Eckard v. Eckard

RODOWSKY, Judge. This appeal is from a civil contempt order issued in a divorce action that began in December 1983. The Circuit ⁵³³ Court for Montgomery County ordered the appellant, Marjorie H. Eckard (Marjorie), to sign a power of attorney authorizing her former husband, William E. Eckard (William), to execute in Marjorie’s name and on her behalf the documents necessary for the sale and conveyance of two adjacent, unimproved lots in the City of Cape Coral, Florida. When Marjorie refused to do so she was imprisoned for contempt until released, pending the outcome of this appeal, on a writ of habeas corpus.

Marjorie’s principal contention is that the Maryland court had no jurisdiction to enter an order affecting the title to realty lying outside of Maryland. As we shall see below, for more than 200 years, courts of equity have issued, enforceable by contempt, the type of order presented here. Marjorie initiated the action, asserting claims, inter alia, for divorce a mensa et thoro, for temporary and permanent alimony, for a monetary award based on the identification and valuation of marital property, and for counsel fees. William counterclaimed for divorce a vinculo.

A decree of absolute divorce was entered in June 1985 under which the other claims in the action were reserved for future determination, and those claims were referred to a master. 1 The matter was heard before a master on December 23, 1985. The parties, and their attorneys, were present. Counsel for Marjorie announced that the parties had reached an agreement, resolving all of the open legal issues between them, the terms of which he then orally explained for the record. The Florida land “will be sold by the husband, and the net proceeds divided equally, unless the wife chooses to buy the husband’s one-half, which she may do prior to his selling it.” Counsel explained that William “has agreed that if [Marjorie] wishes to buy the [Florida] lot[s] she may do so by paying half of ninety-five percent of the appraisal value and [William] will undertake to determine what that is.” The ⁵³⁴ parties acknowledged their understanding that they had entered into a present agreement that was not dependent on subsequent written memorialization of its terms.

The agreement was not to be modifiable by any court in the future. The December 1985 agreement was not reduced to writing, and there was no report by the master recommending any order by the court. Nor was the action voluntarily dismissed. It simply remained an open action, without the docket reflecting any activity.

It appears from the facts recited by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported opinion on an appeal in this action, referred to infra, that in early 1986 William obtained an appraisal of $60,000 for the Florida property. It also seems that by letter in January 1987 Marjorie offered $17,500 for William’s half interest, but that that offer was not acceptable. In August 1987, William listed the property with a realtor at $74,900. Counsel for William in September 1987 advised Marjorie of the listing. 2 In February 1988, Marjorie moved in this divorce action for an order • enforcing William’s promise under the December 1985 agreement to pay to her $1,710 per month out of his retirement.

William had not made the payments for November 1987 and succeeding months. Marjorie also alleged that the December 1985 agreement had been obtained by William’s fraudulent understatement of assets. In addition, she requested a qualified domestic relations order (quadro) increasing the payment to her from William’s retirement to $1,804 per month and a monetary award compensating her for the value of marital property fraudulently undisclosed. Before any ruling was made on Marjorie’s motion, in April 1988, buyers offered $74,900 for the Florida property by ⁵³⁵ submitting a signed contract.

William signed it in May. He then sought an order in this action compelling Marjorie to execute documents reasonably required to sell the Florida property or appointing a trustee to sell it. The motions were heard December 9, 1988, on a record consisting of the court file, a transcript of the December 1985 master’s hearing, certain correspondence, the unchallenged factual statements of counsel, and a near hour-long, unsworn statement of facts and of position by Marjorie. By order docketed December 13, 1988, the court made the following rulings: 1.

