Elliott v. Knott

Le Grand, O. L, delivered the opinion of this court. We regard the principal question involved in this case as having been settled by the decision pronounced in Miles vs. Knott’s Lessee, 12 G. & J., 443 . The only difference, so far as the rights of the parties are concerned, between that case and this, if any, consists in the fact, that there was no question of infancy in that case, whilst there is in the present one. We think this circumstance unimportant.

In that case the court fully adopt the doctrine of the case of Jackson vs. Robbins, 16 Johnson, 582 , which approves of the principle enforced by Lord Chancellor Redesdale, in the case of Bennett vs. Hamill, 2 Sch. & Lef., 566; and the same affirmation is given to it in Manahan & Gorman vs. Sammon, 3 Md. Rep., 471 . The substance of the opinion of Lord Redesdate, on this point, is thus given by Chancellor Kent: “A man died leaving a widow and an infant son, and his judgment creditors, in collusion, as was supposed, with the widow, filed a bill in chancery to have the infant’s estate sold, and the widow appeared for herself 'and as guardian for her infant son, and a decree was obtained. Under that decree certain freehold and leasehold premises were sold, which came by purchase, for a valuable consideration, to the defendant, who expended large sums in improvements. •When the infant came of age, he filed his bill to set aside the decree and sale under it, as irregular and erroneous, and one ground of the allegation was, that he had no day given him by the decree, after he came of age, to show cause against it. The chancellor admitted that there were irregularities in the proceedings, which he pointed out, and that the decree was erroneous, inasmuch as the infant ought to have had a day to show, cause against the