Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church

ELDRIDGE, Judge. In an administrative action for the approval of a development plan, the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County remanded the matter to the Baltimore County Hearing Officer for further proceedings. The petitioners then brought, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, an action for judicial review of the Board of Appeals’ decision. The Circuit Court dismissed the action on the ground that there was no final administrative decision and that, therefore, the judicial review action was premature.

The Court of Special Appeals ultimately dismissed the petitioners’ appeal to that court on the ground that they lacked standing. The Court of Special Appeals’ decision was erroneous, and we shall reverse it. The ⁶⁴ Circuit Court’s decision was correct, arid we shall direct that it be affirmed. I. The respondent, Bethel A.M.E. Church, owns a 255 acre parcel of land on Old Court Road in Baltimore County, and Bethel desires to build a new church building and related facilities on the land.

Churches are permitted under the zoning applicable to the land, but the Baltimore County development regulations require that Bethel obtain County approval of its development plan before proceeding to construct the church building and related facilities. Bethel filed for approval of its plan, and a hearing before the designated Baltimore County Hearing Officer began on August 28, 2000, and continued over several days in September 2000. By agreement of the parties, the record remained open until the middle of October 2000 for the submission of memoranda. On October 30, 2000, the Hearing Officer issued a twenty-five page “interlocutory” opinion and an order ruling in favor of Bethel on all issues except one, which related to the adequacy of the surrounding roads to carry the anticipated traffic volumes to and from the Bethel Church.

The Hearing Officer ordered Bethel to submit additional evidence on the traffic issue at a subsequent hearing before the Officer. The Greater Patapsco Community Association, Inc., by Rosalyn N. Roddy, the Association’s President, took an appeal from the Hearing Officer’s interlocutory decision to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals. The Association’s “Petition In Support Of Appeal,” filed with the Board of Appeals, argued, inter alia, that the Hearing Officer was not authorized to issue an “ ‘interlocutory’ ruling” and that the Baltimore County Code required that the Hearing Officer issue a “final decision” within fifteen days of the “final hearing” or fifteen days from the time the record became closed. The hearing before the Board of Appeals consisted of oral argument on the law, with Rosalyn Roddy, the Association’s President, and Kathleen Skullney, another member of the Association, argu ⁶⁵ ing that the Hearing Officer’s decision was unauthorized, and with Bethel’s attorney arguing to the contrary.

Ms. Skullney also testified as to the nature of the Association, its geographical coverage, and its members. The transcript discloses that other protestants were present, and when the President offered to introduce them, the Board Chairman indicated that it would not be necessary and that, “[i]f there’s ... no counsel ... here, no one is represented by counsel, just go around and they can appear.” In January 2001, the Board of Appeals filed an opinion holding that the Hearing Officer’s interlocutory decision was authorized. The Board filed an order stating “that the matter is not ripe for appeal at this time” and ordering “that this matter be and is hereby REMANDED to the Hearing Officer for findings in accordance with his interlocutory order. Any party then aggrieved would have the right to appeal, in full, to this Board, on all issues of the subject Development Plan.” Next, a petition was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for judicial review of the Board of Appeals’ decision.

