Dixon v. State

MATRICCIANI, J. This appeal arises from the death of fifteen-year-old Dominick Dixon. On September 24, 2009, appellants—Gloria M. Dixon, Ronald Eugene Dixon, and the Estate of Dominick Dixon—filed a negligence complaint against appellee, the State of Maryland, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Appellants alleged that Robert Crosby, after having been released from prison two years earlier, murdered Dominick. The complaint sought money damages relating to the State’s alleged negligence in supervising Crosby after his release from prison.

The State filed a motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2011, arguing that it owed no tort duty to Dominick Dixon to protect him from harm by Crosby. On March 2, 2011, the circuit court entered an order granting the motion and entering judgment in favor of the State. Appellants’ timely appeal followed. Question Presented Appellants present one question for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: ⁵⁰⁸ Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State because it owed no tort duty to appellants?

For the reasons that follow, we answer no and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual and Procedural History This appeal involves three “units” of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services: (1) the Division of Corrections (“DOC”); (2) the Maryland Parole Commission (“MPC”); and, (3) the Division of Parole and Probation (“DPP”). Md.Code (1999, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 2-201 of the Correctional Services Article (“CS”). Each of these units has a role to play in the confinement, conditional release, and supervision of convicted criminals.

DOC operates incarceration facilities for the confinement of sentenced criminals. Watkins v. DPS & CS, 377 Md. 34, 37 , 831 A.2d 1079 (2003). MPC has the exclusive power to authorize the parole of an incarcerated person. CS § 7-205(a)(1).

MPC is also responsible for issuing warrants to retake parolees who are charged with violating a condition of their parole. CS § 7-206(2). DPP is responsible for supervising the post-incarceration conduct of parolees and individuals released on mandatory supervision. CS §§ 6—104(1)(i)—(ii).

This appeal concerns DPP’s incompetent supervision of Crosby after his release from prison. In 1976, the Criminal Court for Baltimore City sentenced Crosby to a thirty-five year term of incarceration for the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl. DOC released Crosby from prison on mandatory supervision on July 31, 1999. 1 Mandatory supervision is a non-discretionary release that must be afforded to any inmate who has served the full term of a sentence of more than eighteen months. CS § 7-501.

Crosby’s freedom was short-lived, however. After he was arrested and charged ⁵⁰⁹ with assault and weapons crimes in February of 2000, MPC issued a retake warrant, and Crosby was remanded to DOC’s custody. He remained in prison for the next four years. During that time, MPC denied two of Crosby’s requests for parole.

In one denial, the MPC explained: Prior psychological reports were uniformly negative; he’s a pattern offender for sex offenses with minor children and violated [mandatory supervised release] by drug use. He’s still deemed a threat to public safety. Crosby became eligible for a second release under mandatory supervision in 2004. Initially, Crosby requested to live with his cousin in Washington, D.C. Before his release, however, the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision denied DPP’s request to transfer responsibility for Crosby’s supervision to Washington, D.C. authorities. 2 DPP, in turn, denied Crosby’s request to live in Washington, D.C. upon his release.

Crosby then notified DPP that he would live at 2721 Parkwood Avenue in Baltimore. On September 24, 2004, DOC released Crosby for a second time on mandatory supervision. Appellants allege that Crosby moved into his cousin’s home in Washington, D.C. in violation of the terms of his mandatory supervision. The mandatory supervision release certificate imposed the following conditions: 1.

Report as directed to and follow your Parole Agent’s instructions. 2. Work regularly. 3. Get permission before: a. Changing your home; b.

Changing your job; or, c. Leaving the State of Maryland. 4. Obey all laws. ⁵¹⁰ 5. Notify your parole agent immediately if you are arrested. 6.

You shall not illegally possess, use, or sell or have under your control any narcotic drug, “controlled dangerous substance,” or related paraphernalia. 7. You shall not own, possess, use, sell, or have under your control any dangerous weapon or firearms of any description without the approval of the Maryland Parole Commission. 8. You shall so conduct yourself as not to present a threat to yourself or others. 9. Special conditions: See front of certificate.

Two special conditions were listed on the front of the release certificate: “No unchaperoned contact with any minor children,” and “Subject to attend Special Offenders Clinic or any other therapy program as directed by his agent.” Crosby was also required to register as a sex offender under the Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2011 Supp.), § 11-701 through 11-721 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”). DPP supervised Crosby from its sex offense unit in Baltimore. DPP classified Crosby as an individual who required “intensive” supervision based on his criminal history. DPP’s field manual prescribed the standards for supervising Crosby.

Agents were instructed to verify that Crosby lived at his approved Baltimore address within twenty days of his release. They did not. Thereafter, agents were required to verify Crosby’s residence with home visits every four months. They did not.

Crosby was instructed to report to DPP’s Baltimore office twice a month for face-to-face meetings. Often times, he did not. During Crosby’s mandatory supervision, DPP should have conducted forty-eight face-to-face visits with Crosby, including additional visits to verify his home address every four months. DPP’s efforts in supervising Crosby fell well short of the standards set forth in its field manual.

From his release in September of 2004 through his incarceration in February of 2006, a DPP employee, Jean Quickley, was Crosby’s Parole Agent. Agent Quickley made at least ⁵¹¹ seven visits to the Baltimore address, but failed to meet Crosby or otherwise confirm that he lived there on any of those visits. Crosby failed to report to DPP’s Baltimore office for face-to-face visits at least fourteen times. Occasionally, he would call agent Quickley with an excuse; other times he simply failed to report as directed.

