Elliott v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery County Community College

CATHELL, Judge. Appellant, James Elliott, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Cave, J., presiding), granting appellee’s, the Board of Trustees of Montgomery County Community College’s, Motion for Summary Judgment in this breach of employment contract case. Appellant presents the following questions on appeal: A. Did Montgomery College’s Policies and Procedures Manual create an enforceable employment contract between Montgomery College and its employee, James Elliott!?] B. Did Montgomery College clearly and conspicuously disclaim any intent to create an enforceable contract by virtue of the Montgomery College Policies and Procedures Manual!?] C. Did the trial Court err in finding, as a matter of law, that Montgomery College did not breach the contract created by its Employee Handbook!?] D. Was the Trial Court precluded by the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act from allowing a jury to determine whether Mr. Elliott was terminated for cause!?] Appellant was hired by Montgomery County Community College (the College) in 1979. He was promoted to a supervisory position in 1988.

In 1992, a female employee charged appellant with sexual harassment. As a result, appellant was disciplined, an action that included a demotion and a transfer to the College’s Germantown campus. A “last chance letter” was issued to appellant, which provided, in pertinent part: It is very important that you understand that these actions are taken in the context of giving you a last chance to remain employed at Montgomery College. Any violation of ...

College ... policy ... and procedures will lead to immediate disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal. In February of 1993, appellant was charged with violating College policy by leaving work early without permission. The ⁹⁸ College’s “Policies/Procedures Manual” (P & P Manual) provides that employees are “[t]o report to work on time and stay until the end of the work day....” It is undisputed that appellant left his shift up to one hour early on four separate occasions. Appellant claimed that his immediate supervisor, John Day, gave him permission to leave work whenever he had completed his duties, even if this occurred before the end of his shift.

Day claimed that he only gave appellant permission to do this during the “winter term” and the four occasions on which appellant was charged with leaving early took place after the “winter term” was over. Day’s supervisor filed a recommendation with the Director of Human Resources that appellant’s employment be terminated. The Director approved the recommendation and notified appellant that he was terminated, effective April 2, 1993. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 1993.

An appeal hearing was thereafter held before Provost O. Robert Brown on the issue of whether cause existed to discharge appellant. Dr. Brown recommended that the dismissal be upheld and that recommendation was upheld by the Chief Administrative Officer of the College. Appellant’s supervisor gave him a copy of the P & P Manual to read when he first started working at the College in 1979. Appellant was issued his own P & P Manual when he was promoted to his supervisory position in 1988.

That same year, the College issued a new P & P Manual. It is not clear when appellant’s promotion occurred in relation to the distribution of the new manual. A two-page memorandum accompanied the new manual that provided, in part: The new manual, while similar in content to the old one, has been restructured to make it easier to use and update as follows____ It then listed six numbered paragraphs concerning the use of the manual, a paragraph concerning computer access, and then notes that: ⁹⁹ The primary purpose of changing the format of the manual is to make it easier for you to use it as a reference document. Conspicuously absent from the memorandum is any acknowledgement that the manual modification also changed the inherent nature of the employment relationship.

No attempt was made to indicate that the new manual provided the following disclaimer in its introduction: “[The manual] does not contain all terms and conditions of employment nor constitute an express or implied employment contract.” After exhausting his remedies at the College, appellant filed this suit in the circuit court, alleging breach of an employment contract. Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, including with the motion an affidavit that provided that the handbook containing the disclaimer had been distributed to all employees eligible to receive it in 1988 and, thereafter, to each employee that had since become eligible to receive it. In support of his opposition to appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, appellant provided an affidavit in which he stated that he had never seen the disclaimer. At the hearing held on the motion, appellant argued that the disclaimer might not have been distributed to all the College’s employees that were entitled to receive the P & P Manual.

The hearing judge reserved ruling on the motion to allow appellant more time for discovery. After appellant failed to provide any evidence that the manual containing the disclaimer had not been distributed as appellee had claimed, the hearing judge granted appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A. & B. In Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md.App. 325, 338 , 517 A.2d 786 (1986), we stated: In Maryland, an employment contract of indefinite duration is considered employment “at will” which, with few exceptions, may be terminated without cause by either party at any time. Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981).

