Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate Co.

BELL, Chief Judge. The issue that we resolve in this opinion is the applicability to a leasing agent or real estate broker of Maryland’s Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Cum. Supp.) § 6-801(o) of the Environment Article. 1 Consistent with the conclusions reached by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and the Court of Special Appeals, see Dyer, et al. v. Criegler, et al., 142 Md.App. 109 , 788 A.2d 227 (2002), we shall hold that a leasing agent or real estate broker, who neither owns, holds or controls the rental property, is not an ⁵⁷⁹ “owner” as defined in § 6 801(o). 2 Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgments of those courts.

I. Sheree Dyer, the petitioner, is the mother and next friend of her minor child Erielle 3 T. Wallace, on whose behalf this action was brought. Marilyn M. Gibson and Eva Criegler are the owners of # 3408 Springdale Avenue. Otis Warren Real Estate Co. (sometimes referred to as “Otis Warren”), the respondent, was the “leasing agent” or “real estate broker” for those premises, which it leased to Henry Goodall and Rosallee Goodall, Erielle Wallace’s grandparents. From approximately December 1997 until December 1998, Erielle Wallace resided at # 3408 Springdale Avenue with her mother and grandparents.

It is alleged that, during this time and at the leased premises, Erielle Wallace was exposed to, and injured by, lead based paint. The petitioner filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Criegler, Gibson 4 and the respondent Otis War ⁵⁸⁰ ren, alleging that Erielle Wallace suffered damages from lead paint poisoning and seeking damages for negligence and violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Maryland Code (1975, 1992 Replacement Volume, 2001 Cumulative Supplement), Title 13 of the Commercial Law Article. Otis Warren filed a motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b) 5 to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Circuit Court granted that motion and ruled, as a matter of law, that neither the Lead Paint Act nor the Consumer Protection Act placed a duty on Otis Warren, whose sole responsibility was to provide a tenant for the landlord.

It reasoned that, “it would be unreasonable to incorporate brokers into that definition [of owner] when the broker’s responsibility ceases at the time that he fulfills [t]he contractual obligation.” The petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court “agree[d] with appellee and the circuit court that the Lead Paint Act’s definition of an ‘owner’ must be read as a whole, meaning that only a leasing agent who owns, holds, or controls at least part of the property in question constitutes an ‘owner’.” 142 Md.App. at 119 , 788 A.2d at 233-34 (2002). 6 Since this case is about the meaning and, thus, the effect, of § 6-801(o), it is governed by well settled canons of statutory construction. The goal with which we approach the ⁵⁸¹ interpretation of a statute is to determine the intention of the Legislature in enacting it. The rules governing the conduct of that search are well settled and have been stated by this Court on many occasions.

In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore et al. v. Chase et al. 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000) (quoting Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578-79 , 683 A.2d 512, 517-18 (1996)), this Court said, on the subject: “[WJe begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent rules [of statutory construction]. Of course, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993). To this end, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also.

Oaks, supra, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Buckman, supra, 333 Md. at 523 , 636 A.2d at 451 ; Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491 , 632 A.2d at 755 ; Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145-46 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). “Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,’ Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491 , 632 A.2d at 755 , nor may it construe the statute with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.’ Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). Moreover, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Buckman, supra, 333 Md. at 524 , 636 A.2d at 452 ; Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491 , 632 A.2d at 755 .” We have also recognized that a statute whose terms are unambiguous when considered by itself, may be rendered ambiguous when viewed in light of a related statute or when it ⁵⁸² is part of a larger statutory scheme.

Chase, supra, 360 Md. at 130 , 756 A.2d at 992 . The application of these canons to the interpretation of the statute at issue produces a clear, logical and predictable result. The definition of “owner” is clear and unambiguous. The statute limits the definition of “owner” to one that owns, holds, or controls at least part of the property.

That becomes clear when all three of § 6-801 (o)’s subsections are read together and it is understood how they relate to each other. The first subsection, § 6-801(o)(l), sets out the general definition of “owner”: “a person, firm, corporation, guardian, conservator, receiver, trustee, executor, or legal representative who, alone or jointly or severally with others, owns, holds, or controls the whole or any part of the freehold or leasehold interest to any property, with or without actual possession.” The critical aspect of the definition is that an “owner” must either “own, hold, or control” at least part of the property. Accordingly, under this definition, an individual can only be classified as an “owner” when that individual owns, holds or controls the property, or a part of it, at issue. The second subsection, § 6-801(o)(2), provides guidance as to whom the term, “owner,” as defined by § 6 — 801(o)(l) includes.

