Diaz v. State

THIEME, Judge. Tony Diaz, appellant, was convicted by a Baltimore City jury of possession of heroin with intent to distribute (Count 1), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (Count 3), use or transport of a handgun (.357) in a drug trafficking (heroin) offense (Count 5), use or transport of a handgun (9mm) in a drug trafficking (cocaine) offense (Count 8), maintaining a common nuisance (heroin) in a vehicle (Count 9), maintaining a common nuisance (cocaine) in a vehicle (Count 10), and alter ⁵⁶ ing the serial number of a handgun (9mm) (Count 1 of a second indictment jointly tried). Appellant was sentenced to twenty years for Count 1, increased to forty years pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol), Art. 27 § 293; twenty years for Count 3, increased to forty years under § 293; consecutive twenty years for Count 5 (merged with Count 8); consecutive twenty years for Count 9 (merged with Count 10), increased to forty years under § 293, consecutive; and three years for the alteration of the serial number, consecutive, the first five years to be served without parole pursuant to Count 5, for a total of 143 years. Subsequently, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted appellant this belated appeal. 1 He presents the following questions: 1.

Did the trial court err in replacing a seated juror on the second day of trial with an alternate when the original juror was seven and one-half minutes late; the court made no inquiry into the juror’s whereabouts; and the record indicated poor weather and congested traffic that morning? 2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that possession alone of a handgun with an altered serial number shifted the burden of proof to the appellant by creating a presumption that the appellant had performed the alteration? 3. Did the trial court err in denying the appellant’s motion for judgement of acquittal on the common nuisance charge where the evidence established drugs in the car in question on only one day and the offense requires proof of a repeated violation? 4. Did the trial court err in admitting irrelevant “expert” testimony regarding drug organizations, drug packag ⁵⁷ ing, and firing characteristics of different weapons; and testimony merely used to scare and inflame the jury? 5.

Did the trial court err in applying the sentencing enhancement of Md.Code, Art. 27, § 293 to double three separate counts from sixty (60) years to one-hundred twenty (120) years, for a sentence totaling one-hundred forty-three (143) years, merely because of one prior possession of cocaine conviction? 6. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury that the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the appellant? We answer “no” to questions 1, 3, 4, and 6, “yes” to questions 2 and 5, and explain. Facts On December 22,1992, Agent Thames of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), while staking out an apartment, saw someone he suspected to be appellant proceed to a car.

This individual walked back and forth from the passenger side to the trunk a number of times before entering the car and driving away. Agent Thames followed the car and subsequently lost it. When Agent Thames again spotted the car later the same day, he and a number of other agents began to follow the car. The car sped up, and all the law enforcement personnel except for Agent Thames lost track of it.

Agent Thames followed the vehicle until it parked in downtown Baltimore. There, the driver exited and went into a nearby building. Agent Thames identified the individual as the same man he had seen enter the car earlier in the day. The police brought in drug-sniffing dogs that alerted to the car, which was then seized and subsequently searched.

The police found two secret compartments in the door panels that were hydraulically locked, and could be opened by a mechanism under the steering wheel. Inside the compartments were 533 blue and white glassine bags of heroin, 355 yellow-topped vials containing cocaine, 10 yellow glassine bags containing heroin, 3 blue-topped vials containing cocaine, 9mm ⁵⁸ and .357 handguns (both of which were loaded), $10,825 in cash, a social security card, and a certificate of citizenship and passport for Henry Rafael Diaz. The two larger bags containing the heroin and cocaine were dusted for fingerprints. The prints lifted did not match those of appellant.

Neither the car itself nor the glassine bags and guns were tested for fingerprints. The serial number of the 9mm gun had been obliterated. The glove compartment contained several invoices for repair work done on the car that listed various names and addresses. The car itself was registered to Carnell Burrow, who was initially arrested for the drugs recovered.

The charges against him were subsequently dropped, however, in return for his testimony against appellant. Barrow denied being in the drug trade, and claimed that in December of 1991 appellant had paid him $900.00 to borrow his birth certificate so that appellant could obtain a car in his own name. The State also produced the testimony of Sofia Didley, who testified that appellant had shared an apartment with her in the fall and winter of 1992. This was the same apartment Agent Thames had staked out earlier on the day of the chase and seizure of the car.

