Duvall v. State

GREENE, J. This matter arises from the administrative judge’s denial of defense counsel’s request for a continuance prior to trial because of defense counsel’s conflict of interest. Juwaughn Alexander Duvall (“Petitioner”) was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, after a jury trial, of first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, and first degree assault. We conclude that a conflict of interest existed in this case. Petitioner denied the charges filed against him.

He informed his defense counsel that another individual, who was represented by the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender, on unrelated charges, was in fact responsible for the crimes for which Petitioner had been charged. Because there existed a conflict of interest and defense counsel requested a ²¹⁴ continuance prior to trial, the administrative judge erred, as a matter of law, in failing to grant the postponement to allow defense counsel a reasonable time to resolve the conflict. Petitioner is therefore entitled to a reversal of his convictions and a new trial. Because of this holding, we need not address the propriety of the trial court’s actions during the trial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND For approximately one year, Alidad Chacon had been selling marijuana from the basement of a house that he shared with his mother, sister, and nephew in Montgomery County, Maryland. He stored the marijuana in a safe behind a curtain in his bedroom, which was located in the basement, and sold the marijuana only to close friends. In June, 2003, two men broke into the house with the intent to steal the marijuana. Chacon’s nephew, Ruben Mesones, saw the intruders when he went to the laundry room in the basement of the house.

Mesones described one of the men as bald or nearly bald, approximately 5'6" tall, in his 20s, and wearing a camouflage mask, camouflage gloves, and a black t-shirt. At trial, Mesones identified this man as Petitioner. The other man was taller, heavier, had darker skin and was wearing a “do-rag” and a cap. The man wearing the mask tried to throw Mesones down on the ground so Mesones shouted to his aunt to call the police.

When trying to stand up, Mesones was hit on the head twice with a gun by the man wearing the cap. The man with the cap broke down Chacon’s door, pointed a gun at him, and asked where the safe was, while the man with the mask ran upstairs. Chacon subsequently opened the safe. The man with the cap took the contents of the safe — a digital scale and approximately two ounces of marijuana — and fled into the yard through the basement door.

Mesones chased after the man with the mask and caught him on the stairs. Mesones’s aunt helped Mesones restrain the individual and then removed his mask. The man exclaimed that he knew them. Mesones’s aunt told Mesones to ²¹⁵ let the man go and the man ran out the front door.

Mesones and his aunt went to a police officer’s house who lived nearby and described to the officer the man with the mask. The officer called the police station and the aunt told the 911 operator that she knew the name of the man with the mask because he was the father of her friend’s baby; she identified him as Petitioner. The aunt explained that she had met him only once, at a nightclub, a few years prior and had photographs from that night. She showed the photographs to the police.

Chacon told the police that this was not the first time that someone had stolen drugs from him. He explained that Adam Muse, an acquaintance who was familiar with the safe and its contents, had stolen the drugs from Chacon’s bedroom on an earlier occasion. Chacon, Mesones, and Mesones’s aunt, who also knew Muse, claimed that Muse was not the man in the mask on the night in question. Petitioner was arrested on August 25, 2003 and was interrogated by the police.

He asked why he was arrested and thought that it was because he owed $12,000 in child support. Petitioner’s mother testified that Petitioner and his friend had driven from Virginia to Germantown, Maryland to help her move into her new home on the date of the incident. She testified that they were with her all day and, further, that her son had never shaved his head bald. Petitioner was represented by an attorney from the Office of the Public Defender located in Montgomery County.

His counsel’s theory was that Petitioner was not the man with the mask who broke into Chacon’s home, but that Muse was that man. Petitioner argued that he was not at the scene of the crime and that it was a case of mistaken identity. Further, he asserted that Muse fit the physical description that Mesones had given of the man in the mask, had committed a similar crime at that exact location on a previous occasion, and had knowledge of the marijuana in the basement safe. In addition, Petitioner is approximately 6 feet tall, while Muse is approximately 5'6" tall. ²¹⁶ When Petitioner’s attorney learned that Muse was being represented by another attorney from the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender in a pending robbery case, she filed a motion for a continuance with the court, on January 15, 2004, more than two months in advance of the 180 day deadline. 1 The administrative judge denied the written motion on January 23, 2004.

