Droney v. Droney

HOLLANDER, Judge. This case presents for our consideration the novel question of whether a mobile home may ever change its character from that of a motor vehicle—an item of personalty—to a fixture upon realty. We answer that it can; whatever the mobile home may once have been, its character was transformed here by the actions of the parties in affixing it to the realty. Based on the undisputed facts of this case, we hold that the mobile home in question lost its vehicular status and became a fixture upon the land when the parties removed its wheels, bolted it to the ground, attached utility lines, and made other significant changes and improvements to it.

Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court’s determination that Mary Ann Droney, appellant, committed a contempt of court by failing to transfer the home to her former husband as part of a divorce settlement. We explain. Factual Summary Ms. Droney and John H. Droney, appellee, married on October 3, 1959. In 1969, the Droneys purchased land in Garrett County, Maryland (the “Property”).

Thereafter, in 1987, they purchased a “double-wide” mobile home, which was financed and subject to a recorded security interest. The ⁶⁷⁶ mobile home was transported to the Property, where the Droneys removed its wheels and bolted it to concrete pilings. The parties made substantial renovations to the mobile home—water, electric, and septic lines were hooked up, gutters and downspouts were attached, a 2,000-pound stone fireplace was installed, new siding was added to the exterior, front and rear decks were built, and shrubs were planted. Although the home apparently was never moved after it was attached to the pilings, the home remained titled as a vehicle with the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”).

On October 3, 1988, Ms. Droney initiated divorce proceedings. By July, 1990, the parties had reached a settlement as to the disposition of their property. Essentially, the parties agreed that Mr. Droney would transfer to Ms. Droney his interest in land located in Baltimore County, which was improved by a house, and Ms. Droney was to transfer her interest in the Property to Mr. Droney, plus $1,000. Accordingly, on January 22, 1991, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Judge H. Kemp McDaniel, presiding) entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce.

The Judgment, after reciting that it had been entered “upon the agreement of the parties,” ordered the parties, inter alia, to transfer to each other the interests each had in certain real estate. It provided as follows: sjc Hi # 2. It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Mary Ann Droney shall deed all of her right, title and interest in and to all real estate owned by the parties in Garrett County, Maryland.... 3. That John H. Droney shall deed unto Mary Ann Droney all of his right, title and interest in and to a parcel of real estate located in Baltimore County, Maryland.... 4.

That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied alimony, past, present and future pursuant to their expressed waivers thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990. ⁶⁷⁷ 5. That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied any marital award pursuant to their expressed waivers thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990. 6. That judgment is granted in favor of John H. Droney against Mary Ann Droney in the amount of $1,000.00. Said payment shall be paid by Mary Ann Droney unto John H. Droney immediately.

(Emphasis added). On November 15, 1991, Ms. Droney signed over to Mr. Droney a deed for the Property. Mr. Droney’s subsequent attempt to transfer the Property to a third party led to his discovery that the home did not fully belong to him. When Mr. Droney sought to close out his outstanding loan and the vendee attempted to secure a mortgage on the Property, the lending banks determined that the “mobile” home remained designated as a vehicle and was still titled in the MVA records in the names of both Mr. and Ms. Droney; only the land itself had been transferred by Ms. Droney.

The banks insisted that Mr. Droney separately transfer his interest in the home to the vendee, to be sure that title to the Property was clear. Mr. Droney then asked Ms. Droney to transfer title to the home to him, based on his understanding of their divorce agreement, but she refused. Because of Ms. Droney’s refusal to transfer title to the home, as well as her failure to pay the $1,000, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Contempt on February 26, 1992. At the contempt hearing on November 18, 1992 (Judge John G. Turnbull, presiding), Ms. Droney argued that the Judgment only obligated her to transfer her interest in the “real estate,” and that the mobile home was a motor vehicle, not “real estate.” There, as here, she contended that the certificate of title for the home, as well as the recorded security interest, conclusively demonstrated that the home was a “vehicle,” and could not be considered part of the “real estate” that she had agreed to transfer.

She also alleged that she was not in contempt for failure to pay the judgment because she did not have the funds to do so. Notwithstanding Ms. Droney’s ⁶⁷⁸ arguments, the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of court for failing to comply fully with the terms of the Judgment. It did not, however, impose a sentence. On December 3, 1992, the court issued an Order (the “1992 Order”), in which the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of the Judgment as to both paragraphs 2 and 6.

