Dixon v. Dixon

Burke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 9th day of May, 1865, Thomasi I. Dail and wife, by deed duly executed and acknowledged, granted and conveyed, in consideration of the sum of five thousand dollars, to Richard H. Dixon, of Dorchester County, a lot of ground and improvements mentioned and referred to in the deed, situated on High street, in the town of Cambridge. This ⁴⁶ deed was not recorded until the 6th. day of March, 1899. On the 17th day of January, 1907, Richard ,H. Dixon, “in consideration of five dollars, and other good and valuable considerations,” granted and conveyed the property to his wife, Helen Y. Dixon.

This deed was recorded among the Land Records of Dorchester.County on January 18th, 1907. The deed also conveyed to her all household and kitchen furniture in his dwelling on High street. Helen Y. Dixon, the grantee in .the deed, was the second wife of Richard H. Dixon. He was married to her in November, 1885, and she is the sole defendant in this ease.

By three deeds dated, respectively, April 27th, 1909, December 28th, 1909, and December 6th, 1910, Helen V. Dixon, and Richard H. Dixon, her husband, granted and conveyed to certain persons named in the deeds parts of the property conveyed to the defendant by the deed of January 17th, 1907, — these parts being k portion of the lot conveyed to Richard H. Dixon by the deed from Dai-1 and wife, above referred to. The aggregate sum realized from these sales was $3,350.00. This purchase money was received by the defendant, except the sum of $450.00 — 'being the purchase price of the portion sold to Delia Bayly Orem. This sum was received by her husband.

About the year 1855, Richard ,H. Dixon married his first wife, Eliza Stewart. She was the only daughter and heir-at-law of John H. Stewart, who was considered to be a prosperous farmer of Dorchester County and who died intestate in the year 1856, leaving surviving him his wife, Rebecca H. Stewalrt, and his daughter, Eliza S. Dixon. John H. Stewart was the owner of two farms in Dorchester County, upon one of which he resided at the time of his death. The total appraised value of his personal estate, as shown by the inventory filed in the Orphans’ Court for Dorehesiter County on Eebruary 26th, 1856, was $4,723.30, consisting of household and kitchen furniture and farming implements -appraised at $1,723.00, and nine slaves appraised at $3,000.00.

The slaves subsequently became the property ⁴⁷ of Richard H. Dixon and were afterwards emancipated. The account of the administrator shows the distribution of the estate as follows: “To Rebecca IT. Stewart, widow of deceased, one-third of balance, $1,541.02/3; to Eliza, wife of Richard TI. Dixon and only child of deceased, two-thirds of balance, $3,000.00.” The estate was evidently distributed in kind — Mrs. Dixon receiving the slaves.

Upon the death of John TI. Stewart, his real estate passed by descent to Eliza S. Dixon, subject to the dower interest of her mother, Rebecca IT. Stewart. On the twenty-fourth day of October, 1856, Eliza S. Dixon and Richard TI.

Dixon conveyed said real estate to Rebecca TI. Stewart, and on the stale day Rebecca TI. Stewart reconveyed said property (being the farms mentioned and all the land owned by John IT. Stewart at the time of his death) to Eliza S. Dixon for life, and after her death to Richard TI.

Dixon in fee. Each of said deeds recited a consideration of $10,000.00 current money. So far as disclosed by the record this real estate and the property shown by the final distribution comprised the whole estate received by Rebecca IT. Stewart and Eliza S. Dixon from John IT.

Stewart, and it is not shown that they were then possessed of any other property or money. The father of Dr. Richard H. Dixon was James Dixon, of Dorchester County, who died about two years after the marriage of his son to Miss Stewart. The evidence shows that he was a man of considerable means. Prior to his son’s marriage he purchased for him and had conveyed to him a farm called “Indian Purchase,” which Dr. Dixon afterwards called “Sunnyside.” It also appears that he furnished the necessary live stock and farming implements for conducting the farm work.

Under the will of his father, Dr. Dixon was devised his father’s interest in some property called Goose Creek Lands, and a legacy of $2,000.00, consisting of securities to be taken by his executors for the purchase price of his real estate vyhich he directed them to- sell. He was bequeathed certain slaves appraised at $2,100.00, and other personal property ⁴⁸ appraised at $175.00. The slaves and the personal property were distributed in kind to Doctor Dixon in July, 1860, and the second distribution account filed August 1st, 1860, shows the payment of the legacy of $2,000.00. Dr. Dixon was one of the executors of his father’s will, and the record shows that he received in legacies and commissions from his father’s estate the sum of $5,766.22.