The motion was renewed on the scheduled trial date, January 27, 2004. At the hearing before the administrative judge on that date, defense counsel explained that she filed the motion for a continuance “for the purpose of securing a panel attorney to represent [Petitioner] and that a Status Conference be set to set a trial date.” 2 At the hearing, defense counsel stated to the judge that “[t]he problem arises, Your Honor, in the fact that my office repre ²¹⁷ sents both [Petitioner] at this time and a man named Adam M[use].” Defense counsel explained that the case was one of mistaken identity and that Adam Muse is very possibly the man who actually committed the crimes, not Petitioner. Defense counsel then explained the nature of the conflict. She said: My office represents Mr. M[use].

Therefore, I could not ask — [sic] Ron Gottlieb represents him for a trial that’s set next week. I could not ask for permission to speak with him because even doing that would be a conflict. I could not review our file on the case because that would be a conflict. I could not review the picture of Mr. M[use] in our file because that would be a conflict, and I could not in any way talk with Mr. M[use].

I’m not saying Mr. M[use] would absolutely talk to me in this case. Obviously, he could decide not to. But I hadn’t, I don’t even have the opportunity to ask him. I very infrequently in 11 years have thought that something was a conflict.

There are people I know who find conflicts out of nothing. I don’t. The administrative judge denied the continuance. She stated: Okay.

Well, this is why I ruled that way. Your trial is first ... If there’s a conflict, then Mr. Gottlieb can move to continue M[use]’s case and remove himself from that case[ 3 ] .... But I don’t want to get into Catch-22 [sic] where you both point fingers at the other — and both try to move cases....

Petitioner’s attorney then reiterated that she felt there existed a conflict of interest. The administrative judge asked Petitioner whether he wanted the case continued. Petitioner explained that he did not want a continuance and would proceed without counsel because he has five children and “a good job waiting on [him].” He stated that he was “ready to go without counsel” because he knew where he was on the ²¹⁸ date in question. The judge asked Petitioner whether he understood the charges against him and he explained that he did.

The judge announced the charges and their mandatory sentences and Petitioner again explained that he understood the charges. He stated, however, that he did not understand “all these postponements and continuances.” The court thereafter told Petitioner that his attorney was requesting a continuance to talk to someone who she felt she could not speak to because someone in her office represented him in another case. The State argued that defense counsel’s request for a continuance was improper and not relevant to the case. The State explained that each witness would testify that Muse was not the man in the house and argued that defense counsel was therefore making a “last-second attempt to get a postponement.” The administrative judge responded by stating: Well, I think [defense counsel] is doing what she is supposed to do, and that’s zealously represent the interests of her client.

She has made her motion and this, [sic] basically she is renewing it today on the day of trial. I’m going to deny the motion to continue. She is still counsel of record, and I’ll find out who is available and send you for trial. Petitioner’s attorney again renewed her motion before the judge assigned to preside at Petitioner’s trial.

The trial judge denied defense counsel’s motion for a continuance. 4 The trial proceeded and, after a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weap ²¹⁹ on, and first degree assault. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. Thereafter, Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent 10-year term of imprisonment for each of his convictions. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted. 5 Duvall v. State, 395 Md. 420 , 910 A.2d 1061 (2006). DISCUSSION We conclude that a conflict of interest existed and, therefore, the administrative judge erred, as a matter of law, when she denied defense counsel’s motion for a continuance. Because of our holding, we need to answer only Petitioner’s first question.

