated, as a matter of law.

In her affidavit, Assistant Warden Murphy acknowledged that on the evening of March 7, at Central Booking, Dett’s SID number was found not to match the SID number for the person who was the subject of the bench warrant. She further attested, however, that the detaining authorities could not release Dett until directed to do so by court order, and “could have simply held [her], without any investigation, and produced her in the Circuit Court when they were ordered to do so.” She pointed out that, when the discrepancy in SID numbers was discovered, it was after business hours for the circuit court. She attested that DPDS could not release Dett until it “received a court order releasing her from custody,” but Central Booking staff members nevertheless “immediately began to undertake steps to verify [Dett’s] identity, including re-fingerprinting her, to satisfy themselves that [she] was not the person who was the subject of the bench warrant”; and that, once they were “satisfied that [Dett] was not the person who was the subject of the bench warrant ..., they were able to secure an order from the Circuit Court authorizing her release.” 6 Dett filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, supported by a memorandum of law, supporting docu ⁴⁴⁰ ments (including Murphy’s affidavit), and her own affidavit. She argued that the appellees did not have legal authority to detain her on the bench warrant or “commitment order,” as issued based on the bench warrant, because, among other reasons, neither her name nor her SID number matched those of the person who was the subject of the warrant.

In a reply memorandum, the appellees argued that DPDS officers could not release Dett without a court order authorizing them to do so, and, given that, it “acted reasonably once it had reason to suspect that [the appellant] was the wrong person who was in custody.” There was no request for a hearing. On March 22, 2004, the court issued an order granting the motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in the appellees’ favor. The order was docketed on March 24, 2004. On April 20, 2004, Dett noted this appeal. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court must determine two legal issues: 1) whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and 2) if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Md. Rule 2-501; Salomon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 307 , 841 A.2d 858 (2004); Jahnigen v. Smith, 143 Md.App. 547, 554 , 795 A.2d 234 (2002). In deciding the first issue, the court must resolve all disputes of material fact and the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence and pleadings, against the moving party. Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676 , 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Carter v. Aramark Sports and Entertainment Services, Inc., 153 Md.App. 210, 224 , 835 A.2d 262 (2003), cert. denied, 380 Md. 231 , 844 A.2d 427 (2004).

A material fact is ⁴⁴¹ one the resolution of which will alter the outcome of the case. King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center, 106 Md.App. 470, 489 , 665 A.2d 297 (1995). Because the decision to grant summary judgment is purely legal, we review it de novo, determining for ourselves whether the record on summary judgment presented a genuine dispute of material fact, and if not, whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. O’Connor v. Baltimore Co., 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191 (2004); Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 549-50 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004).

DISCUSSION (a) False Imprisonment Under Maryland common law, false arrest and false imprisonment are intentional torts. The essence of the civil wrong in each tort is an unlawful detention. The torts thus are separate causes of action that share the same elements. Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 189-90 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000).

The elements are: “1) the deprivation of the liberty of another; 2) without [his] consent; and 3) without legal justification.” Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264 , 761 A.2d 56 (2000); Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 721 , 664 A.2d 916 (1995); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654 , 261 A.2d 731 (1970); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 , 122 A.2d 457 (1956). The vast majority of false arrest and imprisonment cases focus on the third, “legal justification,” element of the torts. The interrelationship between false arrest and false imprisonment is such that the “legal justification” to detain element is the “equivalent to legal authority” under the law of arrest.

Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 120 , 660 A.2d 447 (1995) (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra, 256 Md. at 655 , 261 A.2d 731 ). ⁴⁴² In the case at bar, Dett did not include a claim for false arrest in her complaint. She did not sue Officer Moore or the HABC Police Department for false arrest. She does not contend that Officer Moore acted without legal authority in arresting her upon being informed by the dispatch officer that there was a bench warrant for a person using the name Evelyn Dett.

Rather, Dett’s claim is for false imprisonment, against the appellees, for post-arrest detention. The parties agree that there is no dispute of material fact as to the first two elements of the tort of false imprisonment: Dett was deprived of her liberty by the appellees for four days, from the evening of March 7 to the afternoon of March 10, and she did not consent to the deprivation. The third element of the tort of false imprisonment, “legal justification,” is the topic of this appeal. Dett contends that the evidence in the summary judgment record could support a finding that, soon after she was transferred into the custody of DPDS, first at Central Booking and then at the Detention Center, the DPDS authorities reasonably knew, from the discrepancy found during booking and upon further investigation between her SID number and that of the person for whom the bench warrant was issued, that she was not the person named in the bench warrant (and hence in the “commitment order”).

At that point, because the bench warrant was the sole basis for her lawful detention, the appellees no longer had the legal authority to detain her, and further detention was without “legal justification.” The appellees respond that the evidence in the summary judgment record shows that, upon learning, on the evening of March 7, that Dett’s SID number did not match the SID number of the subject of the bench warrant, they undertook an investigation to determine which person properly was the subject of the bench warrant; and by March 11 they were satisfied that Dett was not that person. At that point, they sought action by the circuit court and the Sheriffs Office to “undo” the bench warrant and commitment order, and upon obtaining permission, released Dett. They maintain, under ⁴⁴³ Glover, supra, that they were without legal authority to release Dett. Only the circuit court and the Sheriffs Office could release Dett; and therefore, even if