Dobbyn v. Dobbyn

GARRITY, Judge. Nina Dobbyn challenges the $15,000.00 monetary award that she was granted on September 11, 1982, by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in its disposition of the marital estate following an absolute divorce from her husband, the appellee John Dobbyn, on June 3, 1981 in the District of Columbia. She also contests the Circuit Court’s failure to award her contribution ⁶⁶⁸ for mortgage payments and for condominium fees that she paid. 1 The Dobbyns, who were both fifty-four years old at the time of trial, were married on December 6, 1967, and lived together as husband and wife for twelve years. They separated on November 12, 1979, when Mr. Dobbyn left the marital home.

Ms. Dobbyn, who was previously married for ten years before she was divorced in 1964, brought three children, ages three, five and seven from that marriage into her marriage with Mr. Dobbyn. There were not children born of the marriage between the Dobbyns. ⁶⁶⁹ In the trial court, Ms. Dobbyn testified that although Mr. Dobbyn only earned $600.00 per month as a clerk with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare when they married, he wanted to support her and her children. For the first few years after they were married, Mr. Dobbyn received minimal wages. During those years, he undertook training and education to become a stockbroker.

Therefore, Ms. Dobbyn, who worked as an executive secretary and office manager with the United States Senate Subcommittee on Labor, produced most of the family income during her husband’s career training. Although Mr. Dobbyn eventually became a commodities broker with an income of as much as $180,000.00 per year, he was plagued with gross financial difficulty during the earlier years of marriage. When his wife became disabled and retired in 1969, Mr. Dobbyn was earning $8,000.00 per annum. 2 Testimony at trial disclosed that Mr. Dobbyn did take care of his wife and her children despite his wife’s constant complaints that he did not make enough money to provide for them. Mr. Dobbyn paid all living expenses incurred by his wife and her children.

He also paid the children’s medical bills, school tuition, gave each of them a car, and paid the costs of all vacations and trips. The Dobbyns purchased a marital home in Tantallon, Maryland, and an unimproved lot in Lehigh Acres, Florida. Furniture, cars, and all requisites of a marital estate were purchased as well. As the marriage progressed, Mr. Dobbyn, who had authority to handle the investment accounts, acquired stocks, commodities, and other investments jointly with his wife, as well ⁶⁷⁰ as in his own name, through the companies that employed him.

There were also large entertainment expenditures as Mr. Dobbyn’s success as a broker demanded that he nurture his clientele in such a manner. Mr. Dobbyn left the marital home on November 21, 1979 to reside in the District of Columbia. On June 11,1981, Mr. Dobbyn married his present wife, Dyan McDonald Dobbyn, a Vice-President of Shearson, Hayden, Stone, a prestigious brokerage firm that had employed Mr. Dobbyn. 3 This marriage produced two children, and Mr. Dobbyn adopted Dyan Dobbyn’s child from a previous marriage. From the time Mr. Dobbyn deserted Nina Dobbyn until October, 1980, he retained possession of all investments and securities, and periodically withdrew funds from them for his personal use.

Within that period, he voluntarily paid the home obligations and expenses on the marital property, as well as the utilities, his wife’s medical bills, and support to his wife of $750.00 per month. Ms. Dobbyn initially filed for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on May 16, 1980. When the matter was heard on February 5, 1981 before Judge Meloy, Ms. Dobbyn abandoned her prayer for divorce and proceeded on prayers of alimony and attorney’s fees. Alimony in the amount of $1500.00 per month and counsel fees of $8,000.00 were awarded to her.

An order reflecting the award was signed on February 18, 1981. On February 27, 1981, Ms. Dobbyn filed a Supplemental Bill of Complaint for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Although she again abandoned her prayer for divorce, Ms. Dobbyn requested that the marital estate be divided. When the matter was heard by Judge James H. Taylor on August 12, 1981, it was determined that the investment accounts and securities constituting marital property totaled $97,-000.00.

