Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos

ALPERT, Judge. In this, the last decade of the 20th Century, our judicial system faces an apocalypse in the guise of asbestos cases. As did the “Apocalyptic beast,” 1 asbestos rose up “as from the depths of the sea,” after having lain dormant for decades, to plague our industries initially and our judicial system consequentially, spreading cancer and asbestosis to thousands of workers along the way. This 10-week case is just one of more than 8,000 asbestos cases that have been filed in Maryland since 1980. 2 Although estimates vary, it has been reported that there are as many as 50,000 asbestos cases pending nationally. 3 Quite apart from the sheer magnitude in numbers, asbestos litigation presents features that, unfortunately, are common to complex litigation.

Most of the cases are of the multi-litigant variety, averaging as many as twenty defendants. 4 When the multitude of cross-claims between those defendants are factored in, the complex metamorphosizes into the maxi-complex. Thus, it seems quite possible that our dockets shall be visited with asbestos litigation well into the next century, each case presenting its unique yet similar tragic scenario. ¹⁸ The immensity of the problem has already required at least one innovative approach here in Maryland. The Court of Appeals recently added new § (d) to Rule 2-327 (Transfer of Action) that permits, inter alia, the transfer of “ ‘any claims or issues’ in actions to a circuit court in which the actions might have been brought and in which similar actions are pending.” See 112th Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, May 23, 1990. Leslie Balbos and Sutton Knuckles are cast in the leading roles of the tragedy that here unfolds, for they were the victims of mesothelioma, a form of cancer caused by exposure to asbestos.

Cast in the roles of the transgressors are: ACandS, Inc. — Armstrong Contracting and Supply Company — a Delaware corporation which has operated since 1958. ACandS installed asbestos-containing thermal insulation products and is a defendant in the Knuckles case. Celotex Corporation — a successor to the Philip Carey Company. Celotex manufactured and/or sold asbestos-containing pipe covering, block, and cement from 1906 to 1984 and is a defendant in both the Balbos and Knuckles cases.

Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. — manufactured asbestos-containing insulating cement from approximately 1930 to 1971, and distributed under its own label Owens-Corning Fiberglass Hylo block and pipe covering from 1960 to 1972. Eagle-Picher is a defendant in both the Balbos and Knuckles case. Owens-Illinois, Inc. — manufactured and sold Kaylo brand asbestos-containing pipe covering and block insulation from 1948 to 1958 and is a defendant in the Knuckles case. Pittsburgh Corning Corporation — manufactured and sold “unibestos” pipe covering from 1962 to 1972.

A different company manufactured and sold “unibestos” prior to 1962. Pittsburgh Corning is a defendant in the Knuckles case. Porter Hayden Company — installed asbestos-containing insulation products and operated in four states: Maryland, ¹⁹ New Jersey, Virginia, and North Carolina. Porter Hayden is a defendant in both the Balbos and Knuckles cases.

Decedent Leslie Balbos was employed as a sheet metal mechanic at the Fairfield Shipyard from 1942 to 1944. The Fairfield Shipyard was owned and operated by Bethlehem Steel and engaged solely in the new construction of naval ships. Mr. Balbos was diagnosed in November 1982 as having malignant mesothelioma (cancer of the pleura or lining of the lung) caused by occupational exposure to asbestos during his employment at the shipyard. He died of that disease in September 1983.

On October 2,1984, Anne Balbos, as surviving widow and personal representative of her husband’s estate, and Paul Balbos, as the sole surviving adult child of Leslie Balbos, filed wrongful death and survival actions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against eighteen manufacturers, installers, and suppliers of asbestos-containing products including among the named defendants Celotex Corporation, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., and Porter Hayden Company. The plaintiffs alleged defendants’ negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Anne Balbos died in March 1985, and the complaint was then amended. The amended complaint was brought by Paul Balbos, individually and as substitute personal representative for the estate of Leslie Balbos, and Robert Fox, as personal representative for the estate of Anne Balbos.

Decedent Sutton Knuckles was employed as an “erector” at the Key Highway Shipyard owned and operated by Bethlehem Steel from 1941 to 1982. As an erector, Mr. Knuckles worked primarily with heavy pieces of steel used in the repair of ships. The Key Highway Shipyard was a major ship repair facility that serviced ships from all over the world. Mr. Knuckles was diagnosed in August 1984 as having malignant mesothelioma caused by occupational exposure to asbestos during his employment at the shipyard.

He died of that disease in November 1984. ²⁰ Sutton Knuckles filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which was amended upon his death to designate Lucille Killian, Mr. Knuckles’s sister, as the personal representative for his estate. The amended complaint named a total of 28 defendants, including ACandS, Inc.; Celotex Corporation; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; and Porter Hayden Company. The amended complaint contained eight counts, including claims based on negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. The Balbos case and the Knuckles case were consolidated for trial.

In summary, both cases involved claims for damages arising out of asbestos-related cancer deaths from mesothelioma caused by occupational exposure to asbestos and alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. A jury trial involving 14 defendants was conducted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City before Judge David Ross. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligence claims 5 and in favor of all the defendants on the product defect claims. 6 In the Knuckles case, the jury assessed punitive damages against Eagle-Picher and Owens-Illinois, Inc. 7 The court denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. All of the defendants mentioned above appealed.

Collectively, they raise a total of twenty issues as set out below. 1. The trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Professor Howard Ayer. ²¹ 2. The trial court erred in failing to order a new trial because the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent as a matter of law. 3. The trial court erred in failing to direct judgment for Porter Hayden Company in that there was insufficient evidence that decedent Knuckles was exposed to any product for which this appellant was legally responsible. 4.

Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that they inhaled sufficient respirable asbestos from Eagle-Picher products to render such products a substantial factor in causing them harm. 5. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in respect to the definition of “substantial factor” in the context of asbestos-related diseases. 6. Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants’ failure to place warnings on their products amounted to negligence. 7. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in respect to the defense of contributory negligence. 8.

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the focus of their analysis of allegedly culpable conduct should be confined to conduct at and before plaintiff’s last mesothelioma-producing exposure to asbestos. 9. The trial court erred in failing to give appellant’s requested instructions on the sophisticated user defense and superseding cause. 10. Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that Eagle-Picher’s conduct was so egregious as to support an award of punitive damages. 11. The trial court erred in denying Eagle-Picher’s motion to dismiss Knuckles’ claim for punitive damages in count one of his amended complaint seeking damages for negligence on grounds the complaint failed ²² to state a claim for punitive damages upon which relief could be granted. 12.

The trial court erred in denying Eagle-Picher’s motion to dismiss Knuckles’ claim for punitive damages in that such claim was unconstitutional and in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 13. The award of punitive damages violates Owens-Illinois’ right to due process of law by subjecting the defendant to multiple punishments for the same alleged wrong. 14. The award of punitive damages violates Owens-Illinois’ right to due process of law because the standards for calculating the sum of the award gave no guidance regarding the appropriate amount of punishment. 15. The trial court erroneously deprived appellant of its right to participate in the exercise of six peremptory strikes. 16.

The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs could read certain deposition testimony of Dr. Daniel Braun and in ruling inadmissible other inconsistent deposition testimony of Dr. Braun offered by EaglePicher. 17. The trial court erred in ruling that conservation orders published in the Federal Register regulating use of asbestos from 1942 to 1945 could not be presented to the jury. 18. The trial court erred in ruling that documentary evidence from the Asbestos Textile Institute was admissible against Eagle-Picher. 19. The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by admitting into evidence a videotape depicting Leslie Balbos on his deathbed. 20.

The trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for judgment in respect to Anne Balbos’s wrongful death claim since plaintiff failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish the amount of dam ²³ ages to which the Estate of Anne Balbos was entitled on account of Leslie Balbos’s death. We shall reverse the judgments for punitive damages in favor of the estate of Sutton Knuckles. We shall affirm all remaining judgments. 1. The trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Professor Howard Ayer.

The sanctity, indeed the future, of the pre-trial order (in mass tort litigation) is at stake in this case. The question before us is whether the trial court erred by not allowing Professor Howard Ayer to testify because his name was not among the witnesses listed in the final pre-trial order. The Proceedings The “master” pre-trial order 8 for this case was filed in 1987. The order included, inter alia, a list of witnesses and submissions scheduled prior to trial.

