Duckett v. Touhey

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On August 25, 1976, a decree was filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, in Equity, enjoining the State’s Attorney of that county from summonsing Mrs. Clara Gibson to appear before the Grand Jury, in relation to any statements given by David Allen Barker to her in the presence of Barker’s mother and brother on or about November 6, 1975. Appellant, Warren B. Duckett, State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County, contends in this appeal that the decree should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support it, On November 5, 1975, David Allen Barker was arrested in connection with a homicide investigation and taken to the Millersville Police Headquarters in Anne Arundel County. Because Barker is a deaf mute, the police called Mrs. Clara Gibson, a sign language interpreter, to come to the police station.

The police also called Elliott S. Newcomb, an attorney, to provide Barker with legal assistance. Before Mrs. Gibson had an opportunity to meet or communicate with Barker, she agreed with Newcomb that anything she learned by reason of that employment would be confidential. While Barker was in custody, attorney Newcomb proceeded to confer with him with the assistance of Mrs. Gibson. On November 6, 1975, the suspect’s mother, Mrs. Evelyn Barker, and brother, Barry Barker, were present at the Millersville Police Station with Newcomb and Mrs. Gibson during a conference.

On May 17, 1976, the State’s Attorney caused to be issued a subpoena for the appearance of Mrs. Gibson before the Grand Jury of Anne Arundel County. Upon learning that Mrs. Gibson had been subpoenaed, the appellee, T. Joseph Touhey, who is the public defender for Anne Arundel County, and a subsequent counsel for Barker, together with Newcomb, brought this suit for an injunction and order to quash the subpoena. ²⁴⁰ We are required to reverse the decree because the equity court lacked jurisdiction to issue it. Wilson v. State, 21 Md. App. 557 , 321 A. 2d 549 (1974). Thus, we do not reach the questions whether the communication in the presence of one’s counsel, brother, and mother was confidential or whether Barker’s attorneys, as opposed to Barker himself, are proper parties to seek relief.

Maryland continues to adhere to the distinction between law and equity courts, the Court of Appeals having recognized such distinction as recently as Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54 , 344 A. 2d 422, n. 5 (1975). See also Olson v. Love, 234 Md. 503 , 200 A. 2d 66 (1964) and Dormay Corp. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 152 , 156 A. 2d 632 (1959). In Fooks’ Executors v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612 , 192 A. 782 (1937), Judge T. Scott Offutt gave a thorough discussion of equitable jurisdiction and said in part: “Jurisdiction of the subject-matter means not simply the particular case to which the attention of the court is directed, but the class of cases to which it belongs, and over which the authority of the court extends. Freeman on Judgments, sec. 337.

So if a court of equity tried an indictment for some criminal offense, and entered a judgment and sentence against the defendant, its judgment would necessarily be void, and so perhaps it would be if it assumed jurisdiction of a purely tort action, for, as stated in Freeman on Judgments, sec. 337, p. 676: ‘Courts of equity exercise a well defined jurisdiction over certain classes of matters; a jurisdiction largely inherent in the court although sometimes enlarged or curtailed by statutes. Any attempt by such a court to hear and determine a case not within either its inherent or statutory powers would result in a void decree rendered without