After the dearth of John H. Stewart, Doctor Dixon and his family moved from Sunnyside, where he had lived from the time of his marriage, to the farm upon which Mr. Stewart lived at the time of his death. In September, 1863, he sold the Sunnyside farm to Joseph H. Wright for $5,000.00, to be paid in five equal instalments — the first falling due January 1st, 1864, and the others annually from the day of sale.' On September 21st, 1863, Mr. Wright, to secure the payment of the purchase money, confessed a judgment in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. Credits were entered on this judgment as follows: 1864, November 9th, by cash...............'$550.00 1865, January 30th, by cash............... 200.00 1866, January 18th, by >eash............... 130.00 1866, April 4th, by cash................... 500.00. 1867, January 11th, by cash................1100.00 and on March 15th, 1867, Dr. Dixon assigned the balance due on the judgment to Caleb S. Maltby. Dr. Dixon moved from the farm and took possession of the Dail property soon after its purchase, and occupied the dwelling house thereon until his death on April 15th, 1912.

Dr. Dixon’s first wife died in 1867, leaving surviving her her husband and four children, the oldest of whom was about ten years old and the youngest about two years old. The family of Dr. Dixon consisted of his wife and four children, his mother and Rebecca TI. Stewart, his mother-in-law. Both his mother, who was possessed of considerable means and who appears to have been at all times ready to aid her son in a financial way, and Mrs. Stewart died before his marriage to the defendant. ⁴⁹ One; of tlio children, Helen S. Dixon, left home in 1892, and lias never returned.

Her father and the defendant, however have each rendered her financial aid. She is one of the plaintiffs in this suit, hut does not appear to have taken any active part in its prosecution. W. Lee Dixon continued, with unimportant intervals, to reside with his father until 1895, when, in consequence of serious financial embarrassments which involved his father and greatly distressed him, he left the State and did not return until after his father’s death. The other two children, with slight exceptions, lived with their father until his death, and one of them, James S., lived in (he home for sometime after his father died.

Dr. Dixon left two children hy his second wife: Robert 11. Dixon, Jr., born August 23rd, 1886, arid Marie Dixon, horn December 3rd, 1890. On the 23rd of April, 1913, the original bill in this case was filed. The substantial allegations of the bill were: 1st. — That in or about the month of May, m the year 1865, a certain Eliza S. Dixon, wife of Richard 11.

Dixon, both of Dorchester County, State of Maryland, being in possession of a large sum of money and desirous of purchasing a home ill Cambridge, in the county aforesaid and learning that one Thomas I. Dail wished to sell a house that suited her, and would take $5,000.00 therefor, intrusted her husband with that amount of money, with the request that he buy the said property for her. 2nd. — That the said Richard H. Dixon piuceeded to* buy said property from the said Thomas I. Dail as directed, and ' paid for it with the said moneys furnished as aforesaid by said wife for that purpose, but instead of having the deed therefor made to his said wife, as both in law and in equity he was bound to do, he caused it to be made In himself as if he was the purchaser and not the said Eliza S. Dixon. 3rd. — That having (1ms fraudulently secured the legal title to the said house and lot in himself, the said Richard H. Dixon secreted the said deed for over thirty-three years and never did reveal the fact of its existence until he filed it in ⁵⁰ the office of the clerk of this Court- in the month of March, in the year 1899. 4th. — That the said Eliza S. Dixon departed this life intestate in the year 1867, as aforesaid, leaving four infant children and her said husband surviving her, the said children being likewise the children of the said Richard TI. Dixon, and being the plaintiffs in this suit; that the plaintiffs were the sole heirs-at-law of their said mother, and upon her death, entitled to the said house and lot, subject to- the life estate therein of their said father. 5 th.- — -That the plaintiffs and their father after the decease of the said Eliza S. Dixon continued to reside on and occupy said property until Helen S. Dixon went abroad to reside and W. Lee Dixon went to Virginia, etc. 6th. — That the said defendant, Helen V. Dixon, well apprised of the foregoing facts, or at least having ample information thereof to put her on inquiry, did, in the year 1907, wickedly induce and persuade her husband, who had become old and infirm, to execute to her without any real consideration a deed -of conveyance of all of said property in fee simplé, though he well knew, ought ito have known, and could have known, that he had only a life estate to convey. '7th. — That in the year 1909 the said defendant, in order, as your orators believe and therefore aver, that she might dispose of said property and pocket the proceeds before the death of her husband, and before the plaintiffs could lawfully intervene and assert their title and claim to the possession of the property because of her estate therein for the life of the said Richard H. Dixon, sold and conveyed portions of said property to certain persons named in the bill. 8th.- — That the plaintiffs are advised,- and therefore allege, that by reason of the foregoing facts the defendant is not an innocent purchaser of said property for value; that she only held an estate for the life time of Richard H. Dixon, and should be compelled by decree to vacate s'aid dwelling house and lot and convey the same to the plaintiffs, and also to pay over to them in the proportions to- which they are entitled ⁵¹ the money she lias received from her sale of the portions of said property. The relief prayed for was that, a decree be passed requiring the defendant to “vacate the dwelling house and lot aforesaid, and convey the same to your orators, and also to pay over to them the moneys received by her from the aforesaid sales of their property, and that a multiplicity of suits may he avoided; and that your orators may have such further and other relief, as the case may require.” An answer was filed by the defendant. It is unnecessary to discuss its averments with any particularity.