The schedule ran as follows: (a) 120 days before trial, final list of defendants’ non-medical experts submitted; 9 (b) 30 days before trial, parties exchange pre-trial orders; ²⁴ (c) 25 days before trial, notification by parties of any disputes or differences to the pre-trial orders; (d) 25 days before trial, expert witness depositions completed; and (e) 20 days before trial, final pre-trial order and voir dire filed. Professor Ayer was named in the “master” pre-trial order, and in the appellants’ final list of experts, which was submitted to appellees’ counsel on May 26, 1988. In addition, on July 22 and August 1, 1988 respectively, appellees’ counsel was informed at a meeting with counsel for one of the defendants and via a follow-up letter that Ayer would be called to testify. At the same meeting and via the same letter, appellees’ counsel was offered information about Ayer but declined to consider the information because he already knew about Professor Ayer. 10 The final pre-trial order and voir dire were typed in the liaison (defense) counsel’s office and filed on September 23.

Although the list of witnesses within the body of the order did not include Ayer’s name as a result of a typographical error, the list of witnesses for voir dire purposes did include his name. On October 24, 1988 the trial began. At the outset of the trial, Ayer’s name was read to the jury in voir dire. On December 14, 1988, appellants’ counsel, during his opening statement, told the jury that Ayer would testify and summarized the issues Ayer would address.

The trial court recessed for the holidays from December 17, 1988 through January 2, 1989. The absence of Ayer’s name in the pre-trial order was first discovered by appellees’ counsel a few days before the trial resumed, when he was reviewing his notes on the appellants’ opening statement. On January 4, 1989, appellees’ counsel objected to appellants’ calling Ayer to testify because his name was not listed in the final pre-trial order filed September 23, 1988. ²⁵ Judge Ross heard arguments from both sides on two occasions and sustained the objection on the ground that he could not say that it would not be prejudicial to the plaintiffs to permit the witness to be called without the adequate notice, without the notice that is required by the pretrial order. So aside from the precedential value or importance of the decision [with respect to adherence to the pretrial order], on the merits of what we have before us, an error [was] made and who suffers the consequences of that error ... has to fall on the side that made the error.

On January 4, after Judge Ross made his initial decision not to allow Ayer to testify, appellants’ counsel requested permission to proffer a transcript of the testimony Ayer would have given if allowed to testify. It is, however, not clear from the record whether the proffer was ever successfully completed. The decision not to allow Ayer to testify was based solely on the violation of the pre-trial order. Appellants contend that the trial court’s exclusion of Ayer constituted an abuse of discretion because it failed to find manifest injustice in the exclusion of Ayer; refused to permit a continuance to allow appellees to prepare for Ayer; and failed to apply a consistent ruling as to the function of the pre-trial order.

The Pre-Trial Order — Its Importance The pre-trial order is an extremely important tool in managing the docket and trials. The pre-trial order codifies the decisions made at the pre-trial conference concerning the facts to be relied on in support of claims; the issues that will be raised; stipulated facts; damages claimed and relief sought; documents and records to be offered into evidence at trial; names and specialties of expert witnesses who will be called, see Rule 2-504; and, in the instant case, a time schedule for various pre-trial notifications and submissions. ²⁶ The pre-trial order is especially important for the effective management of asbestos cases which have flooded the judicial system allowing little time for other civil cases. The scarcest resource in the litigation system is judicial trial time. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U.L.Rev. 659, 663 (1989).

As noted above, over 8,000 asbestos cases have been filed in Maryland to date. Additionally, up to 200 cases continue to be filed each month. 11 Such numbers are alarming. The pre-trial order is the guiding light upon which each party is entitled and encouraged to rely. Its importance, especially in complex and mass tort cases, cannot be overstated.

Maryland Rule 2-504(c) states in pertinent part that “[t]he [pretrial] order controls the subsequent course of action but may be modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.” This rule reposes in the trial judge a great deal of discretion. See Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal.2d 525 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 241, 253 , 386 P.2d 817, 829 (1963). In Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 526 , 276 A.2d 36 (1971), during the trial, counsel for the defendant “attempted to make an end run and to advance” claims that were beyond the issues formulated in the pre-trial order. The defendant claimed that the trial court had erred by limiting him to issues formulated in the pre-trial order and noted that the federal counterpart to the Maryland rule allowed modification of the pre-trial order to prevent manifest injustice.

The Court of Appeals held that, under the circumstances of the case, there had been no abuse of discretion. In the posture of the case before us, we need not reach the basic issue. Judge Levine gave all counsel an opportunity to modify the pre-trial order, and took the precaution of having them endorse the order which was filed. As we see it, from that moment, the order controlled the ²⁷ course of the trial, subject to the court’s discretionary power to permit modification as justice may require.

Under the circumstances here, we find no abuse of discretion. Id. at 526-27 , 276 A.2d 36 . Discretion — Its Use and Abuse Trial judges owe a duty to the public to manage their dockets and trials efficiently to ensure timely access by the aggrieved to our courts. The goal of judicial management is to increase court efficiency and improve the quality of justice.

In Calder v. Levi, 168 Md. 260 , 177 A. 392 (1935), the Court of Appeals recognized that It is an essential function of the court to maintain order and assure propriety of the conduct of legal proceedings, by the enforcement of reasonable rules and regulatory orders. In no other way may the administration of justice proceed with dignity, calmness, and impartiality in its appointed course. Id. at 274-75 , 177 A. 392 . The court went on to note that with the duty to manage judicial resources comes wide discretionary powers to ensure its accomplishment. “A large measure of discretion must necessarily reside in the court, and its exercise will not be reviewed unless it clearly appear[s] that prejudice has resulted from the denial of a legal right.” Id. at 275 , 177 A. 392 (trial judge abused discretionary powers in not allowing victim of car accident to appear as witness against the wrongdoer because of victim’s physical and nervous condition).

The use of discretion in excluding the testimony of a material witness is critical in the case sub judice. A leading case on the use and abuse of discretion is Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 378 , 456 A.2d 29 (1983). There the defense sought to introduce the testimony of an alibi witness on the last day of trial. Because the defense did not disclose the witness’s identity to the State until that day, the trial court excluded the proferred alibi evidence based upon a precursor of current Md. Rule 4-263(d)(3).

The ²⁸ defendant appealed, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the witness to testify. The Court of Appeals noted that whether the exclusion of alibi witness testimony was an abuse of discretion turned on the facts of the particular case. The court applied the principal relevant factors used by most courts to determine abuse of discretion: (1) whether the disclosure violation was technical or substantial; (2) the timing of the ultimate disclosure; (3) the reason, if any, for the violation; (4) the degree of prejudice to the parties respectively offering and opposing the evidence; and (5) whether any resulting prejudice might be cured by a postponement and, if so, the overall desirability of a continuance. Id. at 390-91, 456 A.2d 29 .

After weighing all these factors, the court held that because the defendant knew the identity and address of the witness, knew the date of the trial, had been asked by counsel about witnesses, and provided no justifying excuse for not disclosing the witness until the close of the State’s case, the trial court had acted well within its discretion. Id. at 398, 456 A.2d 29 . The Taliaferro factors are somewhat instructive in our analysis of the trial court’s rejection of the Ayer testimony. As the Taliaferro court noted, “Frequently these factors overlap.

They do not lend themselves to a compartmental analysis.” Id. at 391, 456 A.2d 29 . (1) Was the violation technical or substantial? In discussing the difference between a mere technical disclosure violation and a substantial disclosure violation, the Taliaferro court cited State v. Silva, 118 R.I. 408 , 374 A.2d 106 (1977). Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 391 , 456 A.2d 29 .

In Silva, the trial court excluded alibi testimony for lack of compliance with the Rhode Island rule’s specificity requirements. The defendant had provided the name but not the ²⁹ address of the alibi witness and had not stated precisely at which of two given locations he had been at the time of the offense. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion because, even though the address and precise location had not been provided, there was substantial compliance with the letter and spirit of the rule. Here, although Professor Ayer’s name was not listed in the final pre-trial order, it was listed in the master pre-trial order, the appellants’ final list of experts submitted to appellees’ counsel on May 26, 1988, a letter to appellees’ counsel dated August 1, 1988, and the voir dire list.