In closing argument, the State argued to the jurors that they had a duty as citizens of Baltimore to stop the flow of drugs into their community from New York by finding appellant guilty on all counts. Attorneys for appellant argued that Burrow was in fact the person Agent Thames had seen driving the car in question and that the car registration had Burrow’s signature on it. Additional facts will be provided as required. Discussion Appellant presents six assignments of error.

We find four of those assignments of error to be disintegrous, but we find appellant’s two assignments of error relating to the removal of a serial number from a semiautomatic firearm (Count 1 of the ⁵⁹ second indictment), and to the sentence enhancements under § 293 to be meritorious. I. Dismissal of the Juror On the beginning of the second day of trial, the trial court noticed that juror number 8 was missing. A discussion then ensued among counsel and the court, after which the court observed that seven minutes had passed since the time the trial was supposed to have commenced that morning, and that, according to the Sheriff, “there [was] nobody in sight, not in the jury room.” When the trial court excused the jurors the preceding day, he had informed the jury to be in the courtroom by 9:30 a.m. The trial court replaced the absent juror with an alternate, and resumed the case at 9:37 a.m.

Appellant’s counsel objected, stating that the weather was stormy and raining and there had been an excessive amount of traffic during his drive to the courthouse. Replacement of a juror with an alternate juror for reasons of judicial efficiency is discretionary in Maryland. For non-capital cases, Maryland Rule 4 — 312(b)(3) provides: In all other eases, the court may direct that one or more jurors be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Any juror who, before the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to perform a juror’s duty, shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection.

An alternate juror who does not replace a juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict. The decision to excuse a seated juror and replace him or her with an alternate for reasons particular to that specific juror will not be reversed unless there is “a clear abuse of discretion or prejudice” to the defendant. State v. Cook, 338 Md. 598, 620 , 659 A.2d 1313, 1324 (1995). This standard of review exists for two reasons.

First, “ ‘the trial judge is physically on the scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a ⁶⁰ cold record---- [T]he judge has his finger on the pulse of the trial.’ ” Id. at 615 , 659 A.2d at 1322 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278 , 604 A.2d 489, 493 (1992)). Second, a defendant is not entitled to a jury comprised of any particular group of individuals, but only to a jury that is fair and impartial. Id. at 614, 659 A.2d at 1321-22 . Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion because a juror’s tardiness by seven and one-half minutes does not mean that the juror was “unable or disqualified” from further service under Rule 4-312(b)(3) and that it was incumbent on the trial court to inquire as to whether the juror actually was unable or disqualified to continue her jury service before taking the “rash step” of dismissing her.

His argument is unpersuasive. The trial court committed no error. Appellant fails to show how the court committed the alleged abuse. When urging this Court to reverse for the trial court’s failure to make a “minimal inquiry” into the juror’s absence, appellant relies on a number of factually and legally inapposite cases.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284 , 563 A.2d 392 (1989) (inquiry required when juror made biased remarks after trial began); Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551 (11th Cir.1983) (inquiry required when juror in death penalty case fell ill); State v. Reevey, 159 N.J.Super. 130 , 387 A.2d 381 (App.Div. 1978) (inquiry required when juror appeared to be asleep during summations and charge); State v. Hurd, 325 S.C. 384 , 480 S.E.2d 94 (S.C.App.1996) (inquiry required when juror appeared to be asleep dining summations and charge). Appellant neglects to suggest from whom this preventive inquiry should have been made and how such inquiry would have changed the course of the trial. Neither does he suggest the degree to which a juror might be tardy that would render such inquiry unnecessary, we hesitate to make our way down this slippery slope, and we leave such matters in the hands of Maryland’s trial judges. Incidentally, the record is silent as to when, or even if, the absent juror ever appeared.

The abuse of discretion standard presents appellant with a hurdle that he fails to clear. In addressing judicial discretion ⁶¹ in Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997), the Court of Appeals stated: Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of discretion it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. A proper exercise of discretion involves consideration of the particular circumstances of each case.

As Chief Judge Bond observed in Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441 [ 157 A. 723 ] (1931), “the discretion being for the solution of the problem arising from the circumstances of each case as it is presented, it has been held that the court could not dispose of all cases alike by a previous general rule.” Hence, a court errs when it attempts to resolve discretionary matters by the application of a uniform rule, without regard to the particulars of the individual case. Id. at 351-53, 701 A.2d at 383-84 (in part quoting In re Don Mc, 344 Md. 194, 201 , 686 A.2d 269, 272 (1996)) (citations omitted). Here, the facts show that the trial judge was concerned that the juror’s tardiness would delay the entire proceeding. Although appellant points out that the State’s intended first witness was late as well, the State simply shifted the order of its testimony to allow the tardy witness to testify later in the day.