We therefore address only the parties’ arguments that deal specifically with that question. Petitioner argues that “[b]y forcing defense counsel to go to trial while she was laboring under a conflict of interest which prevented her from zealously representing her client, the Circuit Court denied [Petitioner] his right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Petitioner contends that because the theory of his case was that Adam Muse committed the robbery and not Petitioner, and because Muse was being represented by another public ²²⁰ defender from the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender at the time of Petitioner’s trial, there existed a conflict of interest in his case. According to Petitioner, the administrative judge should have granted his attorney’s motion for a continuance because of the existence of this conflict. Petitioner argues that he is, therefore, entitled to a new trial.

The State counters that Petitioner’s argument is without merit because there did not exist a conflict in this case. The State contends that there is no conflict because the State’s witnesses all explained that, if called to testify, they would state that they knew Adam Muse and that Muse was not present during the robbery in question. In addition, according to the State, there was no conflict because Muse was not a co-defendant, not the State’s witness, and was not involved in Petitioner’s case, other than the fact that Petitioner wrote Muse’s name on his proposed witness list for purposes of voir dire. The State avers, therefore, that the administrative judge properly denied the motion for a continuance.

Moreover, the State contends that because Petitioner elicited evidence concerning Muse during trial and attempted to shift the blame to Muse during closing arguments, Petitioner’s defense was not impaired. We agree with Petitioner that his counsel’s predicament created an actual conflict of interest and that, therefore, the administrative judge should have granted defense counsel’s motion for a continuance. Because defense counsel’s theory at trial was that Muse was the perpetrator of the robbery, rather than Petitioner, and because Muse was being represented by an attorney who also worked in the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender, there existed, at the very least, a strong potential for a conflict of interest; we believe, however, in this case, that an actual conflict of interest existed. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to a new trial and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Free from Conflicts “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu ²²¹ tion 6 and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 7 as a safeguard necessary to ensure fundamental human rights of life and liberty, guarantee to any criminal defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel.” Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 33, 746 A.2d 392, 396 (2000). The Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984) (citations omitted); accord Mosley v. State, 378 Md. 548, 557 , 836 A.2d 678, 683 (2003); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440 , 509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986). “This right has been accorded, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] said, ‘not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.’ ” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 300 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 667 (1984)). Moreover, in Austin v. State, 327 Md. 375, 381 , 609 A.2d 728, 730-31 (1992), we stated that “[t]he constitutional right to counsel, under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, includes the right to have counsel’s representation free from conflicts of interest.” (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 , 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103 , 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230 (1981)); accord Lettley, 358 Md. at 34 , 746 A.2d at 396 ; Graves v. State, 94 Md.App. 649, 656 , 619 A.2d 123, 126 (1993). Furthermore, “[a] defense attorney’s representation must be untrammeled and unimpaired, unrestrained by commitments to others; counsel’s loyalty must be undivid ²²² ed, leaving counsel free from any conflict of interest.” Lettley, 358 Md. at 34 , 746 A.2d at 396 .

The Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility also prohibit attorneys from representing a client if that representation involves a conflict of interest. 8 To establish a violation of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both that his or her attorney’s representation was deficient and that he or she was prejudiced as a result of that deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 . We have explained, however, that: A narrow exception to the Strickland standard exists where defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is based on a conflict of interest.... In addressing an ineffective assistance claim alleging conflict of interest, we do not apply the Strickland two-pronged test but rather a more lenient standard that does not require a showing of prejudice.

Lettley , 358 Md. at 31—35, 746 A.2d at 397 . In Lettley, 358 Md. at 35-39 , 746 A.2d at 397-99 , we outlined the three significant Supreme Court cases regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from conflicts of interest. Writing for the majority, Judge Raker explained: ²²³ In Glasser, which is sometimes referred to as the watershed conflict of interest case, the Supreme Court, in the context of co-defendants, reversed Glasser’s conviction primarily on the grounds that Glasser’s counsel “struggle[d] to serve two masters” because his conflict of interest violated Glasser’s right to effective assistance of counsel. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75, 62 S.Ct. 457 .