Appellees’ counsel, therefore, knew about the witness for discovery purposes and was only unaware of the witness for purposes of "begin[ning] their detailed preparation for the trial.” Because the error was inadvertent and a result of a typographical error, and the deficiency in preparation time for the appellees’ counsel could be remedied by a continuance to allow for detailed preparation, the appellants’ error was, arguably, not a violation of the spirit or intent of the rule and therefore may be categorized as simply technical non-compliance. (2) Timing The final pre-trial order was filed 20 days before trial. The fact that Professor Ayer’s name was not on the pre-trial order list of witnesses was discovered by the plaintiff’s counsel approximately 70 days after the trial began or approximately three months after the filing of the pre-trial order. This time period is substantial.

(3) The reason for the violation The reason Professor Ayer’s name did not appear on the pre-trial order was an inadvertent typographical error by the liaison counsel’s office that was not observed and corrected because appellants’ counsel failed to proofread the order. Even though the mistake was not intentional, it was within the control of the appellants to have prevented it. ³⁰ (4) The degree of prejudice The bulk of appellees’ claim of prejudice was centered around not being able to prepare adequately for cross examination of the witness because they did not have copies of the Ayer’s depositions. As pointed out by the appellants’ counsel and acknowledged by the trial judge, the final pre-trial order does not serve as a notice for discovery and this sort of discovery preparation is begun long before the final pre-trial order is filed. Appellees’ counsel pointed out, however, that the way the pre-trial order was established in this case, provided a five-day “escape hatch” in which a deposition could have been taken, since the pre-trial order was due five days before the depositions were required to be completed.

He explained this escape hatch “[i]f we see an expert that we have no information on, we have five days to call up and say ‘[h]ey I need to depose your witness____’” Since the facts indicate that appellees’ counsel had been informed on at least three occasions prior to the pre-trial order that Ayer would be called to testify, and was offered information on the witness but claimed to have information on him already, it is arguable that appellees’ counsel did not rely on the pre-trial order in not gathering discovery-type information prior to the filing of the pre-trial order, and would not have benefitted from the “escape hatch.” The trial judge correctly noted, however, that the function of the listing of witnesses in the pre-trial order was to alert the parties to the final, narrow, short list of witnesses to be confronted at trial so that the parties could limit their preparation for examination and cross-examination during the few days remaining before the witness was called. And the trial judge found that the appellees’ counsel did rely on the pre-trial order and therefore was “caught short.” Appellants’ counsel’s argument on the issue of prejudice was focused less on the prejudice appellants would sustain, and more on the claim that appellees would not suffer one iota of prejudice. They claimed prejudice to appellants but ³¹ gave only the following reasons why appellants would be prejudiced: the witness “knew the times,” was an industrial hygienist and participated in the shipyard studies on behalf of the U.S. Government; no other witness could duplicate his testimony since he was a member of the U.S. Public Health Service from 1948-1972; it would be difficult to get substitute witnesses because they were out of town witnesses; and “He is our head gun.” Counsel did not elaborate on these statements or on the importance of the contents of Ayer’s testimony. The record does not show that appellants met the considerable burden of proof in this type of case on the degree of prejudice they would suffer if the testimony were not allowed.

(5) Cure by postponement/desirability of continuance The last consideration is “whether any resulting prejudice might be cured by a postponement and, if so, the overall desirability of a continuance.” In Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 429 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983), the court found abuse of discretion partially because “the court gave scant consideration to ... ‘whether any resulting prejudice might be cured by a postponement and, if so, the overall desirability of a continuance.’ ” The court distinguished the case from Taliaferro, where thorough consideration was given to a continuance before rejecting that alternative. Id. In the instant case, assuming that appellees’ counsel did rely on the pre-trial order for not starting the “36 hour rule” preparation for Ayer, a continuance as granted plus appellants’ offer to provide appellees with all the information and depositions they had on Ayer probably would have remedied any prejudice to appellees. Although the trial judge did not consider a continuance for the purposes of permitting Ayer to testify as an alternative solution, he did agree to a continuance to allow appellants a substitute witness (for Ayer) from among those listed on the pre-trial order.

In arriving at his decision not to permit the Ayer’s testimony, the judge based his ruling on many, if not all, relevant considerations, not the least of ³² which included the precedental effect of his decision on the efficiency of the courts in future asbestos litigation and the integrity of the pre-trial order. The judge reviewed the requirements of the pre-trial order; the purpose of the pre-trial order; the reason for the violation of the order; and the prejudice to the respective parties. In addition, the learned trial judge raised several relevant concerns. The judge was concerned that, if he allowed Ayer to testify, every time a mistake was claimed by one party the burden of proof would shift to the opposing party to prove he had been hurt by the mistake.

He also was concerned that the door would be open for “chicanery” and that the court would then have the burden of determining, in every case where a name is not on the list, whether it was intentional, or a change of mind, or a tactical ploy. And finally, he was concerned that if he overlooked the “slip up” there would be no incentive for anyone to obey the rules. Appellants further maintain that the trial court’s decision not to allow Ayer to testify was inconsistent with an earlier court decision to allow one of appellees’ witnesses to testify. That witness was not identified in witness letters prepared by appellees but was listed on the pre-trial order.

We find no inconsistency in these rulings. The court acted consistently to protect the integrity of the pre-trial order by ruling in both situations that a witness may testify if the witness’s name was listed in the pre-trial order. As mentioned above, and apparently not contested by appellants, the manner in which the pre-trial order was established in this case provided a five-day “escape hatch” in which a deposition could be taken if a name of a witness, of which a party was unaware, appeared in the pre-trial order. In Taliaferro, the Court of Appeals noted that “the exclusion sanction should be one of last resort, to be ‘invoked only in those cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice.’ ” 295 Md. at 395 , 456 A.2d 29 .

The Court went on, however, to emphasize the need to permit the exclusion sanction in order that the notice-of-alibi rule may have practical signifi ³³ canee. 295 Md. at 395-97 , 456 A.2d 29 . The same is true for the enforcement of the pre-trial order rule. To give teeth to that rule and to effectuate its goal of efficient docket and trial management, the court must be allowed to employ meaningful or even drastic sanctions as the court has in the case at bar. Id. at 397, 456 A.2d 29 .

Permitting a continuance to prepare for Ayer would not have served as a sanction for violating the pre-trial order. As the Taliaferro court noted, the threat of a continuance is not a sanction at all____ If all the defendant risks is a continuance, he will purposely not give notice [of a witness] because the witness is valuable to him____ The effect of using continuance as a “sanction” is also contra the deep concern of the bench and bar with trial delay. Id. at 396, 456 A.2d 29 (quoting Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J.Crim.L., Criminology & Police Sci. 29, 35-36 (1964)). Although the trial judge found that appellants did not purposely omit Ayer’s name from the list of witnesses, but rather failed to proofread and correct the pre-trial order, that does not excuse appellants from the imposition of a sanction for not adhering to the requirement that the names of all witnesses appear in the pre-trial order.

Other factors considered by the court to determine abuse of discretion are found in McCloud v. State, 317 Md. 360 , 564 A.2d 72 (1989). There the Court stated that the defense’s request to argue last required an exercise of the court’s discretion, and that exercise of discretion involved a ruling based on all considerations and a balancing of alternative solutions. When a court is required to exercise discretion, it must identify principles of law that govern the situation before it and then attempt to apply them in light of the factual and procedural posture of the case. This involves an exercise in balancing alternative solutions and deciding which one to apply, in order to advance the interests of justice____ Put otherwise, “discretion is properly exer ³⁴ cised if a trial judge makes his ruling based on ‘all the considerations which properly enter into the problem.’ ” Id. at 367 , 564 A.2d 72 (citations omitted).

The facts of the instant case indicate (1) that Ayer’s proposed testimony was relevant, (2) that the transgression from the pre-trial order by the defendant was inadvertent, and (3) that the prejudicial effect of the transgression on the appellees may have been relatively minor and might have been remedied by other less harsh means. The importance of adhering to and being able to rely on the pre-trial order in this type of case, however, significantly outweighs the interest in having all relevant testimony. If this were an ordinary case, the factors to be considered in determining abuse of discretion as stated in Taliaferro and McCloud might warrant reversal. But this was not such a case and the collective interests of society in the disciplined management of these all-consuming asbestos cases must be weighed heavily against any prejudice suffered by a party.

