Dykes v. State

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned. The issue on this appeal relates to the duty of a judge presiding at the trial of a criminal cause to instruct the jury. ²⁰⁹ The instructions involved touch on the felony of murder, the mitigating doctrine of self-defense (both perfect and imperfect), the evidence adduced, the authority of the judge, and the function of the jury. Statement of the Case Jon Carlton Dykes was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Somerset County of murder in the second degree. He appealed from the judgment entered on the conviction.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Dykes v. State, No. 1716, September Term, 1988, filed 7 July 1989, unreported. We granted a petition for certiorari submitted by his attorney, an assistant public defender. 1 Murder Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being. It is culpable when it is felonious, and it is felonious when it is not justifiable or excusable.

State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 194 , 396 A.2d 1041 (1978). In order for the trier of fact to convict an accused of a crime, the evidence must be legally sufficient to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged and the criminal agency of the accused. In other words, the evidence must establish, under the reasonable doubt test, that the crime was committed and that the accused committed it. Dykes went to trial on a criminal information which charged that he “did feloniously, wilfully, deliberately and maliciously kill and murder Dwight Lee Landon.” Under this charge, the jury could have acquitted Dykes or could have convicted him of 1) murder in the first degree; or 2) murder in the second degree; or 3) manslaughter.

Id. at 200-201 , 396 A.2d 1041 . The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. ²¹⁰ In the petition we granted, Dykes does not dispute that the manner of Landon’s death was homicide and that the cause of death was multiple stab wounds. 2 Nor does he claim that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a conviction of murder in the second degree. And he does not deny that he was the person who inflicted the wounds resulting in Landon’s death. But he contends that the judgment must be reversed because the jury was not made aware, even if it found that he committed the homicide, that he would not be culpable at all if it found he killed Landon in perfect self-defense, and that he would be culpable only for the crime of manslaughter if the jury found that the killing was committed in imperfect self-defense.

In the former event, he suggests the verdict would properly be not guilty; in the latter event, the verdict would properly be guilty of manslaughter, not murder. The contention arises from the refusal of the trial judge to grant Dykes’s request that the jury be instructed as to perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense. Self-Defense Dykes’s view of the doctrines of perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense is not adverse to the letter of the law. (1) Perfect Self-Defense Homicide committed in perfect self-defense is either ²¹¹ justifiable or excusable. 3 When the defense is established, the killer is not culpable.

Perfect self-defense operates as a complete defense to either murder or manslaughter. A successful [perfect] self-defense, therefore, results in the acquittal of the defendant. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984). In Faulkner , Judge Cole, writing for the Court, set out the requirements for a person to be found not culpable when acting in perfect self-defense in committing a homicide: (1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant; (2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger; (3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and (4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded.

Id. at 485-486 , 483 A.2d 759 . See cases cited therein at 486, 483 A.2d 759 . (2) Imperfect Self-Defense The Court of Special Appeals discussed imperfect self-defense in Faulkner v. State, 54 Md.App. 113, 114-115 , 458 A.2d 81 (1983), aff'd, State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984). The court observed: From the turbulent waters of the criminal law of Maryland, roiled by the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 ²¹² U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 508 ] (1975), emerged an esoteric qualification to the doctrine of self-defense, known as the “imperfect right of self-defense.” We noticed it in Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 658, n. 4 , 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197 , 362 A.2d 629 (1976), recognized it in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33, 40-45 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976), mentioned it in Wentworth v. State, 29 Md.App. 110, 120-121 , 349 A.2d 421 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 735 (1976), and applied it in Law v. State, 29 Md.App. 457, 463-465 , 349 A.2d 295 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 726 (1976).

In its Faulkner, the intermediate appellate court confirmed its adoption of the doctrine and again applied it, but noted that “[t]he Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the matter.” Id. at 115, 458 A.2d 81 . We “addressed the matter” on our review of the Court of Special Appeals’ Faulkner by way of certiorari. We first noted that “[i]mperfect self-defense, by contrast [with perfect self-defense], is not a complete defense.” 301 Md. at 486 , 483 A.2d 759 . We explained that “[i]ts chief characteristic is that it operates to negate malice, an element the State must prove to establish murder.” Id.

