Elliott v. Elliott

Bartol, O. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The only question presented by this appeal is whether the Act of 1872, ch. 272, applies to the case. That Act provides that c‘in all cases where a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is decreed for adultery or abandonment, the Court may, in its discretion, decree that the guilty party shall not contract marriage with any other person during the life-time of the other party ; in which case the bonds of matrimony shall be deemed not to be dissolved, as to any future marriage of such guilty party, contracted in violation of such decree, or in any prosecution on account thereof.” The Act was passed on the 1st day of April, and went into operation on the 1st day of June, 1872. The decree was passed on the 21st day of June of the same year.

The bill was filed in February, 1872, the acts of adultery charged against the appellant, were proved to have begun in July, 1871, and to have continued till the time of taking the evidence, the 8th of March, 1872. The appellant does not complain of the divorce; but contends that the Circuit Court erred in decreeing that he “ shall not contract marriage with any other woman during the life-time of the appellee.” We are all of opinion that the discretion conferred by the Act of 1872, was properly exercised, and entirely justified by the proof in the record; provided the case was within the operation of the Act. On this question a majority of the Court agree in opinion with our brother Miller, who decided the case in the Circuit Court, and think the decree ought to be affirmed. The Act provides in terms, that the discretion may be exercised in all cases, where a divorce a vinculo is decreed for the causes mentioned.

The words of the law are full and comprehensive, embracing all cases, as well such as may have been instituted before the passage of the Act, as those which ³⁶² may thereafter be brought; there ■ is no exception of pending cases. It refers to the time of passing the decree, and being then in operation, it limits and defines the powers of the Court in passing the decree: and consequently applies to all cases, in which a decree may be passed after the Act comes in force. This we take to be the plain meaning of the words of the Act, and consider it clear that this case falls within its operation. It only remains to consider the objections urged by the appellant’s counsel to the law itself.

They have argued that the statute so construed, is invalid for the want of constitutional power in the Legislature to enact it. Since the decision in Baugher vs. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299 , it is settled in Maryland that an Act of Assembly is not invalid, merely because it is retrospective in its terms, or is made applicable to pre-existing or pending cases. Such laws are valid and operative, unless they are obnoxious to the objection, that they impair the obligation of a contract; or are ex post facto laws, within the meaning of the