Eastern Correctional Institution v. Howe

CATHELL, Judge. Appellant, Eastern Correctional Institution, 1 appeals from the granting of Peter Michael Howe’s, appellee’s, motion to dismiss its administrative appeal by the Circuit Court for Somerset County (Long, J., presiding). Appellant presents one question, which we rephrase as: Does the Commissioner of Correction lack the authority to impose direct disciplinary demotions on employees appointed by wardens of a particular correctional facility? As the only issue before us relates to a matter of law, we briefly summarize the facts.

Appellee, an employee of the Eastern Correctional Institution, was placed on probation before judgment in a criminal court proceeding for two criminal offenses. He promptly informed the warden of the institution. The warden then recommended (for reasons not pertinent here) that appellee not be demoted. The warden’s superior, the Commissioner of Correction, nevertheless recommended to the Secretary of Personnel that appellee be demoted.

Appellee appealed and an administrative law judge held that the Commissioner lacked direct authority to recommend demotion and proposed to dismiss the demotion action. Exceptions to the administrative law judge’s proposed decision were taken by appellant. The Secretary’s properly designated official concluded; contrary to the ALJ’s proposed findings, that the Commissioner did have such authority and ordered that appellee be demoted. Appellee then appealed that decision to the circuit court.

The trial court agreed with the ALJ that the Commissioner lacked direct authority to demote appellee and ordered that the decision of the Secretary of Personnel (her designee) “be ... reversed.” This appeal then ensued. One of the determinative factors involves the meaning and effect of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum. ¹⁷⁰ Supp.), Art. 27 § 684(b)(2), which now provides in relevant part: The warden or superintendent of each institution is the appointing officer for employees of that institution, and the Commissioner is the appointing officer for all other employees in the Department. Subsection (b)(1) provides that all officers and employees of the Department shall be appointed and removed ... in accordance with the provisions of the State Personnel Article that govern the classified service. We shall shortly review the prior versions of this subsection to see if something other than what its clear language indicates was intended.

First, we shall discuss the rules relating to statutory construction and then attempt to apply those lessons to the statutes here involved. The Court noted in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seidel Chevrolet, Inc., 326 Md. 237, 248-49 , 604 A.2d 473 (1992): We have stated time and time again that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. In our quest to divine the Legislature’s intent, we have also explained: “There is no doubt that the beginning point of statutory construction is the language of the statute itself.... When we look at the statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all the words in the statute.

And sometimes it may not be necessary to go further than the scrutiny of statutory language, for the language itself may be sufficiently expressive of the legislative purpose or goal. But our endeavor is always to seek out the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be accomplished, the evils to be redressed by a particular enactment. In the conduct of that enterprise, we are not limited to study of the statutory language. The plain meaning rule ‘“is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention____”’ The ‘meaning of the plainest language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears. ¹⁷¹ Thus, we always are free to look at the context within which statutory language appears.

Even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, we are not ‘precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal’ of the law.” [Citations omitted.] See Ayres v. Townsend, 324 Md. 666, 672 , 598 A.2d 470 (1991) (“[0]ur goal is to ascertain ... the intention of the legislature ____ [Unambiguous ... words will be accorded their ordinary meaning.” (citation omitted)); State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421 , 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 , 96 S.Ct. 1680 , 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976) (“[T]he language of the statute ... constitutes the primary source for determining the legislative intent. Where there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intention.... ” (citations omitted.)). [W]here statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, courts are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning. Id. at 421-22, 348 A.2d 275 . See also Police Comm’r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418-20 , 379 A.2d 1007 (1977), and Columbia Road Citizens’ Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 98 Md.App. 695, 702 , 635 A.2d 30 (1994) (“[Statutes should be interpreted according to their plain language, ... all parts should be construed in harmony, as a whole.”).

Compare Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987); and State v. 149 Slot Machines, 310 Md. 356 , 529 A.2d 817 (1987), where the Court held that slot machines were not included within a statutory phrase “any other gaming device.” In construing the meaning of the language of Art. 27 § 684(b), we must first note that its correct interpretation is of additional importance in light of its relationship with the State Personnel and Pension Article provisions. We explain. ¹⁷² Section 4-604 of the State Personnel and Pension Article authorizes appeals to the Secretary of Personnel in matters regarding the demotion of employees in the classified service. The statute requires that “[t]he appointing authority immediately shall enforce a final decision issued under this section.” § 4-604(e). COMAE 06.01.01.02.41A(5) states, in part, that “[t]he appointing authority shall enforce the decision.” That same regulation initially provides that “[a]n appointing authority may submit to the Secretary a written recommendation for the demotion.... ” COMAE 06.01.01.02.41A(1).

It then provides “the ... authority shall enforce the decision.” COMAE 06.01.01.02.41A(5). The Eevisor’s note to § 4-604 of the statute directs the reader to § 1-101 for a definition of “appointing authority.” That section defines “Appointing authority” as an individual or a unit of government that has the power to make appointments and terminate employment. § 1—101(b). The Eevisor’s note to § 1—101(b) points out that the term “unit of government” was substituted for the former references to a “person” for clarity. The term “person”, as defined in subsection (h)[ 2 ] ... expressly excludes governmental ... units. [A] ... governmental unit ... might well be designated by some other law as an appointing authority.

