Duvall v. State

Murphy, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 2, 1968 appellant was indicted for feloniously escaping on May 25, 1965 from the Central Laundry Corree ⁴⁸⁶ tional Camp, a place of confinement within this State. Counsel was appointed to represent him and on March 12, 1968 appellant was arraigned, at which time he pleaded guilty to the offense, and was sentenced to three years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction, to run consecutively with the term of imprisonment he was then serving. He contends on this appeal that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered.

The record discloses that at his arraignment the trial judge asked appellant (a) whether he was satisfied with the services rendered by his court-appointed attorney, (b) whether there was anything that “you’ve asked that he hasn’t done,” and (c) whether he has “done anything you didn’t want him to do.” After appellant responded in the affirmative to the first question and in negative to the other questions, the indictment was read to him and he was asked to plead to the charge. He personally responded, “guilty, Sir.” He was then asked whether he desired trial by court or by jury and his attorney, on his behalf, stated that he wished trial before the court. The State’s Attorney then made a statement indicating appellant’s guilt of the offense charged in the indictment, after which he called a witness on behalf of the State who, without objection by the appellant, advised the court of appellant’s criminal record. The appellant, through counsel, then made a statement to the court in mitigation of punishment.

At the conclusion of these proceedings, the court found appellant guilty and passed sentence. It is well settled that a plea of guilty may be entered under circumstances showing a voluntary desire on the part of the accused to do so, with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty and the possible consequences of such a plea; and the acceptance of a guilty plea entered under such circumstances will not be set aside on appeal. Wayne v. State, 4 Md. App. 424 , and cases cited at page 429. Contrariwise, an appeal will lie, even after a plea of guilty has been entered, where it is alleged that the plea was not voluntarily and freely made, Hamilton v. Warden, 214 Md. 633 , Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1 ; and while it was formerly the law that a plea of guilty by a defendant represented by counsel and capable of participating in his own defense was accepted almost ⁴⁸⁷ as a matter of course (see Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248 ), in James v. State, 242 Md. 424 , it was held that the voluntary nature of a defendant’s plea must he clearly established prior to the court’s acceptance of it, and that although no specific ritual need be followed by the trial judge, he must satisfy himself of the voluntary character of the guilty plea and of the fact that the defendant understands its nature and effect.

In Owens v. State, 243 Md. 719, 721 , it was held that the accused who desires to plead guilty must, prior to the court’s acceptance of such a plea, be advised either by the court or by his own attorney, “of the nature of the charges against him and of the consequences of a plea of guilty.” While it is clear that the indictment charging the crime of escape under Section 139 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code was read in full to the appellant at the arraignment, and that it is a crime relatively simple of understanding, the record