Nevertheless, the court declined to impose a sentence. The court said: [The] sentence on the contempt is suspended generally provided that the Defendant, Mary Ann Droney, on or before December 18, 1992 does the following: a. Properly execute an assignment of the ownership of her interest in a 1987 Champion Trailer ... located at 192 East Cumberland Road, Oakland, Garrett County, Maryland, said trailer being specifically found by this Court to be “real estate” within the meaning of paragraph two of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991. [b.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $1,000.00 ordered in paragraph six of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991. [c.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the sum of $500.00 toward counsel fees incurred in this contempt proceeding____ [d.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $25.00 in open costs in this contempt proceeding. (Emphasis added).

On December 7, 1992, Ms. Droney noted an appeal of the 1992 Order. However, this Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the 1992 Order was not final because it did not impose any penalty. Consequently, it was not appealable. Droney v. Droney, 97 Md.App. 755 (1993) (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 61 Md.App. 535, 544-48 , 487 A.2d 680 (1985)).

Accordingly, we declined to consider whether the home was, indeed, “real estate.” Meanwhile, on January 10, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Further Contempt and Execution of Previously Suspended ⁶⁷⁹ Sentence. Also, on April 19, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Request for Garnishment of Property Other Than Wages, asking for garnishment of the $1,525 owed to Mr. Droney under the 1992 Order. On June 18, 1993, the trial court issued the writ, which was subsequently satisfied. 1 On March 9 and 10, 1994, Judge Turnbull heard Mr. Droney’s Petition for Further Contempt. Again, Ms. Droney argued that she could not be in contempt as the Judgment did not order her to transfer anything other than “real estate,” and a vehicle could not constitute real estate.

Rejecting her argument, the court found as follows: It’s obvious from the [JJudgment of [Ajbsolute [DJivorce ... that it was the intent of the parties that Mrs. Droney get [the real estate located in] Baltimore County, Maryland, together with all the improvements thereon, which happens to be a house. It’s also obvious from the other paragraph that Mr. Droney was to get the real estate located in Garrett County, Maryland, together with everything that there was on that particular property. I am absolutely convinced that neither the parties nor the attorneys at the time had any inkling whatsoever that there was some convoluted title floating around for what was once for the purpose of transporting a modular home or a movable home. It is apparent ... that this house has been affixed to this property and is exactly that, it is a house that is affixed to this real estate and it has become part of the real estate and should be transferred as part of the real estate.

Frankly, I don’t think, if the circumstances were somewhat different, any court would have problems whatsoever with a bill to quiet title on the property and that would satisfy the title companies in this particular case. For [Ms. Droney] to come back at this point in time and say: “Oh, I forgot, this is part mine and it’s personal property,” is absolutely ludicrous. ⁶⁸⁰ This time, after again finding Ms. Droney in contempt, the court sentenced Ms. Droney to two years of incarceration, suspending all but one year (the “1994 Order”). The court, however, allowed Ms. Droney to purge the contempt by executing the necessary documents to effectuate transfer of title of the home to Mr. Droney. Soon after being taken from the courtroom by the sheriff, Ms. Droney signed the documents, thereby purging the contempt.

Ms. Droney now appeals from the 1994 Order. Issues Presented Ms. Droney presents five questions for our consideration, which we have re-worded slightly: 1. Did the court err in granting the Petition for Contempt to enforce a disposition of property, where the Court of Appeals has held this could not be done? 2. Did the court err in determining that the trailer home was real property, when it is titled and its transfer is controlled by the Department of Transportation? 3.

Did the court err in construing the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, according to its opinion as to the intent of the parties, where the language of the Judgment is plain and unambiguous? 4. Did the court err in ordering the transfer of ownership of personal property, when transfer is prohibited by Family Law Article, Section 8-202(a)(3)? 5. Did the court err in sentencing the appellant to one year for contempt, and denying her bail, when Md.Rule P5 specifically provides for bail pending appeal? In addition, Mr. Droney asks whether Ms. Droney has timely appealed and whether the issues are now moot.

We hold that the issue of bail is moot. Although Ms. Droney’s remaining issues are appealable and not moot, we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm. ⁶⁸¹ Discussion I. As Mr. Droney’s questions of timeliness and mootness are threshold considerations, we shall address them first. Maryland Rule 8-202(a) requires parties to note any appeals within 30 days of the entry of judgment; the failure to note appeals in a timely manner can be grounds for dismissing an appeal under Rule 8-602(a)(3).