We interpret the rules to “secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” Md. Rule 1-201. Here, the trial judge’s interpretation of Rule 4-312(b)(3) was reasonable under the circumstances. Although it may have been preferable in retrospect for the trial judge to inquire into the juror’s whereabouts, even a premature dismissal of a juror would not ⁶² be cause for reversal. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 58 Md.App. 211, 234-35 , 472 A.2d 1027, 1039, cert. denied, 300 Md. 484 , 479 A.2d 373 (1984) (if no prejudice, removal of a juror based on factual error by court is not cause for reversal) (cited in Cook, 338 Md. at 610 , 659 A.2d at 1320 ); Bluthenthal & Bickart v. May Advertising Co., 127 Md. 277, 285-86 , 96 A. 434, 437-38 (1915) (“it is not reversible error for the Court on its own motion to exclude a juror, even for insufficient cause, if an unobjectionable jury is afterwards obtained”) (quoted in Cook, 338 Md. at 610 , 659 A.2d at 1319 ).

Appellant does not attempt to argue that he was prejudiced by the substitution. He correctly points out that the “abuse of discretion or prejudice” standard is disjunctive, and would allow reversal on the basis of either abuse of discretion or prejudicial error. See, e.g., Cook, 338 Md. at 609-10 , 659 A.2d at 1319 (“there is no reason to reverse a trial judge who excludes an individual juror unless the removal of the juror constitutes a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge or the defendant can demonstrate that he or she suffered some prejudice”). The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 635 , 735 A.2d 1109, 1120 (1999), makes clear that proving actual prejudice is not necessary in situations where prejudice could easily occur.

Hayes rejects the “expansive harmless error or presumptive non-prejudice doctrine [of federal jurisprudence] that is entirely foreign to our jurisprudence.” This case, however, is readily distinguishable. Hayes narrowly focused on the timing of the juror’s substitution relative to the beginning of jury deliberations, holding that “an alternate juror who remains qualified to serve may be substituted for a regular juror who is properly discharged, until such time as the jury enters the jury room ... and closes the door.” Id. The Court was concerned that prejudice might arise from substitution during the brief period after the jury retires but before it begins formal deliberations. Hayes creates a bright-line rule to prevent the possibility of prejudice.

Here, in contrast, the substitution of the juror occurred during the trial itself, before any jury deliberations began. See id. ⁶³ In the absence of the implied prejudice found by the Court in Hayes , appellant would need to show how prejudice did or might have occurred. He has failed to do so. In fact, prejudice would have been unlikely.

The alternate juror had been seated with other jurors during the first day of the trial; she had the opportunity to hear all evidence presented and abide by the court’s instructions for maintaining a fair and impartial body of jurors.

II

Obliterated Serial Number On the second issue, jury instructions regarding the obliterated serial number under Count 1 of the separate indictment, appellant argues that the instruction given by the trial court unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof from the State to appellant and that the instruction as given effectively makes the presumption irrebuttable. He is correct. Appellant successfully preserved the issue for appeal, despite the State’s chasing chimera to discourage the court from further examining the issue. The trial court instructed the jury as follows on the altered serial number found on the 9mm firearm: And finally, altering the serial of a handgun.

The defendant has been charged with altering the serial number of a handgun. The State must prove that the defendant had possession of a firearm. So first you must find that he did have possession of the firearm. Where the manufacturer’s identification mark or number was obliterated, removed, changed, or altered.

Possession of such a firearm is presumptive evidence that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the identification mark or number. Do you understand presumptive evidence? That if you find that the defendant had possession of that firearm then it is presumptive, it is presumed true that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the identification mark or number. ⁶⁴ Exceptions were taken immediately after the court instructed the jury. Appellant noted his objection to this instruction of the court as follows: “The court instructed the jury that if one is in real possession of a firearm on which the serial number has been obliterated that is presumptive evidence that he did it.

I do not believe that is the status of — .” When asked to continue, counsel declared, “That’s all I have to say on that.” The State asserts that appellant has waived this issue by failing to make known to the court the action that appellant desired it to take. See Md. Rule 4-323(c) (“[f]or purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court”); Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“[ojrdinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised or decided by the trial court....”). As a preliminary matter, appellant pellucidly preserved this issue for appeal. The entire record of jury instruction discussions disclosed that, in advance of the jury instruction itself, and after reviewing with counsel the trial court’s proposed written instructions, the court solicited objections from the parties.