The Court noted that the possibility of the inconsistent interests of Glasser and the co-defendant was “brought home” to the court, but instead of jealously guarding Glasser’s rights, the court created the conflict by appointing, over objection, counsel with conflicting interests, thereby depriving Glasser of his right to have the benefit of undivided assistance of counsel. See id. at 71, 62 S.Ct. 457 . As to Glasser’s prejudice, the Court said: To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court’s appointment of Stewart as counsel for [a co-defendant] is at once difficult an d unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.

Id. at 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457 . In Holloway, again in the context of co-defendants at trial, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that counsel’s conflict of interest deprived the defendants of effective assistance of counsel. Three defendants were on trial for robbery and rape, in a consolidated trial. Defense counsel asked the court before trial to appoint separate counsel for the three defendants, the request based on the defendants’ statements to him that there was a possibility of a conflict of interest in each of their cases.

The trial court denied defendants’ requests and the case proceeded to trial. All three defendants were convicted. The Supreme Court noted that trial counsel, as an officer of the court, alerted the court to the conflict, and focused explicitly on the probable risk of a conflict of interests. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173 .

The trial court, however, “failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps ²²⁴ to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” Id. The Court held that this “failure, in the face of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was empaneled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of ‘assistance of counsel.’ ” Id. Recognizing that joint representation is not per se violative of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, the Court nonetheless said that “since the decision in Glasser , most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding conflict of interests, should be granted.” Id. at 485 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . Turning to the question of proof of prejudice, the Holloway Court concluded that prejudice is presumed, regardless of whether it was shown independently.

See id. at 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173 . The Court “read the Court’s opinion in Glasser ... as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.” Id. at 488 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . The Court recognized that joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing, and that a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict, which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objection, prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application. See id. at 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173 .

Again rejecting a harmless error standard, the Court said: But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And ²²⁵ to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.

Id. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173 . Two years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the conflict of interest issue, in Cuyler. In Cuyler, the potential conflict of interest was not brought to the trial court’s attention. Three co-defendants were jointly represented by two attorneys.

Sullivan did not object to the multiple representation until after he was convicted and he moved for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In establishing a standard to be applied to cases in which the potential conflict is not brought to the trial court’s attention, the Supreme Court held that “in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (emphasis added). In this context, “the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 . Commenting on Glasser , the Court held: Glasser established that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error.

Once the Court concluded that Glasser’s lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it refused to “indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice” attributable to the conflict. The conflict itself demonstrated a denial of the “right to have the effective assistance of counsel.” 315 U.S. at 76 , 62 S.Ct. at 467 . Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. But until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. ²²⁶ 446 U.S. at 349-50 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

Contrary to the resolution in Holloway , Sullivan, who did not object before trial, was required to show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. To date the Supreme Court has never squarely resolved the question of whether proof of an adverse effect of a conflict of interest is required to reverse a conviction. See e.g., Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1043 , 110 S.Ct. 1506 , 108 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Numerous cases in other jurisdictions addressing conflict of interest conclude, however, that the time at which a conflict of interest, or a potential one, is raised and is brought to the court’s attention governs how this issue is to be treated.

See, e.g., Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir.1994); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir.1992); People v. Burchette, 257 Ill.App.3d 641 , 628 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 , 195 Ill.Dec. 550 (1994); State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149, 1153 (La.1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 880 , 113 S.Ct. 231 , 121 L.Ed.2d 167 (1992); State v. Marshall, 414 So.2d 684, 687 (La.1982); State v. Lemon, 698 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La.Ct.App.1997); State v. Dillman, 70 Ohio App.3d 616 , 591 N.E.2d 849 , 852 n. 1 (1990). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.2, at 414 (1986) (“The different, and lesser, showing that obtained reversal in Holloway depended on the lawyer’s trial objection there.”). The cases reason that when a possible conflict exists, but the trial court is not advised of the conflict in a timely manner, the Cuyler standard applies. In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.