The parties have and in this case had an active role in creating the pre-trial order and it was their responsibility to ensure its quality. Therefore, the “manifest injustice” standard required by Rule 2-504(c) for a modification of a pre-trial order in this case and other (asbestos) mass tort cases is a difficult one to meet. In light of the overwhelming public interest in ensuring fair and efficient adjudication of these asbestos cases, we hold that the trial court properly — and not arbitrarily — exercised its discretion in not allowing testimony by a witness whose name was not included in the pre-trial order. See Butkus v. McClendon, 259 Md. 170, 173 , 269 A.2d 427 (1970). 2.

The trial court erred in failing to order a new trial because the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent as a matter of law. With respect to both Balbos and Knuckles, the jury found (1) that the decedents’ deaths were caused by ³⁵ appellants’ negligence, and (2) that the decedents’ deaths were not caused by appellants’ unreasonably dangerous products. Appellants Owens-Illinois, Pittsburgh Corning, ACandS, and Porter Hayden argue that they could not consistently have been found to have acted negligently with respect to the use of products which the jury also concluded were not unreasonably dangerous in the absence of any warning. They contend, therefore, the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent as a matter of law.

Assuming arguendo, that the verdicts were inconsistent, 12 we hold that the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion. Inconsistent jury verdicts generally are not sufficient grounds for an appellate court to reverse a jury’s verdict. Steffey v. State, 82 Md.App. 647 , 573 A.2d 70 (1990). As the Court of Appeals stated in Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 594 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984), “That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible.

But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.” (quoting Justice Holmes in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , ³⁶ 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932)). See also Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546 , 337 A.2d 81 (1975). In so holding, we realize that this precedent has previously been applied by Maryland courts only in criminal cases. 13 We believe, however, that the rationale for this principle is equally valid when applied in civil actions. Here too, we are reluctant “to interfere with the results of unknown jury interplay” at least without proof of “actual irregularity.” See Ford, 274 Md. at 553 , 337 A.2d 81 .

We recognize that inconsistency may be the product of lenity, mistake, or a compromise to reach unanimity. The continual correction of such matters would undermine the historic role of the jury as the arbiter of questions put to it. See Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 54 , 512 A.2d 358 (1986). 14 3. The trial court erred in failing to direct judgment for Porter Hayden Company in that there was insufficient evidence that decedent Knuckles was exposed to any product for which this appellant is legally responsible.

On the issue of proximate cause, the plaintiff must introduce evidence “which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result.” Robin Express Transfer, Inc. v. Canton R.R., 26 Md.App. 321, 335 , 338 A.2d 335 (1975). Porter Hayden contends that appellees failed to present ³⁷ sufficient evidence that Knuckles was exposed to the company’s products. Thus, Porter Hayden argues, appellees failed to prove that the products were the proximate cause of Knuckles’s mesothelioma. The first step in Porter Hayden’s argument is, essentially, that appellees failed to produce sufficient evidence that Porter Hayden’s products were even used at Key Highway.

We disagree. Charles Holterman worked for Porter Hayden, originally called H. W. Porter, from 1947 to 1987 as a contract estimator, a branch manager, and an executive vice president. He testified that H. W. Porter was formed by four former employees of Johns-Manville. He also stated that H. W. Porter generally bought the asbestos products it installed from Johns-Manville and that Porter was “almost” an exclusive distributor for Johns-Manville.

Appellees contend that Holterman’s comments are proof that Johns-Man-ville products at Key Highway were placed there by Porter Hayden. Porter Hayden, however, argues that Holterman’s remarks did not mean that Johns-Manville sold almost all of its asbestos through Porter Hayden. Rather, appellant argues, Holterman meant that Porter Hayden sold almost nothing but Johns-Manville products, but that Johns-Man-ville sold undetermined amounts of its products to companies other than Porter Hayden. Thus, Johns-Manville products found at Key Highway might have been placed there by some other contractor.

We agree with Porter Hayden’s construction of Holterman’s testimony. Shortly before he made the “exclusive distributor” remark, Holterman said, “Also, Johns-Manville sold material directly to larger concerns and we have learned, as years have gone by, that they sold to other contractors when we thought we were kind of exclusive distributors.” In addition, it is clear from the following colloquy surrounding Holterman’s “exclusive distributor” comment that Porter Hayden’s interpretation was accurate: [Attorney for plaintiffs]: Let me make it very specific, from 1947 up until 1970, did you, did Porter offer any ³⁸ asbestos containing insulation products in its material sales business, other than those which were manufactured by Johns-Manville? A: Yes. A. We normally stocked Johns-Manville material, but if a customer specifically asked for the materials of some other manufacturers, we would provide it, and, so to that degree we did not sell Johns-Manville material exclusively- Q. So, insofar as sales were concerned you would say that you were almost an exclusive distributor for JohnsManville products?

A. I think that’s fair to say. As Porter Hayden acknowledges in its brief, however, an asbestos insulator named Santo John Conigliaro testified that Porter Hayden did contracting work at Key Highway at times between 1964 and 1968. From Conigliaro’s testimony that Porter Hayden contractors were at the site, and Holterman’s testimony that most of what Porter Hayden used were Johns-Manville products, a reasonable jury could have inferred that any Johns-Manville products identified at Key Highway were Porter Hayden products. Appellees then had only to identify Johns-Manville products at Key Highway for the identification chain to be complete.

Appellees succeeded in offering such evidence. Elmer Sakowski, for example, testified that he worked with Sutton Knuckles on a number of ships in the 1970s. According to Sakowski, he worked around Johns-Manville products and Knuckles was around him most of the time when he saw them. Another witness, George Robert Edwards, worked in the Key Highway facility’s warehouse from 1951 to 1982.

He testified that Johns-Manville asbestos products were kept in the warehouse. ³⁹ The second step of Porter Hayden’s argument is that, even assuming that Porter Hayden products were used at Key Highway, appellees “failed to introduce any evidence that decedent Knuckles ever worked in the vicinity of Porter Hayden insulators,” and, thus, Porter Hayden products. In support of this argument, Porter Hayden relies heavily on Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.1986). In that case, a man who had worked at the Key Highway Shipyard from 1940 to 1979 developed asbestosis and filed suit against a number of producers of asbestos-containing products. In concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove a reasonable probability of causation between the plaintiff’s disease and the defendants’ products, the Fourth Circuit stated: [W]hen one considers the size of a workplace such as Key Highway Shipyard, the mere proof that the plaintiff and a certain asbestos product are at the shipyard at the same time, without more, does not prove exposure to that product.

Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). As we noted above, appellees in the case before us did introduce sufficient evidence that Porter Hayden’s asbestos-containing products were used at the Key Highway Shipyards when Knuckles worked there. Unlike the plaintiff in Lohrmann , however, appellees also presented expert testimony that asbestos fibers break apart when asbestos products are applied to ships or are removed, that the fibers can be carried by air currents for miles, and that studies have shown that individuals living around asbestos factories have contracted mesothelioma. 15 In Lockwood v. ACandS, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235 , 744 P.2d 605 (1987), the Supreme Court of Washington, in a unanimous en banc decision, placed a great deal of weight on expert testimony concerning this “drifting” of asbestos fibers. The plaintiff in that case had been a rigger in ⁴⁰ shipyards from 1942 to 1972.

He contracted asbestosis and filed suit against a number of producers of asbestos-containing products. One of Lockwood’s witnesses testified that insulators working on the conversion of a large ocean liner called the George Washington in 1947 and 1948 used the same asbestos materials as those he saw used at the Todd Shipyards in 1946. According to the witness, insulators at the Todd Shipyards had used asbestos cloth manufactured by a predecessor of one of the defendants in the case, Raymark Industries (Raymark). While the plaintiff himself did not identify Raymark as one of the manufacturers of the asbestos products he had used, he did testify that he had worked on the overhaul of the George Washington and that there was asbestos on that kind of job.