It is sufficient to say that it is full and complete, and specifically denies all the essential allegations, of the bill, and in addition, relies upon laches and limitations as a bar to the relief prayed. On October 9th. 1913, the plaintiffs asked leave to amend the hill and stated in the petition filed for that purpose: “That they cannot sustain by proof their allegation in paragraph 8 of their bill that the defendant gave to her husband as a reason for a conveyance ito her a fee simple title to the property in dispute, that he could prevent the creditors of W. Lee Dixon, for whom he was surety, from selling the property, and they desire to withdraw said allegation, and to that end make an amendment to the bill by striking out the said ‘8th’ paragraph, and renewing the same by omitting said allegation and making other changes in the verbiage necessitated by the amendment, but in no way affecting the substance and object of the bill.” They prayed leave to amend by striking out the 8th paragraph of the bill, and substituting the following paragraph in lieu thereof: ‘That the said Helen Y. Dixon, well advised of the foregoing facts, or at least having ample information to put her on inquiry by which she could have discovered the same, did, in the year 1907, induce and persuade her husband, the said Richard II. Dixon, to execute to her without any valuable consideration a deed of conveyance of all of said property in fee simple, though he knew, and she knew or ought to have known, and could have known, that he had only a life estate to con ⁵² vey, but whether she knew it or not he did so convey to her the said property in which there was a resulting trust in favor of the said Eliza S. Dixon originally, and at her death in favor of her heirs-at-law, the plaintiffs in this action, and by reason of all the aforesaid, the said Helen V. Dixon, she being a volunteer, took the said property impressed with said trust.’ ” The bill was amended as prayed under an order of Cqurt. A replication was filed and the testimony of the parties was taken before an examiner.

After full argument the learned judge in the Court below filed an elaborate and well-considered opinion in which he, after reviewing the facts and the law of the case, concluded that the property conveyed by D’ail and wife to Richard IT. Dixon by the deed of May 9th, .1865, was impressed with a trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs as heirs-at-law of Eliza S. Dixon. This conclusion was based upon the fact, as found by him, that she furnished the consideration for the deed. In conformity to this opinion the following decree was passed: “This case standing ready for hearing.and being submitted, the counsel for the parties were heard and the proceedings read and considered, and it clearly appearing to the Court that Eliza S. Dixon, mother of the plaintiffs, furnished the money therewith to purchase the certain property described in the deed, of which the Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. T is a copy, offered in evidence, though the said deed names her husband, Richard H. Dixon, as grantee therein; and it further appearing that said property was conveyed to the defendant, Helen V. Dixon, under a voluntary deed, of which the Plaintiff’s Exhibit No.- 2 is a copy, offered in evidence; and it further appearing that subsequent to the execution and delivery as a gift of the said last named deed, the defendant conveyed certain parts of said property unto innocent purchasers of said parts and received from said innocent purchasers the sum of $900.00, as of the 28th day of December, 1909, and the further sum of two thousand as of the 6th day of December, 1910, which sums were converted by her to her own uses and purposes; and it further appearing that the said Richard H. ⁵³ Dixon departed this life before the institution of this suit, and 'the said Eliza S. Dixon likewise departed this life in the year 1867, leaving the plaintiffs as her sole heirs-at-law.

