Doe v. Allegany County Department of Social Services

BERGER, J. This case arises from the Circuit Court for Allegany County’s reversal of an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. Appellee the Allegany County Department of Social Services (“local department”) found that neglect of the child was “indicated.” 1 Appellant John Doe (“Doe”) requested a hearing ⁵⁰ before an ALJ to review the local department’s determination. The ALJ ruled out child neglect under the circumstances of the case. Thereafter, the local department appealed the ALJ’s ruling.

The Circuit Court for Allegany County reversed the decision of the ALJ. Doe filed a timely appeal and presents a single issue for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether the administrative law judge erred as a matter of law in ruling out neglect of the child because the local department immediately undertook the care of the child after the child was not allowed to return home. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Allegany County. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 23, 2008, the local department received an allegation of child neglect involving M.C., who at that time was seventeen years old.

M.C. and his brother E.C., who was sixteen years old, lived with their aunt, J.C., and her live-in boyfriend, Doe, for approximately eight years at that time. J.C. was M.C. and E.C.’s blood relative and their adoptive parent. Nonetheless, Doe and J.C. assumed equal responsibility for the care of both M.C. and E.C. Approximately five months prior to the incident in question, M.C. was paralyzed from the waist down in a car accident. On the morning of the incident, M.C. reported the alleged events to a counselor when he arrived at school.

The counsel- or called the local department which started an investigation into the incident. 2 M.C. explained to the local department officer that Doe and M.C. had an altercation concerning how ⁵¹ M.C. would get to school. 3 Doe wanted M.C. to take the bus, while M.C. made plans to ride to school with friends. An argument ensued when M.C. told Doe about his plans to ride to school with his friends. During this argument, M.C. alleged that Doe grabbed him by the upper arms, lifted him up, shook him, and pushed him back on the bed. M.C. called for E.C.’s assistance but Doe blocked the door to prevent E.C. from helping M.C. M.C. further explained that Doe and J.C. were more restrictive of his actions since his car accident. 4 Thereafter, the local department officer had a brief telephone conversation with Doe at work.

During that conversation, Doe presented nearly the same course of events as M.C. One major difference between the two versions of the events was that Doe stated his actions were in response to taunting gestures and disrespectful actions by M.C. Prior to the local department officer having a more complete conversation with Doe, an agent from the Allegany County Health Department’s Disabled Adults Unit (“Disabled Adults Unit”) called the local department officer to inform him that Doe called the Disabled Adults Unit. Doe told the Disabled Adults Unit that he could no longer care for M.C., and that someone from the Disabled Adults Unit needed to get involved. When the local department officer spoke with Doe later in the day, Doe reiterated that M.C. was no longer welcome at home. Doe explained that he did not want M.C. to return home because M.C. would not take his medications, attend counseling, or tend to his hygiene after his accident. 5 More ⁵² over, Doe did not want M.C. to ruin his reputation by spreading lies about alleged abuse.

The local department officer explained to Doe that the local department was not prepared to make a finding of neglect in connection with this incident. Additionally, the local department officer offered the local department’s services to Doe and M.C. Doe, however, declined the services and insisted that he did not want M.C. to return home. Thereafter, the local department officer contacted J.C. who agreed with Doe that M.C. was no longer welcome in their home. The next day, the local department officer met with M.C. at school.

During this meeting, M.C. expressed a desire to live with the family of a friend. The friend’s uncle confirmed to the local department officer that the family knew M.C. and was willing to take care of him. J.C., however, refused this arrangement and requested that M.C. be placed in a foster home until his eighteenth birthday. The local department officer followed the request and placed M.C. in a foster home.

The local department filed a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) petition after M.C. was placed in a foster home. Doe and J.C. both attended the CINA hearing and reiterated that M.C. was not allowed to return to their home and requested that he remain in foster care. After this hearing, M.C. was found to be a child in need of assistance. Additionally, the local department officer found that Doe and J.C. were responsible for indicated neglect of M.C. 6 This finding was premised on the fact that M.C. needed many medications and other assistance that he would not receive had the local department not intervened and placed him in a foster home.

Doe challenged the finding of indicated neglect in a contested hearing before an ALJ. Prior to this hearing, the local ⁵³ department filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the issue of neglect was fully litigated during the CINA hearing. The ALJ granted the motion to dismiss. Doe filed a petition for judicial review of the decision with the circuit court.

Prior to the circuit court entertaining the appeal, the local department and Doe agreed to remand the case to the ALJ for a determination on the merits because Doe was technically not a party to the CINA proceeding. On remand, the ALJ held a hearing on the merits. The ALJ rejected the local department officer’s finding of indicated child neglect, and instead, ruled out child neglect. This decision was based on the ALJ’s finding that M.C. was never at risk because there was no gap in custody between the care provided by Doe, J.C. and the local department.

