Earl v. Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc.
- Whether the Court should remand the case without affirmance or reversal pursuant to Maryland Rule 871 a based on evidence not in the record on appeal.
Barnes, J., dissenting: Although I am personally sympathetic to the difficulty in which the appellant finds himself in this case, I must dissent because, in my opinion, he is not entitled to have us remand the case without affirmance or reversal pursuant to Maryland Rule 871 a. As I indicated in my recent dissent in State v. Giles, 245 Md. 660 , 229 A. 2d 97 (1967), the proper construction of Rule 871 a is that the reason for the remand without affirmance or reversal must appear from the record in the case before us, and not from evidence, newly discovered or otherwise, which is not in the record on appeal. There is nothing in the Rule which permits us to take additional testimony on appeal or to consider new evidence or other matters by agreement or acquiescence of counsel. Indeed, to do this results in a departure by us from the appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court of Appeals by the Maryland Constitution and statutes, and results in a trespass by us upon the nisi prius jurisdiction vested by the Constitution and statutes in other courts.
We have quite enough appellate judicial business without assuming any part of the original jurisdiction of the lower courts. I developed my ideas in this regard in the Giles dissent and no more need be said about this aspect of the matter here. In my opinion, the majority of the Court was in error in its decision on the motion to remand under Rule 871 a in Fletcher v. Havre de Grace Fireworks Co., 229 Md. 196 , 183 A. 2d 386 (1962). My views on this unprecedented action by the Court 661 fully concur with the excellent dissenting opinion in Fletcher by Chief Judge Bruñe, concurred in by Prescott and Marbury, JJ.
With respect, I fear that the decision in Fletcher is an example of the maxim that “hard cases make bad law.” In any event, I think that the holding in Fletcher should be strictly confined to the unusual situation in that case, and should not be extended. The result in 11 other similar cases, by stipulation, depended upon the result in Fletcher and many other persons who had suffered personal injuries or damage to their property from the explosion of the fireworks factory had deferred filing suit until the appeal in Fletcher had been decided. The evidence said to justify an amendment of the declaration in Fletcher was alleged to have been discovered after the filing of the original declaration. These extraordinary facts did indeed present a “hard” case to this Court.
In the present case, no other cases depend upon our decision. There is no showing that the facts which appear in the proposed amended declaration (which, in my opinion, should not be before us for consideration) were not known or discoverable when the original declaration was filed, although this may have been the situation. In my opinion, it would be far better for the appellant to proceed with a new action and that we affirm the ruling on demurrer of the trial court, which is admittedly correct in view of our decision in White v. King, 244 Md. 348 , 223 A. 2d 763 (1966).