As a result, the successful invocation of this doctrine does not completely exonerate the defendant, but mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter. Id. We recognized that “[i]mperfect self-defense ... is different from either [perfect] self-defense or the commonly recognized mitigation defenses [such as heat of passion which provokes a homicide].” Id. We traced the history and development of the imperfect self-defense doctrine and explored the various views with respect to the standard for applying it.

Id. at 486-499 , 483 A.2d 759 . We settled on “the honest but unreasonable belief standard of imperfect self-defense” as “the proper one to be followed in Maryland.” Id. at 499-500 , 483 A.2d 759 . We quoted with approval, id. at 500 , 483 A.2d 759 , the Court of Special Appeals’ Faulkner, 54 Md.App. at 115 , 458 A.2d 81 , as ²¹³ articulating the ingredients of the defense under that standard as distinguished from perfect self-defense: “Perfect self-defense requires not only that the killer subjectively believed that his actions were necessary for his safety but, objectively, that a reasonable man would so consider them. Imperfect self-defense, however, requires no more than a subjective honest belief on the part of the killer that his actions were necessary for his safety, even though, on an objective appraisal by a reasonable man, they would not be found to be so.

If established, the killer remains culpable and his actions are excused only to the extent that mitigation is invoked.” We agreed that this statement represents an analytically sound view, and reflects the position taken by a majority of those jurisdictions that have addressed and embraced this defense. Faulkner, 301 Md. at 500 , 483 A.2d 759 . We explained: Logically, a defendant who commits a homicide while honestly, though unreasonably, believing that he is threatened with death or serious bodily harm, does not act with malice. Absent malice he cannot be convicted of murder.

Nevertheless, because the killing was committed without justification or excuse, the defendant is not entitled to full exoneration. Therefore, as we see it, when evidence is presented showing the defendant’s subjective belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect self-defense. Id. (footnote omitted).

It follows, we pointed out, that if the jury concluded that the defendant honestly believed that the use of force was necessary but that this subjective belief was unreasonable under the circumstances, then its verdict would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 501 , 483 A.2d 759 . This is so, we declared, because the conduct of the defendant in these circumstances negates the presence of malice, a prerequisite to a finding ²¹⁴ of murder, but the defendant is nevertheless to blame for the homicide and should not be rewarded for his unreasonable conduct. [4] Id. We also agreed with the observation of the Court of Special Appeals, 54 Md.App. at 118 n. 5, 458 A.2d 81 : It is difficult to envision circumstances which are sufficient to generate the issue of justification or excuse by way of perfect self-defense which do not also generate the issue of mitigation by way of imperfect self-defense.

Generally, if a defendant is entitled to an instruction with respect to the former, he will be entitled to an instruction with respect to the latter. 301 Md. at 502 , 483 A.2d 759 . We said: It is hard to imagine a situation where a defendant would be able to produce sufficient evidence to generate a jury issue as to perfect self-defense but not as to imperfect self-defense. It seems clear to us that if the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief is at issue, as it is in self-defense, a fortiori, the existence of that belief is also at issue. Therefore, the jury must reject the reasonableness ²¹⁵ of the defendant’s belief as well as the existence of that belief to find the defendant guilty of murder.

Id. at 502-503 , 483 A.2d 759 . It is clear from our Faulkner that “when evidence is presented showing the defendant’s subjective belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect self-defense.” 301 Md. at 500 , 483 A.2d 759 (footnote omitted), quoted in Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39 , 542 A.2d 1258 (1988). For entitlement to the instruction with respect to both perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense, the defendant has the “burden of initially producing ‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or self-defense ... sufficient to give rise to a jury issue____ Once the issue has been generated by the evidence, however, the State must carry the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue.” Simmons, 313 Md. at 39-40 , 542 A.2d 1258 , quoting State v. Evans, 278 Md. at 207-208 . See Cunningham v. State, 58 Md.App. 249, 257 , 473 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 316 , 477 A.2d 1195 (1984).

