Dougherty v. Superintendent of the Maryland House of Correction

²⁰⁵ Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion, of the Oourt. By Section 11 of Article 42 of the Oode of Public General Laws of this State, it is provided in snbstanee that when any judge of any court in this State, having jurisdiction, shall 'release or discharge any person brought before such court or judge, under the writ of habeas corpus, charged with the violation of the provisions of any act of assembly of this State, or section thereof, or of any article or section of the Oode of Public General Laws or Public Local Laws of this State, upon the ground, or for the reason, that such act of assembly, or section thereof, or such article or section of the Code o f Public General Laws or Public Local Laws, is unconstitutional and void, in whole or in part, because contrary to the Constitution or Bill of Rights of this State, or because contrary to the Constitution of the United States,, it shall be the duty of the court or judge ordering such release or discharge for said cause to reduce his opinion to writing within five days after ordering; said, release or discharge, and to transmit the original papers in the case, together with a copy of its or his order of release or discharge and of his opinion under his hand .and seal, to the Clerk of the Oourt of Appeals, and it shall be the duty of the Oourt to consider the papers so transmitted to the clerk, at the earliest practicable period, after its receipt, and to give its opinion in writing upon the case so presented, and the opinion so given shall have and possess the same authority as if the same was filed in a case formally heard and determined in said Oourt on appeal. It appears that on the 12th of September, 1923, Walter B. Dougherty, the appellee in this, ease, was brought before Judge William H. Haklait, in the Circuit Oourt for Harford County, upon a writ of habeas corpus. The petition for the writ, and the return, showed that Dougherty had been convicted and committed to the Maryland House of Oorreotion for operating a motor vehicle, knowing or having reason' to believe that same had been stolen, in violation of section ²⁰⁶ 157 of chapter 407 of the Acts of 1920, which provides, in part, that any person who shall operate or "be an occupant of any motor vehicle which he knows, or has reason to believe has been stolen, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment for not less than sixty days, nor more than five years, or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

This provision shall not be regarded as exclusive of other penalties prescribed by existing or any future law for the larceny or unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Judge Harlan, in his opinion, held that this act of assembly, in so far as it conferred jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace to hear and determine the offense in the instant case, was unconstitutional and void, and discharged the prisoner. The single question thus presented by the record, as stated by the State in its brief, is whether the right to try a person charged with an offense punishable by the imposition of a maximum fine of five thousand dollars and a maximum sentence of imprisonment for five years, can constitutionally