Dinkins v. State

Orth, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. THE RULE AS TO THE UNEXPLAINED, EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN GOODS To be sufficient in law to justify a conviction in a criminal cause, the admissible evidence adduced must show directly, or circumstantially, or support a rational inference of, the facts to be proved from which the trier of fact may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the accused’s guilt of the offense charged. Metz v. State, 9 Md. App. 15, 23 (1970); Williams v. State, 5 Md. App. 450, 458-460 (1968). We deal here with the aspect of this test for the sufficiency of the evidence which concerns an inference.

We observed in Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640 , 349 A. 2d 640 (1975): “In a real sense, the whole decision-making process is the process of drawing inferences. From fact A we infer fact B. . . . The whole phenomenon of circumstantial evidence is the phenomenon of inferring facts in issue from facts established.” We pointed out that certain inferences, out of the infinite swarm of their ⁵⁸⁰ fellows, have been singled out for legal analysis. One inference so singled out is that arising from the possession of stolen goods.

The rule is that the unexplained, exclusive possession of recently stolen goods permits the inference that the possessor is the thief. 1 Debinski v. State, 194 Md. 355, 360 (1950) 2 ; Davis and Napier v. State, 7 Md. App. 667, 669 (1969). This is a traditional common law inference deeply rooted in our law. Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 843 (1973). 3 Maryland has long followed the rule. Anglin v. State, 244 Md. 652, 656 (1966), cert. den., 386 U. S. 947 (1967), and cases therein cited.

The historical basis of the inference, however, does not guarantee its constitutionality. Common law inferences must satisfy due process standards in light of present day experience. Barnes , at 843-844. The Supreme Court of the United States considered the question of the validity of ⁵⁸¹ criminal law presumptions and inferences in several recent cases before Barnes 4 Although the Supreme Court itself has found that the teaching of those cases was not altogether clear, Barnes , at 843, the cases established, at least, that if a statutory inference submitted to a jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfied the reasonable-doubt standard as well as the more-likely-than-not standard4 5 , then it clearly accorded with due process. 6 We think it advisable, in the circumstances, to apply the more stringent reasonable-doubt standard.

See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B.U.L.Rev. 973, 978-986 (1974). We indicated in Evans that an inference comes to judicial attention in two situations. “When we are called upon to measure the legal sufficiency of evidence, we have to determine whether established facts A and B are legally sufficient to give rise to a fair inference of fact C, the ultimate fact in issue. We are similarly called upon to measure the efficacy of certain inferences when we are asked to instruct a jury that it may (although it need not) infer fact C from established facts A and B.” 28 Md. App., at ⁵⁸² 703. Thus, upon legally sufficient proof that certain goods were recently stolen, that they were in the exclusive possession of the accused, that the possession was not satisfactorily explained, and in the absence of other facts indicating that the accused was more likely to be the receiver than the thief, Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36, 47 (1959), cert. den., 361 U. S. 849 (1959), the judge at a bench trial may infer, in his role as the trier of fact, that the accused was the thief.

At a jury trial, the judge may, and at the request of a party, shall, Maryland Rule 756, § b, instruct the jury that it may infer that' the accused was the thief. The question is whether this permissible inference is in accord with constitutional standards. Due Process of Law Hammond, C. J., said in the opinion of the Court in Anglin v. State, supra, 244 Md., at 656 -657: “The reasonableness and legality of permitting an inference of fact that exclusive recent and unaccounted for possession is a guilty possession is explained by the rule that there may be drawn an inference of one fact from proof of another or others if there is some rational connection between the fact or facts proved and the ultimate fact inferred so that the inference drawn from the proof is not so far-fetched as to be arbitrary.” This view is that of the Supreme Court. It is only the unexplained, exclusive possession of recently stolen goods which permits the inference that the possessor is the thief.

The mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain the possession consistent with innocence does not bar the judge in a bench trial from drawing the inference or in a jury trial from instructing the jury on the inference. The trier of fact must weigh the explanation to determine whether it is reasonable or “plausible”, or “satisfactory”. It is not bound to accept or believe any particular explanation any more than it is bound to accept the correctness of the inference. But the burden of proving beyond a reasonable ⁵⁸³ doubt that the accused stole the property remains in the prosecution.

