Dronenburg v. Harris

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Ephraim G. Harris, spoken of in the testimony as E. Gaither Harris, a resident of Frederick County, Maryland, was injured, on the 30th day of December, 1906, in what is known as the Terra Cotta wreck, on the Metropolitan Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in the District of Columbia, from which injuries he died the next day at the Casualty Hospital, in the District of Columbia. The deceased was a dentist, and up to the time of his death was practicing his profession. He was unmarried, within nine days of being of age and died intestate, leaving a mother, Mrs. Dronenburg (who was not dependent upon him, and to whose support he did not contribute in any way), David Fulton Harris, Earnest G. Harris, Charles E. Harris and Ida May Keller, half brothers and sisters, children of his father, Asa I. Ethel, Irene and William T. Harris, brothers and sister, and Lee, Hiram and Edward Dronenburg, half brothers, children of his mother.

Letters of administration were issued by the Orphans’ Court of Frederick County to Reverdy Dronenburg, stepfather of the deceased, who, on the 9th day of February, 1907, received - from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, through its agent, C. W. Egan, $5,500 in discharge of claims growing out of the injury to and killing of the deceased. David Fulton Harris, Ernest G. Harris, Charles E. Harris and Ida May Keller, half brothers a'nd sister of the deceased, and children of his father, having made claim in the Orphans’ Court of Frederick County to their shares, as next of kin of the, deceased, of the money received by the administrator from the railroad company, that Court on the 24th of December, 1907. for the purpose of determining whether or not the $5,500 received by the administrator belonged to the estate of the deceased, sent to the Circuit Court for Frederick County for trial twelve issues, and ordered that in the trial of said issues the said David Fulton Harris, Ernest G. Harris, Charles E. ⁶⁰⁸ Harris and Ida May Keller should be plaintiffs, and Reverdy Dronenburg, administrator, should be defendant. The case was moved from the Circuit Court for Frederick County to the Circuit Court for Washington County, and from there to the Circuit Court for Carroll County, where it was tried at the last May Term of said Court, and the record of which trial contains eighteen exceptions to the rulings of the Court on the evidence, and one exception to the granting of the plaintiffs* ten prayers, to the overruling by the Court of defendant’s special exceptions to the plaintiffs’ eleventh prayer,- and to the rejection of the defendant’s twenty-eight prayers. Before taking them up in the order in which they appear in the record, a statement of the law applicable to the main facts in the case will contribute to a clearer understanding and a more satisfactory disposition of the numerous exceptions to be considered.

In the case of Stewart v. The United Elec. L. & P. Co., 104 Md. 333 , this Court held that the negligent killing of a person in this State gives rise, under the law of this State,, to two causes of action, one by the executor or administrator of the deceased, for such damages as were sustained by him in his lifetime, for the benefit of his estate; and the other by the State, for the use of certain equitable plaintiffs, under secs. 1 and 2 of Art. 67 of the Code (1904), for such damages as they sustained by the death of the party injured. The first cause of action is the cause of action the deceased had, and which under the Code survives to his executor or administrator, for the benefit of his estate; while the cause of action under secs. 1 and 2 of Art. 67, is a new cause of action, created by them,, and one which the deceased never had. The damages sought, to be recovered in the case referred to, and which this Court said the administrator was entitled to recover, was for physical and mental pain and suffering and expense of the deceased, &c.

In the case of Ash v. B. O. Railroad Co., 72 Md. 144 ,. Charles F. Weaver, a citizen of the State of Maryland, was. killed in the State of West Virginia, by the alleged negligence of the railroad company, and his administratrix, appointed in this State, brought suit for the alleged killing under the law ⁶⁰⁹ of West Virginia, which provided for the recovery of damages for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act of another, and further provided that “every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action shall be distributed to the parties, and in the proportion provided by law, in relation to the distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate. And in every such action the jury may give such damages as they deem fair and just, not exceeding $10,000; and the amount so recovered shall not be subject to any debts or liabilities of the deceased; provided that every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person.” The Court, Alvey, C. J., delivering the opinion, after a careful review of the numerous cases bearing upon the question, held that the statute of West Virginia was essentially different from our statute (secs. 1 and 2, Art. 67 of the Code); that the action sought to be maintained was not a common law action but a special action given by the statute, which had no binding force beyond the limits of the State; that the statute of this State could not be made to apply to transactions that occurred in other States, and that as our statute cannot be so extended and applied, “there can be no reason why statutes of other States, not similar in its provisions to our own, though belonging to the same • general - class of legislation, should be allowed extra-territorial force and operation by the Courts of this State.” That an administrator appointed in this State receives his authority to maintain an action in this State from the laws of this State alone, and that “It is according to the laws of this State that he must conduct his administration and make distribution. There is no statute of this State, nor any principle of law known to our Courts, whereby an administrator or executor is given the right to sue and recover in an action like the present, nor is there any law of distribution, in force in this State, that entitles the next of kin or distributees of decedent’s estate, to receive the money recovered in an action like the present.

And if the present administratrix were ⁶¹⁰ allowed to maintain the action it would be exclusively by virtue of a foreign law, and it would only be by force of that law, that she could be compelled to account for and make distribution of the money recovered. There is certainly no comity that requires one State to apply and administer the statute law of another in a case such as the present.” See also State, use of Allen v. P. & C. R. R. Co., 45 Md. 41 . Secs. 1301, 1302, 1303, of the Code of the District of Columbia provides as follows: Sec. 1301. Liability.

