Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson

COLE, Judge. At the circuit court appeal stage of workmen’s compensation proceedings, an employer and its insurer impleaded the Subsequent Injury Fund (“the Fund”—see Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 66). Pursuant to Art. 101, § 66(5), the circuit court then remanded the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (“the Commission”) in order to afford the Fund an opportunity to defend the claim. Following an award in favor of the employee, the Fund appealed to the circuit court (which appeal named the employee, the employer and its insurers as defendants), and ⁴⁹⁵ the clerk of the court entered the Fund’s appeal as a new case on the circuit court’s docket.

Approximately two years later, the Fund’s appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution under former Maryland Rule 530 (now Rule 2-507). The question we must resolve here is whether the circuit court which heard the employer/insurer’s initial appeal retains jurisdiction over the case it remanded, so that the employer and the insurer may maintain their initial appeal despite the dismissal of the Fund’s appeal. In order to place the issue in its proper focus, we shall set forth the facts with more particularity. George Edward Nicholson, employed as an inspector by Eastern Stainless Steel (“the employer”), sustained an injury while at work on June 9, 1977, when the soles of his feet blistered as the result of standing on a hot metal plate.

The injury apparently aggravated an existing health problem of Nicholson’s (diabetes mellitus), and as a result of the injury and secondary infection, Nicholson suffered several more severe health problems. He has been unable to work since shortly after the injury. Nicholson filed a claim with the Commission, and on October 18, 1977, a hearing was held, during which the employer contested Nicholson’s claim on the issue of accidental injury. On February 3, 1978, the Commissioner issued an award of compensation to Nicholson.

Thereafter, the employer and the insurer appealed the award to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and the case was entered as No. 97634 on the circuit court’s docket. On June 4, 1979, Judge John E. Raine, Jr., granted the employer’s and the insurer’s motion to implead the Subsequent Injury Fund, and the circuit court entered an order suspending further proceedings and remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings (pursuant to Art. 101, § 66(5)). 1 ⁴⁹⁶ On August 21,1981, a second hearing was held before the Commission, in which both the Fund and the employer/insurer participated. Again, the Commission confirmed that Nicholson did sustain an accidental injury in the course of employment, and it awarded compensation to Nicholson. From this award, the Fund appealed.

In its appeal to the circuit court, the Fund named both Nicholson and the employer/insurer as defendants. Although the Fund’s appeal was filed with docket No. 97634 on its caption, the clerk of the circuit court created a new file for the Fund’s appeal—entered as case No. 108484. The employer/insurer filed an answer in the case, which answer contained the original case number, 97634. ⁴⁹⁷ On May 4, 1983, some 18 months after the appeal had been filed, notice was given to all parties in case No. 108484 of a contemplated dismissal of the case pursuant to former Maryland Rule 530. On May 12, 1983, the Fund filed a motion to suspend the operation of Rule 530, which motion was denied by Judge Raine, thereby dismissing case No. 108484.

Soon thereafter, the employer and the insurer filed a motion to reinstate case No. 97634 on the trial docket. Judge Raine signed an order reinstating the case, but later that day he rescinded his order as improperly entered. On July 15, 1983, Nicholson filed a motion to dismiss case No. 97634, and this motion was granted. The employer and insurer appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which in Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md.App. 659 , 484 A.2d 296 (1984) affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the case.

We granted the employer/insurer’s petition for certiorari to resolve the novel issue presented. Appellants’ argument is deceptively straightforward. Appellants assert that Art. 101, § 66(5), which provides for a remand of the case to the Commission when the Subsequent Injury Fund is impleaded at the circuit court stage, also provides that the circuit court shall “suspend further proceedings.” The word “suspend” argue appellants, means to “put on hold” or to stop temporarily. Thus, appellants posit that because the proceedings before the circuit court are only suspended, the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the case while it has been remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.

Consequently, appellants assert, they may still maintain their initial appeal in circuit court. Appellee counters that the order of Judge Raine sending the case back to the Commission was a remand, and a remand by the circuit court is a final judgment. Thus, the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter following the remand. Furthermore, appellee argues, appellants’ proposed construction of Art. 101, § 66(5) is incon- ⁴⁹⁸ sistent with the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and thus should not be followed: In State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 495-96 , 413 A.2d 557, 560 (1980), we recounted the principles upon which we rely in construing our legislature’s statutes.

As we have stated many times, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the actual intention of the legislature. Board v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384 , 408 A.2d 1017 (1979); Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., 286 Md. 303 , 407 A.2d 738 (1979); S.A.S. Personnel Consult v. Pat-Pan, 286 Md. 335 , 407 A.2d 1139 (1979); Unnamed Physician v. Comm’n., 285 Md. 1 , 400 A.2d 396 (1979). The statutory language itself provides the clearest indication of the legislative intent and is thus the primary source for all statutory construction. Board v. Stephans, supra; Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., supra.

We also adhere to the principle that the court should confine itself to construing the statute according to the ordinary and natural signification of the words used without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations designed to limit or extend the operations of the statute. Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., supra; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84 , 400 A.2d 1091 (1979); Massage Parlors, Inc. v. City of Balto., 284 Md. 490 , 398 A.2d 52 (1979). When the words used convey a clear and plain meaning, there is no need to look beyond the statute to ascertain the legislative intent. Collier v. Connolley, 285 Md. 123 , 400 A.2d 1107 (1979); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, supra, 285 Md. at 93, 400 A.2d 1091 ; Massage Parlors, Inc. v. City of Balto., supra, 284 Md. at 494-95 .

Stated differently, when the statute is free from ambiguity, the court may not disregard the natural impact of the words so as to make the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning. In applying these precepts to the case sub judice, we decline to accept appellants’ interpretation of Art. 101, § 66(5). Article 101, § 66(5) provides, in relevant part, that: ⁴⁹⁹ The fund may be impleaded at any stage of the proceedings, either before the Commission, or on appeal; but if impleaded on appeal from the decision of the Commission or on further appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court shall suspend further proceedings and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings in order to afford the fund an opportunity to defend the claim. [Emphasis supplied.] We agree with appellant that the word “suspend” in § 66(5) means to stop temporarily. The statute makes clear, then, that “further proceedings” must stop temporarily.

What stops temporarily, must necessarily resume again in the future. We disagree with appellant, however, that what the legislature intended to resume are the proceedings before the circuit court. As we see it, when the phrase “suspend further proceedings” is read in context, it becomes clear that the legislature only means to say that the circuit court stops the entire workmen’s compensation proceedings, and remands the cause to the Commission where the proceedings resume before the Commission. An examination of the excerpt from Art. 101, § 66(5) shows that the word “proceedings” is used in this section to mean the entire workmen’s compensation action—from the initial hearing before the Commission to the appeals before the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals.

The language of the statute plainly shows that “the proceedings” has two basic stages: (1) before