It does so by giving examples of interests in property short of legal or equitable title that, for purposes of the statute, are treated as ownership: a vendee in possession of the property and an authorized agent of the owner, “including a property manager or leasing agent.” It does not expand the definition of “owner” set out in subsection (o)(l), which it easily could have done by adding additional wording, such as: “whether or not the authorized agent owns, holds, or controls the whole or any part of the freehold or leasehold interest to any property, with or without actual possession” to the end of § 6-801(o)(2). The third subsection, § 6-801(o)(3), provides: “ ‘[ojwner’ does not include: (i)[a] trustee or a beneficiary under a deed of trust or a mortgagee; or (ii)[t]he owner of a reversionary ⁵⁸³ interest under a ground rent lease.” This Court has acknowledged that “ ‘The terms ‘owner’ and ‘owning’ depend somewhat for their signification upon the connection in which they are used. ‘To own’ is defined, ‘to hold as property; to have a legal or rightful title to; to have; to possess.’ And an owner is ‘one who owns; a rightful proprietor.’ An owner is not necessarily one owning the fee-simple, or one having in the property the highest estate it will admit of. One having a lesser estate may be an owner, and, indeed, there may be different estates in the same property, vested in different persons, and each be an owner thereof.’ ” Weinberg v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R. (Co.), 200 Md. 160, 166 , 88 A.2d 575, 577-78 (1952), quoting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Walker, 45 Ohio St. 577 , 16 N.E. 475 (1888).

Thus, we have held that “at law the mortgagee is the owner of the property even if equity does for certain purposes treat him as merely having a lien on the land.” Mayor & City Council of Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560, 563 , 61 A. 467, 468 (1905) (condemnation). See Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 198 , 265 A.2d 748, 751 (1970) (same). See also IA Construction Corp. v. Carney, 341 Md. 703, 716-17 , 672 A.2d 650, 657 (1996) (“ ‘[A]s a consequence of the influence of equity upon law, the mortgagor, while in possession and before default, is now at law regarded as the substantial owner of the property against everybody, except the mortgagee.’ ‘?(quoting Judge Eli Frank, in his work, Title to Real and Leasehold Estates and Liens (1912)); Brittingham v. The Tugboat Underwriting Syndicate, 262 Md. 134, 142 , 277 A.2d 8, 12 (1971). Similarly, in Moran v. Hammersla, 188 Md. 378, 381-82 , 52 A.2d 727, 728 (1947), this court referred to the holder of a ground rent lease as the owner of the land that leases it to the lessee for a certain period.

This subsection consequently is a restriction on the definition of ownership, excluding interests in real property that, in the past and in other contexts, were classified by this Court as “ownership.” Clearly, aware that these classes of persons have been classified as “owners” in the past, the Legislature did not want to ⁵⁸⁴ expose them to liability even though they own, hold or control the property.

II

The petitioner has a different interpretation of § 6-801(o). It is that a “leasing agent,” without regard to control or actual ownership, is, by definition, pursuant to § 6-801(o)(2), an “owner.” She submits that, because it is undisputed that the respondent was a leasing agent and, therefore, falls within the definition of “owner,” the trial court “added a requirement not found in the statute that a leasing agent exercise a particular degree of control before liability may be found that the tenant’s case was dismissed.” (The petitioner’s brief at 7). 7 Furthermore, the Petitioner argues, requiring a leasing agent, or the other persons identified in § 6-801 (o) (2), to own, hold or control the property at issue renders that section superfluous or redundant. Additionally, the petitioner argues that § 6-801(o)(3) 8 excludes only certain individuals and, therefore, all other groups are deliberately left covered. The viability of the petitioner’s interpretation depends upon reading each of § 6-801(o)’s subsections separately and without reference to each other.

All of her arguments essentially ignore § 6-801(o)(l). They are based on reading § 6-801(o)(2)(ii) 9 out of context, as if it were a definition of “owner” ⁵⁸⁵ unto itself and not just a part of one. As we have pointed out, for the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, consistent with the requirement of the rules of construction that the statute be read in context, there would need to be additional language added to § 6-801(o)(2) indicating that any authorized agent or leasing agent is always to be considered an “owner.” The Legislature did not include any such language, signaling that it intended for the persons listed in subsection (o)(2)(ii) to be considered “owners” only when they satisfy the requirements set out in subsection (o)(l). Any other interpretation would arbitrarily hold property managers and leasing agents to a higher standard than that to which actual owners of the property are held.

In fact, the interpretation advocated by the petitioner could extend to any “authorized agent of the landlord” even if not associated in any way with the property. Clearly, this would lead to an illogical result. Our interpretation is further supported by the fact that § 6-801 (o) has a third subsection that excludes certain classes of persons that otherwise would satisly the first subsection. That subsection, too, must be read in context with the other two subsections.

As the respondent correctly states, and we have seen, the categories excluded in § 6-801(o)(3), mortgage holders and ground rent holders, are technically “owners” of an interest in the property because they hold a security interest for a loan or debt. The Legislature obviously excluded these classes of persons because even though they technically satisfy § 6-801(o)(l)’s definition of “owner,” the Legislature did not want to expose them to liability because it does not comport with the Act’s purpose “... to reduce the incidence of childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the stock of available affordable rental housing.” § 6-802. The trial court did not add any requirement on its own; rather, it simply read and applied the plain wording of the statute. Petitioner argues that when the legislative history is considered, it is apparent that § 6-801(o) applies to all leasing agents even if they do not own, hold or control the property. ⁵⁸⁶ This court has addressed the use of legislative history in the following manner: “[o]ur cases indicate that even when the language of 'a statute is free from ambiguity, ‘in the interest of completeness we may, and sometimes do, explore the legislative history of the statute under review.

Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). We do so, however, to look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account. Id. In other words, the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.

See Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546 , 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977) (‘a court may not as a general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not made by the