Additionally, the ALJ noted that Doe and J.C. did everything they could to help M.C. while he was in their custody. Subsequently, the local department filed a petition for judicial review. The Circuit Court for Allegany County reversed the ALJ’s decision and reinstated the finding of indicated child neglect. The circuit court found that the ALJ’s decision was predicated on the actions of the local department rather than the conduct of Doe and J.C. which resulted in the local department taking M.C. into its custody.

The circuit court judge ruled in part: The ALJ erred in reaching the conclusion that the Child was not at a substantial risk of harm since that conclusion was based upon the local department’s ability to care for the child.... If we were to adopt the ALJ’s stance then it would stand to reason that no child would ever be at a substantial risk of harm as long as the local department was capable of taking the child into care. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is authorized by Maryland Code, § 10-222(h) of the State Gov- ⁵⁴ eminent Article.

Under subsection (h), when exercising such review, the court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article (“SG”). Generally, when reviewing the decision of an administrative agency a court must only determine “if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings- and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998) (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)).

Therefore, we review the decision of the agency rather than that of the circuit court. See Owens v. Prince George’s County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 182 Md.App. 31, 51 , 957 A.2d 191, 203 (2008). Our review of the agency’s factual findings consists solely of an appraisal and evaluation of the agency’s fact finding and not an independent decision on the evidence.

Catonsville Nursing Home, supra, 349 Md. at 570 , 709 A.2d at 753 (citing Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187, 212 , 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993)). This evaluation seeks to find whether the evidence is substantial. Thus, “a reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate ⁵⁵ court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency----” Id.

(citing Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Ass’n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985); Anderson, supra, 330 Md. at 212 , 623 A.2d at 210 ; Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 511-13 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978)). In this context, “ ‘substantial evidence,’ as the test for reviewing factual findings of administrative agencies, has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion!)]’ ” Id. (quoting Bulluck, supra, 283 Md. at 512 , 390 A.2d at 1123 ).

It is well established that “reviewing courts are under no constraint to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Id. (citing Ins. Comm’r v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411 , 692 A.2d 474, 479 (1997)). Accordingly, we may reverse an administrative decision premised on erroneous legal conclusions.

Additionally, we are obligated to “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency,” because their decisions are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity. Id. (citing Anderson, supra, 330 Md. at 213 , 623 A.2d at 211 ; Bulluck, supra, 283 Md. at 513 , 390 A.2d at 1124 ). The Court of Appeals has consistently stated that an adjudicatory agency’s decision can only be reviewed on grounds identical to those relied upon by the agency.

Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108 , 112 n. 12, 771 A.2d 1051 , 1053 n. 12 (2001). Finally, in an administrative appeal, the appellant bears the burden of establishing an error of law or that the agency’s final decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Taylor v. Harford County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213, 222-23 , 862 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2004).

DISCUSSION I. Doe contends that the ALJ was correct and that the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the ALJ. Doe main ⁵⁶ tains that the ALJ’s conclusions were correct as a matter of law because the AL J found that: [T]he evidence is clear that neither [Doe] nor [J.C.] forced [M.C.] out of the house, i.e., kicked him out of the house, as it were.... At the time that [Doe] told [the local department officer] that [M.C.] was not welcome back home, [M.C.] didn’t even want to return, indicating he was fearful of returning, even though [the local department officer] had quickly determined that no [neglect] had occurred. Based on these findings, Doe argues that he did not eject or throw M.C. out of the home.

Doe proffers that M.C.’s health and welfare were never at risk because the local department immediately took charge of M.C. Doe further argues that the ALJ’s findings of fact concerning whether Doe forced M.C. out of the house allowed for multiple interpretations. Accordingly, Doe contends that because the ALJ’s findings of fact were open to multiple interpretations, the circuit court should have remanded the case for further clarification. The local department responds that the ALJ’s decision was legally incorrect and that the ALJ misunderstood the legal implications of the local department’s taking charge of M.C. when it was informed that Doe and J.C. would not allow M.C. to return to their home. Additionally, the local department contends that the manner in which M.C. left the home is not critical to a finding of neglect in this case.

Therefore, the local department maintains that the circuit court’s decision was correct and a remand was not necessary. According to § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code: ‘Neglect’ means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate: (1) that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or ⁵⁷ (2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury. FL § 5-701(s). When a member of a Department of Social Services (“DSS”) investigates a case of alleged neglect, he or she may arrive at one of three conclusions: 1) indicated child neglect; 2) unsubstantiated child neglect; or 3) ruled out child neglect.

CO-MAR 07.02.07.13. In the instant case, the local department officer reached a finding of indicated child neglect. Thereafter, the ALJ reversed this decision and ruled out child neglect. The circuit court reversed the ALJ, finding that the local department’s finding of indicated child neglect was correct under the circumstances.

The elements necessary to reach a finding of “indicated” child neglect and “ruled out” child neglect are as follows: A. Indicated Child Neglect. (1) Neglect—Other than Mental Injury. Except as provided in § A(2) of this regulation, a finding of indicated child neglect is appropriate when there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that the following four elements are present: (a) A current or prior failure to provide proper care and attention; (b) The alleged