It is thereupon, this 1st day of September, in the year 1913, hy the Circuit 'Court for Dorehester County, in Equity, adjudged, ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief in the premises, and that the defendant, Helen Y. Dixon, hy a good and sufficient deed to he executed and acknowledged and recorded, agreeable to law, shall convey unto said plaintiffs and their heirs the land and premises in the proceedings mentioned and described, as conveyed hy the aforesaid Richard H. Dixon to the said defendant by deed dated the 17th day of January, 1907, except so much of said property as was afterwards conveyed by the said defendant, and Richard H. Dixon unto Delia Bayly Orem by deed bearing date the 27th day of April, 1909, and to Oarrie W. Ross by deed bearing date the 28th day of December, 1909, and to Ivy L. Leonard by deed bearing date the 6th day of December, 1910, mentioned in these proceedings, and all the right, title, interest and estate of the defendant in and to the same so remaining in her under said deed bearing cíate the 17th day of January, 1907; or, on default thereof on the part of said defendant and the delivery of said deed unto the plaintiffs on or before the 1st day of November, 1913, that Clement Sullivane be, and he is hereby, appointed trustee with full power and authority, by good and sufficient deed to be executed and acknowledged and recorded according to law, to convey to the said plaintiffs and their heirs the said property and estate clear and discharged of all claim from said defendant and of those claiming hy or under her, or the said Richard IJ. Dixon, or either of them; and it is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that the defendant forthwith pay, or bring unto this Court to he paid, unto the plaintiffs the aforesaid sum of $900.00, with interest from the aforesaid 28th day of December, 1909, the same being the proceeds received by her from the sale to Carrie W. Ross mentioned in these proceedings, and the further aforesaid sum of ⁵⁴ $2,000.00, with interest from the aforesaid 6th day of December, 1910, the same being the proceeds received by her from the sale to Ivy L. Leonard in the proceedings mentioned, and the plaintiffs’ costs of snit to be taxed by the clerk.” This decree was on September 15th, 1913, modified so far as it required the defendant to pay interest upon the sales from the respective dates thereof, and that in lieu of such payment of interest it was decreed that “the defendant be and she is hereby required and adjudged to pay forthwith to the plaintiff, as well as the principal sum or sums of said proceeds as provided in said former decree, as also interest thereon from the said 15th day of April, 1912, and that in all other respects and particulars the defendant shall and do abide by and perform the said former decree, dated the first day of September, 1913, as fully and effectually as if the same were incorporated herein.” Brorn each of these decrees the defendant appealed. The record contains 1104 pages, and includes many exhibits and exceptions filed by the respective parties. In many respects, it is a most remarkable record.

It was° to be expected that in a family contest such as this the display of deep feeling, violent antagonism, and the usual conflict of testimony between interested parties upon material facts, would be found. “The little contentions, factions and debates” which filled up the principal drama of the family life of the parties could not be expected to be wholly excluded from the record. The record in such a contest is apt to exhibit the greed of some parties, the delusions of self-interest and partisanship, and a melancholy perversion of truth on the part of some witnesses. But it was not to be expeeted that the record should contain, as it does, a great mass of conflicting evidence upon matters which have nothing whatever to do with the questions presented by the pleadings. We feel safe in saying that all the material testimony or the witnesses in the case could be embraced in 300 pages of the record. ⁵⁵ The plaintiffs by their original and amended bill seek to establish a resulting trust in their favor as to the property embraced in the deed from Thomas I. Dail and wife to Richard II.

Dixon, and it becomes necessary to state briefly, first, tbe principles of law as to the creation of resulting trusts; secondly, the character of proof required to establish them; thirdly, the admissibility of evidence to establish such a trust in a ease like this. After ascertaining the general principles of law and evidence applicable and controlling in this case, the facts disclosed by the record will then be examined in tbe light of those principles. The general rule is well settled that when the purchase price is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another a resulting trust arises in favor of the person paying the purchase money, and the holder of the legal title becomes a trustee for him. There are, however, exceptions, to this general rule: Thus, where a person purchases land and pays the consideration with his own money, but causes the title to he placed in the name of one to whom the purchaser is under a natural or moral obligation to provide, such as in the case of parent and child, or husband and wife, no presumption of a resulting trust will arise, but it. will be regarded prima facie as a gift or an advancement for the benefit of the nominal purchaser.

In either case, the presumption is one of fact and not of law, and the real intention of the parties to the transaction may be shown, and the Court will give it effect if it does not contravene some rule of property or the policy of the law. If a husband purchases real estate in his own name with money furnished by his wife from her separate estate, a resulting trust in her’ favor arises by implication of law. Tbe authorities are practically unanimous in support of these propositions. In Dorsey v. Clarke et al., 4 H. & J. 551 , a case frequently cited upon this subject, the Court said: “If a man purchases an estate and pays the purchase money, hut takes the deed in the name of another, a trust results by construction of law ⁵⁶ to the man who paid the money; and if the nominal purchaser refuses to execute -a declaration of trust, the payment of the consideration money may be proved by parol, as before the statute.

The payment of the money is the foundation of the trust,” and in Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md. 182 , the Court adopted the following rule announced by the lower Oourt in that case: “There is, perhaps, no principle more clearly settled by numerous authorities than tnat if a husband purchases an estate with the money of his wife, there is