On the other hand, when the defendant advises the trial court of the possibility of a conflict of interest, the Glasser/Holloway standard applies. “[A] court confronted with and alerted to possible conflicts of interest must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel.” Wheat v. United States, 486 ²²⁷ U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The trial court is required to “either appoint separate counsel, or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 . If the trial court fails to take “adequate steps” or improperly requires joint or dual representation, then reversal is automatic, without a shoving of prejudice, or adverse effect upon the representation. After this Court’s decision in Lettley , the Supreme Court decided Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002).

In Mickens , the Supreme Court evaluated, with regards to the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, whether the criminal defendant was entitled to the automatic reversal of a conviction when the trial judge failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. The Court reviewed its prior decisions and explained, as the State points out, that Holloway “creates an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent eo[ defendants over his [or her] timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 , 122 S.Ct. at 1241-42 , 152 L.Ed.2d. at 302. The Supreme Court also explained, however, that for Sixth Amendment purposes, “ ‘an actual conflict of interest,’ mean[s] precisely a conflict that ajfect[s] counsel’s performance — as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 , 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. at 1243 , 1244 n. 5, 152 L.Ed.2d. at 304, 304 n. 5. The Court ultimately held that the criminal defendant had to establish that the potential conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance before he would be entitled to reversal. 9 This last principle is essential to our analysis of the case sub judice, as we have determined that an actual conflict of interest existed. ²²⁸ This Court addressed ineffectiveness of counsel due to a conflict of interest in Austin, 327 Md. at 381 -82 n. 1, 609 A.2d at 731 n. 1, infra.

We stated that: “In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance____One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345-50 , 100 S.Ct. at 1716-19 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 343-47 , the [Supreme] Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.

In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 ). We shall discuss Austin in more detail, below.

Conflicts within the Office of the Public Defender The case sub judice involves two attorneys from the same district office 10 of the Public Defender, representing two different defendants (not co-defendants). While this Court has never constructed a bright line rule as to conflicts of interest within public defenders’ offices, it has examined con ²²⁹ flicts of interest within private law firms. 11 In Austin, 327 Md. at 381 , 609 A.2d at 730 , two attorneys from the same private law office were representing two co-defendants. As in the case sub judice, we examined “whether defense counsel labored under such a conflict of interest that the defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel was violated.” We explained that “[t]he cases which have considered the issue have generally concluded that representation of co[-]defendants by partners or associates in a private law firm should be treated the same, for purposes of conflict of interest analysis, as representation of co[-]defendants by one attorney.” Austin, 327 Md. at 383 , 609 A.2d at 732 . We concluded that “the potential for a conflict of interest is present whenever co[-]defendants are represented by the same lawyer or by lawyers who are associated in practice.” Austin, 327 Md. at 385 , 609 A.2d at 733 .

We declined, however, to examine in Austin whether public defender offices were considered private law firms for purposes of such conflicts of interest analyses. We explained that “[w]ith regard to public defender offices, there appears to be some disagreement among the cases as to whether, and to what extent, a public defender’s office is to be viewed like a single private law firm for purposes of applying conflict of interest principles... .We have no occasion in the instant case to explore this matter.” Austin, 327 Md. at 384 -85 n. 3, 609 A.2d at 732 -33 n. 3. This Court has, therefore, never before resolved whether general conflict of interest principles apply, as a per se rule, to the representation of individuals with adverse interests within the same public defender district office. ²³⁰ The Court of Special Appeals did confront this issue, however, in Graves v. State, 94 Md.App. 649, 654-56 , 619 A.2d 123, 126 (1993), rev’d on other grounds, 334 Md. 30 , 637 A.2d 1197 (1994). Graves was charged with assault and attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon.

A man named Trusty was a co-defendant in the case. Both men were represented by assistant public defenders from the same district office of the Office of the Public Defender. Graves filed a motion for a mistrial and motion to strike the appearance of