In two limited situations an ¹⁰⁰ “at will” employee may not be discharged without cause. First, the rule that employment contracts of indefinite duration can be legally terminated at any time is inapplicable where the employee is discharged for exercising constitutionally protected rights.... The second exception [was] adopted by this court in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985)____ [Citations omitted.] The exception to the employment at will doctrine that we adopted in Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 61 Md.App. 381 , 486 A.2d 798 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 295 , 493 A.2d 349 (1985), was that an employee handbook may, in some circumstances, become an unilateral contract. In Staggs , we stated: The question is whether the contracts in dispute here, which are otherwise of indefinite duration, have been so modified by the personnel policy statement as to remove them from the full strictures of the common law rule....

There has been a great deal of litigation in recent years, throughout the country, over the effect of personnel handbooks and other types of policy statements issued by employers on “at will” employment agreements. Although there has yet to develop any uniform rule and the decisions vary somewhat, depending on the type of provision sought to be enforced and the theory pled by the employee, most of the more recent decisions seem to reflect the view that such unilateral pronouncements by an employer may create legally enforceable expectations on the part of its employees. Perhaps the best exposition of this view is found in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579 , 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980). The Court there began by confirming the general rule that indefinite hirings are terminable at the will of either party.

It noted, however, that, “While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative ¹⁰¹ and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.” Id., 292 N.W.2d at 892 .... From this, the Court concluded that where the employer “had established a company policy to discharge for just cause only, pursuant to certain procedures, had made that policy known to Toussaint, and thereby had committed itself to discharge him only for just cause in compliance with the procedures,” a jury could find that “[although Toussaint’s employment was for an indefinite term ... the relationship was not terminable at the will of Blue Cross.” Id., 61 Md.App. at 388-90 , 486 A.2d 798 (some citations omitted). We adopted the Michigan court’s Toussaint decision as the law in Maryland, finding support for doing so in Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471 , 356 A.2d 221 (1976).

There, the Court of Appeals stated that an employer’s “policy directive with respect to severance pay constituted an offer of a unilateral contract of which the employees were aware and, by continuing to work for Brunswick, accepted.” Id. at 475 , 356 A.2d 221 . The Court added that “there is abundant support for the proposition that employer policy directives regarding aspects of the employment relation become contractual obligations when, with knowledge of their existence, employees start or continue to work for the employer.” Id. at 476 , 356 A.2d 221 . See also Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Center, Inc., 93 Md.App. 772, 793 , 614 A.2d 1021 (1992), cert. denied, 330 Md. 319 , 624 A.2d 490 (1993) (“Such personnel policies may give rise to contractual rights if ... properly expressed and communicated ... in a fashion that creates a reasonable basis for ... reliance on the provisions.”).

In Castiglione , we noted that a disclaimer in an employee handbook may provide an exception to the Staggs rule, stating: The handbook contained a statement that it “does not constitute an express or implied contract.” ... ¹⁰² ... We cautioned ... [in Staggs ] that “[n]ot every statement made in a personnel handbook or other publication will rise to the level of an enforceable covenant.” [61 Md.App.] at 392, 486 A.2d 798 .... The disclaimer language in the policy manual quoted in appellee’s pleadings does not indicate any intent to limit the discretion of the appellee to discharge only for cause, as was the case in Staggs . Moreover, other portions of the manual quoted in appellee’s memorandum actually served to reserve the rights of appellee “to direct and discipline our workforce ... and to take whatever action is necessary in our judgment to operate [the Defendant Hospital].” Finally, unlike the situation in Staggs , in this case the appellee expressly negated, in a clear and conspicuous manner, any contract based upon the handbook for a definite term and reserved the right to discharge its employees at any time.

The provisions for review, when viewed in the larger context, were but “general policy statements” not amounting to an offer of employment for a definite term or requiring cause for dismissal. 69 Md.App. at 338-40 , 517 A.2d 786 (some citations omitted). Not every disclaimer in an employer’s employee manual, however, will effectively disclaim- contractual liability. In Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc., 86 Md.App. 116, 128 , 585 A.2d 294 (1991), we noted that, in order for a disclaimer to be effective in preventing the formation of an employment contract, the disclaimer must be “clear and unequivocal____” In Haselrig , the employer relied on two provisions in the employee handbook in support of its contention that it had effectively disclaimed any contractual liability in excess of that under the employment at will doctrine. One provision, under the heading captioned “Employment Relationship,” provided: The relationship between you and PSI is predicated, on an at will basis.