Crosby also missed two appointments for group therapy in DPP’s Special Offender’s Clinic. Crosby’s failure to report for face-to-face meetings and failure to attend the Clinic violated his mandatory supervision release order. Still, DPP took no corrective action. Then, on November 23, 2005, a Detective with the Baltimore Sex Offender Registry e-mailed Agent Quickley.

The Detective asked: Do you know where this guy [Crosby] is? He has missed his anniversary date and people at his residence state that he has cancer and is living in DC. After receiving the e-mail, Agent Quickly called Crosby’s employer. The employer’s records indicated that Crosby lived in Temple Hills, Maryland.

DPP never verified that Crosby lived in Temple Hills or transferred responsibility for his supervision to an agent in a DPP office for Prince George’s County. Nor did it investigate whether Crosby was living at the unapproved Washington, D.C. address. If Crosby moved from Baltimore to Temple Hills or Washington, D.C. without notifying DPP, that too violated his mandatory supervision release order. Finally, on December 16, 2005, Agent Quickley requested that the MPC issue a retake warrant for Crosby’s arrest for his failure to comply with the conditions of his release order.

Crosby was arrested under the MPC’s retake warrant on February 15, 2006. He was later released from prison after the MPC found Crosby not guilty of violating the terms of his release in a hearing on April 18, 2006. 3 Thereafter, Crosby remained under the supervision of Agent Quickley. ⁵¹² From April through September of 2006, Crosby reported sporadically for his required face-to-face meetings. Agent Quickley continued to attempt home visits to Crosby’s Baltimore address, despite evidence that he was in fact living in either Temple Hills or Washington, D.C. No DPP Agent ever attempted to visit Crosby at the Temple Hills or Washington, D.C. addresses. Crosby’s last contact with Agent Quickley was an in-person meeting on August 24, 2006.

Thereafter, he missed reporting dates on September 7 and 14, 2006. Dominick Dixon was killed by strangulation on September 24, 2006 in Washington, D.C. His naked body was found in an abandoned house across the street from Crosby’s cousin’s house. Washington, D.C. police arrested Crosby, and he confessed to killing Dominick. Crosby stood trial on February 19 through 26, 2008.

Although the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the State conceded for the purposes of this appeal that Crosby killed Dominick Dixon. Crosby returned to DOC custody on March 6, 2008 under a retake warrant issued by MPC for violating the conditions of his mandatory supervision release order. Crosby has since served his entire sentence in the 1976 rape case, and was released from the State’s custody to unknown whereabouts. On September 24, 2009 appellants filed a complaint for wrongful death and survival actions against the State and Crosby, and a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Crosby alone.

The State moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing in part that it had no tort duty to protect Dominick Dixon from harm by Crosby. In an order entered on May 26, 2010, the circuit court denied the State’s motion. After discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, making the same duty argument as in its earlier motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment.

Appellants then filed an unopposed motion for entry of final judgment under Maryland Rule 2-602. ⁵¹³ 4 On March 17, 2011 the circuit court entered an order directing the clerk to enter final judgment in favor of the State and against appellants. Appellants filed a timely appeal to this Court on April 1, 2011. Discussion Appellants ask us to determine whether the State’s inept supervision of Crosby caused Dominick Dixon’s death. Despite the tragedy that occurred, that question is not ours to answer.

Instead, we must hold that because the State owed no tort duty to appellants, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper where the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501 (f). We review the circuit court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo and ask whether the trial court was legally correct.

Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 579 , 831 A.2d 18 (2003). The material facts here are undisputed. Accordingly, the sole question before us is whether the circuit court was correct as a matter of law that the State owed no tort duty to appellants. Id. at 579-80 , 831 A.2d 18 .

The State’s Duty Appellants argue that the State had a duty to supervise Crosby so as to prevent Dominick Dixon’s death. The State counters that it had no duty “to protect Dominick Dixon or any other member of the general public from harm upon Crosby’s release.” The circuit court held that no legal duty ⁵¹⁴ ran from the State to appellants, and entered summary judgment in favor of the State. Although we are chagrined at DPP’s lackadaisical supervision of Crosby, because the circuit court interpreted Maryland case law correctly on the duty issue, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We explain.

The existence of a defendant’s duty to protect a plaintiff from injury is vital to a negligence claim, for “there can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due[.]” Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447, 460 , 921 A.2d 196 (2007) (quotation omitted). The general rule is that “there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another[.]” Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628 , 510 A.2d 1078 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). An exception to that general rule would apply here if a “special relationship” exists: either between the State and Crosby, or between the State and Dominick Dixon. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628 , 510 A.2d 1078 .

This special relationship may arise under either statutory or common law. 5 A statutory duty arises “when the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect and the injury was of the type the statute was designed to prevent.” Remsburg, 376 Md. at 584 , 831 A.2d 18 (quotation and citations omitted). A common law duty arises when a connection between the parties imposes a duty on one party to protect the other. Id. at 589-90 , 831 A.2d 18 . If DPP did not have a duty to control Crosby’s actions, then it could not owe appellants a duty to protect Dominick Dixon from harm.

Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 253 , 492 A.2d 1297 (1985). Thus, we must determine whether the State owed any duty, under either statutory or common law, to control Crosby’s conduct while he was on mandatory supervision. The case of Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236 , 492