At that time, appellant re-submitted his proposed jury instructions and asked for an exception to be taken for all of the trial court’s instructions that differed from his own: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: What I intend to do, Your Honor, with the permission of the Court, is I want to hand the Clerk my original prayers that I submitted in chambers last evening. I know the Court didn’t have time to carefully review them all. The Court does have it’s [sic ] own instructions for various crimes that are alleged. I would just, at this time Your Honor, move to introduce my requested prayers and generally take exception[ 2 ] ⁶⁵ THE COURT: All right.

The Clerk will mark them as Defendant’s Exceptions to the Court’s Instructions, Defendant’s Exceptions to the Court’s Instructions. Appellant’s requested jury instruction, given to the court at that time, read as follows: The Defendant is charged with the crime of obliterating, removing, changing, and altering the manufacturer’s identification mark or number on a certain firearm, to wit: a Ruger 9mm Semi-Automatic handgun. In order to convict the Defendant, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed said firearm and that the Defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the manufacturer’s identification mark or number. You are instructed that the previous definition which I have given you regarding the law of possession and the law of what is a firearm is to be used when deciding whether the Defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the manufacturer’s identification mark or number.

Later, when jury instructions had been given, appellant’s trial counsel stated in addition to the remarks quoted above: “First of all, let me incorporate all of the previous objections. Your Honor with regard to your instruction regarding the alteration of the serial number on the firearm, I would object to the instruction.” ⁶⁶ When all of appellant’s efforts are considered in toto, it becomes obvious that he preserved the issue. See Franklin v. Gupta, 81 Md.App. 345, 365 , 567 A.2d 524, 534 (1990) (submitting proposed jury instruction and taking exception to trial court’s failure to provide such an instruction properly preserves issue for appellate review). Appellant made it clear that he was challenging the irrebuttable presumption of proof created by the trial court’s instruction.

The trial court closely followed the language of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 444, which provides: It shall be unlawful for anyone to obliterate, remove, change or alter the manufacturer’s identification mark or number on any firearms. Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or have had possession of any such firearms, such fact shall be presumptive evidence that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the manufacturer’s identification mark or number. Yet giving a jury the bare statutory language, without explaining to them that the presumption may be overcome, in this context effectively turns a rebuttable presumption into an irrebuttable one. It is enough that the “specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State provides certain predicate facts.” Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam).

In Sandstrorn v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court found that a bare statement that the law presumes that “a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” could be taken as a mandatory instruction. As in Sandstrom, the court below stated without elaboration the same type of basic presumption, that “[possession of ... a firearm [where the manufacturer’s identification mark or number was obliterated, removed, changed, or altered] is presumptive evidence that the defen ⁶⁷ dant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the identification mark or number.” Such an instruction “invade[s] the truth-finding, task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases,” and effectively forecloses jury consideration of whether the facts presented by the State prove all required elements of the offense. Carella, 491 U.S. at 265 , 109 S.Ct. at 2420 . As a result, the instruction, as given, unconstitutionally alters the State’s burden of proof for some elements, imposing upon the defendant a burden of disproof that conflicts with the overriding presumption of innocence.

See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521-24 , 99 S.Ct. at 2458 -59 (citing Morissette v. United States, 842 U.S. 246 , 274-75, 72 S.Ct. 240, 255-56 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies the State the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.” Carella, 491 U.S. at 265 , 109 S.Ct. at 2420 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). We are, of course, obligated to follow Carella, Sandstrom, and Winship , and additionally our own precedents wherein appellants have made similar challenges to the constitutionality of common law presumptions and inferences. We held, for example, in Horn v. Maryland, 29 Md.App. 23 , 349 A.2d 372 (1975), that “the rule regarding possession of recently stolen goods does not create a ‘presumption’ but merely permits an inference of fact.” Id. at 25 , 349 A.2d at 373 . “An illogical or improbable ‘inference’ would ... unfairly relieve the State of part of its burden of proving every element of a case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Accord Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577, 580 , 349 A.2d 676, 679 , adopted by, 278 Md. 238 , 362 A.2d 91 (1976) (“The historical basis of the inference, however, does not guarantee its constitutionality.