Additionally, this Court may dismiss an appeal if the issues to be considered have become moot. Rule 8-602(a)(10); see also, Potts v. Governor, 255 Md. 445, 449 , 258 A.2d 180 (1969); Washington Homes v. Baggett, 23 Md.App. 167, 171 , 326 A.2d 206 (1974), cert. denied, 273 Md. 723 (1975). Mr. Droney contends that Ms. Droney has only contested the finding of contempt as to the 1992 Order, but has not specifically challenged the 1994 Order. Additionally, he argues that if Ms. Droney wanted to appeal the “real estate” issue, she should have noted her appeal immediately following the entry of the Judgment.

Yet at the time the Judgment was entered, the parties believed they were in agreement. The court had not yet been asked to interpret the Judgment, nor had the court issued an order based on the Judgment. Thus, no issue even existed until the 1992 Order had been entered. Moreover, we previously held that Ms. Droney could not appeal from the 1992 Order, as it was not final.

Only after the court imposed a sentence for the contempt did the 30-day clock begin to run under Rule 8-202(a). Therefore, the contention as to timeliness is without merit. Mr. Droney also insists that when Ms. Droney purged herself of the contempt she rendered all issues moot. “A question is moot if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.” Att’y Gen. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Sch.

Bus Contractors Ass’n., 286 Md. 324, 327 , 407 A.2d 749 (1979); see also, News American Div. v. State, 294 Md. 30, 38-39 , 447 A.2d 1264 (1982). With contempt, however, even if the purge ⁶⁸² cannot be undone, and thus the party held in contempt cannot be made “whole,” the party remains entitled to seek exoneration. Jones v. State, 61 Md.App. 94, 96 , 484 A.2d 1050 (1984) (defendant, who had served the entire contempt sentence, remained entitled to exoneration by having contempt finding set aside). See also, Williams v. Williams, 63 Md.App. 220, 225-26 , 492 A.2d 649 , aff'd, 305 Md. 1 , 501 A.2d 432 (1985) (party wrongfully held in contempt has the right to have the records cleared of the contempt finding, even if in all likelihood no one else would ever know of it).

Even if Ms. Droney cannot recover her interest in the' home, she still may • be entitled to a vacation of the contempt finding. Accordingly, the issues pertaining to the contempt itself, which further involve the question of whether Ms. Droney complied with the Judgment, are not moot. In contrast, we do not agree with Ms. Droney that the issue of bail pending appeal is properly before us. Rule P5 gives an alleged contemnor the same right to bail while awaiting an appeal as an accused in a criminal proceeding, as established under Rule 4-349.

Once Ms. Droney purged herself of the contempt—thus effectuating her release—the establishment of a bail thereafter would have been pointless. Consequently, “there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide,” Sch. Bus Contractors Ass’n., 286 Md. at 327 , 407 A.2d 749 , and the bail issue is thus moot. Even if the issue were not moot, we have repeatedly held, in the context of Rule 4-349, that the denial of bail pending appeal may be attacked only collaterally, by filing a petition for habeas corpus.

See, e.g., Hurley v. State, 59 Md.App. 323, 327 , 475 A.2d 518 (1984); Long v. State, 16 Md.App. 371, 372-73 , 297 A.2d 299 (1972); Lewis v. Warden, 16 Md.App. 339, 341 , 296 A.2d 428 (1972). Accord, Jones v. State, 61 Md.App. at 97-98, 484 A.2d 1050 (after court set no bail pending appeal of contempt finding, Jones did not file habeas corpus petition, and so served her entire contempt sentence). Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of Ms. Droney’s claim as to bail. ⁶⁸³ II. The contempt power is a tool available to a court to compel a person to act or not to act in a specified manner.

Today, contempts are classified as civil or criminal and at least in theory either of these may be direct or constructive .... Historically, criminal contempts were positive acts which offended the dignity or process of the court. Holding an offending party in contempt of court was designed to vindicate the authority and power of the court and punish disobedience to its orders.... Today, the line between civil and criminal contempt is frequently hazy and indistinct____ A civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily made to benefit such parties.

These proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future compliance. Thus, a penalty in a civil contempt must provide for purging. On the other hand, the penalty imposed in a criminal contempt is punishment for past misconduct which may not necessarily be capable of remedy. Therefore, such a penalty does not require a purging provision but may be merely punitive.

In this State, to these factors must be added the degree of proof required to establish a contempt—a civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, while a criminal contempt must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 727-28 , 298 A.2d 867 (1973) (citations omitted). See also, Md.Rule 2-648 (contempt available to enforce judgment prohibiting or mandating action); Rules P1-P5 (contempt proceedings); 17 C.J.S. Contempt §§ 5(1), 6