After it was determined that Ms. Dobbyn already ⁶⁷¹ had possessed or had access to $28,000.00 worth of marital property, she was awarded an additional $15,000.00. 4 Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the award and the chancellor’s order prompted this timely appeal. On appeal, four issues are presented for our consideration: 1. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to include traceable investment assets as marital property. 2. Whether the chancellor erred in valuing marital investment assets of stocks, securities, and other interest bearing accounts as of the date the initial divorce action was filed. 3.

Whether the chancellor failed to make an appropriate monetary award to adjust the fair equities between the parties. 4. Whether the chancellor erred in denying appellant’s request for an award of contribution as to funds she expended toward jointly owned real property. I. A. Traceable Assets At the outset of our discussion, we point out that the appellant at trial and the appellee in oral argument, agreed to use the date Ms. Dobbyn, the non-faulting party, filed her bill of complaint for divorce (May 16, 1980) as the cut-off date to determine what constituted marital property. That issue, therefore, is no longer before us.

Furthermore, we are not concerned with the valuation date of May 16, 1980 applying to any marital asset other than the disputed stocks, securities and interest bearing accounts as only those investment valuations have been challenged on appeal. ⁶⁷² In rendering his bench opinion, Judge Taylor ruled, in pertinent part, as follows: As to. the value of Mr. & Mrs. Dobbyn’s account on the 16th of May of 1980, when they filed for divorce, it would seem to me there were approximately $97,000.00 in the accounts, that is the credit union, Citizens, the commodities account and the stock accounts, and I am basing that on the figures as given by Mrs. Dyan Dobbyn, as well as the statements in the bank accounts. Now, it is indeed not the most precise determination of value, but I think, by the nature of the activity and the impreciseness of the testimony concerning it, I can only come up with an imprecise result, but I did consider all of the monies which he acquired as a consequence of the stock activities or commodities activities prior to May 16, and that based upon which I concluded, and that in conjunction with the monies from the sale of the furniture and the Citizens’ accounts.... The chancellor further determined as to the stock and commodities account that: All monies which were acquired as a consequence of non-action on the part of Mr. Dobbyn and accrued as a consequence of its mere existence, the assets, the assets mere existence, .... ought to be considered as part of the estate, or as an asset of the estate. The initial point of dispute raised by Ms. Dobbyn is that the chancellor erred in considering only those investment accounts as marital property which increased in value after May 16, 1980 as a consequence of the assets mere existence rather than as a result of active trading by Mr. Dobbyn.

In support of that contention, the appellant avers that all disputed marital investment accounts, including their traceable form, should have been classified as marital property. She reasons that all such marital assets which increased in earnings through interaccount trading, should not have inured to the sole benefit of her husband merely because he ⁶⁷³ happened to be in possession of the accounts, and elected to trade them actively after May 16, 1980. We agree. Marital property under § 3-6A-01(e) of the Marital Property Act 5 , is defined as: [A]ll property, however titled, acquired by either or both spouses during their marriage.

It does not include property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, or property excluded by valid agreement or property directly traceable to any of these sources. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-6A-01(e) (1980 Repl.Vol.) The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to effectuate its actual legislative intent. The primary source for discerning the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. “If the words contained therein are plain and unambiguous, and if they express a definite and sensible meaning, then their meaning is conclusively presumed to be that intended by the Legislature.” Athanason v. Athanason, 48 Md.App. 231, 234 , 426 A.2d 16 (1981). As the Court of Appeals observed in District Land Corporation v. W.S.S.C., et al., 266 Md. 301, 307 , 292 A.2d 695 (1972): In determining the legislative intent, we examine the words used as the primary source for discovering that intent, (citation omitted) If the words are clear and unambiguous, generally speaking, the search for the legislative intent ends.