The ten named plaintiffs in the petition, as amended, were the Greater Patapsco Community Association, Inc., Rosalyn Roddy who had argued before the Board of Appeals as the Association’s President, Kathleen Skullney who had argued and testified before the Board of Appeals, and seven individuals who were residents of the area where the land is located and who stated that they “were parties to the County Board of Appeals of Baltimore County proceeding which is the subject of this petition.” Bethel filed in the Circuit Court a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review on the ground that the administrative decision was not final and, therefore, was not ripe for judicial review. The petitioners responded by arguing that the Board of Appeals’ decision was final, as the entire case was remanded to the Hearing Officer and there was nothing further for the Board of Appeals to do. Bethel, in reply, contended that, as a pre-condition for judicial review, it is the ⁶⁶ administrative decision which must be final and not simply the Board of Appeals’ decision. Following oral argument, the Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the action for judicial review “is premature.” The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The notice of appeal was in the names of the Association and the individuals, and was signed by the President of the Association and by all of the other eight individuals who had signed the petition for judicial review. In the Court of Special Appeals, the appellee-respondent Bethel, in addition to its brief defending the Circuit Court’s decision, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Association was the only party to the proceeding before the Board of Appeals and that the nine individuals who had signed the petition for judicial review and the notice of appeal were not parties before the Board of Appeals. According to Bethel, the Association, which was allegedly the only party to the administrative proceedings, was not a party to the judicial review action and the appeal. Bethel maintained that the individuals, because they allegedly had not been parties to the administrative proceedings, lacked standing to bring the judicial review action and to prosecute an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals on March 4, 2002, filed an opinion which it designated as “Reported.” In that opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that the Association was a party throughout the proceedings, was a party to the judicial review action and the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and therefore had standing to maintain the appeal. Bethel’s motion to dismiss was denied as to the Association. . The Court of Special Appeals’ March 4th opinion, however, held that the individuals lacked standing to bring the judicial review action and maintain the appeal because, according to the appellate court, they had not been parties to the hearing before the Board of Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals granted Bethel’s motion to dismiss the individuals’ appeal.

Finally, the March 4th opinion held that the Association was entitled to judicial review of the Board of Appeals’ final ⁶⁷ decision remanding the case, that the judgment of the Circuit Court would be reversed, and that the case would be remanded to the Circuit Court for a decision on the merits of the Association’s judicial review action. Bethel filed in the Court of Special Appeals a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the Association was not a party to the judicial review action and was not included in the notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, in an “Unreported” opinion filed on May 13, 2002, withdrew its opinion of March 4, 2002, held that the Association was not a party to the judicial review action or the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and dismissed the appeal “as to all appellants.” The appellants in the Court of Special Appeals filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 370 Md. 268 , 805 A.2d 265 (2002).

As earlier indicated, we shall hold that the individual petitioners were parties before the Board of Appeals, had standing to bring the judicial review action, had standing to maintain the appeal, and are proper parties in this Court. 1 We shall further hold that the Circuit Court correctly dismissed the action as premature. ⁶⁸ II. In dismissing the appeal on the ground that the nine individual petitioners lacked standing in the judicial review action because they were allegedly not parties before the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, the Court of Special Appeals committed several errors. A. First, it is clear that the individual petitioners were parties in the Circuit Court, were aggrieved by the Circuit Court’s dismissal of their action, did sign a timely notice of appeal, and were properly parties-appellants in the Court of Special Appeals. As parties in the Circuit Court aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court, they were entitled to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

See Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5(U), which provides in relevant part as follows: “Any party to the proceeding in the circuit court [in an action to review a County Board of Appeals’ decision] aggrieved by the decision of the court may appeal from the decision to the Court of Special Appeals in the same manner as provided for in civil cases.” 2 If the Court of Special Appeals’ holding as to standing had been correct, namely that the individual appellants-petitioners lacked standing to maintain the judicial review action because they were not parties before the Board of Appeals, the Court of Special Appeals could have affirmed the dismissal of the judicial review action on this ground. See Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 321 , 718 A.2d 588, 595 (1998) (“ ‘In a direct appeal, an appellate court will affirm the trial court’s decision on a ground adequately supported by the record although the ground was not relied upon by the trial court or the parties,’ ” ⁶⁹ quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385 , 402 n. 12, 631 A.2d 453 , 462 n. 12 (1993)). See also, e.g., Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596 , 612 n. 8, 664 A.2d 862 , 870 n. 8 (1995); Anne Arundel County v. Hartford Accident Co., 329 Md. 677, 691 , 621 A.2d 427, 433 (1993); Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 530 , 620 A.2d 894, 904 (1993); Paolino v. McCormick & Co., 314 Md. 575, 584 , 552 A.2d 868, 872 (1989); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502 , 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). Or, if the Court of Special Appeals’ holdings regarding standing and ripeness had been correct, the appellate court could have vacated the trial court’s dismissal on the ground of prematurity and directed the trial court to dismiss the petition for lack of standing.

