Dietrich v. State
Opinion by Thieme, J. In August 2015, Dietrich filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the State of Maryland and the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (collectively "the State") in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking the following relief: A. That this [c]ourt determine and adjudicate the duties of the parties with respect to registration as a Tier III sex offender; B. That this [c]ourt determine that [Dietrich] should never have been made to register as a sex offender; C. That this [c]ourt declare the Sex Offender Registry laws enacted after [his] conviction and providing for retroactive application, unconstitutional as applied to [him.] D. That this [c]ourt order [the State] to remove [Dietrich] from all sex offender registries ... [.] The State filed an answer to the complaint, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and denied Dietrich's motion. Dietrich presents the following questions for our review: 1. Did the [circuit] court err in granting summary judgment to [the State]?
A. Does Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services , 430 Md. 535 , 62 A.3d 123 (2013) [ ( Doe I ) ] apply to Mr. Dietrich? B. Is Mr. Dietrich's continued presence on the Maryland Sex Offender Registry a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause? 1 For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND In May 1994, Dietrich was indicted in the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia for thirteen counts of aggravated sexual battery. The indictment was amended in June 1994 to charge eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and three counts of possession of child pornography for acts alleged to have occurred in 1993.
In August 1994, Dietrich pleaded guilty to all of the amended counts and was sentenced to thirty years' incarceration followed by a period of supervised probation. The Virginia Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry Act ("Virginia Act") requires those convicted of a "sexually violent offense" to register for life. See Va. Code.
Ann. §§ 9.1-902, 9.1-908. Under the Virginia Act, Dietrich's convictions for aggravated sexual battery constitute "sexually violent offenses." See Va. Code Ann. §§ 9.1-902 (E)(1) (providing that a "sexually violent offense" includes a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.3 (aggravated sexual battery)).
On August 5, 1994, Dietrich was registered as a "violent sex offender" on the Virginia Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry. Dietrich was released from prison after serving fifteen years of his sentence. In March 2009, Dietrich moved to Maryland, where he completed his supervised probation. At that time, Maryland required registration for those offenders who met the definition of "child sexual offender" and who, before moving to Maryland, were required to register in another state for an offense occurring before July 1, 1995.
See Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article ("C.P.") § 11-701(c)(2) and (4). Pursuant to C.P. § 11-707(a)(4), a child sexual offender was required to register for life. On March 4, 2009, Dietrich registered as a child sexual offender in Maryland.
DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment where there are no facts in dispute, this Court must determine whether the circuit court correctly entered judgment as a matter of law. La Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antidue Manor, LLC , 406 Md. 194 , 209, 958 A.2d 269 (2008) (citation omitted). When the issue before us requires the interpretation and application of Maryland law, we "must determine whether the [circuit] court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review." See Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs. v. Doe , 439 Md. 201 , 219, 94 A.3d 791 (2014) ( Doe II ) (reviewing circuit court's order for declaratory judgment under a de novo standard of review).
II
Ex Post Facto Challenge ( Doe I ) Dietrich argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that he must register as a sex offender in Maryland because the offenses for which he was convicted in Virginia occurred in 1993, prior to the enactment of the Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act (the "Maryland Act" or "the statute") in 1995. Specifically, Dietrich contends that the statute, as applied retroactively to him, violates his rights under Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 2 and the Court of Appeals' decision in Doe I , 430 Md. 535 , 62 A.3d 123 . The State responds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in its favor because at the time Dietrich moved to Maryland, the sex offender registration statute mandated registration for any child sex offender who was required to register in another state for an offense occurring before July 1, 1995. The State argues that because the lifetime registration requirement existed before Dietrich came to Maryland, he was on notice when he chose to move to Maryland that he would be required to register as a sex offender for life in Maryland.
In 1995, the General Assembly first enacted the Maryland Act, which provided for a single classification of sex offenders, and required that offenders register annually for ten years from the date of their release from prison. 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 142. See Doe I , 430 Md. at 545 , 62 A.3d 123 . The Maryland Act applied prospectively to sex offenders who committed their crimes after the statute went into effect on October 1, 1995. Id. ; 1995 Md. Laws, Chapter 142, § 3.
In 1998, the Maryland Act was amended to add a registration requirement "for certain offenders and sexual offenders who, before moving into this State, were required to register in another state for certain offenses occurring before certain dates." 1998 Md. Laws, Chap. 521. The 1998 amendment applied retroactively to child sex offenders "required to register in another state for an offense occurring before October 1, 1995 and to other registrants required to register in another state for an offense occurring before July 1, 1997. Id. § 2. The Maryland Act was again amended in 2009 and 2010.
See Doe I , 430 Md. at 546 , 62 A.3d 123 (citing 2009 Md. Laws, Chap. 541, 2010 Md. Laws Chaps. 174, 175). Relevant to this discussion is the 2010 amendment, which created a three-tiered classification system of sex offenders in order to bring Maryland into compliance with the requirements of federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). See Doe II , 439 Md. at 223 -24 , 94 A.3d 791 ; C.P. § 11-701( l ) (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol, 2013 Cum.
Supp.). The 2010 amendment to the Act, among other things, reclassified persons, such as Dietrich, from a "child sexual offender" to a "Tier III sex offender." The Act defined a "Tier III sex offender" as a "person who has been convicted of ... committing a violation of § 3-307(a)(3) ... of the Criminal Law Article [.]" See C.P. § 11-701(q)(2) (2009 Cum. Supp.). The amendment required Tier III offenders to register in person with law enforcement personnel every three months for life.
Id. § 11-707(a)(4)(iii). When Dietrich moved to Maryland in 2009, he was required to register as a child sex offender under C.L. § 11-701(c)(2) (2008 Repl. Vol.) due to his lifetime registration requirement in Virginia. The registration period for a child sex offender was life.
C.P. § 11-707(a)(4) (2008 Repl. Vol.). In 2010, Dietrich was reclassified as a Tier III sex offender under § 11-701(q)(1) (2015 Supp.). The registration period for a Tier III sex offender is also life.
C.P. § 11-707(a)(2)(i), (a)(4)(iii) (2015 Supp.). Dietrich argues that his case is controlled by the Court of Appeals' decision in Doe I , in which the Court held that retroactive application of the 2009 and 2010 amendments to the Maryland Act violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Doe I , 430 Md. at 547 , 62 A.3d 123 .
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