Following its discussion of the testimony of the witness and the plaintiff himself, the court addressed “[t]he second significant portion of the record,” the expert testimony that asbestos dust, after it is released, drifts in the air and can be inhaled by bystanders who do not work directly with asbestos. According to the court, “Thus, even if Lockwood did not work directly with Raymark’s product on the George Washington, it is reasonable to infer that since that product was used on that ship when Lockwood worked there, Lockwood was exposed to it.” 744 P.2d at 612-13 . We find Lockwood more persuasive than Lohrmann because the plaintiff in Lockwood presented, evidence of asbestos “drift,” while the plaintiff in Lohrmann did not. Thus, we conclude that appellees presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable inference that Knuckles was exposed to asbestos-containing products sold by Porter Hayden. 4.

Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that they inhaled sufficient respirable asbestos from Eagle-Picher products to render such products a substantial factor in causing them harm. Eagle-Picher argues that the evidence that its products caused the harm was insufficient in both the Balbos case ⁴¹ and the Knuckles case. We disagree. As to Balbos, appellees produced witnesses who testified that Eagle-Picher cement was used at the Fairfield Shipyards between 1942 and 1945.

As to Knuckles, one of appellees’ witnesses testified that Eagle-Picher cement was one of the cements used at Key Highway from 1953 to 1960; another said a particular Eagle-Picher cement was used there for 25 to 30 years; and a third said a type of asbestos covering called “Hylo,” manufactured by Owings-Corning Fiberglass and distributed by Eagle-Picher in that company’s packaging, was present in the storeroom at Key Highway from 1964 to 1970 and from 1972 to 1982. Like Porter Hayden, Eagle-Picher argues that even if the evidence was sufficient to place Eagle-Picher products at Fairfield and Key Highway when the decedents worked there, appellees failed to establish that either of the decedents, who did not work directly with asbestos products, actually came into contact with Eagle-Picher’s products. Again we point to the expert testimony that asbestos dust can drift “for miles.” Because of this evidence, appellees were not required to prove that the decedents actually handled Eagle-Picher’s asbestos products. Eagle-Picher’s final argument on this issue is that, even if the decedents did come into contact with some of its products, such contact was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma.

It bases this argument on the testimony of Dr. Peter Rasmussen, who said that the decedents’ diseases were, more likely than not, caused by exposure to amphibole asbestos, rather than to chrysotile asbestos. It argues that because “[t]he principal Eagle-Picher product at issue here contained only chrysotile asbestos,” none of the company’s products could have been the proximate cause of the decedents’ mesothelioma. Even assuming, arguendo, that none of the Eagle-Picher products at issue contained amphibole asbestos, its argument still fails. Dr. Rasmussen stated earlier in his testimony that the literature indicates that all kinds of asbestos, ⁴² including chrysotile asbestos, “are capable of causing malignant mesothelioma.” Dr. William Nicholson said the same thing during his testimony.

A third doctor testified that all of Knuckles’s exposures to asbestos were “significant contributing causal factor[s] to the mesothelioma.” Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Eagle-Picher’s asbestos-containing products — even if they did contain only chrysotile asbestos — were a proximate cause of the decedents’ mesothelioma. 5. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in respect to the definition of “substantial factor” in the context of asbestos-related diseases. Celotex assigns as error the trial judge’s failure to give the following instruction: The products of a particular defendant may be considered a cause of an injury only if the exposure was a substantial factor in causing injury. The word substantial used in this context means that the products must have had such effect in producing harm as to lead a reasonable man to believe exposure to the products by themselves was a direct cause of the injury.

Plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that inhaled respirable asbestos fibers from asbestos products of a particular defendant was a substantial cause of the mesothelioma. In order to prove this plaintiffs must show that each of them worked in proximity to any of the defendants’ asbestos-containing products with enough frequency and regularity so that the inhaled fibers from the products substantially contributed to the claimed mesothelioma of each plaintiff. The judge instead instructed the jury as follows with regard to the “substantial factor” issue: In order for a plaintiff to recover against a particular defendant certain things must ... be proved by the ⁴³ plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence. It must be shown that a product manufactured or supplied by that defendant, by a particular defendant, was a substantial factor in causing the death. ____ If no product manufactured or supplied by a particular defendant was a substantial factor in causing the death then that defendant has no responsibility and the defendant is out right away.

Unless there is a product that was manufactured or supplied by a particular defendant which was a substantial factor in causing the death there is no responsibility on the part of that defendant. On the other hand, the mere fact that a defendant’s product was a substantial factor standing alone is not enough. More must be shown because a manufacturer or supplier is not an insurer of its product____ There may be more than one cause of an injury or death. That is, several negligent acts or several unreasonably dangerous products may work together.

Each person whose negligent act or unreasonably dangerous product has been a substantial cause of the injury or death is responsible. Celotex contends that this instruction gave the jury no guidance in evaluating the evidence. We disagree and hold that the instruction was proper. We note first that a trial judge need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by the instructions actually given.

Md. Rule 2-520(c). In addition, a litigant may only “have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury if that theory is a correct exposition of the law and if there is evidence in the case that supports the theory.” Myers v. Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 130-31 , 560 A.2d 59 (1989) (citing The Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186 , 401 A.2d 651 (1979)) (emphasis added). With those principles firmly in mind, we now compare the requested instruction with that actually given. ⁴⁴ The requested instruction may be summarized as follows: (1) the product of a particular defendant, (2) was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries, and (3) each plaintiff worked in proximity to these products with frequency and regularity. We believe the trial judge’s instruction clearly covered the first two portions of the requested instruction fairly.

The judge’s instruction did not, however, cover the third portion. We believe the judge was correct in omitting any mention of proximity, frequency, and regularity because the evidence did not support this “theory.” There was no need for appellees to prove that the decedents were in proximity to any defendant’s asbestos products because, as we pointed out in the previous section (Section 4, supra), an expert had testified that asbestos dust drifts over great distances. In addition, appellees were not required to show that the decedents were exposed to the asbestos products frequently or with any degree of regularity. Dr. Nicholson testified that “[f]or the asbestos cancers we have no data that would indicate there is a level below which ... there is no risk.” (Emphasis added.) A short while later, the same witness said that “mesothelioma can occur from extremely low exposures.” Because the decedents died of mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer, requiring appellees to prove frequency and regularity of asbestos exposure would have contradicted this expert medical evidence.

We also note that the instruction that Celotex requested was based upon language from Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir.1986). As we noted in the previous section (see Section 4, supra), Lohrmann is distinguishable from the case before us in that the plaintiff there did not present evidence regarding the distance asbestos dust travels on air currents. More significantly, for purposes of our discussion of the “substantial factor” jury instruction, Lohrmann also is readily distinguishable from the case sub judice because the injured worker in that case suffered from asbestosis, a noncancerous disease, rather than mesothelioma. A medical expert ⁴⁵ testified there that “even thirty days exposure, more or less, was insignificant as a causal factor in producing [asbestosis].” 782 F.2d at 1163 .

In the case before us, Dr. Nicholson testified that mesothelioma can occur from asbestos exposures that are too low to cause asbestosis. (E.305) Thus, Lohrmann is inapposite and provides no support for Celotex’s version of the jury instruction. As the authors, W. Prosser & W. P. Keeton, of The Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) pointed out, “It has been considered that ‘substantial factor’ is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury and that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms.” Id. at 267. That line of reasoning was manifested in the trial judge’s comments on the instruction Celotex requested: “[Substantial factor means substantial factor and I think any ordinary person gets the drift of what that means and I don’t see where all of the additional language adds a great deal to it.” Such logic makes eminent good sense. 6.

Plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants’ failure to place warnings on their products amounted to negligence. To have a right of action in negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant owed him a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, and (3) that the breach caused harm to the plaintiff. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 291 , 252 A.2d 855 (1969). Two of the appellants appear to argue that appellees failed to meet the second Myers requirement; four (including one of the first two) contend that appellees failed to meet the third requirement.