When, however, aggrieved parties in the trial court are entitled to appeal and prosecute a timely, proper appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, their alleged lack of standing to have instituted the action in the trial court furnishes no ground for dismissal of the appeal. If a trial court erroneously rules that the plaintiffs in an action have standing, if an appeal is taken from a final trial court judgment, and if lack of standing is properly raised in the appellate court, the appropriate appellate judgment is to reverse or vacate the trial court’s judgment. See, e.g., Ruark v. Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, 157 Md. 576, 594-595 , 146 A. 797, 804 (1929).

If a trial court dismisses an action because the plaintiffs lack standing, if an appeal is timely and properly taken, and if the appellate court agrees that the plaintiffs lack standing, the appropriate appellate judgment is an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment. See, e.g., Maryland-Nat’l v. Smith, 333 Md. 3 , 633 A.2d 855 (1993); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 622-624 , 612 A.2d 241, 254-255 (1992). Nevertheless, lack of standing to initiate an action in a trial court is not a ground for dismissal of a timely and proper appeal. ⁷⁰ B. As the Court of Special Appeals correctly pointed out, the defendant-appellee Bethel failed to raise the issue of standing in the Circuit Court. The. appellate court went on, however, to take the position that, “regardless of appellee’s failure to raise the issue at the circuit court level, we have the authority to consider the issue of standing....” No authority was cited for this proposition.

Under some circumstances, an appellate court may consider a standing issue even though it was not raised in the trial court. See Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Secretary of State, 294 Md. 160, 167-170 , 448 A.2d 935, 939-941 (1982), affirmed sub nom. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). Sometimes an issue described as a “standing” issue may relate to the jurisdiction of the appellate court, such as whether the “case-or-controversy requirement” is met, and such an issue may always be noticed by the appellate court.

Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, supra, 467 U.S. at 970-971 , 104 S.Ct. at 2854 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 804-805 (Justice Stevens concurring). Under the circumstances of the present case, however, the standing issue is not one which should have been raised and decided for the first time in the Court of Special Appeals. There is no jurisdictional standing issue in this case. The original petition for judicial review stated that the individual plaintiffs were parties before the Board of Appeals, and it was signed by one of the individuals.

The amended petition was to the same effect, and it was signed by all nine individual plaintiffs. The administrative record was not inconsistent with this allegation. Bethel filed no response or motion in the Circuit Court contradicting these facts and asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not parties or were not aggrieved.. No standing issue, which under the circumstances would depend on factual findings, was litigated before the Circuit Court.

Bethel’s motion to dismiss was based entirely upon the lack of a final administrative decision, ⁷¹ and this is the only issue that was litigated and decided by the Circuit Court. In light of these circumstances, the individual plaintiffs had prima facie standing to seek judicial review, and any dispute concerning their standing should have been raised and litigated in the Circuit Court, not the Court of Special Appeals. See, e.g., Sugarloaf v. Department of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 292 , 686 A.2d 605, 616 (1996) (The “judicial standing issue should be adjudicated by the circuit court ‘through a motion or other pleading filed by [an adverse party] to dismiss [petitioner] as a party, [petitioner’s] answer thereto, and testimony if need be on the point,’ ” quoting Morris v. Howard Res. & Dev. Corp., 278 Md. 417, 424-425 , 365 A.2d 34, 38 (1976)); Baxter v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 111, 113 , 235 A.2d 536, 537 (1967); Hertelendy v. Montgomery County, 245 Md. 554, 564-568 , 226 A.2d 672, 678-680 (1967); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 63 , 225 A.2d 294, 301 (1966); Brashears v. Lindenbaum, 189 Md. 619, 628-629 , 56 A.2d 844, 849 (1948).

C. Even if it had been appropriate, under the circumstances of this case, for the Court of Special Appeals to have decided whether the individual petitioners had standing, its decision in this regard was erroneous. The intermediate appellate court held that the nine individuals lacked standing to bring the judicial review action because they were not parties before the Board of Appeals. In finding that they were not parties before the Board of Appeals, the appellate court stated that Ms. Roddy appeared before the Board only “in her capacity as President of the Association” and that Ms. Skullney’s appearance “was solely in her capacity as a” member of the Association who was speaking on its behalf. The court went on to