Whenever by an injury done or happening within the limits of the District of Columbia the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured, or if the person injured be a married woman, have entitled her husband, either separately or by joining with his wife, to maintain an action and recover damages, the person who or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages for such death, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, even though the death shall have been caused under the circumstances which constitute a felony; and such damages shall be assessed with reference to the injury resulting from such act, neglect, or default causing such death, to the widow and'next of kin of such deceased person: Provided, That in no case shall the recovery under this Act exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars: And provided further, That no action shall be maintained under this chapter in any case when the party injured by such wrongful act, neglect, or default has recovered.damages therefor during the life of such party. Sec. 1302. By whom suit to be brought. Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person, and within one year after the death of the party injured.

Sec. 1303. Distribution of damages. The damages recovered in such action shall not be appropriated to the payment of the debts or liabilities of such deceased person, but ⁶¹¹ shall enure to the benefit of his or her family and be distributed according to the provisions of the Statute of Distribution in force in the said District of Columbia.” Under sec. 380 of the Code of the District of Columbia the mother of the deceased would be entitled to the whole amount recovered under the provisions of secs. 1301 — 2—3. Sec. 329 of the Code of the District of Columbia provides as follows: “It shall be lawful for any person or persons to whom letters testamentary or of administration have been granted by the proper authority in any of the United States or the territories thereof to maintain any suit or action and to prosecute and recover any claim in the District in the same manner as if the letters testamentary or of administration had been granted to such person or persons by the proper authority in the said District; and the letters testamentary or of administration, or a copy thereof certified under the seal of the authority granting the same, shall be sufficient evidence to prove the granting thereof, and that the person or persons, as the case may be, hath or have administration.” In the case of Railroad Company v. Barron, 5 Wallace, 90, in passing upon the statute of Illinois similar to that of the District of Columbia, the Court held that it is not necessary for the recovery that the'widow and next of kin should have had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for their support, and the ruling in this case was adopted by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in the case of the District of Columbia v. Wilcox, 4 Appeal Cases, 90, Chief Justice Alvey delivering the opinion, as the proper construction of the District of Columbia statute.

See also case of U. S. Electric Lighting Co. v. Sullivan, 22 Appeal Cases (D. C.) 115. In ths case of Asphalt Co. v. Mackey, 15 Appeal Cases, 417 (D. C.) the Court said, that the damages recoverable under the sections of the District Code referred to, are not assets of the estate of the deceased. It is clear, on the authorities and statutes referred to, (1) that no action could have been maintained in this State for the death of the deceased; (2) that an action could have been ⁶¹² maintained by the administrator in this case in the District of Columbia to recover for the death of the deceased; (3) that such damages as might have been recovered for the death of the deceased, or any sum of money paid on account of his °death would not belong to his estate, and (4) that to justify a recovery for the wrongful killing, under the Code of the District of Columbia, it is not necessary to show that the equitable plaintiff had any claim upon the deceased for support. It is. not necessary to determine in this case whether the administrator could have recovered in any form of action for the injuries sustained by the deceased in his lifetime.

But it is also-clear, on the authorities cited, that if any sum was paid him on account of such injuries, or on account of damages sustained by his estate in consequence thereof, such sum belongs to his estate and should be accounted for by the administrator to the Orphans’ Court of Frederick County. At the trial of the case the defendant first moved to quash the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 12th issues, which motion the Court overruled, and the case was then tried before the Court without a jury. ' The plaintiff, in addition to the facts already^ stated, proved by C. E. Egan, that he was a general claim agent for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company; thát he knew the administrator of the deceased; that he was familiar with the Terra Cotta wreck, and “the date of the settlement made on account of the loss sustained by the death and injury of Mr. Harris;” that he made the settlement "of a claim with, the administrator and took from him at the time of the payments the following releases: Release No.- 1. “Received of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company the sum of Five Thousand $5,000 Dollars in full satisfaction payment and discharge of all claims or demands which I. R. Dronenburg, administrator of the estate of E. Gaither Harris,, deceased, now have, or may or can hereafter have against said Railroad Company, or for the death of said E. Gaither Harris arising out of accident to train No. 66 at Terra Cotta,. D. C., December 30, 1906, and in consideration of the receipt by me of said sum I do hereby release and forever dis ⁶¹³ charge the said Company from all said claims or demands, as well as from all claims or demands of any kind whatsoever. Witness my hand and seal this 9th day of Feby., 1907.

Witness: R. Dronenburg (Seal) C. W. Egan, Administrator of the estate of Asa I. Harris, E. Gaither Harris.” Release No. 2. “Received of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company the sum of $500.00 for all claims which I. R. Dronenburg, administrator, of Frederick, Md., now have, or can hereafter have, against The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, arising out of the death of E. Gaither Harris, of Washington, D. C., who met his death in the accident to train No. 66 at Terra Cotta, D. C., December 30th, 1906, and for all compensation for lost time and all expenses and for pain and suffering endured by the deceased from the time of his injury until death. And in consideration of the said sum of $500.00 I do hereby-release and forever discharge the said The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for all claims and demands of whatsoever kind. Witness my hand and seal this 9th' day of Feby. A. D., 1907.

Witness. R. Dronenburg (Seal) C. W. Egan, Administrator of the estate of Asa I. Harris. E. Gaither Harris.” Said witness further testified that “at the time these releases were executed I paid the money to Mr. Dronenburg (the administrator); it was paid on account of the death of his stepson, Mr. Harris.” The questions asked and the testimony offered in the second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth and tenth exceptions elicited and were