If, however, the words are not clear and unambiguous, then the well-established rules of statutory construction apply, (citation omitted) In light of its provision that property traceable from an excluded asset not be considered marital property, it is quite plain, sensible and free from ambiguity that property trace ⁶⁷⁴ able from a nonexcluded asset acquired during marriage be considered marital property. Although factually distinguishable from the case sub judice, the holding and rationale of Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54 , 448 A.2d 916 (1982) would appear to be supportive of our construction. Harper involved the equitable distribution of funds from the sale of a marital home acquired during marriage that had been built upon property purchased by the husband prior to marriage. In construing Section 3-6A-01(e) of the Act as protecting the premarital interest of thé husband from being “transmuted” into marital property, the Court applied the “source of funds” theory, and determined that a spouse who contributed nonmarital funds would be entitled to recoup that proportionate share as such funds were excluded from being classified as marital property.

We hold that as to the unliquidated marital investment accounts as of May 16, 1980, the court erred in failing to classify all such accounts, including their traceable assets, as marital property.

II

Valuation of Stocks and Securities The appellant next contends that under Section 3-6A-05 and Section 3-6A-01(e) of the Maryland Property Act, the chancellor committed error as a matter of law in valuing marital stocks, securities and other interest bearing accounts as of May 16, 1980. She opines that the proper valuation date for these assets was the date of trial of the property dispute, August 12, 1982. We are of the opinion that the chancellor erred in valuing the investment accounts as of the date the initial divorce complaint was filed. We disagree, however, with the appellant’s contention that the accounts should have been valued as of the date of trial of the property dispute.

We hold that those assets of securities, stocks, bonds, options, commodities, and reserve funds, including their tracea ⁶⁷⁵ ble form, however titled, which existed as marital property on May 16, 1980, and which continued to bear interest or either lose or gain in value or amount through stock splits or interaccount trading, are to be valued as of the earlier time of either liquidation or June 3, 1981, the date the parties were granted an absolute divorce by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Section 3-6A-05 of the Marital Property Act, which governs the equitable distribution of marital property when divorcing spouses are unable to agree between themselves on how such property is to be divided, provides: (a) In granting an absolute divorce . . . the court shall determine which property is marital property if the division of property is an issue. . . . (b) The Court shall determine the value of all marital property. After making the determination, the court may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded....

(emphasis added) (Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 8- 6A 05) (1980 Repl. Vol.) Under Section 3-6A-01(e) of the Marital Property Act, marital property is defined as: [A]ll property, however titled, acquired by either or both spouses during their marriage. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-6A-01(e) (1980 RepLVol.) (emphasis added) As a matter of law, we have consistently held that a marriage is considered terminated by divorce as of the date of the decree granting a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969); Browning v. Browning, 224 Md. 399 , 168 A.2d 506 (1961); Wright v. State, 198 Md. 163 , 81 A.2d 602 (1951); Brewster v. Brewster, 204 Md. 501 -507, 105 A.2d 232 (1954); Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202 , 183 A. 605 (1936); Hensel v. Smith, 152 Md. 380, 136 A. 900 (1927); Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 322 , 133 A. 110 (1926).

In light of this rule, we think that under Section ⁶⁷⁶ 3-6A-01(e) “during the marriage” means the time between the commencement of the marriage and its dissolution by death, annulment or the issuance of a decree of absolute divorce. In harmony with the general rule governing the point of termination of a marriage, the legislature established that property interests between spouses are to be adjusted “when a marriage is dissolved.” This proposition is explicitly set forth in the preamble to the Marital Property Act which provides in pertinent part: [T]hat when a marriage is dissolved the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably.. . (1978 Md.Laws, ch. 794 at 2305. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63 , 448 A.2d 916 (1982) (emphasis added) We think that the precision and efficiency with which the statute was meant to operate in the distribution of marital assets is aptly demonstrated by the particular facts of this case when the parties could not reach an agreement as to a date of finality regarding the valuation of investment assets.

Herein, assets subject to being identified as marital property included, among other items, an array of valuable stocks, commodities, securities, and interest bearing accounts. As a consequence of the unique nature and sensitivity of the stock and commodity markets, these financial products are inherently endowed with a high propensity towards fluctuation. Consequently, the value of these assets could, depending upon market highs and lows, substantially increase or decrease at any time