We disagree and hold that appellees sufficiently proved that the appellants were negligent in failing to place warnings on their asbestos-containing products. ⁴⁶ A. Breach of Duty We said in Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.App. 408 , 475 A.2d 1243 (1984), that Negligence is a relative term and must be decided upon the facts of each particular case. Ordinarily it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, and before it can be determined as a matter of law that one has not been guilty of negligence, the truth of all the credible evidence tending to sustain the claim of negligence must be assumed and all favorable inferences of fact fairly deducible therefrom tending to establish negligence drawn____ And Maryland has gone almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury. The rule has been stated as requiring submission if there be any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, and the weight and value of such evidence will be left to the jury. Id. at 423 , 475 A.2d 1243 (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 , 213 A.2d 549 (1965) (emphasis in Fowler)).

We went on to say that the test of legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence serves to prove a fact or permits an inference of fact that would enable an ordinarily intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the right of the plaintiff to recover.” Banks, 59 Md.App. at 424 , 475 A.2d 1243 (quoting Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75, 81 , 227 A.2d 226 (1966)). In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975), the Court of Appeals noted that a manufacturer’s duty to produce a safe product, with appropriate warnings and instructions when necessary, is no different from the responsibility each of us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others. Whether any such unreasonable risk exists in a given situation depends on balancing the probability and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against the costs of taking appropriate precautions. However, we observe that in cases such as this the cost of giving an ⁴⁷ adequate warning is usually so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a label, that this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers, if the manufacturer is otherwise required to do so.

Id. at 543-44 , 332 A.2d 11 (citations omitted). The Court then quoted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965), observing that the section had previously been adopted as a general principle in the duty to warn area by previous Maryland cases. Section 388 states as follows: Chattel Known to Be Dangerous for Intended Use One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Following a lengthy review of the case law and the commentaries on the subject, the Moran court concluded that in the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when the manufacturer’s product comes near to or in contact with the elements which are present normally in the environment ⁴⁸ where the product can reasonably be expected to be brought or used____ 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d 11 (emphasis added).

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of what manufacturers “should know” in Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.1985). Summarizing the holding in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 , 95 S.Ct. 127 , 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974), the Dartez court said, Borel holds all manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of an expert. They are obliged to keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and are presumed to know the results of all such advances. Moreover, they each bear the duty to fully test their products to uncover all scientifically discoverable dangers before the products are sold.

Id. at 1089-90 . The actual knowledge of an individual manufacturer is not the issue. If the dangers of asbestos were known to Johns-Manville at the time of Dartez’s exposure, then the same risks were scientifically discoverable by other asbestos corporations____ 765 F.2d at 461 . Thus, the Dartez court concluded, “the knowledge of one manufacturer can be a proper basis for concluding that another manufacturer should have warned of a specific danger.” Id.

Eagle-Picher argues that the trial judge should have granted its motion for judgment because appellees failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Eagle-Picher’s failure to place warnings on its products amounted to negligence. According to the company, its conduct “must ... be evaluated in light of what it knew or should have known at and before [the decedents’] last mesothelioma-producing exposure to its products.” Eagle-Picher then goes on to discuss various testimony and exhibits which, the company contends, indicate that it neither knew nor should have known that its asbestos-containing products were harmful. Appellees argue that the evidence they presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that Eagle ⁴⁹ Picher knew or should have known of the dangers regarding its asbestos-containing products, and that the company negligently failed to warn the decedents of those dangers. We agree.

Appellees presented evidence of an article written in 1936 that mentioned patients who had died after prolonged exposure to asbestos dust. Eagle-Picher admits that this article was received by the company’s research library in January 1938. Appellees also presented a report, written by an Eagle-Picher salesman named H.M. Aber, to three EaglePicher employees in April 1942, telling them of an article he had read on the subject of asbestos. Aber warned, “[I]f you think mineral wool is dangerous you should read this.” Thus, it was reasonable to infer that Eagle-Picher had actual knowledge of the dangers of asbestos as early as 1942.

Based upon this evidence, it could reasonably be inferred that Eagle-Picher, in 1938 and even more likely by 1942, knew or should have known of the dangers regarding its asbestos-containing products. Because the dangers were “inherent and hidden,” Eagle-Picher had a duty to warn of those dangers. Moran, supra. Assuming “all credible evidence tending to sustain the claim of negligence” and drawing “all favorable inferences of fact fairly deducible therefrom tending to establish negligence,” we believe there was legally sufficient evidence tending to prove that Eagle-Picher was negligent in failing to provide the decedents with a warning prior to 1964.

Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., supra. The trial judge was correct in leaving the weight and value of such evidence to the jury. Porter Hayden argues that, because it did not actually manufacture asbestos-containing products (it only installed insulation), it did not have the manufacturer’s duty to inspect the products. According to Porter Hayden, the trial court should have directed judgment in its favor in the Balbos case because appellee in that case failed to introduce evidence that Porter Hayden knew or should have known that its installation work at the Fairfield Shipyards from ⁵⁰ 1942 through 1944 could injure other workers in the shipyard.

We disagree. As the Court of Appeals noted in Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325 , 211 A.2d 302 (1965), A vendor of a chattel which another has manufactured who sells it knowing that it is or is likely to be dangerous has the liability of a manufacturer if the dangerous condition causes the chattel to cause harm, Restatement, Torts Sec. 399, and such a vendor, like a manufacturer, is subject to liability if, although ignorant of the dangerous character or condition, he could have by the exercise of reasonable care discovered it by utilizing the peculiar opportunity and competence which he has or should have as a dealer in such chattels. Restatement, Torts Sec. 402.... The predecessor of Porter Hayden, the H.W. Porter Company, was founded by former members of Johns-Manville.

The company generally acquired its asbestos-containing materials from Johns-Manville. Dr. Barry Castleman testified that a 1930 publication called Asbestos Magazine included an article on pulmonary asbestosis. According to Castleman, [W]hat the article says is that some attention is being given by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor to pulmonary asbestosis, a disease resulting from exposure to asbestos dust. The bureau urges the establishment of efficient exhaust systems and the introduction of other safety methods.

It goes on to say the disease has been noted in England and much has been written concerning it but this is the first time to our knowledge that it has been officially discussed in this country. They then go on to talk about British sources describing clinical and chest x-ray appearance in fifteen cases of pulmonary asbestosis and concludes by saying it is said that asbestos dust causes a pulmonary fibrosis attacking the bases of the lungs and like silicosis it is frequently complicated by tuberculosis____ ⁵¹ Dr. Castleman testified that a number of companies that mine and manufacture asbestos products, including JohnsManville, had advertised in that issue of Asbestos Magazine. We believe a reasonable inference could then be drawn that Johns-Manville knew or should have known of the contents of this article. A jury also could reasonably infer that Porter Hayden could have discovered this information about the hazards of asbestos “by utilizing the peculiar opportunity and competence which [it] has or should have as a dealer in” asbestos-containing products.

Woolley, supra. The discovery could have come through discussions with its primary supplier, Johns-Manville, or through reading the article itself. The trial judge did not err in denying Porter Hayden’s motion for judgment in the Balbos case. B. Cause-in-Fact Most of the appellants point out that there was no evidence that Sutton Knuckles, as an “erector,” personally worked with any asbestos-containing insulation products, or that he ever saw the cartons or containers in which appellants’ products were delivered to the shipyard.

Thus, the appellants argue, “[T]here simply is no rational basis from which it can be inferred that warnings on appellants’] products or product containers would effectively warn and protect Mr. Knuckles from airborne asbestos fibers emitted by appellants’] product during use.” Celotex makes a similar argument, but its argument appears to apply to both Knuckles and Balbos. All of the appellants, therefore, contend that the appellees failed to provide sufficient evidence that appellants’ failure to place warnings on their asbestos-containing products was a cause-in-fact of the decedents’ injuries. Appellees respond by arguing that if the appellants had placed warnings on their asbestos-containing products, insulators and others working directly with these materials would have been prompted to wear protective equipment. According to appellees, Knuckles would have seen the insu ⁵² lators with their protective equipment and taken precautions to protect himself.

Thus, the failure to place warnings on the products was a cause-in-fact of the decedents’ injuries. We agree with appellees’ reasoning and hold the evidence was sufficient to establish that the lack of a warning was a cause-in-fact of the injuries. 7. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in respect to the defense of contributory negligence. As we noted above, Eagle-Picher contends that there was no proof that the decedents were in a position to read and react to the warnings Eagle-Picher began to place on its products in 1964, and that the absence of a warning label earlier, therefore, was not a legal cause of appellees’ claimed harm.

