Dryden v. Hanway

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The only material question for us to decide, from the circumstances of this case is, as to the existence of any such trust, or confidence between the appellant and Franklin Hanway, in regard to the house and lot in question, as a Court of Equity can consider as implied by operation of law, and not in conflict with the Statute of Frauds, the plea of which has been interposed by the appellee. Resulting trusts are saved and -excepted by the 8th section of that Statute; and that parol proof of facts and circumstances may be admitted in equity tb establish such trusts, is fully settled. The answer to the main question involved depends upon the force, effect, and sufficiency of the proof.

If the money advanced by Hanway was on his own account, as a bona fide purchaser of the property, the deed, which was taken in his own name, must have correspondent construction, and wall vest the title to the property in him, according to the terms expressed therein, and ²⁶³ there is no ground for any implied, constructive, or resulting trust. On the contrary, if Hanway did not in truth become the purchaser of the property, and did not mean to buy the same, but merely to advance or loan the money to Hryden, the appellant, the purchase in equity can only be considered as made by Hryden, and the deed, although taken in Ilanway’s name, constitutes him but a trustee for Hryden, the bona fide purchaser, and is only a security for the payment of the loan. Boyd vs. McLean, 1 Johnson’s Ch. Ca ses, 590; McBinney vs. Wildar, 42 Barbour, 402.

The proof in this case very clearly shows that Hryden, the appellant, was the purchaser, in his own name, of the