Doughty v. Bayne

Brune, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether or not certain statements made by the defendant-appellant, John E. Doughty, were sufficient to permit a jury to find that he had acknowledged a debt which otherwise would have been barred by the Statute of Eimitations. The plaintiff-appellee, Clarence E. Bayne, brought suit in the Circuit Court ffor Worcester County upon a note allegedly made by Doughty. The case was removed for trial to Somerset County, where a jury found for Bayne.

A motion for judgment n. o. v. or for a new trial was denied, judgment was entered for Bayne upon the jury’s verdict, and Doughty appealed. Bayne testified that he was asked to buy more stock in a corporation which operated a jewelry store in Salisbury. He already owned some stock in the corporation. He refused, saying he wanted more security.

It was then suggested by a Mr. Cameron, an officer of the corporation, that if Doughty, who at that time was both the president and the largest individual stockholder of the corporation, would sign a note for the money, Bayne would lend the money for the use of the corporation. Bayne agreed to this plan and the transaction ³⁶⁴ was consummated. There was introduced in evidence a check from Bayne to the jewelry store corporation for $2,000 which was deposited May 26, 1954, and also the note signed by Doughty on May 25, 1954, for the same amount. Between the date of the loan and March 18, 1959, Bayne never requested payment of principal or interest by Doughty.

On the latter date Bayne called Doughty and requested payment. It was during this conversation that the statements found to be an acknowledgment were made. Bayne’s version of this conversation is as follows: “Of course, after the usual greetings you always make when you make a ’phone call, I asked him about the note and told him I needed the money and that I would like to have the $2,000.00, plus interest. At first he said he didn’t remember the note.

Then after I refreshed his memory he said, ‘Well, possibly I did sign it. But don’t you think I have lost enough?’ I said, ‘Yes, I realize you have lost quite a bit.’ ‘But’, I said, ‘this $2,000.00 that I personally loaned you is a lot of money to me.’ He said, Well, I can’t pay you.’ I proceeded to go ahead. I said, T want my money.’ I said, ‘You gave me a note for it. You said you would be liable for it.’ ‘And’, I said, T want my money.

I need my money.’ He said, Well, I haven’t got it. I can’t pay it. If you want to take it to an attorney and see what he can do about it, all right.’ ” Doughty testified that he had no recollection of signing the note that was introduced. He did not deny that he did sign it, and even acknowledged that the signature on the note was his, but said he could not remember signing it.

Also, he said he had never seen the check from Bayne to the jewelry store corporation and had no idea of what happened to the money. Doughty admitted receiving the telephone call from Bayne requesting payment of the note in March, 1959. His testimony as to what was said is different from Bayne’s. No payment was forthcoming and Bayne brought this suit.

The note was not under seal and therefore the period of limitations was three years. Code (1957), Art. 57, Sec. 1. However, it has long been the rule that an acknowledgment revives the remedy and avoids the operation of the statute. Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204 ; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Ac ³⁶⁵ tions, § 308.

In Maryland, unlike most other states, an acknowledgment of a subsisting debt, unaccompanied by any qualification or declaration which, if true, would exempt a defendant from a moral obligation to pay, or such an acknowledgment accompanied by a refusal to pay, coupled with an excuse for not paying which itself furnishes no real objection to the payment of the debt, is sufficient to remove the bar of the statute. Oliver v. Gray, supra, at 217; Weil v. Lambert, 183 Md. 233, 244 , 37 A. 2d 312 ; Gill v. Donovan, 96 Md. 518, 523, 54 A. 117 ; Felty v. Young, 18 Md. 163, 167 ; Mitchell v. Sellman, 5 Md. 376, 387 ; Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill 85, 98 , 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 313. In the instant case it is, of course, not our duty to determine whether Bayne’s version of Doughty’s