Common law inferences must satisfy due process standards in light of present day experience.”); Boswell v. State, 5 Md.App. 571, 578 , 249 A.2d 490, 496 (1968) (“The inference to be drawn from possession of recently stolen goods is one of fact and it does not in any case raise a presumption of law of the possessor’s guilt.”). ⁶⁸ Likewise, in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), to the presumption that murder is in the second degree, we applied the teachings of Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), which hold that the State has the full burden of proof in homicide cases and the defendant is under no burden to produce mitigating evidence. We admonished lower courts at that time to refrain from instructing juries with careless phraseology such as, “All murder will be presumed to be murder in the second degree.” Although such statements, standing alone, are not constitutionally infirm, they potentially confuse jurors about which party carries the burden of proof. Evans, 28 Md.App. at 680 , 349 A.2d at 326 . Accord State v. Garland, 278 Md. 212, 219 , 362 A.2d 638, 642 (1976) (“[WJhen the issue of mitigation is properly presented by the evidence, it is the State’s burden to prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Banks v. State, 92 Md.App. 422, 439-40 , 608 A.2d 1249, 1258 (1992) (“Absence of mitigation is presumed, unless the defendant produces some evidence to make mitigation an issue in the case ..., [then] the State has the burden of proving the absence of mitigating circumstances.”).

Thus, under harmless error analysis and after examining the entire record, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-80 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106-07 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (applying harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to erroneous jury instructions), we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the faulty instruction played no part in the jury’s decision to convict appellant. The instruction given did not make clear that the statutory presumption was rebuttable, nor did it reiterate the State’s paramount duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime. Although the trial judge asked the jurors if they understood presumptive evidence, this rhetorical inquiry fell short of the standard articulated in cases like Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (instruction was reversible error, even though judge told jury presumption “may be rebutted” and read during the ⁶⁹ charge general instructions on the State’s burden of proof and duty). We thus reverse appellant’s conviction on this count.

III

Common Nuisance On the third issue, whether the evidence of common nuisance was legally sufficient, appellant’s conviction stands. The trial court did not err. At the close of the State’s case, appellant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for maintaining a common nuisance. He claimed that the evidence presented by the State demonstrated only that drugs were in the car on the day it was searched.

Thus, according to appellant, the State failed to prove the repeated nature of this violation. The trial court found that the sophistication of the hidden panel system implied a continuing violation and overruled appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant now contends that drugs were found in the car on one occasion only, and that the State failed to prove “previous use” of the hidden compartments or, at the very minimum, to show when the hidden compartments were installed. Appellant argues, as in Nickens v. State, 17 Md.App. 284 , 301 A.2d 49 (1973), that the mere implication of prior use from the drugs themselves cannot substitute for actual evidence of a repeated violation necessary for a common nuisance conviction.

The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). Accord Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 566-67 , 597 A.2d 1359, 1366 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007 , 112 S.Ct. 1765 , 118 L.Ed.2d 427 (1992). The Court’s concern is not whether the verdict is in accord with what appears to be the weight of the evidence, “but rather is only with whether the verdicts were ⁷⁰ supported with sufficient evidence — that is, evidence that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479 , 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994). In contrast, it is the exclusive function of the jury to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts.

McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 290 , 600 A.2d 430, 439 (1992). Moreover, measuring the weight of the evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses are always matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact. Id. See also Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281 , 619 A.2d 111, 114 (1993).

With this standard of review as our polaris, we now evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence required to convict one of maintaining a common nuisance under Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.VoL), Art. 27, § 286(a)(5). Under this statute, it is unlawful for any person [t]o keep or maintain any common nuisance which means any dwelling house, apartment, building, vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or any place whatever which is resorted to by drug abusers for purposes of illegally administering controlled dangerous substances or which is used for the illegal manufacture, distribution, dispensing, storage or concealment of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia ____ Section 286(a)(5). The essential element of the offense under this statute is its recurring nature. Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 387 , 641 A.2d 941, 950 (1994) (citing Skinner v. State, 16 Md.App. 116, 129 , 293 A.2d 828, 836 , cert. denied, 267 Md. 744 (1972)).