Marjorie’s Motion to Enforce the Agreement was granted “to the extent that the Agreement reached between the parties on December 23, 1985 is hereby incorporated, but not merged, in the original Decree of Absolute Divorce filed in this cause on June 21, 1985”; 2. Marjorie’s remaining claims for relief were denied; 3. William’s summary judgment motion was granted, requiring Marjorie “to perform all acts and to execute all documents necessary for the sale and settlement” of the Florida property; and 4. In the event Marjorie failed to comply with the order described in ¶ 3, the circuit court “shall, upon motion of [William], appoint a Trustee, resident in the State of Florida, to act in the place and stead of [Marjorie] with respect to the sale and settlement of said lots.... ” Entry of this order on the docket fully adjudicated all of the claims and constituted final judgment in the action.

See Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455 , 413 A.2d 549 (1980). No order for appeal was noted. Rather, on January 12, 1989, Marjorie moved for reconsideration, asserting multiple errors. 3 The motion for reconsideration was denied, and that ⁵³⁶ denial was appealed by Marjorie. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed that appeal by order of August 10, 1989, for failure to file a brief.

Meanwhile, in the circuit court, William by motion filed April 19, 1989, sought the appointment of a trustee to sell the Florida property. Marjorie opposed. By order filed July 31, 1989, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County appointed a Florida attorney as its trustee “to perform all acts and to execute all documents, in the place and stead of [Marjorie], necessary to carry out the sale and settlement” of the Florida lots. Marjorie appealed this order.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed by an unreported opinion, filed June 13, 1990. That court held that Marjorie “did not perform as ordered” by the December 1988 order. Paragraph four of that order had anticipated the appointment of a trustee, but the Court of Special Appeals did not reach the merits of paragraph four in Marjorie’s earlier, dismissed appeal. The intermediate appellate court, in its June 1990 opinion, concluded that, “regardless of the validity of the [December 1988] order ... the circuit court certainly did not abuse its discretion in thereafter appointing a trustee pursuant to its December order.” (Footnote omitted).

Our chronological review now shifts to Florida, where William sued Marjorie in Lee County, the situs of the property. That suit, invoking both comity and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, alleged, inter alia, that “[b]y virtue of the settlement agreement being placed before the [Maryland] Court, the parties have placed their property into the jurisdiction of the Maryland Court____” The Lee County court construed the appointment by the Maryland court of a trustee to act for Marjorie as an attempt to partition Florida realty and held that the Maryland judgment was not entitled ⁵³⁷ to full faith and credit. In February 1991, the Florida court dismissed William’s action. Two months later the prospective purchasers of the Florida lots, who some three years earlier had tendered a signed contract, withdrew their offer, requested a refund of the deposit, and apparently received that refund.

There were some further negotiations between the parties in August 1992. Marjorie offered $28,500 for William’s half interest, on the theory that the valuation date, under their agreement, should be as of 1986 when the property was worth $60,000. William rejected, opining that the present value was approximately $100,000. In September 1992, William petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to find Marjorie in contempt of the December 1988 and July 1989 orders.

That petition proposed that, until Marjorie executed a power of attorney to William under which he could sell the Florida lots, Marjorie be directed to pay into the registry of the court the monthly payments which Marjorie was receiving directly, under a quadro, from William’s retirement. At a hearing on October 26, 1992, the circuit court rejected William’s proposal that Marjorie pay over her quadro income, because the court envisioned that hearings would be required every month. Instead, the circuit court directed Marjorie, under threat of contempt, to execute a power of attorney that counsel for William had prepared. The court gave Marjorie until October 30 to reflect and decide.

When she appeared before the court on October 30, Marjorie advised: “I will refuse to sign a power of attorney to my ex-husband hatchetman.” The court found Marjorie in contempt, ordered her confined “for a period of at least 120 days as of this juncture,” and advised her that she could be released “at any time by simply signing that document.” This appeal followed. Marjorie was released on bail under a writ of habeas corpus. This Court issued the writ of ⁵³⁸ certiorari on its own motion prior to consideration of the matter by the Court of Special Appeals. 4 I The court order which Marjorie refused to obey directed that she sign a limited power of attorney. That order, in turn, was but a particularization of the final and unappealed December 1988 judgment directing Marjorie “to perform all acts and to execute all documents necessary for the sale and settlement of’ the Florida property.

