Dickinson v. Mayor of Baltimore

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant had leased to the appellee or its agent, a certain store or cellar, in the City of Baltimore, for the term of three years ; the term had expired and the property was surrendered to her. Waste thereon, or injury thereto, being alleged to have been committed by the appellee during the tenancy, this action was brought for the recovery of damages therefor.. During the pendency of the action the appellant conveyed the property to the appellee. ⁵⁸⁸ This alienation was relied upon as a sufficient defence to the action, the appellee insisting that to enable the appellant to recover, it was necessary not only that she should hold the reversionary interest when the waste was done, hut at the time of the recovery.

The Superior Court entertained this view, and so ruled, in which we think there was error. The right of the appellant otherwise to recover, seems not to have been questioned. The law in regard to ancient and modern remedies for waste, is well stated in note 7, Greene vs. Cole, 3 Wms. Saunders, 252.

The action of waste as formerly known was a mixed action, being partly real and partly personal, and consisted in privity, and by it the owner of the inheritance in reversion, or remainder, in fee or tail, recovered against the tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy or guardian in chivalry, the thing or place upon which the waste was committed, and also damages for the injury. It was therefore necessary that the plaintiff should be entitled to the property upon which the waste was committed, not only at the time of the waste, but when the recovery was had. There can be no doubt therefore, that the action of waste could only be brought by the person having the inheritance at the time when the waste was committed to his prejudice by the respective tenants aforesaid, and being confined in its operation, to the proprietor of the inheritance and the tenant of the land, between whom there existed a relation of privity to some extent, according to the nature of the tenure, if after the waste, the inheritance was alienated, and that privity broken up, the action of waste was gone. 1 Coke upon Lit., 53 a. By the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Henry 3, ch. 23, and of Statute 6, Ed. 1, ch. 5, the action of waste was given a wider range, and could be brought against lessee for life or ⁵⁸⁹ years, or against the assignee of the same for waste done after the assignment. 1 Sharswood’s Blackstone, 283; 2 Blackstone’s Com., 178, n. 7; Greene vs. Cole, 3 Saunders Rep. , 252, n. 7.

To avoid the defective and inadequate remedy afforded by this action, as known to the common law, or as modified by the Statutes of Marlhridge and Gloucester, and to provide an effectual remedy or method of recovery against tenant or stranger, where no privity existed, better adapted to the exigencies of the case, the action on the case in the nature of waste, as it is denominated, was devised; which enables the party who has been injured in his reversionary right, to recover damages for the same, and whether he has become repossessed of the property after the injury, or has transferred the same, does not affect the claim for the damages committed to his property at the time it belonged to him. It extends to every case where one who has any reversionary interest or estate in the premises suffers I by the tortious act of the actual tenant or occupant. The! transfer of the estate afterwards cannot operate to condone!; the wrong. It is an equitable action and not to be discountenanced by any technical consideration, hut must be sustained in all cases, and against all persons, who are by the common law or under the statutes aforesaid, liable to the action of waste.