Di Legge v. Peper

Pattisow, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the.26th day of September, 1923, the Land Commissioner of Maryland issued to “the surveyor of Baltimore County a special warrant to survey for and in the name ²⁶⁹ of the appellee, John H. Peper, “one acre, more or less, of vacant land, be the same cultivated or otherwise,” in the fourteenth election district of Baltimore County, Maryland. On the 2.5th day of March, 1924, the surveyor returned his certificate of survey, in which he described the land surveyed by him under the warrant, by metes and hounds, courses and distances, and with his return filed a plat showing that the land so surveyed contained four and ninety-nine one hundreds acres, more or less, and designating it thereon as “PepePs Chance.” On April 12th, 1924, the appellants filed a caveat against the issuance of a patent therefor upon two grounds: (1) that the land described in the surveyor’s certificate is comprehended within the lines of the appellants’ deed or deeds by which a fee-simple title therein was conveyed, and (2) adverse possession in the appellants and their predecessors in title. The answer of the appellee, filed on July 9th, 1924, denied the allegations of the caveat, .and, after hearing on the caveat, the commissioner, on the 25th day of August, 1924, passed his order overruling the caveat and ordering the patent to issue.

This appeal is from that order. The statute of this State, article 54, section 25, of the Public General Laws of Maryland, under which a special warrant was obtained, is as follows: “Any vacant land, whether cultivated or1 uncultivated, and any land which has escheated by reason of the last owners in fee simple dying intestate thereon .and without heirs may be taken up by any person by complying with the provisions herein contained.” The deed mentioned by the appellants in their caveat, which, as claimed by them, comprehends the land involved in these proceedings, is the deed to them from Frederick Eosengarn and wife, dated October 18tb, 1922, and 'by it three distinct parcels of land, described by metes and bounds, courses and distances were conveyed1 to them, containing, respectively, 18%, 1% and 5 acres of land, more or less. As disclosed by tlie record, the land in dispute is not included within any of these particularly described parcels of ²⁷⁰ land, nor is' it so contended by the' appellants, but it is claimed by them that it was intended to be embraced within the five-acre parcel contained in said deed, which lies adjacent thereto on the west, but