Eagle-Picher argues, however, that if the court believes there is sufficient evidence to support an inference that Knuckles 16 may have been in a position to observe warnings had they been in place pre-1964, such would certainly be the case post-1964 and to the extent that Dr. Daum’s testimony that “Every exposure contributes” is given any credibility whatsoever, the jury should have been allowed to find that [Knuckles’s] post-1964 failure to see, read and heed Eagle-Picher’s warning constituted contributory negligence. Thus, Eagle-Picher argues, the court’s refusal to give a contributory negligence instruction in the Knuckles case was error. The flaw in this argument is that we do not believe Knuckles (or Balbos) was in a position to see warnings no matter when they were placed on Eagle-Picher’s products. As we noted in our discussion of whether appellants’ failure to place warnings on their products was a cause-in-fact of the decedents’ injuries, Knuckles would not have learned of ⁵³ the products’ dangers from warnings on the packages.

Rather, he would have learned of the dangers when he saw those who worked directly with the products don respirators and other protective equipment. Thus, Knuckles could not have “fail[ed] to see, read and heed” the warnings Eagle-Picher placed on its products after 1964, as the company contends. The trial judge was correct in refusing to give the contributory negligence instruction. 8. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the focus of their analysis of allegedly culpable conduct should be confined to conduct at and before plaintiff’s last mesothelioma-producing exposure to asbestos.

Appellant Eagle-Picher contends that “[t]he trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the focus of their analysis of allegedly culpable conduct should be confined to conduct at and before Plaintiff[s’] last mesothelioma-producing exposure to asbestos.” According to Eagle-Picher, the court also erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was to evaluate defendants’ duty, if any, to warn “bystanders,” such as Balbos and Knuckles, rather than workers who actually “used” the products. With regard to the duty to warn, Eagle-Picher requested that the court instruct the jury as follows: 17 To show breach of duty to warn plaintiffs must show such defendant, one, knew or had reason to know that it caused or was likely to subject bystanders such as Knuckles and Balbos to a risk of mesothelioma; two, defendant had no reason to believe that those who were exposed to the products would realize its dangerous conditions; and, three, the defendant failed to exercise rea ⁵⁴ sonable care to inform those exposed to the product of the dangerous condition of the product or the facts which made it likely to be dangerous. In determining whether any defendant breached a duty to warn you must consider what a reasonable manufacturer or supplier of a particular asbestos product should have provided in terms of warnings and precautions in view of the hazard at and before the time of the plaintiffs’ last mesothelioma-producing asbestos exposure. Compliance with suggested standards, regulations or recommendations may be considered by you as evidence of whether or not a defendant was free of negligence in marketing and labeling its product.

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, appellants requested that the court instruct the jury with regard to punitive damages as follows: In evaluating plaintiffs’ punitive damage claim you must only consider conduct which occurred at or before each plaintiffs last mesothelioma-producing exposure to a particular defendant’s product. Anything done after that date may only be considered to the extent it bears upon earlier conduct within the relevant punitive damages time frame. Thus, even if you find that a particular defendant committed a bad act for which punitive damages would be appropriate, no such damages may be awarded if the act was committed after plaintiffs’ last mesothelioma-producing asbestos exposure. (Emphasis added.) The instructions the trial judge gave on the issues of duty to warn and punitive damages were as follows: A manufacturer or a supplier of a product is negligent if it knew or through the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the product was or was likely to be dangerous to the persons whom it reasonably expected to use the product, had no reason to believe that those ⁵⁵ persons would know of the danger and failed to warn them of that danger. * * * * * * Now, in order for there to be a right to punitive damages, in order for the plaintiffs to have the right to recover punitive damages, there must be conduct of an extraordinary and outrageous nature.

That is, there must be wanton and reckless conduct. Wanton and reckless conduct is more than mere negligence. Wanton and reckless conduct requires direct evidence of substantial knowledge on the part of the manufacturer that the product is or is likely to become dangerous and a gross indifference to that danger. Eagle-Picher contends that the court’s refusal to give the requested instructions constituted reversible error.

We disagree. As to the language regarding the “last mesothelioma-producing asbestos exposure,” we believe that our recent decision in Myers v. Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124 , 560 A.2d 59 (1989), is controlling. We said in that case that “[a] litigant is entitled to have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury if that theory is a correct exposition of the law and if there is evidence in the case that supports the theory.” Id. at 130-31 , 560 A.2d 59 (citing The Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186 , 401 A.2d 651 (1979) (emphasis added). We do not believe that Eagle-Picher’s instruction regarding the “last mesothelioma-producing asbestos exposure” is a correct exposition of the law.

While no Maryland court has addressed this precise issue, Judge Marshall A. Levin, the asbestos judge/master for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, denied an asbestos-producing defendant’s motion in limine to preclude state of the art evidence after the date of the last exposure to the defendant’s product. In his order, Judge Levin relied heavily on Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235 , 744 P.2d 605 (1987), which is instructive. In Lockwood the evidence showed that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos in his work in shipyards in Washington State from 1942 until his disability retirement in 1972. In ⁵⁶ that year, he ceased regular smoking, having been a habitual smoker since his teen years, but he occasionally smoked a cigarette thereafter.

Lockwood was diagnosed as having asbestosis in 1979. One of the defendant manufacturers in Lockwood , Ray-mark Industries, Inc. (Raymark), argued that evidence of its knowledge of the dangers of asbestos which it acquired after Lockwood’s retirement was irrelevant because, it contended, there was no continuing duty to warn Lockwood of the dangers of asbestos after he was no longer exposed to the product. In concluding that evidence of Raymark’s post-1972 knowledge was relevant, the Supreme Court of Washington stated: We believe that where a person’s susceptibility to the danger of a product continues after that person’s direct exposure to the product has ceased, the manufacturer still has a duty after exposure to exercise reasonable care to warn the person of known dangers, if the warning could help to prevent or lessen the harm. Such a warning should be required to the extent practicable.

Thus, it will depend on the circumstances if a warning to previous users of the product must be made by direct personal contact with such users. Alternative warning methods which may be reasonable in a given situation might include notices to physicians or advertisements. In this case, in view of the expert testimony at trial that asbestos remains in the lungs long after exposure and that cigarette smoking aggravates asbestosis, we believe that if Raymark had made a reasonable effort to provide Lockwood with the information it acquired about the dangers of asbestos exposure after his retirement, the seriousness of his injury might have been reduced. Under these circumstances, Raymark had a continuing duty to warn Lockwood of the known dangers of its product after he was no longer exposed to it____ 744 P.2d at 619 .

The appellants in the case before us, including EaglePicher, owed a similar duty to exercise reasonable care to ⁵⁷ warn Balbos and Knuckles of the dangers of asbestos long after the two men had their last mesothelioma-producing exposures. As appellees correctly point out, if the decedents had been apprised of the dangers to their health, they might have sought medical treatment sooner and thus, perhaps, prolonged their lives. 18 The trial court’s decision not to use the word “bystanders” in its duty to warn instruction, as Eagle-Picher had requested, also did not constitute reversible error. We recognize that there is a difference between the words “bystander” and “user.” We also realize that the evidence clearly showed that the decedents were bystanders. The trial judge, therefore, would have been better advised to instruct the jury on the duty that manufacturers owe to such bystanders.

As it turns out, however, the judge’s failure to use the proper word made no difference. We explain. We note that manufacturers are no longer liable for negligence only to users and consumers of their products. They also are liable to those whom the manufacturer should expect to be endangered by the products’ probable use.

W. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 100, at 703 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965)). “There is no longer any doubt that the negligence liability extends to any lawful use of the thing supplied, as well as to a mere bystander____” Id. See also Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 554 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (cologne ⁵⁸ manufacturer was negligent in failing to place on cologne bottle a warning that cologne was highly flammable; manufacturer liable to bystander burned when her friend poured cologne on burning candle). Because Eagle-Picher and the other defendants owed the same duty to bystanders such as Balbos and Knuckles as they owed to users of their products, it made no difference that the trial judge spoke of “persons whom [a manufacturer’] reasonably expected to use the product,” rather than “persons whom a manufacturer reasonably expected to be bystanders near where the product was used.” We also observe that the jury had heard weeks of testimony clearly showing that the two decedents did not actually handle, or “use,” the asbestos-containing products. It would have been obvious to anyone in the courtroom that Balbos and Knuckles were “bystanders.” It was clear that the persons to whom appellants owed, or did not owe, a duty to warn were the decedents, not some unnamed “users” of the products.