Barnes , at 845, n. 9. “If the [State] proves possession and nothing more, this evidence remains unexplained unless the defendant introduces evidence, since ordinarily the [State’s] evidence will not provide an explanation of his possession consistent with innocence.” Id. 7 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 , 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975), provides no basis to support a belief that the inference permitted from possession of stolen goods violates due process. We so indicated in Evans. We said, at 703, “Since an inference does not shift a burden either of persuasion or of going forward with evidence to a defendant, it does not come under the scrutiny of Mullaney v. Wilbur in that regard.” We applied that conclusion in Horn v. State, 29 Md. App. 23 (1975), and we expressly now affirm it.7 8 Self-incrimination The Court of Appeals in Anglin v. State, supra, also considered the inference arising from possession of stolen goods in the frame of reference of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against a person being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. It said, 244 Md., at 657 : “It is not unreasonable to require the possessor to cause the facts of his possession to be explained if he desires to overcome the prima facie case against him arising from the permissible inference of fact flowing from his possession, because the facts as to that possession are peculiarly within his knowledge and ordinarily are not known or available to ⁵⁸⁴ the State.” It observed, at 658: “The Supreme Court, early and lately, has rejected the claims made here by appellant as to the impermissibility of allowing a trier of fact to infer from a proven fact which is not satisfactorily explained by the accused an ultimate fact which may be sufficient evidence of guilt.” 9 The Supreme Court in Barnes v. United States, supra, made crystal clear that it stood by its position that the privilege against self-incrimination was not infringed by the inference.

It said, 412 U. S., at 846 -847: “This Court has twice rejected this argument [that the privilege was infringed], Turner v. United States, 396 U. S., at 417-418, 90 S. Ct., at 652; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 185 , 45 S. Ct. 470, 472 , 69 L. Ed. 904 (1925), and we find no reason to re-examine the issue at length. . . . Introduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.” The Court noted, id., at 846, n. 12: “Nor can the instruction [stating the rule] ‘be fairly understood as a comment on the [defendant’s] failure to testify.’ United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S., at 70-71, 85 S. Ct., at 759.” We find that the inference of criminal agency permitted from the unexplained, exclusive possession of recently stolen goods does not violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. THE CASE SUB JUDICE Statement of the Case On 3 January 1975 in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, JAMES THOMAS DINKINS was found guilty by a jury of ⁵⁸⁵ feloniously robbing James L. Brown with a deadly weapon on 22 March 1974, stealing from him $14,000, on which conviction a sentence of 20 years was imposed, of unlawfully using a handgun in a crime of violence, on which conviction a consecutive sentence of 5 years was imposed, and of unlawfully carrying a handgun upon his person, on which conviction a concurrent sentence of 3 years was imposed.

A motion for a new trial was heard and denied. A timely appeal from “the judgment and sentence” was noted. Issues for Decision The two questions Dinkins presents on appeal center on the permissible inference arising from possession of stolen goods. The challenge to the inference is through the instructions given by the trial judge to the jury.

The judge below explained that the jury were the judges of the law and that his instructions were advisory only. Rule 756 § b. He made clear that it was the jury’s function and responsibility to determine the facts. They were to do so “solely from the evidence and all of the evidence which you have seen and heard during the course of the trial, and any inferences which may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” The jury were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and it was the duty of the jury to weigh the evidence.

He discussed the burden of proof: “You should not assume that the Defendant is guilty merely because he is being prosecuted and because charges have been brought against him. The burden of proof is on the State to prove every element of the crimes charged against the Defendant, and he is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption attends him throughout the trial and unless or until overcome by proof establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. While the burden is on the State of establishing every fact material to the guilt of the Defendant, including every circumstance that enters into the crime charged beyond a reasonable ⁵⁸⁶ doubt, that does not mean that the State must prove the Defendant guilty to an absolute or mathematical certainty.” He explained what the reasonable-doubt standard did mean.

He discussed the inference: “If one is in possession of property which has recently been stolen, unless there is a satisfactory explanation of that possession, may be inferred to be guilty of stealing the property. And if the property was stolen in a robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, then it may be inferred from the possession of the recently stolen property that he committed the crime of robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon. Once this inference arises, the burden is cast upon the possessor of the goods to give a reasonable explanation of how they came to his possession.” He went on to discuss the nature of “possession”, pointing out that it must be exclusive but need not be sole and that it may be constructive as well as actual. He returned to the burden of proof: “As I have already stated, in order to find the Defendant guilty of any of the crimes charged in these informations, he must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.

Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be based on direct evidence of facts, or it may be based on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. The law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred.

No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is ⁵⁸⁷ circumstantial than when it is direct, because in either case, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant. The Defendant is entitled to every inference in his favor which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. And where two inferences may be drawn from the same facts, one consistent with guilt and one consistent with innocence, the Defendant is entitled to the inference which is consistent with innocence.” The charge covered self-incrimination: “It is the privilege of a Defendant in a criminal case not to testify. You may not entertain any inference against him because of his absence from the stand.

You must base your verdict in this case solely on the evidence and all of the evidence which you have seen and heard during the trial, and the inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Dinkins now asks: “I. Did the trial court’s charge deprive the appellant of his privilege against self-incrimination in violation