Thus, the scope of review on this appeal from the finding of contempt is narrow. Whether the December 1988 order represented a correct application of the law to the facts is not before us. In Harford County Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ. of Harford County, 281 Md. 574 , 380 A.2d 1041 (1977), school teachers had violated an anti-strike injunction and were fined for criminal contempt.

In discussing the scope of review on the teachers’ appeal from the contempt order, we said: “A party enjoined may not violate the terms of an injunction and then attack the injunction collaterally in a contempt proceeding, civil or criminal. Only a complete lack of jurisdiction in the court to grant the injunction and not merely error in granting it could avail a party.” Id. at 585-86 , 380 A.2d at 1048 (citation omitted). See also Save-Mor Drugs, Bethesda, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 225 Md. 187, 190-91 , 170 A.2d 223, 225 (1961) (same). Shapiro v. Ryan, 233 Md. 82 , 195 A.2d 596 (1963), in contrast, reversed an orphans’ court adjudication of contempt because a circuit court had assumed jurisdiction over the case and had thereby deprived the orphans’ court of its authority.

Id. at 86-87 , 195 A.2d at 599 . Nevertheless, were the orphans’ court order that was disobeyed “merely erroneous due ⁵³⁹ to a mistaken view of the facts or to a mistaken view of the law,” an adjudication of contempt “will ordinarily be upheld.” Id. at 86 , 195 A.2d at 598 . In the instant matter Marjorie questions whether the December 1988 order correctly applied the law. She submits that the agreement reached before the master in December 1985 was silent as to incorporation of its terms into any decree and that, absent mutual authorization, incorporation may not be accomplished, leaving the court without any basis for enforcing the agreement.

These collateral attacks on the December 1988 order are not available, under the authorities cited above. Thus, we intimate no opinion on the merits of these arguments raised by Marjorie. It is within the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court to incorporate a separation agreement into a decree. The court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction even if, arguendo, that incorporation was accomplished through an error of law.

Marjorie also suggests that the incorporation feature of the December 1988 judgment was erroneous because, as phrased, it incorporated the agreement into the decree of absolute divorce entered June 21, 1985. As we indicated above, the decree of divorce did not resolve all of the claims in the action. The other claims were resolved later by the December 1988 judgment incorporating the separation agreement. The circuit court had jurisdiction, and indeed expressly reserved jurisdiction, to decide the other claims.

Assuming, arguendo, that there was an error in phrasing this 1988 decree, the error could have been raised on direct appeal from the judgment, but the assumed error is not a defect of jurisdictional magnitude. It is not available collaterally to attack the December 1988 judgment in this appeal from an adjudication of contempt for refusing to obey that order, as particularized. The foregoing analysis also answers a theme that runs through Marjorie’s arguments, namely, that William breached the agreement to sell her his interest in the Florida property ⁵⁴⁰ which she was and is willing and able to acquire. That contention was also resolved by the December 1988 judgment.

II Marjorie’s principal argument is that the order directing her to execute the power of attorney authorizing William to act on her behalf in the sale and conveyance of realty in another state is beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. She views the order as attempting directly to affect the title to land in Florida. Relying almost exclusively on Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 3 , 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909), Marjorie asserts that Florida is not constitutionally obliged to give full faith and credit either to the order directing her to sign the power of attorney or to the December 1988 judgment, because a Maryland court has no power to affect the title to real estate in Florida. William replies that the court has in personam jurisdiction to order Marjorie to sign a power of attorney in Maryland.

This done, it would not be the decree of the Maryland court that transfers the title to realty in Florida. That is to be accomplished by the deed to some presently unknown purchaser, signed by William for himself and on behalf of Marjorie, as her agent, appointed by her under coercion. From the standpoint of the historic power of equity, William is correct. Basically, this case involves the maxim that equity acts on the person.

The maxim was applied to a problem analogous to that in the present matter in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1750), a case of great significance to Marylanders. There had been a long-running