As Chief Judge Stedman Prescott opined in Hartman v. Meadows, 243 Md. 158 , 220 A.2d 555 (1966): The average jury of today is composed of intelligent people. For the main part, they generally know and understand what is going on in a trial, and realize the purport of the judge’s charge. It is unnecessary, in order not to be misleading or confusing, for the court to set forth in minute detail the limitations of every conceptual interpretation that might be placed upon his charge. The purpose of oral charges is to tell the jury in simple words what the law is in the case before them, and we will not be too particular in criticizing the words used if the result be sufficient.

Lloyd v. Yellow Cab Co., 220 Md. 488 [ 154 A.2d 906 ] [ (1959) ]. Id. at 163 , 220 A.2d 555 . See also Lundgren v. FernoWashington Co., 80 Md.App. 522, 531 , 565 A.2d 335 (1989). The result of the trial judge’s instruction was sufficient. ⁵⁹ Finally, we observe that counsel for Eagle-Picher did not mention the distinction between the terms “user” and “bystander” during the arguments surrounding the motions for judgment and the renewed motions for judgment.

It appears that Eagle-Picher did not deem the distinction worthy of mention until after the jury instructions had been given. We perceive no error in the trial court’s refusal to give either the failure to warn instruction or the punitive damages instruction that Eagle-Picher requested. 9. The trial court erred in failing to give appellants’ requested instructions on the sophisticated user and superseding cause defenses. Appellants Owens-Illinois and Pittsburgh Corning manufactured asbestos-containing products and sold them to Bethlehem Steel.

They were defendants in the Knuckles case. Appellants ACandS and Porter Hayden installed asbestos-containing products at Bethlehem Steel shipyards. ACandS was a defendant in the Knuckles case while Porter Hayden was a defendant in both the Balbos and Knuckles cases. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to give appellants’ requested instructions on the sophisticated purchaser and superseding cause defenses.

Sophisticated Purchaser The sophisticated purchaser defense relieves a supplier of its duty to give direct warnings to the employees of a purchaser, when the giving of such direct warnings is not feasible and the purchaser knows of the dangers posed by the use of the supplier’s product in the workplace. The appellants allege that Bethlehem Steel was a sophisticated or knowledgeable industrial purchaser aware of the dangers associated with the use of asbestos-containing products. They claim that because Bethlehem Steel was a knowledgeable industrial purchaser, appellants acted reasonably in relying on Bethlehem Steel to protect its employees and thus were relieved of any duty to warn the employees ⁶⁰ independently of the dangers associated with the asbestos-containing products supplied by the appellants. The Court of Appeals has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965), as an authoritative statement of the “reasonableness” standard applied in failure to warn cases under all three theories of negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability.

Dechello v. Johnson Enter., 74 Md.App. 228, 236 , 536 A.2d 1203 (1988) (failure to warn claim brought against an importer who supplied a retailer with the bottle of sparkling wine, out of which allegedly flew a plastic stopper, which injured the plaintiff); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 544 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (failure to warn claim brought against a manufacturer of cologne that exploded when it was dripped on a lit candle). The sophisticated purchaser defense relates to clause (c) of Restatement § 388. Section 388 in pertinent part states: Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. If established by the evidence, this defense negates the essential element of liability that the defendant supplier 19 failed to exercise reasonable care to warn the ultimate user of the product or those endangered by its ultimate use. ⁶¹ Appellants cite two cases to support their position that the sophisticated purchaser defense applies in this case, Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F.Supp. 552, 557 (W.D. Va.1984), aff'd sub nom.

Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.1985); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (D.Md.1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir.1988). Goodbar involved the delivery of silica sand to a foundry via unpackaged railroad car lots. In Goodbar the court applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, focusing on the requirements of clause (c), to determine “whether the Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in relying upon the Foundry to supply its employees with the necessary information to satisfy the duty to warn.” Goodbar, 591 F.Supp. at 557 . The court found that the danger was clearly known to the purchaser/employer and that only the Foundry was in a position to communicate an effective warning to its employees.

Id. at 566 . The court held that the supplier of silica-containing products did not have a duty to warn foundry employees about the dangerous characteristics of silica products. In Higgins fire fighters exposed to glycol-ether-acetate-based paint at a Baltimore fire station brought a products liability suit against the paint manufacturer (Dupont) and the manufacturer’s chemical suppliers (Eastman and Union Carbide) for failure to warn the purchaser’s employees about the possible teratogenic effects of Imron paint which plaintiffs claimed caused the death of their offspring. Higgins, 671 F.Supp. at 1058 .

The court opined that the Court of Appeals of Maryland would recognize the sophisticated user/bulk supplier defense with regard to both negligent and strict liability failure to warn claims, given that the defense logically follows from section 388. Id. at 1059 . The court restated the “essential premise of this defense: There is no duty on product suppliers to warn ultimate users (whether employees or customers) of product-related hazards in products supplied in bulk to a knowledgeable user. The corollary ... is that this is is [sic] especially the case when the knowledgeable industrial purchaser is the ⁶² only one in a position to communicate an effective warning to the ultimate user.” Id. at 1061 .

The court granted the suppliers summary judgment based on the sophisticated user/bulk supplier defense on the basis of its findings that: Eastman and Union Carbide supplied in bulk, via railroad tank cars and tank trucks, vast amounts of liquid chemicals which were subsequently reprocessed and repackaged by Dupont ... rendering these bulk suppliers unable ... to communicate any warning to the ultimate purchasers. [And these suppliers] reasonably relied on the knowledgeable industrial purchaser DuPont to warn customers____ Id. at 1062 . In the instant case, the trial court (Judge Marshall Levin serving as the motions judge), in granting the plaintiffs’ motion to exclude evidence of the sophisticated purchaser defense, correctly distinguished these cases from the instant case. The former cases dealt with suppliers of products delivered in bulk via railroad cars where the supplier as a practical matter had no opportunity to effectively warn the ultimate user. In Goodbar , the silica-containing sand was unloaded from the railroad cars at the Foundry onto conveyer belts and taken to storage silos.

Likewise in Higgins , the chemicals were delivered in tank cars, unloaded, and mixed with many other ingredients to make the paint product which was then packaged, labelled and sold by the manufacturer to the consumer. In the case sub judice, however, the asbestos-containing products were delivered by the appellants to Bethlehem Steel in their original containers, i.e., bags, cartons, cans, and other packages and placed in warehouses. The evidence presented at trial indicated that the quantity required for a job determined the form in which the product was delivered to the work site. In any case, the storage room and warehouse employees handled the original containers and on occasion so did other workers.

The appellees argue that Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied sub nom. ⁶³ Oman v. H.K. Parker, 474 U.S. 970 , 106 S.Ct. 351 , 88 L.Ed.2d 319 (1985), another asbestos case, is apposite. Judge Levin found Oman persuasive and so do we. In Oman the plaintiffs were shipyard workers who claimed to have contracted asbestosis after being exposed to asbestos fibers in the course of their employment for Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company. Id. at 226.

The Court, in determining whether the district court “should have charged the jury that the manufacturer’s duty to warn the ultimate users ... is satisfied if a sophisticated employer is aware of the dangers involved in the use of the product,” discussed the various factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 comment n. Oman, 764 F.2d at 233 . Comment n to section 388 provides six factors for the court to balance in determining what precautions a manufacturer or supplier of a product must take to satisfy the requirement of reasonable care stated in § 388(c): (1) the dangerous condition of the product (2) the purpose for which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4) the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary information about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and (6) the burdens imposed upon the supplier by requiring that he directly warn all users. Oman, 764 F.2d at 233 .

In Oman the court concluded that the product was very dangerous because it contained asbestos fibers; the burden on the manufacturer of placing a warning on the product was not great; the employer was unaware of the danger until 1964; and that once the employer became aware of the potential danger it failed to convey its knowledge to its employees.