That is to say that either the Employee or the Company may terminate their employment at their discretion. ¹⁰³ Id. at 120 , 585 A.2d 294 . The second provision was found in a section pertaining to a probationary period and provided: It should be understood that employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause and with or without notice at any time, at the option of either the Company or the Employee. Id. at 120-21 , 585 A.2d 294 . In deciding that these two provisions were not, as a matter of law, adequate to disclaim the employee handbook as an implied contract, we stated: If we determine that the language of the provisions is ambiguous—an ambiguity exists when the language in the provision is, to a reasonably prudent layman, susceptible of more than one meaning, Truck Insurance Exchange v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 433 , 418 A.2d 1187 (1980), or where the placement of the provisions in the handbook has that effect—and/or equivocal, then the issue of appellant’s justification in relying on the other provisions is for the fact finder.

Where the issue is, as it is here, the justiciability of an employee’s reliance on a handbook, we must consider both the placement of the provisions in the handbook and the language of the provisions. Id., 86 Md.App. at 128 , 585 A.2d 294 . The language of the disclaimer in the case sub judice is not ambiguous. Nor does the placement of the disclaimer cause one to question whether it applied to only a portion of the manual; its placement in the new P & P Manual’s introduction clearly indicates its application to the manual as a whole. 1 Nevertheless, appellant proffers two reasons why the disclaimer was not, as a matter of law, sufficient.

First, he claims that he never received the disclaimer. With respect to this contention, we note that it is not necessary that an employee actually read a disclaimer in order for it to be valid. ¹⁰⁴ We initially note that an employer is free to modify unilaterally the contractual relationship that it had previously established with its employees as a result of an employee manual. In Castiglione, 69 Md.App. at 335 n. 4, 517 A.2d 786 , we responded to Castiglione’s argument that the manual she was first issued did not claim a disclaimer by stating: Even if the review provisions of the manual in effect at appellant’s initial hiring constituted an implied contract, ... the later manual [which did have a disclaimer] would have superseded any earlier editions. By continuing to work for appellee after the new manual’s issuance, appellant, by her conduct, impliedly would have assented to a modification of her employment agreement. [2] The affidavit that appellee included in its Motion for Summary Judgment provided the undisputed fact that the disclaimer was distributed “College-wide in September 1988.” The hearing judge provided appellant the opportunity to conduct discovery and submit evidence that this was not true.

Appellant failed to submit any such evidence. While no Maryland appellate court has had the opportunity to address the issue of whether each individual employee must actually see the disclaimer, we note the concern the hearing judge expressed over creating such liability, namely, “It does not matter ... whether he remembers getting it, whether he received it because everyone, then, can come in and say, T don’t remember seeing it. I never got it.’ If it was generally ¹⁰⁵ circulated, then that is what becomes the agreement, and the disclaimer is valid.” We agree with Judge Cave on this point. While other jurisdictions appear to be split over this precise issue, we find the rule adopted by the Michigan courts to be persuasive.

In Grow v. General Products, Inc., 184 Mich.App. 379 , 457 N.W.2d 167, 170-71 (1990), appeal denied, 439 Mich. 871 , 478 N.W.2d 92 (1991), the court affirmed the granting of a summary disposition, stating that “an employer may unilaterally change its employment termination policy so long as reasonable notice is given. Reasonable notification is not necessarily actual notification.... ” In Transou v. Electronic Data System, 767 F.Supp. 1392, 1399 (E.D.Mich.1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1422 (1993), the court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, stating: “Though plaintiff claims that he does not recall receiving a copy of the handbook, its disclaimer is effective in light of the uniform and reasonable method of distributing the manual throughout the company.” Cf. Gaglidari v. Denny’s Restaurants, Inc., 117 Wash.2d 426 , 815 P.2d 1362, 1367 (1991) (reasonable notice would not include only