(3) The “Some Evidence” Requirement Prior to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , we believed, and so held, that “the burden is upon [the defendant] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense.” Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 559 , 276 A.2d 214 (1971). We learned from Mullaney that we were wrong. The holding in Mullaney, decided in the light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), reached a jury instruction given in a homicide case. It taught us that an instruction which cast upon the defendant in a homicide case the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, when the issue of self-defense was raised by the evidence, was consti ²¹⁶ tutionally defective since it shifted the burden to the defendant to prove justification or excuse for the homicide.

State v. Evans, 278 Md. at 207 , 362 A.2d 629 . We discovered through Mullaney and Winship that due process of law is offended by placing the burden on the defendant to prove, by any standard, the existence of mitigating circumstances necessary to lower a felonious homicide to the level of manslaughter. Id. at 206, 362 A.2d 629 (emphasis added). Therefore, we declared, “All Maryland homicide cases involving the defense of mitigation which contain contrary holdings are no longer valid precedents.” Id.

We were careful to point out, however, that the burden of initially producing “some evidence” on the issue of mitigation or self-defense (or of relying upon evidence produced by the State) sufficient to give rise to a jury issue with respect to those defenses, is properly cast upon the defendant. Id. at 208 , 362 A.2d 629 . It is only when “some evidence” has been adduced which is looked to by the defendant on the issue of self-defense or other mitigation, that the State “must carry the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue.” Id. In Evans we were talking in terms of perfect self-defense, although not by that nomenclature.

We did not characterize self-defense as “perfect” or “imperfect” because we had not then adopted the concept of imperfect self-defense. It was after our Evans that imperfect self-defense surfaced in this Court and was accepted by us as a mitigating defense in the criminal law of Maryland. But our holdings in Evans also spoke to mitigating defenses other than perfect self-defense. Id. at 208-209, 362 A.2d 629 .

Imperfect self-defense is another mitigating defense and, thus, is clearly within the ambit of the Evans teachings. Faulkner, 301 Md. at 486 , 483 A.2d 759 . Some evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no more than what it says— ²¹⁷ “some,” as that word is understood in common, everyday usage.

It need not rise to the level of “beyond reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.” The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden. Then the baton is passed to the State.

It must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did not kill in self-defense. The Evidence Adduced There were no eyewitnesses to the homicide. It took place in a bedroom of a mobile home trailer in which Landon resided. The trailer was in a trailer park in Princess Anne, Somerset County, Maryland.

A Maryland State Trooper described the outside of the trailer and the floor plan. At the suggestion of the prosecutor, he drew, for the edification of the jury, a diagram of the exterior and interior of the trailer, showing the two doors providing ingress and egress to the trailer and the location of five rooms off a hallway which ran the length of the trailer. Landon’s body was found in the master bedroom at the rear of the trailer, on the floor beside the bed. The jury was shown a color photograph depicting the body in the position and the condition in which it was found.

The photograph also showed a part of the bedroom floor, cluttered ankle deep with discarded clothing, bags, shoes, coat hangers, and other articles between the door to the bedroom and the body. The Post Mortem Examination Report, to which were appended nine photographs of Landon’s nude body showing the wounds in close-up, was received in evidence. The Trooper testified as to the events leading to the finding of the body, how the investigation became focused on Dykes, and the circumstances of Dykes’s arrest and interrogation. ²¹⁸ The details of the commission of the homicide came from Dykes. The interrogation of him by the police was over a period of almost two hours, with a break for dinner.

Without prodding, Dykes readily gave a statement which, when transcribed, covered nine and one-half pages. The statement was read verbatim to the jury. Dykes also testified at the trial. The result was that the jury had before it three versions of the events leading to the homicide and of the circumstances of the killing itself, all from the mouth of Dykes.

We set out a compendium of each version. In the first version Dykes averred that Landon, who was not known to him previously, abducted him at gunpoint outside a bar and drove him to Landon’s house trailer. By the time they arrived, Dykes believed, from Landon’s remarks en route, that Landon was a homosexual. Landon forced him into the trailer, pressing the gun to his neck and telling him they would get “some action.” Dykes stalled by asking to use the