Evidence found on a single occasion, however, may be sufficient to demonstrate a crime of a continuing nature. [T]here is no particular extent of time prescribed during which the improper practices must continue or recur; each case must be adjudged according to its own circumstances. It is usually deemed sufficient if, when the character of the culpable acts and the circumstances under which they were ⁷¹ committed are taken into account, it appears that they were repeated often enough to warrant an inference that the house was kept for the indulgence of such practices. Ward v. State, 9 Md.App. 583, 593 , 267 A.2d 255, 261 (1970) (emphasis added). This analytical framework complements this court’s general standard for assessing sufficiency of evidence, “ ^whether the evidence shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged.’ ” McMillian v. State, 325 Md. at 295 , 600 A.2d at 441 (quoting Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535-36 , 573 A.2d 831, 834 , rev’d on other grounds, 319 Md. 530 , 573 A.2d 831 (1990)).

Hunt v. State, 20 Md.App. 164 , 314 A.2d 743 (1974), cert. denied, 271 Md. 738 (1973), teaches that we evaluate whether the evidence supports a rational inference from the facts such that the trier of fact could be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Andre Hunt was convicted of maintaining his apartment as a common nuisance based on evidence seized on a single day in the execution of a search warrant. Found in the apartment were large quantities of drugs packaged for street sale, paraphernalia, and ledgers of sale. Id. at 165, 314 A.2d at 743-44 .

A detective testifying as an expert witness classified the items seized as part of a large operation. Id. at 166 , 314 A.2d at 744 . This Court concluded that, based on the evidence found and expert testimony regarding the inferences to be drawn therefrom, the “evidence was sufficient to show continuing and recurring acts” at that apartment which constituted the crime of maintaining a common nuisance. Id. at 169 , 314 A.2d at 745 .

Here, in the course of ruling on appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on all of the counts, the trial judge made the following observations: We have the sophistication of the concealment. We have the quantity of the concealment, indicating a vast operation, not only money, the large amount of drugs, expensive weapons — high caliber expensive weapons — very, very so ⁷² phisticated armament and, in addition to that, all of this combined in one, in- two concealed locations, I heard the word hydraulic — certainly electrical method of opening and shutting them. The trial court observed that “by the sophistication of the method of concealment that a Juror could reasonably believe that this was not put together for this particular day, but for a continuing operation of concealment of drugs.” Under Hunt , the trial court was correct. A search of the interior of appellant’s car revealed hidden compartments in each side wall of the back seat area where the arm rest ordinarily would be.

Whereas the interior side walls of most cars are molded plastic, perhaps with cloth covering, the side walls of appellant’s car had cloth-covered steel panels, which covered a secret compartment on each side of the vehicle. The police had to forcibly pry open those compartments, but later discovered under the steering column a complex electrical control system for opening the hydraulic locks on the compartments. Inside these artfully concealed compartments were 543 glassine bags containing a white powdery substance, which was later tested and determined to be heroin. As in Hunt , the State called an expert witness, who testified that heroin typically is packaged for street sale in gelatin capsules or glassine envelopes.

There was also expert testimony that the drugs were packaged in a “professional manner,” indicating that they “came from outside of Baltimore City proper.” Police also found in the car 80 vials of cocaine, over $10,000.00 in cash, a box of large Ziplock bags, and two loaded guns in holsters, one of which was a 9mm weapon with its serial number obliterated with a drill, indicating a “professional job.” Under Hunt , the foregoing evidence is legally sufficient to establish that appellant maintained this vehicle on a recurring basis as a common nuisance for the purpose of distributing narcotics, rather than on the one day the police perchance performed their search. The enormous quantity of drugs and currency concealed within sophisticated hidden compartments operated by a complex electro-hydraulic system indicated that the use of this deliberately restructured car was not a single, ⁷³ isolated violation of the narcotics laws but, rather, an ongoing criminal enterprise. The cases cited by appellant are inapposite to the facts at hand. First, his reliance on Nickens is misplaced.

In Nick-ens, police executed a search warrant for an apartment and a car. The car search recovered 43 glassine bags of heroin. The apartment search recovered numerous articles of paraphernalia and contraband drugs. Although a juror could have inferred an ongoing violation of the narcotics laws from the quantity of drugs and paraphernalia recovered, this Court found that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury on a common nuisance charge because “[t]he proof of narcotic violations occurring only at the time in question was insufficient to establish the element of the recurring nature of the offense.... ” Nickens, 17 Md.App. at 292 , 301 A.2d at 53 .

Similarly, in Skinner, 16 Md.App. at 124 , 293 A.2d at 833 , the only evidence supporting the common nuisance