Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson

BELL, Judge. If on appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission the Subsequent Injury Fund is impleaded, the court shall suspend further proceedings and remand the case to the Commission. This completes the matter before that court and the case shall return to the body from which it came to allow the Fund to defend. The decision of the Commission on remand becomes the final decision from ⁶⁶² which all further appeals must be taken.

Failure to recognize this resulted in a morass of troubles for these litigants. We need first to look at how these parties arrived at their present posture. George E. Nicholson (Claimant, Appellee) worked for Eastern Stainless Steel (who with Travelers Insurance Company are designated Employer/Insurer, Appellants) as an inspector. On June 9, 1977, while at work, Nicholson was injured when the soles of both feet became blistered as a result of standing on a hot steel plate.

The blisters quickly became infected and Nicholson started to lose time from work. Prior to this incident, Nicholson had been diagnosed as having diabetes mellitus. As a result of the infection, he sustained renal failure and loss of vision which kept him from returning to work. Nicholson ultimately filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. .

At the hearing before the Commission, Employer/Insurer contested the claim based on the issue of accidental injury. The Commission, however, on February 3, 1978, awarded compensation to Claimant for his injuries. Dissatisfied with this result, Employer/Insurer filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“Case 1”). Before the appeal progressed further, Employer/Insurer moved to implead the Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund) pursuant to Md.Code Ann., Art. 101, § 66(5) (1957, 1979 Repl.

Yol., 1984 Cum.Supp.). The Fund was an interested party because Art. 101, § 66 provides that where a preexisting condition (here, diabetes mellitus) contributed to the permanent injury suffered, the Fund may be liable for a portion of the amount awarded. The court granted the motion, suspended the appeal and remanded the case to the Commission. The Employer/Insurer and Claimant participated along with the Fund in a hearing before the Commission.

The Commission again found on October 28, 1981, that Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the ⁶⁶³ course of his employment and that the disability was the result of that injury. The Fund filed an appeal in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“Case 2”), which was docketed separately from “Case 1” and was entitled “Subsequent Injury Fund v. George E. Nicholson, Claimant, Eastern Stainless Steel, Employer and Travelers Insurance Co., Insurer.” The Fund alleged that the Commission erred in not allowing it to call witnesses and in finding that Claimant sustained accidental injury! Employer/Insurer filed an answer in which they did not except to “the language of” any of these allegations. Claimant denied all of the contentions of the Fund.

No further action appears to have been taken in either case from December 9, 1981, until May 4, 1983, when all parties in “Case 2” were sent notice in accordance with Md.Rule 530 1 of a contemplated dismissal for want of prosecution. On May 12, 1983, the Fund moved to suspend operation of Rule 530 in “Case 2.” Employer/Insurer took no action. Claimant opposed the suspension. The court denied the motion on June 6, 1983, and dismissed that appeal.

Employer/Insurer on June 30, 1983, filed a motion to reinstate “Case 1”, the initial appeal. No certificate of service was appended. The same judge who had dismissed “Case 2” signed an order reinstating “Case 1.” Later that very day he rescinded the order, noting “the case was not under Rule 530 notice.” On July 8, 1983, the judge notified counsel for Employer/Insurer that “there obviously was a misunderstanding in this case [“Case 1”] and I think all you need do is ask the Assignment Office to set the case for trial.” ⁶⁶⁴ On July 15, 1983, in “Case 1,” Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there was no dispute as to a material fact and that the issues were rendered moot by the dismissal of the Fund’s appeal in “Case 2.” Employer/Insurer answered and after a hearing the court granted summary judgment which dismissed the appeal in “Case 1.” This determination constitutes the basis for Employer/ Insurer seeking review in this Court. THE REMAND Appellants contend that the dismissal of “Case 2” did not affect “Case 1.” Rather, there were two separate appeals with different parties, and Claimant should have moved to consolidate them if he so desired.

On the other hand, appellee asserts that only one case was involved and relies on Connor v. Celanese Fibers Co., 40 Md.App. 452 , 392 A.2d 116 (1978), for support. Further, while there should have been a consolidation of the two cases, there was only one appeal pending. Hence, because the appeal by the Fund was dismissed, the issue concerning accidental injury is now moot. Appellants and appellee focus their attention on the dismissal of “Case 2” under Md.Rule 530 and whether that affected “Case 1.” We find that focus disregards what had already transpired.

We will consider first the remand which occurred in “Case 1.” That remand followed the initial appeal filed by Employer/Insurer, who thereafter sought to implead the Fund pursuant to Art. 101 § 66(5), which provides: “The fund may be impleaded at any stage of the proceedings, either before the Commission, or on appeal; but if impleaded on appeal from the decision of the Commission or on further appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court shall suspend further proceedings and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings in order to afford the fund an opportunity to defend the claim.” ⁶⁶⁵ THE REMAND AS A FINAL ORDER A remand is defined as “[t]he sending ... of the cause back to the same court out of which it came, for purpose of having some further action taken on it there.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1162 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Under Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. §§ 12-301 and 12-302, as interpreted in Department of Public Safety v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533 , 419 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1980) and reinforced in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), remands to administrative agencies are final and appealable orders. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-301 (1974, 1984 Repl. Yol.) provides in pertinent part: “[A] party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil ... case by a circuit court.” Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12 — 101(f) defines final judgment as “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” This Court and the Court of Appeals have often been called upon to interpret these statutes.

In Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. at 5-6 , 432 A.2d 1319 , the Court of Appeals pointed out that it had “consistently stated that a judgment or order of a court is final when it determines or concludes the rights of parties or when it denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” In LeVan , this Court had dismissed the appeal based on Rule 1035a, which provides: “From Pro Forma Orders. The Court will not entertain or consider an appeal taken from a pro forma order or judgment, but will treat every such appeal as prematurely taken and will dismiss the same whenever it appears on the face of the record, or otherwise, that the appeal is from such pro forma order or judgment.” ⁶⁶⁶ The Court of Appeals agreed in LeVan , that this Court was prohibited from entertaining pro forma orders, judgments or decrees, but in the holding Judge Smith stated: “We have no pro forma order here. This was a contested case. The parties disagreed and the circuit court judge decided the controversy.” 288 Md. at 541 , 419 A.2d 1052 .

LeVan was quickly followed by Schultz v. Pritts, supra. In that opinion written by Judge Davidson, the Court of Appeals held that: “[w]hen a court remands a proceeding to an administrative agency, the matter reverts to the processes of the agency, and there is nothing further for the court to do. Such an order is an appealable final order because it terminates the judicial proceeding and denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights in the judicial proceeding.” 291 Md. at 6 , 432 A.2d 1319 . In Schultz the circuit court determined that there