Accordingly, the term “unit” is necessary to accommodate that situation. [Emphasis added.] Thus, as we perceive these statutes, the term “appointing authority” contemplates a person with authority to make appointments, or a unit of government that has been given that express authority by statute. Appellant (and, for that matter, appellee) asserts that Article 27 § 684(b) and the State Personnel and Pension Article section must be considered in light of the Department’s regulation that states that: ¹⁷³ an appointing authority may submit to the Secretary a written recommendation for the demotion of an employee, and shall provide the employee with a copy. This regulation apparently is intended to comport with subsection (b) of Section 4-604, which provides that requests or recommendations must be made “on written charges submitted to the Secretary.” Moreover, COMAR' 06.01.01.01B(1) defines appointing authority as “a person who has the power to make appointments and to terminate employment.” We have set forth the various sections of the two statutes and their relationships in order to show (as we shall, infra) how their relationship has evolved since the legislature’s initial decision in 1962 to change the nature of the duties and responsibilities of various officials in the corrections system. In other words, the COMAR regulations are a reaction to both statutes.

Article 27 § 684(b) and its predecessor statutes, however, defined “appointing authority” and the duties of wardens long prior to the applicability of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (or its predecessor, Md.Code Art. 64A) or the regulations at issue here. 3 Prior to the 1962 amendments, the comparable section was found in Md.Code (1957), Art. 27 § 685. It did not contain language comparable to the present section 684(b). It noted, rather, that [t]he said wardens shall each for the respective institutions employ, with the approval of said, Board [of Correction] ... such other employees as may to said Board seem necessary for the proper management of said institutions. The said wardens and all persons employed by them ... shall perform their employment only during the pleasure of said Board....

Thus, at that time, the then equivalent to the present Commissioner of Correction had the power of employment approval over all employees at an institution and all of them served at the “pleasure of the Board.” That Board, by ¹⁷⁴ statute, had direct appointment approval and direct termination authority over all employees. That section, as relevant to this case, was substantially and substantively changed by Chapter 123 of the Laws of 1962, a comprehensive revision of the correction statute to its current form. As codified, the pertinent language of that revision, section 684(b), reads: The warden ... of each institution is the appointing officer for employees of that institution, and the Commissioner is the appointing officer for all other employees in the Department. The prior language affording to the Board of Correction employment approval and direct termination authority is conspicuously absent in the 1962 revision.

Looking only to the change in the language of the sections, ie., that which was deleted, it is clear that the former direct authority of' the Board was intentionally changed to an indirect overview of a warden’s employment practices. A statutory chain of command system, as it were, was substituted for the previous direct management of employees by the Board {ie., the Commissioner). Chapter 123 of the Acts of 1962 was a comprehensive revision of the correction statutes. Its purposes section notes, that it was intended as a revision and that it was to provide “generally for the operation, administration and control of the Department of Correction, the several penal ... institutions ... and the officers and employees thereof ... and relating generally] to the Department ..., its officers, employees, powers, duties, responsibilities, functions.... ” The Act also then provided, in section 682(b), that a warden [s]ubject to Departmental policy as established from time to time by the Commissioner ... is in sole and direct charge of his institution, and it is his duty to supervise the ... discipline, and policy of his institution and to enforce all orders and regulations of the department. [Emphasis added.] ¹⁷⁵ We have not found any comparable language to that established above in the prior statute.

The language added to the statute by the 1962 amendment is still contained in current section 682(b). Thus, the statute still states that a warden is in “sole and direct charge.” Section 684(b) was amended by Chapter 662 of the Laws of 1976. The amendment dealt with the appointment and removal of employees, while leaving the status of the warden as an appointing authority unchanged. It made the appointment and removal of employees subject to then Art. 64A, the predecessor statute to the State Personnel and Pension Article.

Even then, despite the obvious opportunity, when dealing with appointment and removal matters, to change a warden’s status, that 1976 amendment did not do so. At that time, the only relevant references in Art. 64A to an appointing authority were found in section 1, “Definitions” (“ ‘Appointing authority’ means any commission, board or officer having power to make appointments.”), and section 33, “Separation of employees,” that provided, in part: The appointing authority may ... reject any person [for appointment to a classified position] ... upon statement ... of the cause for rejection.... No employee ... may be permanently removed ... except ... upon written charges.... Such charges may be filed by the appointing authority or by any citizen, provided ... that no such charges may be filed by a citizen, without the consent of the appointing authority or of the Secretary. ...

Section 36, “Suspension,” provided that “[t]he appointing authority may ... suspend an employee---- [A]ny employee who is suspended by the appointing authority may appeal ... to the Secretary of Personnel.... With respect to his [the Secretary of Personnel] employees the Secretary shall be deemed the appointing authority....” The last substantive change to Art. 27, § 684(b) occurred by the comprehensive revision in 1962. That revision, as we have said, changed the direct authority of the then Board to an ¹⁷⁶ indirect chain of authority over a warden’s decision. It, first, in § 682(b), legislated that “the warden ... is in sole and direct charge of his institution, and it is his duty to supervise the ... discipline, and policy of his institution and to enforce all orders and regulations of the department.” Then the act . provided that wardens would be the appointing authority as to their institutions, then expressly stating, as now, that “the Commissioner is the appointing officer for all other employees____” § 684(b) (emphasis added).

In respect to the present statute, Art. 27 § 684(b), having considered its legislative history, we conclude that (1) it is not ambiguous in the first instance; (2) a review of the legislative history establishes that the legislature intended it to mean exactly what its language encompasses—a transfer of direct authority over appointments and discipline in the respective places of incarceration to the wardens, designating them as “appointing authorities;” and (3) wardens, in respect to the employees within their institutions, are the appointing authorities. Moreover, our review of the provisions of the State Personnel and Pensions Article reveals that it requires the appointing authority to take certain steps and, as we have indicated, defines an appointing authority as “an individual or a unit of government that has the power to make appointments and terminate employment.” § l-101(b) (emphasis added). We have previously noted that the term “unit of government” was added to avoid conflict with another section if a unit of